On Ambedkar's philosophy and views, and Indian philosophy on dalits; includes quotation extracted from Buddhist scriptures and literature.

Articles on spiritual philosophy and various aspects of Bhāgavatapurāṇa, Hindu mythological text; previously published in various newspapers and magazines.

On the fundamentals of Vedanta philosophy.

Kurt Gödel’s Incompleteness theorem is well known in Mathematics/Logic/Philosophy circles. Gödel was able to find a way for any given P (UTM), (read as, “P of UTM” for “Program of Universal Truth Machine”), actually to write down a complicated polynomial that has a solution iff (=if and only if), G is true, where G stands for a Gödel-sentence. So, if G’s truth is a necessary condition for the truth of a given polynomial, then P (UTM) has to answer first that (...) G is true in order to secure the truth of the said polynomial. But, interestingly, P (UTM) could never answer that G was true. This necessarily implies that there is at least one truth a P (UTM), however large it may be, cannot speak out. Daya Krishna and Karl Potter’s controversy regarding the construal of India’s Philosophies dates back to the time of Potter’s publication of “Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies” (1963, Englewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall Inc.) In attacking many of India’s philosophies, Daya Krishna appears to have unwittingly touched a crucial point: how can there be the knowledge of a ‘non-cognitive’ mokṣa? [‘mokṣa’ is the final state of existence of an individual away from Social Contract]—See this author’s Indian Social Contract and its Dissolution (2008) mokṣa does not permit the knowledge of one’s own self in the ordinary way with threefold distinction, i.e., subject–knowledge-object or knower–knowledge–known. But what is important is to demonstrate whether such ‘knowledge’ of non-cognitive mokṣa state can be logically shown, in a language, to be possible to attain, and that there is no contradiction involved in such demonstration, because, no one can possibly express the ‘experience-itself’ in language. Hence, if such ‘knowledge’ can be shown to be logically not impossible in language, then, not only Daya Krishna’s arguments against ‘non-cognitive mokṣa’ get refuted but also it would show the possibility of achieving ‘completeness’ in its truest sense, as opposed to Gödel’s ‘Incompleteness’. In such circumstances, man would himself become a Universal Truth Machine. This is because the final state of mokṣa is construed as the state of complete knowledge in Advaita. This possibility of ‘completeness’ is set in this paper in the backdrop of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya’s Advaitic (Non-dualistic) claim involved in the mahāvākyas (extra-ordinary propositions). (Mahāvākyas that Śaṅkara refers to are basically taken from different Upaniṣads. For example, “Aham Brahmāsmi” is from Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad, and “Tattvamasi” is from Chāndogya Upaniṣad. Śrī Śaṅkarācārya has written extensively. His main works include his Commentary on Brahma-Sūtras, on major Upaniṣads, and on ŚrīmadBhagavadGītā, called Bhāṣyas of them, respectively. Almost all these works are available in English translation published by Advaita Ashrama, 5 Dehi Entally Road, Calcutta, 700014.) On the other hand, the ‘Incompleteness’ of Gödel is due to the intervening G-sentence, which has an adverse self-referential element. Gödel’s incompleteness theorem in its mathematical form with an elaborate introduction by R.W. Braithwaite can be found in Meltzer (Kurt Gödel: on formally undecidable propositions of principia mathematica and related systems. Oliver & Boyd, Edinburgh, 1962). The present author believes first that semantic content cannot be substituted by any amount of arithmoquining, (Arithmoquining or arithmatization means, as Braithwaite says,—“Gödel’s novel metamathematical method is that of attaching numbers to the signs, to the series of signs (formulae) and to the series of series of signs (“proof-schemata”) which occur in his formal system…Gödel invented what might be called co-ordinate metamathematics…”) Meltzer (1962 p. 7). In Antone (2006) it is said “The problem is that he (Gödel) tries to replace an abstract version of the number (which can exist) with the concept of a real number version of that abstract notion. We can state the abstraction of what the number needs to be, [the arithmoquining of a number cannot be a proof-pair and an arithmoquine] but that is a concept that cannot be turned into a specific number, because by definition no such number can exist.”.), especially so where first-hand personal experience is called for. Therefore, what ultimately rules is the semanticity as in a first-hand experience. Similar points are voiced, albeit implicitly, in Antone (Who understands Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, 2006). (“…it is so important to understand that Gödel’s theorem only is true with respect to formal systems—which is the exact opposite of the analogous UTM (Antone (2006) webpage 2. And galatomic says in the same discussion chain that “saying” that it ((is)) only true for formal systems is more significant… We only know the world through “formal” categories of understanding… If the world as it is in itself has no incompleteness problem, which I am sure is true, it does not mean much, because that is not the world of time and space that we experience. So it is more significant that formal systems are incomplete than the inexperiencable ‘World in Itself’ has no such problem.—galatomic”) Antone (2006) webpage 2. Nevertheless galatomic certainly, but unwittingly succeeds in highlighting the possibility of experiencing the ‘completeness’ Second, even if any formal system including the system of Advaita of Śaṅkara is to be subsumed or interpreted under Gödel’s theorem, or Tarski’s semantic unprovability theses, the ultimate appeal would lie to the point of human involvement in realizing completeness since any formal system is ‘Incomplete’ always by its very nature as ‘objectual’, and fails to comprehend the ‘subject’ within its fold. (shrink)

