We present the inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic DP r , a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts such as O A ∧ O ∼A, O A ∧ P ∼A or even O A ∧ ∼O A. On the other hand, DP r still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (SDL). DP r interprets a given premise set ‘as normally (...) as possible’ with respect to SDL. Whereas some SDL-rules are verified unconditionally by DP r , others are verified conditionally. The latter are applicable unless they rely on formulas that turn out to behave inconsistently in view of the premises. This dynamic process is mirrored by the proof theory of DP r. (shrink)

We propose a logic of abduction that (i) provides an appropriate formalization of the explanatory conditional, and that (ii) captures the defeasible nature of abductive inference. For (i), we argue that explanatory conditionals are non-classical, and rely on Brian Chellas’s work on conditional logics for providing an alternative formalization of the explanatory conditional. For (ii), we make use of the adaptive logics framework for modeling defeasible reasoning. We show how our proposal allows for a more natural reading of explanatory relations, (...) and how it overcomes problems faced by other systems in the literature. (shrink)

We present two defeasible logics of norm-propositions (statements about norms) that (i) consistently allow for the possibility of normative gaps and normative conflicts, and (ii) map each premise set to a sufficiently rich consequence set. In order to meet (i), we define the logic LNP, a conflict- and gap-tolerant logic of norm-propositions capable of formalizing both normative conflicts and normative gaps within the object language. Next, we strengthen LNP within the adaptive logic framework for non-monotonic reasoning in order to meet (...) (ii). This results in the adaptive logics LNPr and LNPm, which interpret a given set of premises in such a way that normative conflicts and normative gaps are avoided ‘whenever possible’. LNPr and LNPm are equipped with a preferential semantics and a dynamic proof theory. (shrink)

Even when inconsistencies are present in our premise set, we can sensibly distinguish between good and bad arguments relying on these premises. In making this distinction, the inconsistency-adaptive approach of Batens strikes a particularly nice balance between inconsistency-tolerance and inferential strength. In this paper, we use the machinery of Batens’ approach to extend the paraconsistent approach to dialogical logic as developed by Rahman and Carnielli. In bringing these frameworks closer together, we obtain a dynamic mechanism for the systematic study of (...) dialogues in which two parties exchange arguments over a central claim, in the possible presence of inconsistencies. (shrink)

We translate unconstrained and constrained input/output logics as introduced by Makinson and van der Torre to modal logics, using adaptive logics for the constrained case. The resulting reformulation has some additional benefits. First, we obtain a proof-theoretic characterization of input/output logics. Second, we demonstrate that our framework naturally gives rise to useful variants and allows to express important notions that go beyond the expressive means of input/output logics, such as violations and sanctions.

We present a logic, \, for the discovery of deterministic causal regularities starting from empirical data. Our approach is inspired by Mackie’s theory of causes as INUS-conditions, and implements a more recent adjustment to Mackie’s theory according to which the left-hand side of causal regularities is required to be a minimal disjunction of minimal conjunctions. To derive such regularities from a given set of data, we make use of the adaptive logics framework. Our knowledge of deterministic causal regularities is, as (...) Mackie noted, most often gappy or elliptical. The adaptive logics framework is well-suited to explicate both the internal and the external dynamics of the discovery of such gappy regularities. After presenting \, we first discuss these forms of dynamics in more detail. Next, we consider some criticisms of the INUS-account and show how our approach avoids them, and we compare \ with the CNA algorithm that was recently proposed by Michael Baumgartner. (shrink)

We present a formal argumentation system for dealing with the detachment of prioritized conditional obligations and permissions. In the presence of facts and constraints, we answer the question whether an unconditional obligation or permission is detachable by considering arguments for and against its detachment. For the evaluation of arguments in favour of detachment, we use a Dung-style argumentation-theoretical semantics. We illustrate how violations and contrary-to-duty scenarios are dealt with in our framework and pay special attention to conflict-resolution via priorities.

We present a logic, $$\mathbf {ELI^r}$$ ELI r, for the discovery of deterministic causal regularities starting from empirical data. Our approach is inspired by Mackie’s theory of causes as INUS-conditions, and implements a more recent adjustment to Mackie’s theory according to which the left-hand side of causal regularities is required to be a minimal disjunction of minimal conjunctions. To derive such regularities from a given set of data, we make use of the adaptive logics framework. Our knowledge of deterministic causal (...) regularities is, as Mackie noted, most often gappy or elliptical. The adaptive logics framework is well-suited to explicate both the internal and the external dynamics of the discovery of such gappy regularities. After presenting $$\mathbf {ELI^r}$$ ELI r, we first discuss these forms of dynamics in more detail. Next, we consider some criticisms of the INUS-account and show how our approach avoids them, and we compare $$\mathbf {ELI^r}$$ ELI r with the CNA algorithm that was recently proposed by Michael Baumgartner. (shrink)

Paul Thagard’s theory of deductive coherence, as set out in his Coherence in Thought and Action, faces a regress objection. Thagard’s method of solving deductive coherence problems presupposes some notion of logical consequence. The problem of specifying which logic to use to this end is itself a deductive coherence problem, so we would expect Thagard’s theory to be able to solve it. However, on pain of regress, the theory of deductive coherence cannot reach such a solution.

In order to deal with the possibility of deontic conflicts Lou Goble developed a group of logics (DPM) that are characterized by a restriction of the inheritance principle. While they approximate the deductive power of standard deontic logic, they do so only if the user adds certain statements to the premises. By adaptively strengthening the DPM logics, this paper presents logics that overcome this shortcoming. Furthermore, they are capable of modeling the dynamic and defeasible aspect of our normative reasoning by (...) their dynamic proof theory. This way they enable us to have a better insight in the relations between obligations and thus to localize deontic conflicts. (shrink)