In this work, attention is drawn to the abundant use of metaphor and analogy in works of logic. I argue that pervasiveness of figurative language is to be counted among the features that characterize logic and distinguish it from other sciences. This characteristic feature reflects the creativity that is inherent in logic and indeed has been demonstrated to be a necessary part of logic. The goal of this paper, in short, is to provide specific examples of figurative language used in (...) logic that yield insights into the nature of the subject. I encourage the reader to take metaphors seriously, and to accept that they are not mere embellishments but key elements in our understanding of logic. (shrink)

Aristotle tells us that contemplation is the most self-sufficient form of virtuous activity: we can contemplate alone, and with minimal resources, while moral virtues like courage require other individuals to be courageous towards, or courageous with. This is hard to square with the rest of his discussion of self-sufficiency in the Ethics: Aristotle doesn't generally seek to minimize the number of resources necessary for a flourishing human life, and seems happy to grant that such a life will be self-sufficient despite (...) requiring a lot of external goods. In this paper I develop an interpretation of self-sufficiency as a form of independence from external contributors to our activity, and argue that this interpretation accounts both for Aristotle's views on contemplation and for the role self-sufficiency plays in his broader account of human happiness. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against rationalist readings of Aristotle's epistemology, on which our scientific understanding is justified on the basis of certain demonstrative first principles that are themselves justified only by some brute form of rational intuition. I then investigate the relationship between our intuition of principles and the broadly perceptual knowledge from which it derives. I argue that, for Aristotle, perceptual knowledge helps justify our intuition of principles, and also serves as an authority against which these principles and (...) their consequences must be assessed. I end by considering how we should understand the justificatory role played by perception, and sketching the nuanced, empirically-minded sort of foundationalism I take Aristotle to endorse. (shrink)

Panenetheism is the claim that God and the cosmos are intimately inter-related, with the cosmos being in God and God being in the cosmos. What does this exactly mean? The aim of this paper is to address this question by sheding light on four possible models of God-world-inter-relatedness. Being critical of those models, which understand maximal immanence in a literal, spatial sense, the paper argues in favor of a model, which cashes out immanence in terms of divine activity. God is, (...) where God acts. Since God acts upon all of creation everywhere and anytime, God is omnipresent to it at all times. Thus, the proposal is to read the ‘en’ in ‘panetheism’ in an ‘agential sense’: God is in the cosmos by creating and sustaining it and the cosmos is in God by constantly being within the sphere of divine activity. (shrink)

The aim of the present volume is to draw the balance of naturalism's success so far.

Despite the opening of the market and partial privatization of state‐owned companies in China, the state still represents the controlling shareholder in larger companies. By analyzing the weaknesses of Chinese corporate governance we illustrate the framework for harmful corruption. China is characterized by a weak legal system and strong influences of traditions such as guanxi. In this article we analyze the influence of guanxi on the Chinese corporate governance system. We find that guanxi is in general a double‐edged sword, but (...) business‐to‐government guanxi in particular can harm the weak Chinese corporate governance system and hamper its further economic development and growth. (shrink)

Aristotle claims that "although we perceive particulars, perception is of universals; for instance of human being, not of Callias-the-human-being" (APo II.19 100a16-b1). I offer an interpretation of this claim and examine its significance in Aristotle's epistemology.

Aristotle's cognitive ideal is a form of understanding that requires a sophisticated grasp of scientific first principles. At the end of the Analytics, Aristotle tells us that we learn these principles by induction. But on the whole, commentators have found this an implausible claim: induction seems far too basic a process to yield the sort of knowledge Aristotle's account requires. In this paper I argue that this criticism is misguided. I defend a broader reading of Aristotelian induction, on which there's (...) good sense to be made of the claim that we come to grasp first principles inductively, and show that this reading is a natural one given Aristotle's broader views on scientific learning. (shrink)

