The Book of Historical Documents is an ancient Chinese written monument, a collection of addresses of the ruler to the subjects and of the subjects to the rulers. The philosophical meaning of Shu jing is that it mentions or refers to the issues of a broad ideological order. These brief references either gave life to philosophical ideas, or later, after appropriate interpretation, were used by the philosophers to authoritatively confirm their thoughts. The first complete Russian translation of Shu jing was (...) done by Archimandrite Daniil in the early 40s of the 19th century. The translation was undertaken, first and primarily, as a teaching material assigned to students of the Chinese Language Cathedra at the Kazan Imperial University. This cathedra was first one established in Russia and the second one in Europe. Archimandrite Daniel was its first head in 1837-1844. Unfortunately, the translator have never had a chance to publish his work. Sivillov for the first time in Russian and European Sinology used a purely Chinese commented edition of The Book. The canonical text used by Sivillov and later his followers was considered and understood through the prism of modern Neoconfucianism, which, in comparison with ancient and early medieval Confucianism, reinterpreted and significantly enriched the philosophical meaning of the Shu jing. In some points of understanding of the Neoconfucian interpretation of the ancient text, Archimandrite Daniil was not only ahead of, but also more successful than his later colleagues. The text of the previously unpublished Shu jing Chapter III Da Yu mo Russian translation by archimandrite Daniil is attached. (shrink)

Wedin considers the relation between the ontological commitment in the Categories and the semantical theory of underlying ontological configurations for standard categorical statements. According to Wedin, Aristotle's fourfold division of beings, which divides things according to whether they are, or are not, said of, and/or present in a subject, is a meta‐ontology that is concerned with beings per se, i.e. the fundamental things that are. Wedin explains that the primacy of c‐substance involves an asymmetry in the relation between c‐substance and (...) everything else, or between the substantial and the nonsubstantial. This is because there is an ontological dependence of non‐substances, and also of secondary substances, on substances: everything is either said of, or in, primary substance. The argument of this chapter, then, is that the world of the Categories is a world of individuals: all ontological relations needed for semantics can be accommodated by appeal to individuals only. (shrink)

Wedin argues that Aristotle makes form the substance of c‐substances because it is the essence of the c‐substance. Much of this chapter consists of a careful examination of a passage in Metaphysics Zeta 4, which Wedin calls the ‘New Primacy Passage’, that is crucial to Wedin's overall thesis, because here Aristotle appeals to a notion of definitional primacy, as opposed to the ontological primacy of the Categories. Z.4 focuses on this claim that form must be essence: Wedin argues that essence (...) is a certain kind of form, a form of a genus ; this does not mean ‘species’, as some commentators have thought. This is because the species is a combination of form and matter, whereas the genous eidos, Wedin argues, is the formal part only of the definition that applies to the thing. On Wedin's account, Aristotle introduces the notion of explanatory primacy of form in Z.4. (shrink)

Wedin offers an interpretation of Metaphysics Zeta 13, a very important and difficult chapter, where Aristotle apparently denies that substance is a universal, having, on most accounts, already claimed that form is substance, and that form is a universal. This interpretation of the argument of Z.13, Wedin argues, threatens the possibility of attaining a definition of substance, and places in doubt what has gone before in the treatise. According to Wedin, what Aristotle is concerned with in Z.13 is not the (...) denial that substance is a universal but rather with the denial that anything predicated universally of a c‐substance is the substance‐of the c‐substance, which Wedin calls ‘Weak proscription’. In Wedin's account of Z.13, then, Aristotle is continuing to pursue issues first raised in Z.10–11 that have to do with the relations between form and definition, and form and the universal. Wedin also argues that the dilemma at the conclusion of Z.13, regarding the definability of substance, is resolved in Z.16, with the notion of ‘Dual Complexity’, according to which the parts of a form exist potentially in the form, just as the parts of the c‐substance exist potentially in the c‐substance. (shrink)

