The sentence cited in the title - in what follows, I refer to it as (S) - occurs in a story Russell tells us in On Denoting. It represents the class of sentences containing a comparative predicate applied twice to a single object in the scope of an epistemic verb. The problem with sentences of this type is that the received tools of logical analysis do not allow both to accurately reflect their surface structure and to take into account some (...) intuitions about our use of them in standard cases. For instance, as Kripke has shown, Russell's own analysis conflicts with our intuition since it renders (S) as an ascription of a de re belief about the size of the yacht. I argue that an analogous flaw have alternative analyses involving the notion of size, viz. ones offered by Kaplan and Salmon. In 2013, I proposed an objectual analysis of (S) which makes no use of the notion of size. That analysis has certain counter-intuitive implications, too. Recently, Gorbatov proposed a version of the objectual analysis based on interpretation of the adjective larger in (S) as a cross-world predicate in terms of Wehmeier's cross-world subjunctive modal logic (CSML). I argue that Gorbatov's analysis is counterintuitive, too, for it ascribes to the utterer a quite uncommon belief involving a particular possible world. Nevertheless, I find the idea behind his proposal - the interpretation of larger in (S) as a cross-world predicate - fruitful, and offer an alternative version of analysis of (S) in terms of CSML. The analysis I propose renders (S) as an ascription of an objectual attitude rather than a propositional one. I sketch the semantics of objectual attitude ascription involving a cross-world comparative predicate and argue that the analysis I propose is free from disadvantages of the analyses mentioned above. (shrink)

The paper suggests a straight solution to the problem of meaning skepticism presented in Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. The solution is based on Ladov’s moderate solution to the problem. Ladov’s solution is to the effect that the total skepticism cannot be a theory because it cannot be stated without performative contradiction. This entails that only a limited skepticism is possible as a theory. I argue that the limited skepticism is compatible with the view that meaning can be (...) known provided the knowledge of meaning is construed as an internal part of a speech act, not as a result of interpretation of behavioral facts. (shrink)

The article is a detailed review of the books by Maria daVenza Tillmanns “Why We Are in Need of Tales” (Toronto, Iguana Books, 2020—2021). The books appeared as a result of the author’s many years’ experience in conducting philosophy classes with children (elementary school level). The books are written in the form of a dialogue, which creates the effect of the reader’s presence in the fairy tales plots, stimulating reflection on their philosophical content. The author of the article examines the (...) plots from the standpoint of some key ideas of the world philosophical thought. (shrink)

The article breaks down the essence of the information approach in interpreting consciousness in the context of the relationship between the intellect and the psychophysiology of the body, on the one hand, and the relationship between “natural” and “artificial” intelligence, on the other. The article presents a critical analysis of theories and approaches on the D. Dubrovsky’s conceptual basis. The information approach is considered by the authors of the article as the most methodologically justified and productive in studying the problem (...) of consciousness, since it is thanks to the information received that various material systems change the nature of their behavior, which under certain conditions can be considered a conscious act. Material systems capable of preserving and transmitting information interaction arise both in the course of natural evolution in living nature and are artificially created by man. Thus, in terms of the genetic prerequisites of consciousness, information and information interaction can be considered as an attributive property of being. (shrink)

The philosophical definition of violence today is “incomplete” and leaves a “gap” between the phenomenon and the concept. This is due to the fact that the concept of “violence” was/is strangely included in the general philosophical categorial line. In domestic and Western discourse, the problem field of violence contains, above all, political and ethical meanings. The problem is intuitively resolved in its appeal to the concept of “power”, which turns out to be philosophically lost in modern philosophy. Only exceptionally do (...) we find “traces” of this concept in philosophical works. Among them are the works of Aristotle, which need to be freed from modern, distorting interpretations. Thus, in the translations of Aristotle, the Greek δύναμις, used for the traditional transferring the category of possibility, lost its meaning of force ; in its turn, “force” lost relation to “violence” and “necessity”. Violence is understood as a kind of necessity, which is associated with the suppression of one’s “own decision”, freedom, something that “prevents desire” and contrary to “common thinking,” as well as the absence of “good”. Violence is presented not only in an ontological sense, but also existentially, as the opposite of “good” and of one’s own “desire”. Force remains in the shadow of “necessity” as “possibility”, “potential energy” and “movement”, and violence loses the opposition that has arisen in an ontological mode. (shrink)

In ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’ (1956), Quine demonstrated that the naïve model-theoretic formalization of belief ascriptions de re, applied to cases of recognition failure, produces two unwelcome effects: 1) the seeming inconsistency of belief systems ascribed to rational agents, and 2) the contradictoriness of some (apparently well justified) belief reports. In the paper under discussion, Domanov claims that proof-theoretical formalization of belief ascriptions, based on the constructive type theory, precludes those effects. I challenge this claim by showing that the formalism (...) used by him reproduces at least the first of them. I suggest that this is so because of the identifying of variables from different contexts in Domanov’s definition of context extension functions. (shrink)

The article is an overview of the events of the International Online Conference on Philosophical Practice, which took place on July 28-31 on the electronic platform of the South Ural State University, organized by the University Department of Philosophy and the Association of Practical Philosophers “Ratio” with the support of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (project No. 20- 011-22002).