Aristotle presents perception as a potentially intelligent form of cognition—a form of cognition that allows us to respond in discerning, knowing ways to a range of different situations, and develop certain theoretical insights relevant to some inquiry. But it’s not clear how we should understand the interaction between our rational and perceptual powers in these cases, or how widespread we should take their interaction to be. In this paper I argue against interpretations on which human perception would be an inherently (...) rational power. I then develop an alternative view of intelligent perception that seeks to do justice to the role Aristotle assigns nonrational uses of perception in his account of our learning, and to his emphasis on the continuity between animal and human forms of cognition. On the view I develop, our rational powers influence perception in two ways. First, they allow for a form of perception that is contemplative—that is, a form of perception that aims to work out how and what things are, and not just how things are to be responded to. Second, they afford us practical and theoretical forms of understanding that inform what we recognize perceptually, and thereby yield forms of action and insight unavailable to other animals. (shrink)

SummaryHolm Tetens develops in his book „Gott denken. Ein Versuch über rationale Theologie“ theoretical and practical arguments against a naturalistic and in favour of a theistic understanding of reality. In my paper I focus on Teten’s claim that we are rationally justified to hope for the truth of classical theism. I distinguish between rationally justified and unjustified forms of hope and argue that we are rationally justified to hope for the redemption of reality as promised by classical theism. However, this (...) hope has a weaker basis of justification than Tetens seems to assume because serious objections to classical theism ought to be taken into consideration as well. (shrink)

Das Handbuch dokumentiert die Bedeutung der analytischen Philosophie für den religionsphilosophischen und theologischen Diskurs erstmalig in kompakter Weise für den deutschsprachigen Raum. Ausgehend von der analytischen Methode, den Vorboten und den maßgeblichen Vertretern der analytischen Religionsphilosophie, wird der Blick auf die wichtigsten etablierten Diskurse, wie etwa die Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes, das Verhältnis Gott – Mensch und Gott – Welt, sowie auf aktuelle Debatten gelenkt. Dabei kommen sowohl der „Neue Atheismus“, die Attraktivität a-personaler Gottesbegriffe als auch der religiöse Pluralismus zur (...) Sprache. (shrink)

While direct proof is widely considered the paradigm of the acquisition of knowledge by deductive means, indirect proof has traditionally been criticized as showing merely ‘that’ its conclusion is true and not ‘why’ it is true. This paper accounts for the traditional objection by emphasizing the argumentative role in indirect proof of logical principles such as excluded middle and non-contradiction.

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 67 Heft: 2 Seiten: 300-306.

Alternative Gotteskonzepte gibt es viele. Im Grunde ist jedes Gotteskonzept eine Alternative für andere Gotteskonzepte. Die Frage nach alternativen Gotteskonzepten ist somit eine Frage der Perspektive. In der gegenwärtigen analytischen Religionsphilosophie werden unter dem Begriff ›alternative Gotteskonzepte‹ Gottesvorstellungen zusammengefasst, die sich implizit oder explizit von dem in der Diskussion vorherrschenden christlich inspirierten theistischen Gottesbegriff abheben. Die Ausgangsperspektive ist also der durch die westlich-christlich geprägte Tradition theistische Gottesbegriff, während Abweichungen davon als alternative Gottesbegriffe gelten.

Dürrenmatt a été profondément marqué par la philosophie qu’il a étudiée à l’Université de Berne. Le présent article montre quelques aspects de cette influence, qui comprend non seulement des aspects épistémologiques (Platon et Kant) auxquels Dürrenmatt s’est dit fidèle tout au long de sa vie, mais aussi une approche de l’écriture axée sur la communication indirecte, à la suite du Kierkegaard du Postscriptum aux Miettes philosophiques, puisant souvent dans les contes et les mythes antiques pour en dégager la pertinence et (...) l’actualité, contre toute visée systématisante et dogmatisante qui prétend se saisir de la vérité en soi. (shrink)

Die Frage, was Religionsphilosophie eigentlich ist, ist eine Meta-Frage, da sie nach der spezifischen Eigenart religionsphilosophischer Reflexion fragt. Diese Frage ist schwierig zu beantworten, da Religionen äußerst komplexe Phänomene sind. Zum einen gibt es eine schier unendliche Vielfalt an unterschiedlichen existierenden Religionen und religiösen Praktiken.

