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J'ai fait dernierement (etant a un endroit ou quelques jours durant je n'avais rien a faire) un petit discours de Metaphysique, dont je serais bien aise d'avoir le sentiment de M. Arnauld. Leibniz annoncait en ces termes, en fevrier 1686, a l'un de ses nombreux correspondants, l'achevement tout recent de ces fameux trente sept articles. Ce discours offre, avec une remarquable densite, le premier grand expose d'ensemble des principes generaux d'une metaphysique qui jusque la se cherchait encore a travers de (...) nombreux travaux partiels; c'est cette synthese, qui sera bientot reprise par d'innombrables opuscules, qui inspirera encore les grandes oeuvres de maturite (Theodicee, Monadologie, Principes de la nature et de la grace). (shrink)

In God existence is the same as essence; or—the same thing ·put differently·—it is essential for God to exist. So God is a necessary being, ·a being who exists necessarily·.

Redigee a Paris en 1673, editee pour la premiere fois en 1915, la Confessio philosophi presente la premiere formulation de ce qui deviendra un theme majeur, l'un des plus mal compris aussi par les critiques, de l'oeuvre de maturite. Dans sa Theodicee, Leibniz en rappellera lui-meme le sujet central: Un dialogue latin de ma facon, ou je mettais deja en fait que Dieu ayant choisi le plus parfait de tous les mondes possibles, avait ete porte par sa sagesse a permettre (...) le mal qui y etait annexe, mais qui n'empechait pas que tout compte et rabattu ce monde ne fut le meilleur qui put etre choisi. L' optimisme leibnizien s'exprime ici au plus pres de sa source religieuse; la justification de la realite reconnait l'ombre comme la contre-partie ineluctable de toute illumination. (shrink)

In this unpublished Latin fragment (which dates from May 1702) G. W. Leibniz criticizes the Cartesian conception of body and force and develops his own notion of matter, extension and his theory of forces. He argues against Descartes and Cartesians that 1) the essence of corporal bodies cannot be reduced to extension alone but the latter arise from the primitive force itself, 2) consequently Cartesian quantity of motion falls short to account the motive force of a moving body since the (...) true nature of physical bodies which can only be understood through a careful analysis of dynamical forces. -/- Mayıs 1702’de kaleme aldığı ve ölümünden sonra yayımlanan bu Latince fragmanda G. W. Leibniz, Kartezyen felsefenin cisim ve kuvvet anlayışını eleştirir ve kendi madde, uzam ve kuvvetler teorisini geliştirir. Leibniz, Descartes ve Kartezyenlere karşı 1) cisimlerin özünün yalnızca uzama indirgenemeyeceğini, bunun ilksel kuvvetin kendisinden kaynaklandığını, 2) sonuç olarak da Kartezyen hareket miktarının hareket eden bir cismin kuvvetini açıklamakta yetersiz kaldığını, çünkü fiziksel cisimlerin gerçek doğasının ancak dinamik kuvvetlerin dikkatli bir analiziyle anlaşılabileceğini ileri sürer. (shrink)

Les etudes leibniziennes consacrees au droit positif, telles que le De Conditionibus de 1665, sont encore mal connues pour des raisons d'accessibilite et de complexite. En effet, ecrites en latin, impregnees de references prelevees dans le Corpus justinien (Digeste, Codex et Institules) ou dans le Droit Canonique (Decretales et Extravagantes) et souvent hermetiques dans leur abstraction apparente, elles ont ete delaissees au profit des reflexions jusnaturalistes dont la lecture ne semblait pas requerir les competences d'un juriste et encore moins celle (...) d'un romaniste. Mais on a ainsi occulte des travaux qui representent un apport essentiel pour toute philosophie pretendant depasser l'utilisation superficielle des principes du Droit Naturel dans la question du fondement des legislations positives. Et l'on s'est prive, sans le savoir, des moyens techniques de reconnaitre les diverses manifestations d'une raison commune dans le detail du systeme des obligations conditionnelles. Bien plus, on a totalement meconnu la vigueur et l'actualite d'une enquete portant sur les conditions de validite des dispositions juridiques affectes d'une modalite et soulevant en definitive ces questions esentielles que sont la constituion d'une theorie generale des conditions juridiques, la rationalisation du Droit et les limites de son traitement deductif. (shrink)

