I describe my current thinking on two old questions—the causal role of appraisals and the relationship of appraisal theories to basic emotions theories and constructivist theories, and three (sort of) new questions—the completeness of appraisals, the role of language, and the development of automaticity in emotional responses.

Concerned with the idea of the self, this text challenges what it perceives to be the bleak deconstructionist views of ceaseless change with a discussion and depiction of the self in new vocabulary - an action-oriented self defined by the ways in which it communicates.

This reflection considers my dawning realization that Zapatista insurgency reflects not only opposition to racist devaluation of the cultures of indigenous peoplesbut more fundamentally a struggle to overcome spiritual deracination. I contest two basic assumptions of much contemporary social theory: that race and deracination are entirely socio-cultural phenomena and that the central role played by dialogical accord in Zapatista communities can be understood without a spiritual conception of human existence. I propose that only a spiritual understanding of these three pivotal (...) issues—race, deracination, and dialogue (or accord)—aptly captures the core intuitions that inform Zapatista insurgency. (shrink)

This article provides a brief introduction to psychological emotion theories, particularly appraisal theory. According to appraisal theory emotions are combinations of a person’s appraisal of the novelty, valence, certainty, goal conduciveness, causal agency, controllability, and morality of a situation. These dimensions correspond to elements of the stories attorneys attempt to create in arguing a case. Appraisal theory puts specific content into the vague concept of reappraisal, accounting for emotional changes that go beyond the changes in valence and intensity generally studied (...) by law and emotions scholars. (shrink)

The purpose of this volume is to remedy this neglect, to explain Thoreau's philosophical significance, and to argue that we can still learn from his polemical conception of philosophy.

Some thoughts on the nature of networks, the prevalence of emotional experiences, and the importance of new questions.

This article describes James’s distaste for taxonomic classification of emotion and argues that he would not have been pleased by current scholarship which still focuses on the definition and classification of discrete emotions, distracting scholars from more fundamental underlying processes. I argue that as in James’s time, current taxonomies are still arbitrary and still constrain the kinds of questions psychologists ask.

Interweaves elements of Kristevan and Heideggerian thought in order to reconstruct a linguistically embedded, existentially and affectively rich, dialectical model of willed self-regulation.

Researchers are concerned about whether manipulations have the intended effects. Many journals and reviewers view manipulation checks favorably, and they are widely reported in prestigious journals. However, the prototypical manipulation check is a verbal (rather than behavioral) measure that always appears at the same point in the procedure (rather than its order being varied to assess order effects). Embedding such manipulation checks within an experiment comes with problems. While we conceptualize manipulation checks as measures, they can also act as interventions (...) which initiate new processes that would otherwise not occur. The default assumption that manipulation checks do not affect experimental conclusions is unwarranted. They may amplify, undo, or interact with the effects of a manipulation. Further, the use of manipulation checks in mediational analyses does not rule out confounding variables, as any unmeasured variables that correlate with the manipulation check may still drive the relationship. Alternatives such as nonverbal and behavioral measures as manipulation checks and pilot testing are less problematic. Reviewers should view manipulation checks more critically, and authors should explore alternative methods to ensure the effectiveness of manipulations. (shrink)

La filosofía desde la teoría general del derecho, por H. Cairns.--Teoría jurídica integralista, por J. Hall.--Más allá del pragmatismo jurídico, por T.A. Cowan.--La tecla para una ciencia jurídica estimativa, por A.H. Pekelis.--Palabras y música, por J. Frank.--Teoría de los intereses sociales de Pound, por E.W. Patterson.--La metamorfosis de la idea de justicia, por H. Kelsen.--Sobre la naturaleza del derecho natural, por A.-H. Chroust.

Gliomas are diffuse and invasive brain tumors with the nefarious ability to evade even seemingly draconian treatment measures. Here we introduce a simple mathematical model for drug delivery of chemotherapeutic agents to treat such a tumor. The model predicts that heterogeneity in drug delivery related to variability in vascular density throughout the brain results in an apparent tumor reduction based on imaging studies despite continual spread beyond the resolution of the imaging modality. We discuss a clinical example for which the (...) model-predicted scenario is relevant. The analysis and results suggest an explanation for the clinical problem of the long-standing confounding observation of shrinkage of the lesion in certain areas of the brain with continued growth in other areas. (shrink)

William James was not a basic emotion theorist in that he did not propose a list of basic emotions or concern himself with the question of which emotions were really basic. He may have believed that some emotions evolved earlier and spread more widely than others; whether this makes him a basic emotion theorist is a matter of taste.

It was customary in traditional approaches to the sociology of knowledge to bracket either questions about the possibility of the social determination of natural scientific ideas or questions about the ability of the sociology of knowledge to evaluate other types of knowledge claims. The current strong program in the sociology of knowledge, a typical representative of the new approach to the sociology of science, wants to study the production of natural scientific knowledge scientifically and simultaneously bracket normative considerations. We criticize (...) this neglect of the normative dimension in the strong program on the basis of the role that Marx envisioned for his sociology of knowledge. For example, the sociology of knowledge should be understood as a critique of power that does not merely accept the status quo as a datum. In addition, we attempt to extend Marx's discussion of the social bases of such a critique. (shrink)

It is the contemporary belief, in American legal circles at all events, that law or jurisprudence, whatever it may have been in the past, has now the status of a social science. This is an assumption easier to make than to substantiate, and in view of the increasing insistence upon this point, it is now appropriate to inquire whether or not it possesses a tangible foundation. This requires a consideration of the distinctive characteristics of social science, the determination whether or (...) not jurisprudence exhibits these characteristics, and, if not, if it is possible for it to assume them. It will be convenient to begin, briefly and concisely, with an examination of the characteristics of modern legal thought. (shrink)

Here the techniques customarily employed in the interpretation of legal phenomena are critically analyzed from the position of rigorous scientific method. Cairns's book is a brilliant statement for the possibilities of the scientific approach in regard to social institutions in general and to the sociology of law in particular. Originally published in 1941. A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously (...) out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value. (shrink)

In "reason and conduct" henry david aiken maintains that there is an antinomy of moral objectivity and freedom. Freedom requires that we each choose our own moral principles while objectivity requires that there be universally binding principles. He resolves the antinomy by proposing a principle of objectivity consistent with a diversity of moral codes, Thus forsaking universalizability in ethics. However, His notion of freedom is too stringent and his objectivity inadequate in not encompassing universalizability. Still, Aiken's concept of objectivity is (...) important in pointing to the defeasibility of all our moral positions. (staff). (shrink)