ABSTRACT Copredication, as exhibited by sentences such as ‘That book is heavy but informative,’ is commonly seen as a phenomenon that is tied to sentences featuring polysemous expressions. David Liebesman and Ofra Magidor have recently attacked this view by arguing that ‘book’ has a single context-sensitive sense. The first aim of the present paper is to show that Liebesman and Magidor are wrong to claim that ‘book’ is univocal, but that they may nonetheless be right to question that (...) class='Hi'>copredication requires polysemy. Its second aim is to consider implications of this result for the debates on copredication and on semantic variability. (shrink)

The standard view of truth-conditional semantics is that it is world-involving in the sense that a theory that specifies truth conditions eo ipso is a theory that specifies the way the world must be if the target sentences are to be true. It would appear to follow that the semantic properties of expressions, such as nominals, specify the very worldly objects that make true or false the sentences that host the nominals. Chomsky and others have raised a fundamental complaint against (...) this thought: perfectly quotidian nominals, such as London or book, may occur copredicatively as a single argument of categorically mismatched predicates, which prima facie preclude a coherent uniform construal of the nominal argument. The argument has hitherto been presented via examples that challenge the standard view. My aim here is to present the argument explicitly, defend it against some likely counterclaims, and resolve what might appear to be a decisive consideration against the conclusion of the argument, viz., if nominals as copredicatively occurring do not contribute uniform worldly entities, then how can the copredicative constructions be counted as true? (shrink)

In Löhr and Michel (2022), we proposed a neurocognitive model within the predictive processing paradigm for acceptability intuitions about copredication sentences. We also addressed “predicate order effects,” the phenomenon that the acceptability of copredication sentences can vary with the order in which the predicates occur. We discussed Murphy's interpretation of order preferences based on a hierarchy of semantic complexity and tried to motivate that other interpretations are worthwhile pursuing. In a reply letter, Murphy (2022) takes issue with our (...) approach, putting forward several purported methodological and conceptual issues with our paper. In this reply, we first clarify where exactly we agree and disagree. Second, we focus on a crucial equivocation and some misrepresentations of our proposal by Murphy. (shrink)

Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 5, May 2022.

Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 10, October 2022.

We propose a record type theoretical account of cases of copredication which have motivated the introduction of dot types in the Generative Lexicon. We will suggest that using record types gives us a simple and intuitive account of dot types and also makes a connection between copredication and the use of hypothetical contexts in a record type theoretic analysis of dynamic generalized quantifiers. We propose a view of lexical innovation which draws both on Pustejovsky’s original work on the (...) Generative Lexicon and the notion of resource present in the Grammatical Framework. (shrink)

Copredication occurs when a sentence receives a true reading despite prima facie ascribing categorically incompatible properties to a single entity. For example, ‘The red book is by Tolstoy’ can have a true reading even though it seems that being red is only a property of physical copies, while being by Tolstoy is only a property of informational texts. -/- A tempting strategy for resolving this tension is to claim that at least one of the predicates has a non-standard interpretation, (...) with the salient proposal involving reinterpretation via meaning transfer. For example, in ‘The red book is by Tolstoy’, one could hold that the predicate ‘by Tolstoy’ is reinterpreted (or on the more specific proposal, transferred) to ascribe a property that physical copies can uncontroversially instantiate, such as expresses an informational text by Tolstoy. On this view, the truth of the copredicational sentence is no longer mysterious. Furthermore, such a reinterpretation view can give a straightforward account of a range of puzzling copredicational sentences involving counting an individuation. -/- Despite these substantial virtues, we will argue that reinterpretation approaches to copredication are untenable. In §1 we introduce reinterpretation views of copredication and contrast them with key alternatives. In §2 we argue against a general reinterpretation theory of copredication on which every copredicational sentence contains at least one reinterpreted predicate. We also raise additional problems for the more specific proposal of implementing reinterpretation via meaning transfer. In §3 we argue against more limited appeals to reinterpretation on which only some copredicational sentences contain reinterpretation. In §4 we criticize a series of arguments in favour of reinterpretation theories. The upshot is that reinterpretation theories of copredication, and in particular, meaning transfer-based accounts, should be rejected. (shrink)

Copredication is the phenomenon whereby two or more predicates seem to require that their argument denotes different things. The denotation of words that copredicate has been broadly discussed. In this paper, I investigate the metaphysics behind this question. Thus, mereological theories of dot objects claim that these nouns denote complex entities; Asher (Lexical meaning in context, Cambridge University Press, 2011, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511793936) thinks that they denote bare particulars; and the Activation Package Theory contends that they stand for multiple denotations. According (...) to the Activation Package Theory, copredicative nouns stand for complex knowledge structures that offer a range of multiple potential denotations. In this paper, I claim that the Activation Package Theory contributes to solve some of the metaphysical questions that arise from copredication. (shrink)

