Ancient Greek philosophers, medieval theologians, Enlightenment thinkers, and contemporary humanists alike have debated all aspects of human sexuality, including its purpose, permissibility, normalcy, and risks. _Philosophizing About Sex_ provides a philosophical guide to those longstanding and important debates. Each chapter takes a general issue and shows how ongoing public discussions of sexuality can be illuminated by careful philosophical investigation. Debates over topics such as sexual assault, sexual orientation, sex education, prostitution, and “sexting” involve larger questions about morality, law, science, and (...) politics and cannot be intelligently discussed in isolation from broader issues. By asking deceptively simple questions, this book shows how difficult but important it is to arrive at satisfying answers. (shrink)

The contributors in _Expanding and Restricting the Erotic_ offer a multidisciplinary perspective on the ways in which what is considered acceptable within the realm of the erotic has altered over time to the current situation where the erotic is being both expanded and restricted.

Aristotle provides two extended discussions on the subject of pleasure within the Nicomachean Ethics. The first, which comprises the last four chapters of Book 7, produces a definition of pleasure in which pleasure is identified with activity (energeia). But in the second discussion of pleasure—provided in the first five chapters of Book 10-this position is characterized as "strange" or "absurd" (1175b 35). Instead of an identification between the two, pleasure is now said to "supervene" upon activity "as the bloom of (...) youth does on those in the flower of their youth" (1174b 33). Why this difference in the characterization of pleasure? Is Aristotle here committing the simple inconsistency of which he appears to be guilty? In the first section of this paper I shall argue that he is not. In the second section of this paper I shall suggest some reasons as to why Aristotle's interests in the subject of pleasure changed in the relatively short interim between Book 7 and Book 10. (shrink)

This paper argues first that claims that we are in the midst of a global obesity epidemic are vastly overblown and hardly new since we can find such calls to alarm for over a century at least. Second, we suggest that claims made about the possibility of losing weight are, for most people, simply false. Bluntly stated, there is lots of evidence to suggest that diets don’t work for the vast majority of people: even for those who lose weight, their (...) reprieve from fat tends to be short lived with 90% regaining their lost weight. Third, we maintain that claims made that obesity is either itself a disease or is causally and directly linked to harmful and sometimes lethal diseases are also misguided. Finally, we discuss the ways in which the construction of obesity as an epidemic disease has affected various parties, including fat people themselves. In particular, we discuss two approaches that have been made to the general anti-fat attitudes of contemporary western societies: the ‘fat and fit’ and ‘fat and proud’ movements. (shrink)

This paper employs Ian Hacking’s notion of interactive kinds to examine the recent construction of the kind, “depressed adolescent.” I examine first how adolescents themselves were constructed. I then trace how, in North America, we have moved in the past thirty-odd years from a situation of virtually no adolescent depression to the current situation where it is estimated that approximately one in four adolescents is depressed. I offer some reasons why we should be uncomfortable both with the exponential increases in (...) this kind and with the way in which depressed adolescents are being treated at present. In conclusion, I tentatively suggest some ways of proceeding in the future. (shrink)

This paper employs Ian Hacking’s notion of interactive kinds to examine the recent construction of the kind, “depressed adolescent.” I examine first how adolescents themselves were constructed. I then trace how, in North America, we have moved in the past thirty-odd years from a situation of virtually no adolescent depression to the current situation where it is estimated that approximately one in four adolescents is depressed. I offer some reasons why we should be uncomfortable both with the exponential increases in (...) this kind and with the way in which depressed adolescents are being treated at present. In conclusion, I tentatively suggest some ways of proceeding in the future. (shrink)

“That is no country for old men” is the famous first line of Yeats’s “Sailing to Byzantium,” which reflects upon aging, art, and immortality. Yeats sug­gests in his poem that the aged ought to move from the sensual, physical world of their youth to a world of intellect and timeless beauty. We em­ploy this poem and that line to explore the aging male protagonists in two recent novels: Cormac McCarthy’s No Country For Old Men, and J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace. We suggest (...) that though both of the novel’s pro­tagonists have aspirations to ’sail to Byzantium’, various factors ranging from their characters to the problematic realities of contemporary south­west America and South Africa make such a wholesale, successful journey impossible even though some progress is made. (shrink)

A central and integral feature of Mill's version of Utilitarianism is the necessity for moral agents to empathize with others, for without such empathy one has little or no motivation to pursue the general good. Mill believed that Benthamite Utilitarianism failed to provide a sufficient mechanism to induce would-be moral agents to empathize with others. Mill located the requisite mechanism when reading English Romantic poetry and theory: in particular, Mill believed that to empathize completely with others requires a special kind (...) of imagination. I argue that the theory of imagination adopted by Mill was essentially Wordsworthian. The importance of this conception of imagination has far reaching effects in Mill's thought: for example, Mill's infamous proof of the principle of utility is plausible only when considered in the context of the Mill's Romantic theory of imagination. ;Mill's initiation into aesthetics occurred in the late 1820s and early 1830s when Mill was also first exposed to Continental, and particularly to French, sociologists, especially to Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte. I investigate the nature and extent of their influence on Mill. Interestingly, there are some important parallels between this group and the English Romantics. Though widely divergent in political theory, all were, in some sense, conservatives and elitists. Both Comte and Coleridge, for example, thought that society ought to be run by a clerisy constituted primarily by the intellectual elite of society. This posed a serious problem for Mill both as an empiricist and as a liberal. Indeed, some have argued that, at least for some periods of his life, Mill abandoned both his empiricist heritage and his liberalism. I examine these issues in detail arguing that, in typical fashion for Mill, he attempted an amalgam of these various doctrines. In the final analysis, however, Mill remained firmly committed both to empiricism--and the reductionist and mechanistic view it implied--as well as to liberalism, though it is a liberalism with definite elitist strains within it. (shrink)

Debate concerning virtual reality is often drawn in terms of sharply defined dichotomies--for example, between "real" (or "actual") and "virtual," "authentic" and "inauthentic," and "natural" and "artificial." In this paper we offer an alternative approach by suggesting a conception of a virtual world that highlights a continuity and commonality with our sense of everyday reality. We accomplish this in part by an examination of the English picturesque garden as if it were a virtual world partially constructed out of ideas and (...) objects collected during travels to foreign lands on the Grand Tour. Such foreign travel transformed not only the English person's sense of self, but also altered the English landscape. We conclude that in one sense the "real" England is also a "virtual" reality. (shrink)