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  1.  26
    Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas.Patricia W. Cheng & Keith J. Holyoak - 1985 - Cognitive Psychology 17 (4):391-416.
    We propose that people typically reason about realistic situations using neither content-free syntactic inference rules nor representations of specific experiences. Rather, people reason using knowledge structures that we term pragmatic reasoning schemas, which are generalized sets of rules defined in relation to classes of goals. Three experiments examined the impact of a “permission schema” on deductive reasoning. Experiment 1 demonstrated that by evoking the permission schema it is possible to facilitate performance in Wason's selection paradigm for subjects who have had (...)
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  2.  37
    From Covariation to Causation: A Causal Power Theory.Patricia W. Cheng - 1997 - Psychological Review 104 (2):367-405.
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  3.  25
    On the Natural Selection of Reasoning Theories.Patricia W. Cheng & Keith J. Holyoak - 1989 - Cognition 33 (3):285-313.
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  4.  29
    Bayesian Generic Priors for Causal Learning.Hongjing Lu, Alan L. Yuille, Mimi Liljeholm, Patricia W. Cheng & Keith J. Holyoak - 2008 - Psychological Review 115 (4):955-984.
  5.  22
    Covariation in Natural Causal Induction.Patricia W. Cheng & Laura R. Novick - 1992 - Psychological Review 99 (2):365-382.
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  6.  71
    Causes Versus Enabling Conditions.Patricia W. Cheng & Laura R. Novick - 1991 - Cognition 40 (1-2):83-120.
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  7.  26
    Assessing Interactive Causal Influence.Laura R. Novick & Patricia W. Cheng - 2004 - Psychological Review 111 (2):455-485.
    The discovery of conjunctive causes--factors that act in concert to produce or prevent an effect--has been explained by purely covariational theories. Such theories assume that concomitant variations in observable events directly license causal inferences, without postulating the existence of unobservable causal relations. This article discusses problems with these theories, proposes a causal-power theory that overcomes the problems, and reports empirical evidence favoring the new theory. Unlike earlier models, the new theory derives (a) the conditions under which covariation implies conjunctive causation (...)
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  8. Pragmatic Reasoning with a Point of View.Keith J. Holyoak & Patricia W. Cheng - 1995 - Thinking and Reasoning 1 (4):289 – 313.
  9.  8
    Constraints and Nonconstraints in Causal Learning: Reply to White and to Luhmann and Ahn.Patricia W. Cheng & Laura R. Novick - 2005 - Psychological Review 112 (3):694-706.
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  10.  12
    Causal Learning in Rats and Humans: A Minimal Rational Model.Michael R. Waldmann, Patricia W. Cheng, York Hagmayer & Aaron P. Blaisdell - 2008 - In Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford (eds.), The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press.
  11.  3
    Inferential Dependencies in Causal Inference: A Comparison of Belief-Distribution and Associative Approaches.Christopher D. Carroll, Patricia W. Cheng & Hongjing Lu - 2013 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 142 (3):845-863.
  12.  9
    Causal Learning.Marc J. Buehner & Patricia W. Cheng - 2005 - In K. Holyoak & B. Morrison (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. Cambridge University Press. pp. 143--168.
  13.  60
    Pragmatic Reasoning From Multiple Points of View: A Response.Keith J. Holyoak & Patricia W. Cheng - 1995 - Thinking and Reasoning 1 (4):373 – 389.
  14. The Taming of Content: Some Thoughts About Domains and Modules.Keith J. Holyoak & Patricia W. Cheng - forthcoming - Thinking and Reasoning.
  15.  7
    Pragmatic Constraints on Causal Deduction.Patricia W. Cheng & Richard E. Nisbett - 1993 - In Richard E. Nisbett (ed.), Rules for Reasoning. L. Erlbaum Associates. pp. 207--227.
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  16.  5
    Restructuring Versus Automaticity: Alternative Accounts of Skill Acquisition.Patricia W. Cheng - 1985 - Psychological Review 92 (3):414-423.
  17.  13
    The Induction of Hidden Causes: Causal Mediation and Violations of Independent Causal Influence.Christopher D. Carroll & Patricia W. Cheng - 2010 - In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 913--918.
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  18. Uncertainty in Causal Inference: The Case of Retrospective Revaluation.Christopher D. Carroll, Patricia W. Cheng & Hongjing Lu - 2010 - In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society.
  19.  3
    Categorization and Response Competition: Two Nonautomatic Factors.Patricia W. Cheng - 1985 - Psychological Review 92 (4):585-586.
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  20.  6
    Postscript.Patricia W. Cheng & Laura R. Novick - 2005 - Psychological Review 112 (3):706-707.
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  21. Contextual Factors in Deontic Reasoning.Keith J. Holyoak & Patricia W. Cheng - forthcoming - Thinking and Reasoning.
  22.  93
    There is More to Thinking Than Propositions.Derek C. Penn, Patricia W. Cheng, Keith J. Holyoak, John E. Hummel & Daniel J. Povinelli - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):221-223.
    We are big fans of propositions. But we are not big fans of the proposed by Mitchell et al. The authors ignore the critical role played by implicit, non-inferential processes in biological cognition, overestimate the work that propositions alone can do, and gloss over substantial differences in how different kinds of animals and different kinds of cognitive processes approximate propositional representations.
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  23. Causal Learning in Rats and Humans: A Minimal Rational Model.Michael R. Waldmann, Patricia W. Cheng, York Hagmeyer & Blaisdell & P. Aaron - 2008 - In Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford (eds.), The Probabilistic Mind: Prospects for Bayesian Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press.
     
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