Le merite de cette etude est son refus de reduire la theologie d'Eckhart au developpement systematique d'une seule notion fondamentale. Mais cette theologie n'y est pas non plus concue comme une sorte d'eclectisme ou chacune de ces notions aurait sa place et trouverait successivement son tour. S'il y a chez Eckhart une notion fondamentale, c'est celle de Dieu, ou, plutot, c'est celle de l'ineffabilite de Dieu. Dieu est l'etre, assurement, mais n'est-il pas plutot l'Un? Ou l'Intellect? Comprendre qu'il est chacune (...) de ces perfections, absolument, purement, donc en apparence a l'exclusion des autres, c'est justement en quoi consiste l'ignorance transcendante qui eleve Dieu au-dela de toutes les affirmations. Vladimir Lossky a ainsi voulu mettre en lumiere le refus qu'oppose Eckhart a toute tentative d'inclure la divinite dans une notion qui se tiendrait pour suffisante a la definir. (shrink)

The aim of the present article is to demonstrate that the hermeneutical activity of Lucius Annaeus Cornutus is best characterized as ‘ethnographical’ rather than merely ‘allegorical.’ Without denying the presence of allegorical interpretation in the philosopher’s work, the paper establishes that Cornutus’ etymological interpretations aimed first and foremost to extract the archaic vision of the world that motivated every theogony. Thus, the philosopher regarded conventional mythology and traditional religion as sources of information about the primeval accounts of the cosmos: his (...) analyses of various etymologies discovered not merely the origin of the word in question but, first of all, the origin of the ancient world picture that underlay the particular system of beliefs. As a result of this, interpreting myths was for Cornutus tantamount to gaining profound insights into the mind of primordial man and his world. Key words CORNUTUS, ALLEGORY, MYTH. (shrink)

Problem duša–um–tijelo, drevno je pitanje koje je mučilo mnoge filozofe. Još od Platona i predstoika mnogi su filozofi pokušavali odgovoriti na pitanja odnosa između tih “dijelova”. Ovaj rad je pregled teorije o holonima koju je predložio Arthur Koestler i njezinih implikacija u modernoj kinematografiji, posebno na primjeru anime filma Ghost in the Shell. Postoje mnoga pitanja koja su aktualna i povezana s problemom duha i tijela, a koja proizlaze iz moderne kinematografije i TV emisija, no obično su zanemarena ili previđena. (...) U tim serijama i filmovima nalazimo suvremene ideje o kiborzima i transhumanizmu koje je spomenuti anime film popularizirao. Većina suvremenih serija bliža je transhumanizmu i postmodernizmu, no zbog opsega članka, biti će spomenute samo imenom.Drugi problem koji se nameće u modernoj kinematografiji je individualizam i egocentrizam koji nije usmjeren na transcendentalno ili čak transcendentno. Namjera ovog rada je pokazati da kroz Koestlerove ideje o holonima moramo uzeti u obzir širi pristup transhumanizmu, te da taj pristup ne smije biti fokusiran samo i isključivo na pojedinca. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to confront normative pre-assumptions of Marx’s and Freud’s emancipatory projects. Considerations on axiological presuppositions of the projects under discussion come to the conclusion that an argument between psychoanalysis and Marxism has its source in the two mutually exclusive systems of values whereas the psychoanalytical critique of Marxism remains the legacy of a conflict dating back to the beginnings of the Enlightenment. The article claims that a confrontation of Freud’s emancipatory project with that of Marx’s (...) means a confrontation of two traditions: according to the first one — pessimistic and referring to Hobbes — man is bad by nature, whereas the other — optimistic and deriving from Locke — man is good by nature. The final conclusion, thus, is a statement that though both Marx and Freud were certain that their emancipatory projects were devoid of not only metaphysical presuppositions, but also metaphysical conclusions, a Freudian critique of Marxism refers to an axiological argument between Locke and Hobbes. Because both in psychoanalysis and Marxism a descriptive order is intricately intertwined with a normative one. The conflict between the two emancipatory projects must remain ilsolluble owing to the antagonistic axiological presuppositions. (shrink)

The article aims to confront the skeptical critique of cognition with Nietzsche’s refutation of classical epistemology. Irrespective of some striking analogies, it does not purport that skepticism exerted direct impact on Nietzsche’s philosophy. Nevertheless, both critiques reject such a type of philosophy that endeavors to discover the very nature of things and both repudiate the dogmatic dichotomy of the ‘apparent’ and the ‘true’ world that since Plato has become an integral part of nearly every metaphysical project. The ancient skeptics and (...) Nietzsche demonstrate that every cognition is determined by various physiological, social and cultural contexts and, consequently, the Greek thinkers seem to agree with the German philosopher that concepts such as ‘reality’ or ‘world’ are but interpretations conditioned by the very structure of the human sense organs and basic human needs. In the light of the contingent and situational character of our knowledge, the skeptics and Nietzsche dethrone the discourse of science and philosophy by showing not only the genesis of our propositions but also the possibility of opposite, yet equally justified, propositions. Thus, ‘world’ transpires to be a necessary illusion and every attempt at explaining it is relegated to the position of just one of the manifold perspectives attainable. In the final analysis, the article offers a reevaluation of the skeptical project, as it advances a thesis that the ancient and Nietzschean skepticisms show the insurmountable limitations of every cognition, protest against any endeavor to establish an absolute account of reality and, thereby, opt for a continuous striving for new interpretations and perspectives. (shrink)

We argue that while it is a valuable contribution, Carruthers' model may be too restrictive to elaborate our understanding of the development of mindreading and metacognition, or to enrich our knowledge of individual differences and psychopathology. To illustrate, we describe pertinent examples where there may be a critical interplay between primitive social-cognitive processes and emerging self-attributions.

Osiurak and Reynaud's account of human tool cognition misses key element: human capacity for functional representations and teleological inferences. I argue that the teleofunctional approach accounts better for some features of human tool cognition and points to a viable candidate for the cognitive “difference-maker” behind human technological success.