La doctrine du Droit est du nombre de celles qui ne dependent pas des experiences mais des definitions, ni des demonstrations a partir des sens mais a partir de la raison et qui, pour ainsi dire, sont de droit et non de fait. Puisque la Justice consiste en effet en quelque convenance et proportion, il est possible de comprendre qu'il y ait quelque chose de juste, meme s'il n'y a personne qui exerce la justice ni sur lequel elle soit exercee, (...) exactement comme des relations numeriques sont vraies, meme s'il n'y a personne qui compte ni rien qui soit compte, et nous pouvons predire au sujet d'une maison, d'une machine, ou d'une republique, sa beaute, son efficacite, son bonheur, dans l'hypothese ou elles doivent exister, meme si elles n'existent jamais. (shrink)

In the New Essays on Human Understanding, Leibniz argues chapter by chapter with John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, challenging his views about knowledge, personal identity, God, morality, mind and matter, nature versus nurture, logic and language, and a host of other topics. The work is a series of sharp, deep discussions by one great philosopher of the work of another. Leibniz's references to his contemporaries and his discussions of the ideas and institutions of the age make this a fascinating (...) and valuable document in the history of ideas. The work was originally written in French, and the version by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett, based on the only reliable French edition (published in 1962), first appeared in 1981 and has become the standard English translation. It has been thoroughly revised for this series and provided with a new and longer introduction, a chronology on Leibniz's life and career and a guide to further reading. (shrink)

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION T JLJe1bn1z was above all things a metaphysician. That does not mean that his head was in the clouds, or that the particular sciences ...

The monadology.--On the notions of right and justice.--New system of the nature of substances and of the communication between them.--Explanation of the new system--Third explanation of the new system.--On the ultimate origination of things.--New essays on the human understanding.--Introduction.--Principles of nature and of grace.

_Discourse on Metaphysics and Other Essays_ contains complete translations of the two essays that constitute the best introductions to Leibniz’s complex thought: _Discourse on Metaphysics_ of 1686 and _Monadology_ of 1714. These are supplemented with two essays of special interest to the student of modern philosophy, _On the Ultimate Origination of Things_ of 1697 and the Preface to his New Essays of 1703-1705. The translations are taken from Leibniz, _Philosophical Essays_, edited and translated by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Hackett, (...) 1989). (shrink)

Die Generales Inquisitiones von 1686 stellen die wichtigste geschlossene Arbeit Leibniz' zu Fragen der Logik dar. Wie in dem ebenfalls 1686 verfaßten Discours de Métaphysique (PhB 260) wird hier Leibniz' Auffassung deutlich, in seinem Denken eine gewisse systematische Geschlossenheit gefunden zu haben.

