This is the first book to evaluate the significance and usefulness of the practices of anthropomorphism and anecdotalism for understanding animals.

Despite its diminished importance amongst philosophers, the deductive-nomological framework is still important to contemporary behavioral scientists. Behavioral theorists operating within this framework must be careful to distinguish between nesting and chaining. Explanations are chained when the explanandum sentence of one explanation is one of the antecedent conditions of another. They are nested when one of the antecedent conditions or the explanandum sentence of one explanation is one of the covering laws of another. Confusion between nesting and chaining leads to explanation (...) nests that cannot be nomologically entrenched. They cannot, even in principle, be logically connected to laws arising from other sciences. This hazard should be particularly important for evolutionary psychologists to avoid, since many evolutionary psychologists tend to see themselves as dedicated to both nomological entrenchment and cognitive functionalist models. The hazard can be avoided if the intentional constructs of the behavioral sciences are construed not as ineffable and inaccessible antecedent conditions, but as complex, law-like patterns in behavior. (shrink)

We believe that “caching” a baby would have been too great a danger in human prehistory, and thus could not serve as the context for prelinguistic vocalization. Rather, infants were most likely carried at all times. Thus, the question arises of why the cry of an infant is such a loud vocalization.

Much research in the field of emotions has shown that people differ in the cues that they use to perceive their own emotions. People who are more responsive to personal cues (personal cuers) make use of cues arising from their own bodies and behavior; people who are less responsive to personal cues (situational cuers) make use of cues arising from the world around them. An evolutionary explanation of this well-documented phenomenon is that it occurs because of the operation of a (...) cognitive module designed to enable the organism to predict its own impending behavior. This theory suggests that situational cuers would be people for whom external factors are the best source of information about their own future behavior, whereas personal cuers are people for whom cues about themselves are the best source of information about their own future behavior. Such a view is founded in the New Realist philosophy of the early twentieth century, a philosophy that affected psychology through the work of E. C. Tolman and J. J. Gibson. (shrink)

The expression exapted as is offered as a substitute for the target article's exaptation for and exaptation to on the grounds that exapted as is less likely to foster the pernicious intuition that natural selection designs for future consequences.

Any general account of successful selection explanations must specify how they avoid being ad hoc or vacuous, hazards that arise from their recursive form.

Robin Dunbar's hypothesis that language capacity in response to the demands of maintaining large groups suggests a more specific hypothesis that language arose from a cognitive calculus by which animals could predict their status in complex dominance situations.

The idea that dreams function as fright-simulations rests on the adaptionist notion that anything that has form has function, and psychological argument relies on the mentalist assumption that dream reports are accurate reports of experienced events. Neither assumption seems adequately supported by the evidence presented. [Revonsuo].

In reasserting the primacy of the individual in biological analysis, Rose directs attention away from the crucial insights of the developmental/structuralist perspective that he advocates. In presenting his advocacy as a diatribe, he brings disrespect down upon that very tradition.

The antipathy toward group selection expressed in the target article is puzzling because Laland et al.'s ideas dovetail neatly with modern group selection theory.

Wilson and Sober's (1994t) revival of group selection theory may have failed with some readers because its simple arithmetic foundation was obscured under the complexities of its presentation. When that uncontrovertible principle is uncovered, it broadens dramatically the fundamental motives that social scientists may impute to human nature and still be consistent with Darwinian evolutionary theory.

We find the idea that infant crying arises from thermoregulation more consistent with a coregulatory account of its evolutionary history than it is with the informational account advocated in the target article.

The apparent incompatibility of mental states with physical explanations has long been a concern of philosophers of psychology. This incompatibility is thought to arise from the intentionality of mental states. But, Brentano notwithstanding, intentionality is an ordinary feature of higher order behavior patterns in the classical literature of ethology.