This book traces the intellectual revolution initiated by Thales in the sixth century BC to its culmination in the metaphysics of Parmenides.

It may seem strange, in view of the spate of recent literature on the subject, that yet another article should be forthcoming on what is certainly the most familiar, as well as the most vexed, of all Platonic passages. But it is precisely this spate of literature that has impelled me to write. The time seems to have come for an article which, rather than seeking desperately for something new, sets out instead to reaffirm those facts and conclusions that even (...) the most resolutely original of scholars could hardly venture to dispute. This article will therefore be based, not on any of the numerous modern interpretations, but on what Plato himself actually wrote. It will contain a number of tentative suggestions which, to the best of my knowledge, have not been made before. They can, and probably will, be rejected. But its primary purpose remains to restate, whenever possible in Plato's own words, a number of important facts that are at once so simple and so obvious that they seem repeatedly, and especially in recent years, to have been quite forgotten. (shrink)

A history of the pre-Socratic philosophers, with selected writings and texts.

This book is an anthology of Plato's writings, connected with sections of commentary.

In a well-known quotation from Speusippus in the Theologumena Arithmeticae , said to have been derived from Pythagorean sources, especially Philolaus, occur the following sentences: And again a little later: Similarly Sextus Empiricus , drawing evidently on a relatively early Pythagorean source, writes as follows: And Aristotle himself writes of the Pythagoreans : There were, in fact, certain Pythagoreans who equated the number 2 with the line because they regarded the line as ‘length without breadth extended between two points’; and (...) likewise the number 3 was equated with the plane and 4 with the solid. (shrink)

No pre-Socratic philosopher, perhaps, has caused more disagreement, or been more variously interpreted, than Anaxagoras of Clazomenae. Among recent attempts to reconstruct his system some of the more notable are those of Tannery, Bailey, Cornford, Peck, and Vlastos. Each of these reconstructions, and especially that of Tannery, has its adherents; and since none of them has much in common with any other, a universally acceptable solution to the fundamental problems involved may well by now seem unattainable. It is my belief, (...) however, and it is the object of this paper to try to prove, that all these modern reconstructions have at least one quality in common, namely an undue complication. The actual system of Anaxagoras was, I believe, considerably simpler than any reconstruction yet forthcoming. Unfortunately what I take to be the basis of the whole system, Anaxagoras' reaction to his Eleatic predecessors, is by.no means easy to convey in brief and simple terms. But if I should succeed in conveying it, then it will, I hope, be seen in itself to possess such a simplicity and neatness that my contention will carry with it a fair warrant of its own truth. I shall, for convenience, divide my argument into ten sections, to which I shall append a brief summary of my conclusions. (shrink)

No pre-Socratic philosopher, perhaps, has caused more disagreement, or been more variously interpreted, than Anaxagoras of Clazomenae. Among recent attempts to reconstruct his system some of the more notable are those of Tannery, Bailey, Cornford, Peck, and Vlastos. Each of these reconstructions, and especially that of Tannery, has its adherents; and since none of them has much in common with any other, a universally acceptable solution to the fundamental problems involved may well by now seem unattainable. It is my belief, (...) however, and it is the object of this paper to try to prove, that all these modern reconstructions have at least one quality in common, namely an undue complication. The actual system of Anaxagoras was, I believe, considerably simpler than any reconstruction yet forthcoming. Unfortunately what I take to be the basis of the whole system, Anaxagoras' reaction to his Eleatic predecessors, is by.no means easy to convey in brief and simple terms. But if I should succeed in conveying it, then it will, I hope, be seen in itself to possess such a simplicity and neatness that my contention will carry with it a fair warrant of its own truth. I shall, for convenience, divide my argument into ten sections, to which I shall append a brief summary of my conclusions. (shrink)

In a well-known quotation from Speusippus in the Theologumena Arithmeticae, said to have been derived from Pythagorean sources, especially Philolaus, occur the following sentences: And again a little later: Similarly Sextus Empiricus, drawing evidently on a relatively early Pythagorean source, writes as follows: And Aristotle himself writes of the Pythagoreans : There were, in fact, certain Pythagoreans who equated the number 2 with the line because they regarded the line as ‘length without breadth extended between two points’; and likewise the (...) number 3 was equated with the plane and 4 with the solid. (shrink)

In this paper I first list a number of areas in which recent research seems to reinforce the need to follow through on activities identified in Simonetta Magari’s article. A careful review of research in these areas would lead us into deeply mysterious psychological processes and underline the need to change the most fundamental assumptions on which modern psychology is built. Unfortunately, I am in no position to undertake this review. Accordingly, I have settled for the lesser objective of discussing (...) the problems posed by the phenomenon of emergence; the dominant role that networks of external social forces play in determining behaviour, and the emergence of a network of negative social forces which seems to have the future of mankind and the planet in its grip. I start by showing that one of the most important uses of the slippery word “intelligence” is to refer to an emergent property of a group. Groups can, to a greater or lesser extent, harness the diverse talents available to them to create cultures of intelligence or enterprise on the one hand and despondency and conflict on the other. Whereas we, as a species, currently have the highest levels of individual intelligence ever, it seems that we have the lowest levels of collective intelligence ever. But group and individual characteristics are not the only things transformed by networks of social forces. Time after time we see that well intentioned social action is transformed into its opposite by networks of social forces. A systemogram of the social forces which transform the “educational” system into its opposite is then used as a basis for a discussion of the role of social forces more generally. Two issues then stare one in the face. One is that our governance systems are ill equipped to promoting the kind of experimentation and societal learning that is needed…especially to enable us to survive as a species. The other is the dominance of the “sociological” forces pressing unrelentingly toward the societal hierarchy and division that is leading us so forcefully toward our self-destruction. Unexpectedly, therefore, it emerges that two key tasks for psychologists, qua psychologists, are to contribute to the design of a societal management system which will act more effectively in the long term public interest – that is to say, in the interests of maintaining life itself – and to map the network of social forces which are driving us so relentlessly toward our own extinction. (shrink)

By way of introduction I have to say that I know little about the Focolari movement or the Economy of Communion group. This paper is offered on the assumption that the movement is dedicated to the radical transformation of society and not just tinkering at the edges in order to keep the economy as we know it going.

This article argues that harnessing social processes for the common good depends on creating a learning society which will innovate, learn, and evolve in the long-term public interest. In essence, this involves establishing more embedded, interconnected, and interacting, “organic” feedback loops which do not depend on long and distorting chains of “accountability” to distant “representative” assemblies of “decision takers”. Several important steps toward doing this are discussed. However, all depend on undertaking a great deal of adventurous, problem-driven research. By far (...) the most important of these research programmes would be to develop a better understanding of the currently invisible network of social forces that have the future of our species and the planet in their grip … and then to find ways of intervening in that network. It is suggested that this is analogous to Newton first conceptualising physical forces and then showing how to measure, map, and harness them. Answering the question of how work like Newton’s could be funded and conducted in modern society – and especially under current research-funding arrangements – thus emerges as crucial to finding a way forward. (shrink)