This paper aims to investigate the differences between the concepts of libel and slander as understood by the Polish statutory and English common law. As it turns out, the above terms are not only divergent with regard to language but also with regard to corresponding acts in the real world. Western cultures cherish such values as dignity, honour and self-fulfillment as the underlying rights of a citizen in democratic countries. The above terms are being constantly referred to in (...) international treaties and conventions but the question which should be asked is whether they receive due attention in legal practice. As regards interpretation, not only in theory, but also in practice the important issue is not how the defamatory statement makes the person referred to feel, but the impression it is likely to make on those reading it. The subsequent analysis of particular cases in the practical part supports the above claim. Although it is reiterated by the Polish legal academics that civil regulations are not sufficient to guarantee legal protection of dignity, there is an equal or even greater amount of supporters of the broadly conceived “freedom of speech”. The discussion might be summarized as involving the proponents of liberal and democratic policies on the one hand, and those who wish to avoid complete decriminalization of libel and slander and deem them necessary components of balance in a democratic state. (shrink)

H.L.A. Hart objects to John Rawls’s liberty principle by drawing attention to how our legal system accepts the restriction of liberty to protect against other harms than liberty-deprivation, such as by laws against slander, libel, and publications which grossly infringe privacy. What is the solution for John Rawls, faced with this criticism? One solution is, by the reflective equilibrium method, to justify abandoning the judgment that these actions are immoral.

On countering slander, religious hate speech, and blasphemy from Islamic perspectives to build religious harmony in Indonesia.

We are accustomed to the claim that appropriate backing must be available if criticism is to be justifiable. For example, if someone criticises a film he must be prepared to cite the criteria he is using and to show how they are or are not satisfied by the film. Such processes of evaluation have frequently been investigated: what has been less thoroughly sexplored is the right to criticise itself. Certainly, questions of the appropriate backing for critical utterances have bearing on (...) the right to criticise , for one way of denying that a person has that right is to deny that he can provide the appropriate backing for his criticism. But the question of his right is a wider one, since the attempt to criticise may be blocked before the question of backing can arise at all. It is therefore worthwhile to explore the right to criticise with a view to discovering in what circum-stances it is defeasible. I shall be concerned mainly with the moral right to criticise as investigation of the legal right would raise issues for specialists in the laws of libel and slander. (shrink)

Ḥeleḳ 1. Hilkhot kibud av ṿa-em u-khevod rabo -- ḥeleḳ 2. Hilkhot lashon ha-raʻ u-rekhilut ʻal ha-Ḥ. ḥ. ṿe-ʻinyene emet ṿe-sheḳer.

Ḥeleḳ 1. Hilkhot kibud av ṿa-em u-khevod rabo -- ḥeleḳ 2. Hilkhot lashon ha-raʻ u-rekhilut ʻal ha-Ḥ. ḥ. ṿe-ʻinyene emet ṿe-sheḳer.

Discussion of the closing lines of Pindar¿s seventh Nemean has concentrated almost exclusively on the lines¿ relevance to the larger question that hangs over the poem: does the ode serve as an apologia for the poet¿s uncomplimentary treatment of Neoptolemus in an earlier Paean, and is Pindar here most plainly gainsaying the vilification in which he supposedly previously engaged. The reading that I offer suggests that a very different concern frames the conclusion to the work. Rather than seeking to exculpate (...) himself, the poet announces instead that in the song that the audience has just heard, the composer has adhered to two prime virtues that the encomiastic genre should embrace: variatio and an ability to counter the language of blame. By reorienting the debate in this way, I aim to elucidate the striking metaphors and other rhetorical devices that fill the final lines, and most particularly to make sense of the canine imagery that seems so recurrent a motif. As my reading seeks to show, the dog is chosen as master trope both for his relation to the practice of invective and for his relevance to that stale act of repetition that the poet here rejects. By giving his audience a sample of the mode of speech that the calumnist practises, and that the praise poet may appropriate when combating the opposite genre, Pindar makes the merits of his own poetry shine the brighter, and invites the cognoscenti to appreciate his sophia. More broadly, the encomiastic singer¿s brief deployment of the weapons of the abuse poet allows us to understand something of the overlapping and symbiotic relations between the different genres in archaic Greek poetry. (shrink)

Libel played an important and extraordinary role in early modern conflict culture. The article discusses their functions and the way they were assessed in court. The case study illustrates argumentative spaces and different levels of normative references in libel trials in 16th century electoral Saxony. In 1569, Andreas Langener – in consequence of a long stagnating private conflict – posted several libels against the nobleman Tham Pflugk in different public places in the city of Dresden. Consequently, he was (...) arrested and charged with ‘libelling’. Depending on the reference to conflicting social and legal norms, he had therefore been either threatened with corporal punishment including his execution, or rewarded with laudations. In this case, the act of libelling could be seen as slander, but also as a service to the community, which Langener had informed about potentially harmful transgression of norms. While the common good was the highest maxim, different and sometimes conflicting legally protected interests had to be discussed. The situational decision depended on whether the articulated charges where true and relevant for the public, on the invective language, and especially on the quality and size of the public sphere reached by the libel. (shrink)