Wedin addresses the debate over whether nonsubstantial individuals, that inhere in a subject but are not said of a subject, i.e. accidents, such as the pallor of Socrates, are nonrecurring particulars or a kind of determinate universal. Wedin examines the secondary literature on this topic and divides it into two schools of thought, determined by the contributions of J.L. Ackrill and G.E.L. Owen. According to Ackrill, individuals in non‐substance categories are particular to the substance they are in; Owen critiques Ackrill's (...) view, and proposes that these items can recur in more than one subject and hence are a sort of universal. Wedin finds Owen's thesis unsatisfactory, even after supplementing it with an improved version due to Michael Frede; instead, Wedin argues for a revised version of Ackrill's interpretation of nonsubstantial individuals as nonrecurrent particulars. According to Wedin, Aristotle is committed to individuals only—e.g. to Socrates and to the particular bit of pallor in him: this conclusion has an important bearing on the ontological status of individuals and on the primacy of substance to nonsubstantial items. (shrink)

Wedin considers the problem of the compatibility of the Categories account of primary substance with the theory of substantial form of the Metaphysics. Wedin collects from the secondary literature the most important arguments for incompatibilism, and offers some proposals for restoring their harmony. While admitting the evident differences in the way Aristotle treats the question of substance in each treatise, Wedin is keen to argue that these differences are not sufficient to conclude that the treatises are incompatible. Wedin singles out (...) for particular attention, and criticism, Michael Frede and Gunther Patzig's account of Metaphysics Zeta, according to which the primary substance of the Metaphysics and the basic subject of predications is the form. Wedin considers two ‘philosophical’ arguments and one ‘Aristotelian’ argument for the subjecthood of forms, and argues that the textual evidence does not support the claim that form is the subject of accidents. (shrink)

Chapters 10 and 11 are critical to the argument of Metaphysics Zeta: these chapters are concerned with the purification of form. Z.10 introduces the apparatus of part and whole and consists of an argument to the end that form and its parts have priority over the other internal structural components of c‐substances, i.e. matter and the compound of form and matter; while in Z.11 Aristotle argues that form and its parts cannot involve any admixture of matter. Wedin argues that the (...) causal role of form presupposes its purity: if form is to explain why a certain portion of matter constitutes a c‐substance of a given kind, then matter—whether this latter is understood as functional, or remnant matter—cannot already be contained in the form. This is the ‘purity thesis’, as Wedin calls it: matter cannot be included in the definitions of natural organisms, Wedin points out, because that would make the explanandum a part of the principle that explains it. Wedin also argues that form must be sufficiently complex to provide definitions of the natures of particular compounds, which are complex, even though form itself is a kind of universal. (shrink)

In the Metaphysics, Aristotle often says that ‘form is substance’: in this chapter, Wedin argues that ‘substance’ in this context means the ‘substance‐of’ c‐substances. Wedin begins by examining Aristotle's use, and retention, of the framework of the Categories in Metaphysics Zeta, before turning to discuss Z.3, which is crucial to understanding the relation between the Categories and Metaphysics theories of substance, because it is usually thought that here Aristotle departs from the substance of the Categories. Wedin denies that Z.3 involves (...) a rejection of the Categories subjecthood criterion for primary substance: Aristotle rejects only the claim that one thing is the substance of another simply if it is the primary underlying subject of the other. Wedin argues that in Z.3 Aristotle introduces the idea of the ‘substance‐of’ a thing, and identifies as candidates for the substance of c‐substances the internal structural components form, matter, and the compound of form and matter. (shrink)

Wedin discusses Aristotle's claims in Metaphysics Zeta 6 that the essence of a thing is to be sought among its per se attributes, and that each thing that is primary and spoken of per se, e.g. primary substance, is the same as its essence. Wedin argues that the Zeta 6 Thesis, i.e. that the essence of a thing is the thing's immediate essence, is a crucial requirement of the explanatory role of essence as the substance of c‐substances. According to Wedin, (...) Aristotle introduces this requirement in order to establish that a thing's essence cannot depend on another essence. Form must be the essence; if form cannot explain the nature of the thing of which it is the form, there would be the threat of a regress of explanatory forms. At the end of the chapter, Wedin considers the problem that the identity of a thing and its essence is a requirement that can be met by non‐substance items, but he denies that this leads to a dilution of the conception of substance. (shrink)

This essay explores the aspects of the Aristotelian psuchē that accounts for its contemporary appeal. The poverty of the notion of the mind is discussed. The superiority of the psuchē over the mind is emphasized.