A prominent version of mathematical structuralism holds that mathematical objects are at bottom nothing but "positions in structures," purely relational entities without any sort of nature independent of the structure to which they belong. Such an ontology is often presented as a response to Benacerraf's "multiple reductions" problem, or motivated on hermeneutic grounds, as a faithful representation of the discourse and practice of mathematics. In this paper I argue that there are serious difficulties with this kind of view: its proponents (...) rely on a distinction between "essential" and "nonessential" features of mathematical objects, and there's no good way to articulate this distinction which is compatible with basic structuralist commitments. But all is not lost. For I further argue that the insights motivating structuralism (or at least those worth preserving) can be preserved without formulating the view in ontologically committal terms. (shrink)

In this paper I aim at explaining how analytic philosophical theology developed into a thriving field of research. In doing so, I place analytic philosophical theology into a larger intellectually narrative that is deeply influenced by the philosophy of Enlightenment. This larger framework shows that analytic philosophical theology aims at providing answers to concerns raised by a philosophical tradition that shaped fundamentally the making of our modern Western secular world.

We take it for granted that a person persists over time: when we make plans, we assume that we will carry them out; when we punish someone for a crime, we assume that she is the same person as the one who committed it. Metaphysical questions underlying these assumptions point towards an area of deep existential and philosophical interest. In this volume, leading metaphysicians discuss key questions about personal identity, including 'What are we?', 'How do we persist?', and 'Which conditions (...) guarantee our identity over time?' They discuss whether personal identity is 'complex', whereby it is analyzable in terms of simpler relations such as physical or psychological features, or whether it is 'simple', namely something that cannot be analyzed in terms of more fundamental relations. Their essays offer an innovative discussion of this topic and will be of interest to a wide readership in metaphysics. (shrink)

Friedrich Nietzsche has emerged as one of the most important and influential modern philosophers. For several decades, the book series Monographien und Texte zur Nietzsche-Forschung (MTNF) has set the agenda in a rapidly growing and changing field of Nietzsche scholarship. The scope of the series is interdisciplinary and international in orientation reflects the entire spectrum of research on Nietzsche, from philosophy to literary studies and political theory. The series publishes monographs and edited volumes that undergo a strict peer-review process. The (...) book series is led by an international team of editors, whose work represents the full range of current Nietzsche scholarship. (shrink)

Since the spectrum of possibilities in linguistic theory construction is much broader and more variegated than students of linguistics have perhaps been led to believe, the Current Issues in Linguistic Theory series has been established in order to provide a forum for the presentation and discussion of linguistic opinions of scholars who do not necessarily accept the prevailing mode of thought in linguistic science. CILT is a theory-oriented series which welcomes contributions from scholars who have significant proposals to make towards (...) the advancement of our understanding of language, its structure, functioning, and development. Current Issues in Linguistic Theory is especially designed, by offering an alternative outlet for meaningful contributions to the current linguistic debate, to furnish the community of linguists the diversity of opinion which a healthy discipline must have. (shrink)

Several non-naturalist philosophers look for ways to maintain the objectivity of morals without making any ontological commitments. Recently Derek Parfit proposed an account of non-ontologically existing irreducible moral properties. My first aim in this paper is to outline that such an account is doomed to fail. My second aim in this paper is to argue that irreducible moral properties can be integrated with adaptions into an ontological framework such as E.J. Lowe’s four-category ontology. If it can be shown that irreducible (...) moral properties have a proper place in such an ontology, then there is no need to distinguish between an ontological and non-ontological mode of existence, which, in turn helps to eschew the obscurities that this distinction brings in its wake. (shrink)