Conceptual realism acknowledges the existence of abstract objects: theoretical realism acknowledges the existence of non-observable objects; whereas classical realism acknowledges the existence of observable objects. Similarly, temporal realism accepts the existence of future and past events along with present ones, and spatial realism accepts the events which occur there (else-where) as well as those that occur here. We dealt earlier with the three former kinds of realism and their opposites: nominalism, instrumentalism and (ontological) idealism [2]. This paper contains an examination (...) of the two latter forms of realism: temporal and spatial, and their counterparts: temporal and spatial irrealisms. Analogies and connections between these standpoints will be the focus of the paper. (shrink)

The question concerning the ontic nature of space-time points and of space-time itself - is the question: are these objects set-theoretic sets or individuals, i.e. nonsets? Two classifications of the standpoints concerning the nature of these objects are formulated and then they are intersected. In concequence three standpoints appear: mereological substantivalism, set-theoretic substantivalism and set-theoretical relationism; it is showed that mereological relationism is not real. It is proved that set-theoretic standpoints logically imply so called set-theoretic realism which accepts the existence (...) of sets (if Quine's conception of existence is assumed). (shrink)

The author compares and evaluates four characterizations of spatio-temporal points, proposed by various modern ontologies of space-time, namely by set-theoretical substantivism and relationism on one hand, and by mereological substantivism in causal (exemplified by H. Field) or acauasal (exemplified by J. Jadacki) version, on the other hand. It is the question of properties (extension, localisation, causality, and individuality), and contexts (relation to moments or spatial points, and status in the theory of relativity), ascribed to spatio-temporal points in these ontologies. The (...) detailed discussion of these solutions leads to the conclusion that the only ontology consistent with the modern physics as well as with some essential philosophical intuitions, is the ontology of relationism. (shrink)

The domain of contemporary physics consists of two different classes of objects: a) of physical objects - events, particles (and their aggregates) and fields; b) spatio-temporal objects - space-time points, moments, space points and their corresponding sets: space-time, time and space. If objects of some kind (physical or spatio-temporal) are treated as individuals (= nonsets), then it is possible to define (equivalently) all remaining kinds of objects belonging to both classes which were mentioned above. This way we can construct two (...) monistic ontologies of physics: eventism founded on events, and the pointism founded on space-time points. It is also possible to construct a dualistic ontology of physics, based on events and space-time points. The paper presents these three ontologies. (shrink)

The paper presents an analysis of two basic notions of the ontology of physics: the notion of physical entity; and the notion of spatio-temporal entity. The author claims that there are three types of physical as well as spatio-temporal entites: (i) objects; (ii) propertes; and (iii) relations. The philosophical background of the author's considerations is his conception of point-eventism.

The conceptual framework of the article consists of three basic terms: „quasi-simultaneity”, „co-location” and „genidentity” (with their negations). Within this framework the author formulates and discusses his main thesis: if two events are not genidentical, then they are either spatially or temporally separated. This thesis expresses the fact, that, loosely speaking, time and space have their common basis in difference of things.

Contents: POSSIBLE ONTOLOGIES. Jacek Juliusz JADACKI: Preface. Book I: Zdzis??l??aw AUGUSTYNEK: Point Eventism. An Outline of a Certain Ontology. Book II: Jacek Juliusz JADACKI: Ontological Minimum. DISCUSSIONS. Katarzyna PAPRZYCKA: Carnap and Leibniz on the Problem of Being. Piotr PRZYBYSZ: Polish Discussions about Reism.