Reports in the popular press suggest that smart drugs or “nootropics” such as methylphenidate, modafinil and piracetam are increasingly being used by the healthy to augment cognitive ability. Although current nootropics offer only modest improvements in cognitive performance, it appears likely that more effective compounds will be developed in the future and that their off-label use will increase. One sphere in which the use of these drugs may be commonplace is by healthy students within academia. This article reviews the ethical (...) and pragmatic implications of nootropic use in academia by drawing parallels with issues relevant to the drugs in sport debate. It is often argued that performance-enhancing drugs should be prohibited because they create an uneven playing field. However, this appears dubious given that “unfair” advantages are already ubiquitous and generally tolerated by society. There are concerns that widespread use will indirectly coerce non-users also to employ nootropics in order to remain competitive. However, to restrict the autonomy of all people for fear that it may influence the actions of some is untenable. The use of potentially harmful drugs for the purposes of enhancement rather than treatment is often seen as unjustified, and libertarian approaches generally champion the rights of the individual in deciding if these risks are acceptable. Finally, whether the prohibition of nootropics can be effectively enforced is doubtful. As nootropics use becomes widespread among students in the future, discussion of this issue will become more pressing in the years to come. (shrink)

The glorious anniversary of the great victory of the Soviet people and their heroic armed forces over the most aggressive armies of international imperialism provides a perspective that makes it possible to see the importance of this feat on the scale of world history, in the vivid light of the favorable influence it has exercised on all the subsequent development of sociopolitical processes on earth.

Among the numerous philosophical problems associated with analysis of the current revolution in science and technology, the problem of the revolution in the productive forces of society holds a place of importance. The revolution in science and technology brought the problem of the revolution in the productive forces into the foreground, along with the problems of the social revolution as a revolution in the entire system of societal relations.

This set reprints volumes that were orginally published by Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. in 1953. Landmark volumes at the time of their original publication, these titles do not merely expound the theoretical constructions of Russian philosophers, but also relate these constructions to the general conditions of Russian life. Volume One examines the historical conditions of the development of philosophy in Russia and explores the general features of Russian philosophy. It also surveys the principal works on the history of Russian (...) philosophy. Volume Two includes biographies and examination of the themes of the following philosophers; Vladimir Solovyov, V.D. Kudryavtsev, N.F. Fyodorov and Later Hegelians such as Chicherin, Debolski and Bakunin. This volume also provides analysis of various schools of thought in Russian philosophy in the twentieth century, for example; Neo-Leibzianism, Modern Positivism and New-Marxism to name but a few. (shrink)

Purpose. The purpose of the study is to outline the links between individual and collective dimensions of the human worldview. This purpose requires solving two tasks: to update philosophical ideas formed by reflection on human and community worldview; to identify and generalize the relationship of singular and general in the context of the problem of human worldview. Theoretical basis. The study is based on philosophical reflections about manifestations of singular and general worldviews. Such reflections appeared in European philosophy quite a (...) long time ago. Ukrainian and foreign philosophical discourse considers both measures of the worldview. And a role of the carrier of worldview plays either human or society. We can see that in researches of S. Krymskyi, I. Nadolniy, V. Popov, N. Rozhanska, V. Tabachkovskyi, V. Shynkaruk, V. Poythress, D. Rousseau, D. Billingham, C. Gianolla and others. However the links between individual and collective dimensions of worldview are not clearly outlined. It is possible to note the research of V. Popov who focuses on the problem of socio-collective and individual dimensions of worldview. But the scientist focuses more on the use of the concept of worldview in these two meanings. Human as a social being interacts with worldviews of other individuals. That is why we can speak of two dimensions of the worldview function: individual and collective. This problem became topical due to acuteness of the links between human and society in modern life. Originality. The author outlined key links between individual and collective dimensions of human worldview functioning. The study identified a role of human as a carrier of the worldview in formation of collective worldview. Conclusions. Human as a worldview carrier plays a key role in formation of collective worldview. In philosophical discourse thoughts about links between individual and collective worldviews are different and sometimes conflicting. We have a discussion problem of uniformity and diversity of collective worldview. Collective worldview is showed as a circulation of different ideas and views of individuals. But collective worldview is showed as a whole system of individual views too. Collective worldview manifests as integrated phenomenon because it is based on common worldviews of individuals. At the same time the human is influenced by collective worldview in particularly as a past generation heritage. (shrink)