Composti tra il 1703 e il 1704, e pubblicati postumi da R.E. Raspe nel 1765, i Nuovi saggi sullíintelletto umano costituiscono un trattato di filosofia della conoscenza, ma scandito secondo la prospettiva metafisica elaborata dall’«autore del sistema dell’armonia prestabilita», come suona il sottotitolo del volume. Sono redatti in forma di dialogo tra Filalete, seguace di Locke, e Teofilo, portavoce di Leibniz, e i loro capitoli seguono pari passo, a mo’ di commentario analitico, quelli del Saggio sullíintelletto umano di Locke. Gli (...) estremi della disputa tra i due filosofi, imperniata per lo più sul tema della teoria della conoscenza in generale, sono riassumibili, da un lato, nell’assioma empirista lockiano, di tradizione aristotelico-tomista, secondo cui nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu (niente è nell’intelletto che non sia già stato nella sensibilità), e, dall’altro lato, nella risposta corrosiva e tagliente di Leibniz: excipe: nisi ipse intellectus (a eccezione dell’intelletto stesso). Ma, oltre al confronto con la posizione teorica di Locke, Leibniz fornisce al lettore i fondamenti e i principi del proprio sistema speculativo, tra i quali spiccano: il concetto di monade quale sostanza individuale, inestesa, dotata di attività; la teoria delle piccole percezioni, intese come processi e stati mentali inconsci (teoria che apre la strada alla scoperta dell’inconscio); la lex continui, ovvero la legge della connessione totale del mondo, che non tollera né salti né vuoti; il principium individuationis, basato sul principio metafisico di identità degli indiscernibili; il principio ontologico dell’infinita molteplicità e diversità del reale; la massima secondo cui «il fondo delle cose è ovunque identico». I Nuovi saggi sullíintelletto umano furono pubblicati postumi da R.E. Raspe nel 1765 in G.W. Leibniz, Oeuvres philosophiques latines et franÁoises, Amsterdam-Leipzig. La traduzione è stata condotta sull’edizione critica curata da A. Robinet e H Schepers: G.W. Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais, Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1962, con recezione dei corrigenda acclusi nella ristampa del 1990. (shrink)

O szacowaniu rzeczy niepewnych (przekład Grzegorz Słowiński).

1.-2. Bd. Hauptschriften zur Grundlegung der Philosophie; übers. von A. Buchenau, durchgesehen und mit Einleitungen und Erläuterungen hrsg. von E. Cassirer. 1904-1906.--3. Bd. Neue Abhandlungen über den menschlichen Verstand; ins Deutsche übers., mit Einleitung, Lebensbeschreibung des Verfassers und erläuternden Anmerkungen versehen von C. Schaarschmidt. 2. Aufl. 1904. Erläuterungen zu den Neuen Abhandlungen ... hrsg. von C. Schaarschmidt. 1874.--4. Bd. Die Theodicee; uebers. von J. H. v. Kirchmann. 1879.

1. Reihe. Allgemeiner politischer und historischer Briefwechsel. v. <1-11, 13 >--2. Reihe. Philosophischer Briefwechsel. v. <1, 3 >--3. Reihe. Mathematischer naturwissenschaftlicher und technischer Briefwechsel --4. Reihe. Politische Schriften. v. <1-3 > --6. Reihe. Philosophische Schriften. v. <1-3, 6 >.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This volume contains more than 60 original translations of papers written by the German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716). As well as contributing to Leibniz scholarship, it is intended to function as an introductory text for students.

Copyright © 2010–2015 All rights reserved. Jonathan Bennett [Brackets] enclose editorial explanations. Small ·dots· enclose material that has been added, but can be read as though it were part of the original text. Occasional •bullets, and also indenting of passages that are not quotations, are meant as aids to grasping the structure of a sentence or a thought. Every four-point ellipsis . . . . indicates the omission of a brief passage that seems to present more difficulty than it is (...) worth. (shrink)

The selections contained in these volumes from the papers and letters of Leibniz are intended to serve the student in two ways: first, by providing a more adequate and balanced conception of the full range and penetration of Leibniz's creative intellectual powers; second, by inviting a fresher approach to his intellectual growth and a clearer perception of the internal strains in his thinking, through a chronological arrangement. Much confusion has arisen in the past through a neglect of the develop ment (...) of Leibniz's ideas, and Couturat's impressive plea, in his edition of the Opuscu/es et fragments (p. xii), for such an arrangement is valid even for incomplete editions. The beginning student will do well, however, to read the maturer writings of Parts II, III, and IV first, leaving Part I, from a period too largely neglected by Leibniz criticism, for a later study of the still obscure sources and motives of his thought. The Introduction aims primarily to provide cultural orientation and an exposition of the structure and the underlying assumptions of the philosophical system rather than a critical evaluation. I hope that together with the notes and the Index, it will provide those aids to the understanding which the originality of Leibniz's scientific, ethical, and metaphysical efforts deserve. (shrink)