The philosophical definition of violence today is?incomplete? and leaves a?gap? between the phenomenon and the concept. This is due to the fact that the concept of?violence? was/is strangely included in the general philosophical categorial line. In domestic and Western discourse, the problem field of violence contains, above all, political and ethical meanings. The problem is intuitively resolved in its appeal to the concept of?power?, which turns out to be philosophically lost in modern philosophy. Only exceptionally do we find?traces? of this (...) concept in philosophical works. Among them are the works of Aristotle, which need to be freed from modern, distorting interpretations. Thus, in the translations of Aristotle, the Greek???????, used for the traditional transferring the category of possibility, lost its meaning of force ; in its turn,?force? lost relation to?violence? and?necessity?. Violence is understood as a kind of necessity, which is associated with the suppression of one?s?own decision?, freedom, something that?prevents desire? and contrary to?common thinking,? as well as the absence of?good?. Violence is presented not only in an ontological sense, but also existentially, as the opposite of?good? and of one?s own?desire?. Force remains in the shadow of?necessity? as?possibility?,?potential energy? and?movement?, and violence loses the opposition that has arisen in an ontological mode. nema. (shrink)

The book under review shows, from various perspectives, that the force of wonder and the silence that follows from it can nurture our ability to be receptive to and present in human relations and in resonance with the meaning-giving life phenomena that surround us. Wonder, Silence, and Human Flourishing: Toward a Re-humanization of Health, Education, and Welfare approaches humanization and the process of re-enchantment in a radical new way. For more than a decade the call for re-humanization in education, care (...) and welfare has been heard and discussed primarily in critical thinking, political theory, and sociological discourses. This critique is mainly based on a social constructivist and naturalistic worldview that keeps the discussion in an anthropocentric perspective. By focusing on the phenomenology and ethics of wonder as an ontological and even spiritual event, and by listening to the silence that follows this contemplative wonder, the contributors offer an existential, phenomenological, and hermeneutic way of understanding humanization. (shrink)

The article is a philosophical reflection of the author, caused by M.N. Epstein’s book “Children’s Questions: Dialogues” (Moscow, 2020). The book presents more than 300 children’s questions, covering the most diverse facets of being: from the universe as a whole to psychological, moral, social, aesthetic problems. The idea of the book is to engage children and adults in a general conversation about the most important phenomena of the universe. The author of the article weaves the material of the book into (...) the outline of existential comprehension of truth. (shrink)

The article is a philosophical essay based on Maria Tillmanns’ book Why We Are in Need of Tails (Iguana Books, 2019). In an allegorical form the essay presents many current philosophical issues such as understanding, companionship, communication, attitude towards the Other, and the continuity of cultural tradition.

The article is a review of the third part of a series of books by the philosopher Maria daVenza Tillmanns, united by the common title “Why we are in need of tales”. The book deals with the problems of existential self-determination and moral choice in the dialogue of fairy tale characters. At the request of the author of the book, the review is published in English and is accompanied by a translation into Russian with minor additions.

Readers are awaiting a new encounter with stories united under the common title Why We Are in Need of Tales. Let me remind you that these deep philosophical books were written by Maria daVenza Tillmanns, a professional philosopher dedicated to the study of philosophizing with children, who has gained valuable experience in this field. Maria’s books are inspired by her work with her students at El Toyon Elementary School in National City (California), with whom Maria held philosophy with children classes (...) for three years before COVID-19. With parental permission, the children provided their drawings, which are used as illustrations for the books. I read Why We Are in Need of Tales, Part III with great pleasure. The focus of this book is on making decisions, sometimes very hard decisions. In Part II, the focus is on dreams — hopes and wishes we have for life. This book looks at how we may best decide how to make those hopes and wishes come true. And the answer Huk and Tuk suggest is deceptively easy: by making decisions “with your eyes wide open.” (5, p. ix). The author of this excellent book managed to describe how to make decisions with your eyes wide open through the playful dialogue between Huk and Tuk. The books are written in dialogue so the reader immediately plunges into the context of a lively conversation. Dialogue not only sharpens attention, but also invites the reader to participate in the conversation. In this way, the reader becomes a listener at the same time. (shrink)

A straight solution to S. Kripke’s skeptical problem, proposed by E.V. Borisov, is considered. The main assumption of the argumentation of a straight solution is the thesis about the possibility of knowing meanings. The article shows the need to further define the terms used in the argumentation, in particular the concept of introspection.