On Jaina philosophy; includes translation in Hindi.

A Survey of Vinaya Literature. Charles S. Prebish. The Dharma Lamp Series 1, Jin Luen Publishing House, Taipei 1994. 157 pp. No price given.

Der Ursprung der japanischen Vinaya-Schule, Risshu, und die Entwicklung ihrer Lehre und Praxis. László Hankó. Göttingen: Cuvillier Verlag, 2003. xiii, 433 pp. €50. ISBN 3898736202.

The present contribution suggests the common authorship of three P?li commentaries of the twelfth/thirteenth centuries CE, namely the Vinayavinicchaya??k? called Vinayas?ratthasand?pan?, the Uttaravinicchaya??k? called L?natthappak?san?, and the Saccasa?khepa??k? called S?ratthas?lin?. The information collected from these three commentaries themselves and from P?li literary histories concerning these three texts leads to the second quarter of the thirteenth century CE as the period of their origination. The data from parallel texts explicitly stated to having been written by V?cissara Thera in the texts themselves (...) render it possible to establish with a high degree of probability V?cissara Thera as their author. (shrink)

While it has been known for several decades that the Āvaśyakacūrṇi of the Śvetāmbara Jaina tradition and the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya of the Buddhist tradition share some common narrative plots or motifs, so far no detailed study has been made to understand the different ways in which parallel narrative material is utilized in the two texts. Through a comparative study of stories of three characters in the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya and their counterparts in the Āvaśyakacūrṇi, this paper demonstrates that the (...) Buddhists and the Jainas who composed or redacted the two texts exploited parallel narrative plots or motifs along different lines and for different purposes. In particular, with regard to Jīvaka, who is widely known among Buddhists as a model of medical skill and religious faith, this paper argues that the fact that Jīvaka is prominently featured in Buddhist literature but finds no parallel in Jaina literature may be explained by the different attitudes of the two religions to medical healing and to the role of secular physicians in general. (shrink)

The word sautrāntika is known to designate one of the philosophical schools in later documents, but its earlier phase remains uncertain. The discovery of this term in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra thus brings forward new evidence essential for solving the problem of sautrāntika. In this paper, I will attempt to establish the interpretation of the context, in which the phrase vinayadharaḥ sautrāntikaḥ appears.