A family of familiar linguistic tests purport to help identify when a term is ambiguous. These tests are philosophically important: a familiar philosophical strategy is to claim that some phenomenon is disunified and its accompanying term is ambiguous. The tests have been used to evaluate disunification proposals about causation, pain, and knowledge, among others. -/- These ambiguity tests, however, have come under fire. It has been alleged that the tests fail for polysemy, a common type of ambiguity, and one that (...) is at issue in philosophically interesting cases. Furthermore, the objection that the tests fail for polysemy is often taken to be an undeniable bit of linguistic data. -/- We argue that this is mistaken. The objection implicitly relies on controversial assumptions about how to account for copredicational sentences, in which a single argument is ascribed prima facie incompatible properties. Furthermore, on several viable theories of copredication, the objection fails. However, our discussion also reveals that even if ambiguity tests are preserved, they may be significantly harder to execute than previously thought. (shrink)

It is still an open question how senses of inherent polysemous words are represented and interpreted. Empirical results are not conclusive about the representation of polysemy. Therefore, different representation models try to give an answer about the puzzle of representation of polysemous words in general and of inherent polysemous words in particular. Inherent polysemous words are those that have several related senses that allow copredication, which occurs when one polysemous word is used to express simultaneously two related senses in (...) a sentence. Ortega-Andrés and Vicente, 2019) propose a rich semantic approach that explains the interpretation of copredicative sentences. This chapter has three goals: I discuss and classify underspecification approaches about the representation of polysemous words; I analyze some empirical results and their contributions to the debate about the representation of polysemy and inherent polysemy; and I argue that the rich account that Ortega-Andrés and Vicente give a plausible explanation about the representation of inherent polysemous words. (shrink)

Empirical evidence suggests that perceptual‐motor simulations are often constitutively involved in language comprehension. Call this “the simulation view of language comprehension”. This article applies the simulation view to illuminate the much‐discussed phenomenon of copredication, where a noun permits multiple predications which seem to select different senses of the noun simultaneously. On the proposed account, the (in)felicitousness of a copredicational sentence is closely associated with the perceptual simulations that the language user deploys in comprehending the sentence.

The paper presents an accommodation problem for extant semantic accounts of fiction. Some accounts of fiction are designed to accommodate one or another form of fictive statement exclusively, what I shall call in-fiction and out-fiction. Thus, typically, the accounts fail to do justice to their respective excluded form. A natural response, entertained by Kripke and in a different fashion by latter-day Meinongians, is to let the two different kinds of fiction have their respective accounts. It is very easy, however, to (...) mix in and out predicates, which amounts to a species of copredication, where a single nominal receives simultaneous distinct interpretations relative to distinct predicates without creating ambiguity. Copredication is a perfectly general phenomenon that arises for any nominal. The simple problem now is that copredication appears to render all extant accounts of fiction either essentially partial, in dealing with one kind of simple form of fiction but not another, or merely wrong in imagining that fiction comes in categorically distinct forms, for the coherence of copredication is enough to show that this is not so. The aim of the paper is to show to resolve this accommodation problem by the radical expedient of suggesting that the fiction/non-fiction distinction is not really a semantic one, but more one between different ways in which sentences are made true or false. (shrink)

Predictive processing, an increasingly popular paradigm in cognitive sciences, has focused primarily on giving accounts of perception, motor control and a host of psychological phenomena, including consciousness. But higher cognitive processes, like conceptual thought, language, and logic, have received only limited attention to date and PP still stands disconnected from a huge body of research in those areas. In this thesis, I aim to address this gap and I attempt to go some way towards developing and defending a cognitive-computational approach (...) to higher cognition within the predictive processing paradigm. To test its explanatory potential, I apply it to a range of linguistic and conceptual phenomena. I proceed in three steps. First, I lay out an account of concepts and suggest how concepts are represented, how they can be context-sensitively processed, and how the apparent diversity of formats arise. Secondly, I propose how paradigmatic higher cognitive competencies, like language and logical reasoning, could fit into the PP picture. Thirdly, I apply the PP account of concepts and language to a range of linguistic-conceptual phenomena as test cases, namely: metaphor, the semantic paradox (specifically the Liar Paradox) and copredication. Finally, I discuss some challenges and objections to the PP framework as applied to higher cognition and in general. (shrink)