In his article Evgeny Borisov offers an original solution to Kripke’s sceptical problem of meaning. Its conceptual core is the point of view of the participant of speech acts. He believes that first-person statements of speech act participants like “I know for certain that the expression ‘e’ is used by me in the meaning of m” cannot carry any epistemic fallacies. As a criticism, I propose to point out that non-factual Cartesian semantics have serious epistemic flaws that make it (...) vulnerable to sceptical attacks and accusations of petitio principii. (shrink)

The article deals with some problems of formalization of Russell's example with a yacht and Eugeniy Borisov's proposal concerning the usage of “object" affitudes. This idea seems wrong to me in terms of its contents, besides its formal realization fails. I believe that formalization of the example with a yacht must, firstly, take into account the pragmatics of the phrase's usage and, secondly, point at the mental representations of the objects. To do this, one can use propositions reflecting a (...) technical aspect of semantic relations. (shrink)

The article discusses the issue of the relationship between ontology and theory of knowledge in the works of Samara philosophers of the late Soviet period. The purpose of the study is to identify the local specifics of Samara philosophical thought by revealing the system-forming significance of the problem of the conditional unity of being and thinking at the level of a distinctive separation between ontological premises and epistemological prospects of methodological reflection in scientific knowledge. The objectives of the article are (...) (1) to establish the characteristic features of the views of Samara philosophers on the general methodological significance of the problem of the relationship between ontology and the theory of knowledge, (2) to demonstrate the methodological relevance of their theoretical principles in the context of the philosophy of science, (3) to substantiate the applicability of the latter for the activity approach to the social interpretation of theoretical results. In the course of the study, the author uses the method of distinctions, formed in onto-epistemology by M.A. Lifshitz, methods of functional analysis, diachronic reconstruction and rationing of the worldview legitimation of a particular subject theoretical entity. Thus, the article reveals the local specificity of the Samara philosophy of the era of developed socialism. The author analyzes the program for optimizing scientific knowledge based on the Borisov–Dukhanin methodology, tied to the materialistic solution of the “main question of philosophy” (i.e., the issue of the relationship of the being and consciousness). The article pays attention to the theory of the style of scientific thinking, proposed by V.T. Salosin, to the methodological foundations and reception of the socio-philosophical theory of M.S. Kvetnoy. The author examines the productivity of the Samara precedent of the interaction of worldview and methodological aspects in philosophy. The article concludes that the specificity of the Samara philosophers’ solution of the problem of the unity of being and thinking on the basis of the Marxist understanding of the the main question of philosophy lies in the fact that it is considered as a methodological problem of achieving logical consistency to express the balance between ontological premises and epistemological perspectives. (shrink)

The paper discusses a solution to Kripke’s skeptical problem proposed by E.V. Borisov. It shows that this solution is based on the idea of “introspection2”, i.e. intuitive knowledge of meaning, which: a) is an essential part of a speech act, b) is given in our immediate experience and c) doesn’t form a source of empirical facts. The author of the paper admits the significance of the proposed idea for the discussion of the skeptical problem. Nevertheless, he argues that: 1) (...) as a point of the discussion the idea of introspection2 needs to be established more extensively; 2) this idea reinforces not a straight solution of the problem, but skeptical. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Personhood: A Start Are Dolphins Persons? Language and the Hand Personhood Redefined Conclusion: What Kind of Beings Are Dolphins?

This chapter contains section titled: Human Adaptations to the Water: An Exercise in Imagination Life in the ocean: the importance of other people Dolphin Intelligence in the Wild Dolphin Communication Social Intelligence and Group Cohesion Dolphins and Sex The Cognitive and Affective Skills Involved in Group Living Conclusion: Dolphin Intelligence.

This chapter contains section titled: “Human” Versus “Person” Human, Person and Ethics Philosophical Ethics Ethics and Nonhumans “Alien Intelligence” Two Questions.

This chapter contains section titled: “Interspecies ethics” The Dolphin/Tuna Controversy Dolphins in Captivity So What Do We Do? The Ethics of Human/Dolphin Contact: Two Final Thoughts.

Russian transition of Why We Are in Need of Tales, Part III by Dr. Sergey Borisov -/- философии Readers are awaiting a new encounter with stories united under the common title Why We Are in Need of Tales. Let me remind you that these deep philosophical books were written by Maria daVenza Tillmanns, a professional philosopher dedicated to the study of philosophizing with children, who has gained valuable experience in this field. Maria’s books are inspired by her work with (...) her students at El Toyon Elementary School in National City (California), with whom Maria held philosophy with children classes for three years before COVID-19. With parental permission, the children provided their drawings, which are used as illustrations for the books. I read Why We Are in Need of Tales, Part III with great pleasure. The focus of this book is on making decisions, sometimes very hard decisions. In Part II, the focus is on dreams — hopes and wishes we have for life. This book looks at how we may best decide how to make those hopes and wishes come true. And the answer Huk and Tuk suggest is deceptively easy: by making decisions “with your eyes wide open.” (5, p. ix). The author of this excellent book managed to describe how to make decisions with your eyes wide open through the playful dialogue between Huk and Tuk. The books are written in dialogue so the reader immediately plunges into the context of a lively conversation. Dialogue not only sharpens attention, but also invites the reader to participate in the conversation. In this way, the reader becomes a listener at the same time. (shrink)

Collected sayings of Muslim Caliphs and saints.

Collected works of Dngul-chu Dbyangs-can-grub-paʼi-rdo-rje, 1809-1887 on Tibetan Buddhist doctrines, philosophy, and rituals of Dge-lugs-pa.