This paper offers a critique of sustainability reporting and, in particular, a critique of the modern disconnect between the practice of sustainability reporting and what we consider to be the urgent issue of our era: sustaining the life-supporting ecological systems on which humanity and other species depend. Tracing the history of such reporting developments, we identify and isolate the concept of the ‘triple bottom line’ (TBL) as a core and dominant idea that continues to pervade business reporting, and business engagement (...) with sustainability. Incorporating an entity’s economic, environmental and social performance indicators into its management and reporting processes, we argue, has become synonymous with corporate sustainability; in the process, concern for ecology has become sidelined. Moreover, this process has become reinforced and institutionalised through SustainAbility’s biennial benchmarking reports, KPMG’s triennial surveys of practice, initiatives by the accountancy profession and, particularly, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)’s sustainability reporting guidelines. We argue that the TBL and the GRI are insufficient conditions for organizations contributing to the sustaining of the Earth’s ecology. Paradoxically, they may reinforce business-as-usual and greater levels of un-sustainability. (shrink)

In an increasingly complex world with increasingly powerful organisations it seems inevitable that society – or groups in society – would become anxious about whether these organisations could be encouraged to match that power with an appropriate responsibility. This is the function of accountability – to require individuals and organisations to present an account of those actions for which society holds them – or would wish to hold them – responsible. And the history of social accounting, at its most fundamental, (...) is a history of attempts to develop this accountability. It seems to me that the widespread and systematic practice of social and environmental accounting is a deeply essential element in any well‐functioning, complex democracy. The corollary is that the absence of such mechanisms raises fundamental questions about the nature of modern democracies. This article briefly outlines what I believe to be the three strands of social accounting. It then identifies a few of the lessons that we may be able to learn from current experience and, in particular, how social accounting is related to accountability, democracy and sustainability. The central issue of the tension between accountability and control is touched upon: I then illustrate how the stakeholder model can be used to help define the social account, and conclude with a few words on attestation. (shrink)

In an increasingly complex world with increasingly powerful organisations it seems inevitable that society – or groups in society – would become anxious about whether these organisations could be encouraged to match that power with an appropriate responsibility. This is the function of accountability – to require individuals and organisations to present an account of those actions for which society holds them – or would wish to hold them – responsible. And the history of social accounting, at its most fundamental, (...) is a history of attempts to develop this accountability. It seems to me that the widespread and systematic practice of social and environmental accounting is a deeply essential element in any well‐functioning, complex democracy. The corollary is that the absence of such mechanisms raises fundamental questions about the nature of modern democracies. This article briefly outlines what I believe to be the three strands of social accounting. It then identifies a few of the lessons that we may be able to learn from current experience and, in particular, how social accounting is related to accountability, democracy and sustainability. The central issue of the tension between accountability and control is touched upon: I then illustrate how the stakeholder model can be used to help define the social account, and conclude with a few words on attestation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:76. A REFUTATION OF HUME'S THEORY OF CAUSALITY1 Given Hume's conceptions of space and time, which I take to be fundamental to his theory of causality, it is not always possible to meet all of those conditions definitive of the cause-effect relation, i.e., those "general rules, by which we may know when" objects really 2 are "causes or effects to each other" (T. 173). To show this, it will (...) be necessary, first, to give a very brief exposition of Hume's conceptions of space and time, with regard chiefly to their implications for the nature of motion. Then, after briefly summarizing his views on the nature of the cause-effect relation, I shall proceed immediately to my objection. It should be noted first, however, that, if one instance of a cause-effect relation can be found to which Hume's analysis will not apply, that, presumably, would be sufficient to refute his theory. I shall not here repeat all of Hume's arguments for the indivisibility of space and time. Suffice it to say, he takes it to be fairly obvious that each must consist of a finite number of indivisible points or moments, each of which is distinct, and therefore separate, from every other, and, in the case of time, none of which ever "co-exist." Only one of his arguments for the indivisibility of space need concern us here. The argument is brief: The infinite divisibility of space implies that of time, as is evident from the nature of motion. If the latter, therefore, be impossible, the former must be equally so. (T. 31) The argument here seems, roughly, to be this: the motion of an object can be described only by giving its positions at various times (the nature of motion). If, therefore, an object, such as a ball moving along a line AB, can be assigned an infinite number of positions taken between A and B (the infinite divisibility of space), 77. the time taken to traverse AB must also be infinite, i.e., must consist of an infinite number of instants. But the finite time taken to traverse the distance AB is not infinitely divisible; therefore, neither is the line AB. This argument, of course, relies upon the assumption that, in traversing the line AB, the ball will occupy each of the points (whether finite or infinite) of which it consists. The argument can also be turned around so as to derive the finite divisibility of time from that of space. Here, too, it must be assumed that the ball occupies each of those instants which constitute the time taken to traverse the line AB. It thus seems clear that, on Hume's view, the ball's motion can be neither more nor less divisible than the space and time it takes to move. x In its motion from A to B, then, the ball will occupy first one, then another of the points lying between A and B until finally it has occupied them all and has moved from A to B. But, in saying that it will occupy first one and then another, we are saying nothing more than that it successively occupies a series of points, and, insofar as its occupation of these different points is successive, it takes time. We are in a position, then, to define motion (at least motion along a straight line) as "the successive occupation of adjacent, linearly ordered points or places." Now, this is very different from the usual conception of motion. The ball's motion between any two adjacent points is not a moving from one to the other. It is simply its being in the one place at one instant and its being in the other place at the next. It is not a continuous motion, but the occupation of discrete places at different times. It is, as it were, a series of instantaneous leaps. This interpretation, if it is accurate, may also serve to account for Hume's ill-understood propensity for 78. referring to cause and effect as objects rather than as events. Events must, on Hume's view of time at least, be essentially static. Unlike those... (shrink)

Berkeley held space to be relational. On the other hand, He took extension to be composed of absolute minima. This paper offers an analysis of berkeley's views on the nature of minimum visibles and space and related notions, E.G., Distance, Extension, And figure. The difficulties in his theory are clearest in the analysis of figure where it is argued that minima can have neither figure nor extension and that, Contrary to berkeley's view, Extension and figure cannot be composed of such (...) minima. The paper concludes by arguing that the "esse est percipi" doctrine is false, Since it entails that there are minimum visibles and that distances be specifiable in terms of minimum visible distances. (shrink)