Over two decades ago a "quite revolution" overwhelmingly replaced knowledgebased approaches in natural language processing (NLP) by quantitative (e.g., statistical, corpus-based, machine learning) methods. Although it is our firm belief that purely quantitative approaches cannot be the only paradigm for NLP, dissatisfaction with purely engineering approaches to the construction of large knowledge bases for NLP are somewhat justified. In this paper we hope to demonstrate that both trends are partly misguided and that the time has come to enrich logical semantics (...) with an ontological structure that reflects our commonsense view of the world and the way we talk about in ordinary language. In this paper it will be demonstrated that assuming such an ontological structure a number of challenges in the semantics of natural language (e.g., metonymy, intensionality, copredication, nominal compounds, etc.) can be properly and uniformly addressed. (shrink)

In the formal semantics based on modern type theories, common nouns are interpreted as types, rather than as predicates of entities as in Montague’s semantics. This brings about important advantages in linguistic interpretations but also leads to a limitation of expressive power because there are fewer operations on types as compared with those on predicates. The theory of coercive subtyping adequately extends the modern type theories and, as shown in this paper, plays a very useful role in making type theories (...) more expressive for formal semantics. It not only gives a satisfactory solution to the basic problem of ‘multiple categorisation’ caused by interpreting common nouns as types, but provides a powerful formal framework to model interesting linguistic phenomena such as copredication, whose formal treatment has been found difficult in a Montagovian setting. In particular, we show how to formally introduce dot-types in a type theory with coercive subtyping and study some type-theoretic constructs that provide useful representational tools for reference transfers and multiple word meanings in formal lexical semantics. (shrink)

Resolution of Frege's Puzzle by denying that synonym substitution in logical truths preserves sentence sense and explaining how logical form has semantic import. Intensional context substitutions needn't preserve truth, because intercepting doesn't preserve sentence meaning. Intercepting is nonuniformly substituting a pivotal term in syntactically secured truth. Logical sentences and their synonym interceptions share factual content. Semantic content is factual content in synthetic predications, but not logical sentences and interceptions. Putnam's Postulate entails interception nonsynonymy. Syntax and vocabulary explain only the factual (...) content of synthetic predications; extrasentential reality explains their truth. Construction of logical factual content explains logical necessity. Terms retain objectual reference, but logical syntax preempts their function in explaining truth. Grasping the facts GG/gg assert entails understanding this. Understanding what GH states requires some recognition that GH must be true just because GmH, and GmH state an empirical fact. GH is standardly used to express that fact. Church's Test exposes puzzles. QMi sentences, and QTi sentences are metalogical necessities, true by syntax. Intercepting QMi creates empirical QM contingencies. Synonymy turns semantic contingencies into metalogical and lexical necessities. That transformation is syntactic, via the syntactic duality of definite descriptions. GmH is a contingent copredication, and a lexically necessary referential identity with rigidly codesignating indexicals. Metalogical sentences may be about expressional matter or what it expresses. GG has GG's semantic content, but the referent expression switches. Metalogical syntax secures truth by self-referential quotational indexing. Metalogically, referents are identified with intrasentential replica. Extrasentential identifications are metalogically irrelevant. (shrink)

Based on the existence of polysemy (e.g., lunch can refer to both food and events), it is argued that central tenets of externalist semantics and Fodorian concept atomism, an externalist theory on which words lack semantic structure, are unsound. We evaluate the premise that these arguments rely on—that polysemous words have separate, finer‐grained senses. We survey the evidence across psychology and linguistics and argue that it shows that polysemy does not exist, at least not in this “sense”. The upshot is (...) that if polysemy does not exist, it cannot pose a problem for atomism or externalism. (shrink)

In Category Mistakes, Magidor proposes that sortal restrictions should be viewed as pragmatic presuppositions. This contrasts with recent linguistic theories of successfully resolved category mistakes, e.g. coercions or copredication. It has been argued that for the proper treatment of such examples, sortal restrictions should be expressed by semantic presuppositions since they need to interact with compositional semantics. I explore possible ways in which Magidor’s theory could be extended to explain examples of coercion and copredication. The outcome of the (...) discussion is that incorporation of these facts into Magidor’s pragmatic system might be possible, but ecessitates choices that are far from trivial. (shrink)