?Negative? and ?positive? liberty are not distinct types of freedom. They represent distinct points of stress within the one logical matrix. The abstract logical formula for liberty is taken to be ?A is free from x to do y?, where ?from x? is taken to implicate ?to do y?, and vice versa. By contrast, concrete cases of freedom ('rights'), such as ?from hunger? or ?to speak?, are taken always to contradict other concrete cases, such as property rights or defences against (...) libel, slander, or ?hate speech? more generally. As all rights are expressions of liberty, however mutually contradictory, we cannot appeal to liberty per se as a principle enabling us to mediate between them. Liberty pre?eminent, or indeed alone, seems too brittle to contain the alienation or anomie of modernity. It may now be necessary, philosophically, to decoct the glue of empathy, of friendship and, by extension, equality. (shrink)

Animal liberationists call speciesism their enemy, but speciesism, perspicuously specified, says only that being human is sufficient for having our moral status. No one thinks it necessary. Throughout history, people have imagined alter-specifics, like the crowd at a Star Wars cantina, whom they’d recognize as their moral equals. Speciesism says nothing about our treatment of nonhumans. Speciesism’s historic popularity justifies presuming it true, a presumption buttressed by the absence of sound objections to it when properly understood. Its rationality is explained (...) by combining two ideas. First, universalizations of our reasons require some category of self-identification. Second, our primary category of self-identification is our key concept for understanding ourselves biologically, metaphysically, psychologically and socially, namely our species concept. We’re rationally bound to conspecifics by the relational “accident” of their essence being our own. (shrink)

In an anecdote in the Holy Bible, there is a rumor that because the Prophet David wanted to marry a woman named Bathsheba, whom he saw, he commissioned her soldier husband Uriah the Hittite to cause him to die in the most critical places of the army. In Islamic sources, some narrations originating from Isrāʾīliyyāt have been conveyed in many different ways. Likewise, in some Islamic sources, this incident, which is attributed to the Prophet David, was unfortunately also linked to (...) the marriage of the Prophet Muḥammad and Zaynab b. Jaḥsh. In addition, there is a claim that the Prophet Muḥammad sent Zayd b. Ḥāritha, who was Zaynab b. Jaḥsh’s ex-husband, to many wars and eventually caused his death in Muʾta war. First, the so-called incident between Prophet David and Uriah the Hittite will be discussed, and thereafter, Prophet Muḥammad and Zaynab b. Jaḥsh’s marriage will be thoroughly addressed in the study. In addition, it will be revealed that the incident that was attributed to the Prophet David was in no way similar to the incident of assigning Zayd b. Ḥāritha as a commander.Summary: According to a parable in the Bible, Prophet David sees a woman bathing while he was walking around the roof of his palace one night and he is impressed by her. Prophet David sends someone to investigate who this woman is, and as a result of the research, it is revealed that this woman is Bathsheba, the wife of Uriah the Hittite, one of the commanders of Prophet David. Prophet David sends someone to bring this woman and when the woman is brought to him, he commits adultery with her. The woman becomes pregnant after this affair and informs Prophet David about this situation. After receiving this news of pregnancy, Prophet David sends a message to the commander-in-chief, Joab, who is at war with his army, and asks him to send Uriah the Hittite to him. After hosting Uriah the Hittite in the palace for a few days, Prophet David sends him back to the front with a letter to be given to the commander-in-chief, Joab. In this letter, Prophet David asks the commander-in-chief, Joab, to send Uriah the Hittite to the most dangerous place in the war and to ensure that he is killed. Fulfilling the order stated in the letter of Prophet Davud, Joab sends Uriah the Hittite to a region where the war will be the harshest and causes him to be killed there. After the mourning of Bathsheba for her husband ends, Prophet David marries her. According to the Islamic belief, it is not possible for this incident to occur as it was mentioned in the Bible since the prophets were protected by Allah. It is because the parable states Prophet David committed adultery. In the Qur’ān, which is the source where we can get the clearest information about the incident, it is narrated inverses 21-25 of sûra Ṣād. Although there is a partial resemblance between the verses and the Bible, the verses do not mention either the woman or Prophet David’s sending that woman’s husband to the war because he wanted to marry her.In other Islamic sources, some relevant narrations originating in Isrāʾīliyyāt are narrated in many different ways. Our tafsīr scholars did not approve these narrations originating in Isrāʾīliyyāt. Also, they stated that the narrations expressing that Prophet David sent Uriah the Hittite to the war for his killing were not true and that such a situation would not be suitable for a prophet or even for a Muslim.In the same sources, many different possibilities were voiced in order to resolve the situation and this incident, which was attributed to Prophet David, was tried to be placed on a more reasonable ground. As a result of these efforts, the marriage of the Prophet Muḥammad and Zaynab b. Jaḥsh has been linked to this incident in various ways.Although it is not possible to give a certain date of the marriage of Zaynab and Zayd b. Ḥāritha, it is seen that this marriage occurred with the help of the Prophet Muḥammad in the first year of the emigration to Madinah. The marriage of the Prophet Muḥammad’s aunt’s daughter and Zayd, a freed slave, was for eliminating the discrimination between free individuals and slaves that existed in the society.There is not any serious problem about the marriage of Zayd and Zaynab at this point. However, at the point of ending this marriage, there are some narrations in our sources, and these leave the Prophet Muḥammad under suspicion. According to these narrations, the Prophet Muḥammad went to Zayd’s house to meet him and the Prophet Muḥammad called out to Zayd from outside the house. For not keeping the Prophet Muḥammad outside, Zaynab opened the door and invited the Prophet Muḥammad in by stating that Zayd was not at home although the clothes on her were not suitable. As soon as the Prophet Muḥammad saw her, he immediately turned his head and because he liked Zaynab, “I exonerate almighty Allah. I exonerate Allah that has turned the hearts.” he grumbled. After a while, Zayd came home and learned what the Prophet Muḥammad said. He immediately went to the Prophet Muḥammad and said “Messenger of Allah! May my mother and father be sacrificed for you. If you liked Zaynab, let me divorce her for you.” However, the Prophet Muḥammad advised him not to divorce his wife. As far as we can find in our sources, there are two other similar narrations.These narrations contain many problems in terms of both isnād and logical consistency. When we examine at the narrations in terms of isnād, we see that all three narrations are mursal. We can say that this is the first factor that reduces the reliability of narrations. Secondly, all narrations have at least one narrator accused of weakness or even dishonesty. Therefore, it is not appropriate to base a serious claim about the Prophet Muḥammad on such weak narrations. In addition, the rumor that the Prophet Muḥammad liked Zaynab, his aunt’s daughter and a married woman, and wished that she would divorce her husband has no reasonable logic. The fact that the marriage of Zayd and Zaynab ended quickly was mostly caused by Zaynab’s harsh temperament. Moreover, although Zaynab did not want this marriage, she could not oppose the order of the Prophet Muḥammad due to the verse about her. For these reasons, Zaynab could not get along with her husband and she was constantly reflecting her dissatisfaction with this marriage on Zayd. Therefore, Zayd constantly complained about Zaynab, but the Prophet Muḥammad gave Zayd the same advice every time, commanding “Keep your spouse with you, do not leave her!” Although the Prophet Muḥammad constantly banned Zayd, he could not stand Zaynab anymore and divorced her. After he divorced Zaynab, verse 37 of sûra al-Aḥzāb was sent down. Thus, the marriage of the Prophet Muḥammad and Zaynab took place as a result of a divine will.There is also a claim that the Prophet Muḥammad sent Zayd, the ex-husband of Zaynab, to many wars and consequently caused him to be killed in Muʾta war. When we examine the dates of the nine military expeditions, in which the Prophet Muḥammad appointed Zayd as a commander, it is seen that the first expedition was held on 3/624 while the others were held after 6/627. Therefore, at least eight of the nine expeditions in which Zayd served as a commander were taken place after the marriage of the Prophet Muḥammad and Zaynab. Consequently, in the light of this information, it is clear that the fact that Zayd was appointed as a commander is not similar to the situation in narrations about Prophet David. (shrink)