The domain of contemporary physics consists of two different classes of objects: a) physical objects — point events (shortly — events), elementary particles (and their aggregates), and fields; b) spatio-temporal objects — space-time points (shortly — points), moments, space points, and their corresponding sets: space-time, time and physical space. If objects of some kind (physical or spatio-temporal) are treated as individuals, i.e. nonsets, then it is possible to define the remaining kinds of objects from both above-mentioned classes. In this way (...) one can construct two alternative monistic ontologies of physics: eventism founded on events, and pointism founded on points. It is also possible to establish a dualistic ontology of physics, based both on events and points treated as individuals. In this paper these three ontologies are presented with particular emphasis on some extreme versions of monistic ontologies. I shall compare them considering both their respective advantages and difficulties and trying to justify my own choice of eventistic ontology. (shrink)

The paper presents an outline of two related space-time notions: the notion of location and the notion of extension. The first notion concerns only physical objects, the second notion referrs also to space-time objects. The approach to both notions is here non-metric of - strictly speaking - topological. The construction is carried out within the ontology of point-eventism. Hence two problems appear immediately: the problem of location of certain sets and the problem of their extension. The reason is that according (...) to the ontology of point-eventism all the physical as well as space-time objects - only point events excepted - are sets founded in such events. The author analyzes also the very relation between location and extension. (shrink)

This paper tries to prove two statements. Firstly, that set-theoretic positions in the controversy on the ontic nature of space-time logically imply set-theoretic realism. Secondly, thatmereological positions in this controversy give set-theoretic nominalism an appearance of verisimilitude.

The paper discusses the ontology of Zdzisław Augustynek, especially the part of this ontology that relates to space and time. This position is analyzed as an attempt to implement two methodological postulates, namely the postulates of reductionism and scientific realism.

The ontological theory of point eventism appears in the Polish philosophical literature as Zdzisław Augustynek's original work, belonging to the glorious philosophical tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School. The author concentrates exclusively on "weak points" of Augustynek's eventism (skipping simultaneously all its unquestionable advantages); he examines basic notions and statements of the analysed doctrine. The main aim of this critical survey is to prepare a ground for a proper reconstruction of this ontological stance.

The book is comprised of three components. The first component analyses the creative contribution to the theory of imperatives and norms provided by 20th-century Polish researchers. The second component summarizes their reflections and considerations. The third component is an anthology of the classic writings of Polish authors of the time; it constitutes an illustration of the first part and indicates that their research covered practically the whole scope of this theory. Author Jacek Jadacki (born 1946) is professor at Warsaw University. (...) His scholarly production includes approximately hundred works spanning almost every domain in philosophy: from logic, through ontology, epistemology, aesthetics and ethics, to the history of these disciplines. Among his more than twenty books are Possible Ontologies (with Zdzislaw Augustynek; 1993), From the Viewpoint of the Lvov-Warsaw School (2003), and Polish Analytical Philosophy (2009). His pupils include such well-known figures of modern Polish thought as Anna Brozek, Mariusz Grygianiec, Joanna Odrowaz-Sypniewska, and Mieszko Talasiewicz. (shrink)

The main aim of the paper is to revive Zdzisław Augustynek's attempts to define the relation of genidentity. The text embraces the following issues: (i) a presentation of three axiomatic definitions of genidentity; (ii) a reconstruction of the definitions in question in the language of the predicate calculus; (iii) a supplementing the above reconstruction by appropriate proofs; (iv) an analysis of the selected methodological and ontological assumptions of the discussed systems; (v) a comparison of Augustynek's systems with Eugeniusz (...) Żabski's proposal; (vi) an outline of the definition of a thing as an abstractum (equivalence class, invariant) over the set of all punctual events under a relation of genidentity. (shrink)

In the text Zdarzenia, rzeczy, procesy Zdzisław Augustynek argued against some versions of liberal reism that they are not able to deliver appropriate, non-circular definitions both of events and moments respectively. The main aim of the article is to show that the objection in question is not sound: indeed, we are vested with a proce-dure to find a way out from the indicated difficulty. In the text three forms of liberal reism are presented and their problems with the relevant (...) definitions are analysed. Then the schematic method of defining the aforementioned categories is proposed and discussed. The presented considerations are crowned with the conclusion that in the light of the suggested reconstructions Augustynek's pessimistic evaluation of reistic doctrines should not be seen as a correct one. (shrink)