Semantic internalism is the view that linguistic meaning amounts to forms of conceptual instructions, and that the process of forming linguistic representations does not involve reference to extra-mental entities. Contemporary philosophy of language remains predominantly externalist in focus, having developed systems of extensional reference which depart from classical rationalist assumptions. Semantic internalism is defended here using a broad range of case studies. Particular focus is be placed on exemplar cases such as natural kind and artifactual terms. Typical natural kind terms (...) are shown to have their meaning constructed via a range of cognitive faculties (considerations of material basis being only one of them), and consulting basic properties of language processing and parsing can explain our intuitions about common word use, a major goal of the internalist enterprise. Copredication via inherent polysemy is used as a strong source of evidence for internalism, countering the received view of the externalist character of meaning. Semantic internalism is comprehensively defended against its critics, pushing the exploration of linguistic content and meaning “back into the head”. (shrink)

In a recent paper Asher and Pustejovsky propose a type theoretical approach to account for cases of copredication which had motivated Pustejovsky to introduce dot types in the Generative Lexicon. In this paper I will propose an alternative treatment to that given by Asher and Pustejovsky using type theory with records. I will suggest that using record types not only gives us a simple and intuitive account of dot types but also makes an important connection between copredication and (...) the use of hypothetical contexts in dynamic generalized quantifiers I have proposed in earlier work. More generally it allows us to preserve the intuitive feature structure based accounts of lexical analysis proposed in Pustejovsky’s original work on the Generative Lexicon while at the same time introducing functions and binding in the way that is necessary for giving formal accounts of compositional semantics. (shrink)

We propose a lexical account of event nouns, in particular of deverbal nominalisations, whose meaning is related to the event expressed by their base verb. The literature on nominalisations often assumes that the semantics of the base verb completely defines the structure of action nominals. We argue that the information in the base verb is not sufficient to completely determine the semantics of action nominals. We exhibit some data from different languages, especially from Romance language, which show that nominalisations focus (...) on some aspects of the verb semantics. The selected aspects, however, seem to be idiosyncratic and do not automatically result from the internal structure of the verb nor from its interaction with the morphological suffix. We therefore propose a partially lexicalist approach view of deverbal nouns. It is made precise and computable by using the Montagovian generative lexicon, a type theoretical framework introduced by Bassac, Mery and Retoré in this journal in 2010. This extension of Montague semantics with a richer type system easily incorporates lexical phenomena like the semantics of action nominals in particular deverbals, including their polysemy and felicitous copredications. (shrink)

We propose a lexical account of event nouns, in particular of deverbal nominalisations, whose meaning is related to the event expressed by their base verb. The literature on nominalisations often assumes that the semantics of the base verb completely defines the structure of action nominals. We argue that the information in the base verb is not sufficient to completely determine the semantics of action nominals. We exhibit some data from different languages, especially from Romance language, which show that nominalisations focus (...) on some aspects of the verb semantics. The selected aspects, however, seem to be idiosyncratic and do not automatically result from the internal structure of the verb nor from its interaction with the morphological suffix. We therefore propose a partially lexicalist approach view of deverbal nouns. It is made precise and computable by using the Montagovian generative lexicon, a type theoretical framework introduced by Bassac, Mery and Retoré in this journal in 2010. This extension of Montague semantics with a richer type system easily incorporates lexical phenomena like the semantics of action nominals in particular deverbals, including their polysemy and felicitous copredications. (shrink)

In my book Category Mistakes, I discuss a range of potential accounts of category mistakes and defend a pragmatic, presuppositional account of the phenomenon. Three commentators discuss the book: Márta Abrusán focuses on a comparison between my book and Asher’s Lexical Meaning in Context, suggesting that Asher’s theory has the advantage of accounting not only for category mistakes, but also for additional phenomena such as so-called ‘coertion’ and ‘co-predication’. I argue that Asher’s account of all three phenomena is deficient, and, (...) moreover, that it is far from clear that the latter two phenomena are related to that of category mistakes. James Shaw challenges two of my arguments against the MBT view. I respond to these challenges. Paul Elbourne provides a novel argument in support of my account of category mistakes, involving multi-sentence discourses and ERP experiments. I show that it is not entirely straightforward for my account to explain this data, but that his argument does ul... (shrink)

Zeugmatic oddness is a linguistic intuition of oddness with respect to an instance of zeugma, i.e. a sentence containing an instance of a homonymous or polysemous word being used in different meanings or senses simultaneously. Zeugmatic oddness is important for philosophical debates as philosophers often use it to argue that a particular philosophically interesting expression is ambiguous and that the phenomenon referred to by the expression is disunified. This paper takes a closer look at zeugmatic oddness. Focusing on relevant psycholinguistic (...) literature on homonymy and polysemy processing and representation, I argue that there are two different ways in which zeugmatic oddness can arise. Philosophical upshots concerning zeugmatic oddness are then drawn. (shrink)