This paper compares the Cīvaravastu of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya with its counterparts in the other four Sthavira Vinayas, namely the Cīvarakkhandhaka/Cīvaradharma[ka] sections of the Vinayas of the Theravādins, Dharmaguptakas, Mahīśāsakas and Sarvāstivādins. It demonstrates that a significant number of stories and rules in the Cīvaravastu have no parallel in the other Sthavira Vinayas. Even those stories and rules that have parallels or partial parallels in the other Sthavira Vinayas can still offer us glimpses into the distinctive concerns of the (...) Mūlasarvāstivādin jurists who wrote or redacted this text. Based on three comparative tables and two examples, this paper argues that the Mūlasarvāstivādin authors/redactors of the Cīvaravastu, contrasted with the jurists of other Sthavira sects or schools, displayed at least five characteristics. First, they shared some common narrative lore with the Śvetāmbara Jainas, which is not found in the other Sthavira Vinayas. Second, they showed a stronger predilection for including past-life stories. Third, they repeatedly used the learned-but-greedy monk Upananda to create comic effect. Fourth, they were strongly and explicitly concerned with a wider range of legal issues related to Buddhist monastic inheritance, and came up with detailed solutions to such issues. Fifth, they showed a more acute awareness of the connection between monastic clothing and public image, as well as the need for thoroughly differentiating the appearance of Buddhist monks from that of other religious groups in ancient India. (shrink)

Der Pravarana in dem kanonischen Vinaya-Texten der Mulasarvastivadin und der Sarvastivadin. Jin-il Chung., Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1998. 368 pp. ISBN 3-525-26156-X.

Die Vorschriften für die Buddhistische Nonnengemeinde im Vinaya-Pitaka der Theravadin. Ute Hüsken. Dietrich Meier Veralg, Berlin 1997. 519 pp. ISBN 3-496-02632-4.

Comparative study of discipline in Theravada and Sarvastivada Buddhism.

This article compares two versions of a story about a Tibetan Buddhist monk, Sgra tshad pa Rin chen rnam rgyal, who engages in sexual intercourse with a laywoman. The authors of these two narratives, dating from the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries, each provide a different rationale for the monk’s behavior. In the earlier telling, Rin chen rnam rgyal is said to have “eased the suffering” of a “lust-crazed” woman, conducting himself virtuously, as a bodhisattva. In the later telling, the monk (...) is forcibly seduced by his patron and he adheres to a provision found in the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya, which specifies that the usual punishment intended for a Vinaya transgression of sexual intercourse—loss of communion from the order—may be commuted if the act has not been concealed from others. This article focuses on the transformation of the story and proposes that its changes contribute to the author’s wider commentary on strict Vinaya observance as an element of Buddhist monastic exemplarity. (shrink)

Most modern scholars seem to assume that Buddhist monks in early India had a good knowledge of Buddhist doctrine and at least of basic Buddhist texts. But the compilers of the vinayas or monastic codes seem not to have shared this assumption. The examples presented here are drawn primarily from one vinaya , and show that the compilers put in place a whole series of rules to deal with situations in which monks were startlingly ignorant of both doctrine and (...) text. One of these examples is particularly interesting for what it suggests about the linguistic sophistication of nuns, and another because it presents a case in which a nun is required to fill an important liturgical role in public and in the presence of monks. (shrink)

In the study of Buddhism it is commonly accepted that a monk or nun who commits a pārājika offence is permanently and irrevocably expelled from the Buddhist monastic order. This view is based primarily on readings of the Pāli Vinaya. With the exception of the Pāli Vinaya, however, all other extant Buddhist monastic law codes (Dharmaguptaka, Mahāsāṅghika, Mahīśāsaka, Sarvāstivāda and Mūlasarvāstivāda) contain detailed provisions for monks and nuns who commit pārājikas but nevertheless wish to remain within the saṅgha. (...) These monastics are not expelled. Rather, they are granted a special status known as the śikṣādattaka. In this paper I explore the rules. concerning pārājika penance and the śikṣādattaka with specific regard to monastic celibacy. Given that five out of six extant law codes recognise this remarkable accommodation to the rule of celibacy, I argue that we must look to Vinayas other than the Pāli Vinaya if we are to arrive at a nuanced and representative view of Indian Buddhist monasticism. Grant me chastity and continence, but not yet.Augustine of Hippo (354–430 C.E.). (shrink)