This article is based on a chapter of my forthcoming book, A World Cut in Two: The Global Traffic in Organs . My debts to those who have assisted the Organs Watch project are too numerous to be acknowledged here. The late "Micky" Friedlaender of Hadassah Hospital was an invaluable friend and feisty interlocutor on the ethics and practice of transplantation. Meira Weiss, esteemed anthropological colleague and friend, and Dr. Chen Kugel, military IDF commissioned officer and senior pathologist, each paid (...) dearly for their love of truth, of their professions, and their patriotism. Their work on this subject paved the way for the writing of this article. (shrink)

The development of the law of libel at Rome during the second and first centuries B.C. is important for an understanding of the changing attitude on the part of society towards public criticism. This article attempts to trace the development from Naevius to Augustus, by bringing together the scattered references in our literary and legal sources, and, by setting them in their historical perspective, to make the attitude of society towards criticism more easily discernible.

The development of the law of libel at Rome during the second and first centuries B.C. is important for an understanding of the changing attitude on the part of society towards public criticism. This article attempts to trace the development from Naevius to Augustus, by bringing together the scattered references in our literary and legal sources, and, by setting them in their historical perspective, to make the attitude of society towards criticism more easily discernible.

This article argues that a potential expert witness's decision about testifying for a libel plaintif should not be driven by an unexamined loyalty to journalists, to the press, or to broad principles of expression. Real harm done to a plaintif by libel and the advantage to the press corps and to the system of expression of having a knowledgeable expert testihing for a libel plaintif are discussed as factors that might outweigh the traditional loyalties. An ethical framework (...) is offered to help journalists and journalism educators make a reasoned determination based on what is fair and responsible for the plaintiffand for the defendant. (shrink)