Offering an overall insight into the French tradition of philosophy of technology, this volume is meant to make French-speaking contributions more accessible to the international philosophical community. The first section, “Negotiating a Cultural Heritage,” presents a number of leading 20th century philosophical figures and intellectual movements that help shape philosophy of technology in the Francophone area, and feed into contemporary debates. The second section, “Coining and Reconfiguring Technoscience,” traces the genealogy of this controversial concept and discusses its meanings and relevance. (...) A third section, “Revisiting Anthropological Categories,” focuses on the relationships of technology with the natural and the human worlds from various perspectives that include anthropotechnology, Anthropocene, technological and vital norms and temporalities. The final section, “Innovating in Ethics, Design and Aesthetics,” brings together contributions that draw on various French traditions to afford fresh insights on ethics of technology, philosophy of design, techno-aesthetics and digital studies. The contributions in this volume are vivid and rich in original approaches that can spur exchanges and debates with other philosophical traditions. (shrink)

Before his death in 1989, Gilbert Simondon wrote two major books consisting of his principal and complementary theses, both defended in 1958. The complementary thesis on the mode of existence of technical objects was published in 1958, while it was only in 1964 that sections of his principal thesis on individuation were made available to the public (and even then only the chapters dedicated to the regimes of physical and vital individuation, excluding those dealing with psychic and collective individuation.) Over (...) the course of his career, Simondon produced other major texts, but only in the form of unpublished courses or conference presentations published in poorly distributed journals. Some of these texts have .. (shrink)

Scientists and engineers who extensively use the term “nanomachine” are not always aware of the philosophical implications of this term. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the concept of nanomachine through a distinction between three major paradigms of machine. After a brief presentation of two well-known paradigms - Cartesian mechanistic machines and Von Neumann’s complex and uncontrolled machines – we will argue that Drexler’s model was mainly Cartesian. But what about the model of his critics? We propose a (...) third model - Gilbert Simondon’s notion of concrete machines – which seems more appropriate to understand nanomachines than the notion of “soft machines”. Finally we review a few strategies currently used to design nanomachines, in an effort to determine which paradigm they belong to. (shrink)

De façon très allusive dans quelques textes de Signes et dans une note de travail du Visible et l’invisible, Merleau-Ponty a indiqué qu’élucider la question d’une « chair du social » exigeait un approfondissement préalable des notions de Gestalt, d’institution et de symbolisme. L’objet de cet article est de montrer comment Simondon a repris la question au point où Merleau-Ponty l’a laissée, en décrivant l’activité ou l’invention technique comme l’inscription matérielle d’un collectif en genèse, non partagé par la dualité du (...) psychique et du social . La pensée technique, loin d’être anecdotique ou spécialisée, apparaît donc comme un moment essentiel dans l’élaboration d’une théorie générale du lien social et de la socialisation des individus. (shrink)

Personalized medicine has recently become the new horizon of healthcare policies worldwide, but it hasalso given rise to misunderstandings and conflicting debates due to the lack of clear definitions and appropriate framing. Personalized medicine is mainly defined as the tailoring of diagnosis and therapies to the genetic profile of each patient, both enhanced by considerable improvements of technologies for acquiring and processing large amounts of data. Is personalized medicine the right term however, considering that it focuses on signaling pathways at (...) the molecular level, where undoubtely persons as such cannot be found?The rival expression «person-centered medicine» has been coined to avoid any ambiguity: on the one hand, molecular biomedicine improved by high-throughtput molecular technologies is more legitimately labelled «individualized» or «precision» medicine, while on the other hand «person-centered medicine» is considered the only authentic personalized medicine insofar as it focuses on the patient as a whole.Far from overcoming the misunderstandings and conflicting views at stake in current debates on futuremedicine however, this divide between personalized and person-centered medicine gives rise to new difficulties and proves to be misleading. Conceptual confusions remain underinvestigated and undermine current attempts to clarify core issues of biomedical research and biomedicine today. This paper intends tohighlight these confusions. (shrink)

resumo: Enquanto as duas teses defendidas por Simondon em 1958 relevam o problema da individuação humana na sua dimensão psicossocial e técnica, a publicação nos últimos anos do conjunto do corpus simondoniano sugere que outro tema constitui o fio condutor do pensamento de Simondon por três décadas, dos anos 50 ao início dos anos 80: aquele da vida. Ora, enquanto o problema da individuação humana poderia ser interpretado na ótica de uma reflexão política, notadamente através do conceito de “transindividualidade” desenvolvido (...) nas teses e efetivamente considerado pelos comentadores como o conceito chave da política simondoniana, a questão de se saber o que se torna essa política simondoniana coloca-se, precisamente, no momento em que o deslocamento do acento em direção a uma filosofia da vida é operado. Na medida em que o conceito de transindividualidade desaparece dos escritos posteriores às teses, a questão coloca-se ainda mais. Como compreender esta centralidade do tema da vida, enquanto que aquele do homem e de seus modos de ser no mundo parecia privilegiado nas teses? Em qual medida este deslocamento de acento conduz Simondon a abandonar a reflexão política proposta nas teses em prol de uma antropologia biológica que, cabe perguntar-se, flertaria com o programa da sociobiologia dos anos 70? Este artigo propõe elementos em resposta a essas duas questões. abstract: Whereas the two theses defended by Simondon in 1958 highlight the problem of human individuation in its psychosocial and technical dimension, the publication in the last years of the set of the Simondonian corpus suggests that another theme constitutes the leading thread of Simondon’s thought for three decades, from the 1950s to the early 1980s: that of life. Now, whereas the problem of human individuation could be interpreted in the view of a political reflection, mostly through the concept of “transindividuality” developed in the theses and effectively considered by the commentators as the key concept of Simondonian politics, the question of knowing what makes this Simondonian politics is put forth precisely at the moment in which is operated the displacement of the accent towards a philosophy of life. As the concept of transindividuality disappears from the manuscripts posterior to the theses, the question is even more pressing. How can one comprehend this centrality of the theme of life, whereas that of man and its modes of being in the world would seem to be privileged in the theses? To which extent does this displacement of accent lead Simondon to abandon the political reflection proposed in the theses towards a biological anthropology that, one may ask, would flirt with the sociobiology program of the 1970s? This paper provides some elements to answer these two questions. (shrink)

Introduction Dans ses Essais philosophiques, Hans Jonas rattache son questionnement sur la technologie moderne à une perspective de philosophie morale. L’introduction du recueil est en effet pour lui l’occasion de revenir sur l’ensemble de son parcours intellectuel, et de préciser dans quel contexte son « attention philosophique»s’est portée sur le « défi moral de la technologie moderne ». Abandonnant l’optimisme un peu naïf qu’il confesse avoir nourri à l’égard des possibilités de la techn...

Depuis une vingtaine d’années, le concept de « médecine personnalisée » désigne la possibilité d’adapter finement les diagnostics et thérapies au profil biologique, en particulier génétique, de chaque patient·e. L’article traite d’un aspect spécifique de la médecine personnalisée, celui du statut qu’y acquiert « l’environnement ». Il est unanimement admis que les gènes n’expliquent qu’un faible pourcentage des phénotypes pathologiques, l’environnement en constituant le principal facteur explicatif. Les efforts pour identifier et caractériser ces facteurs environnementaux sont aujourd’hui rassemblés sous une (...) nouvelle étiquette, l’ exposomique. Elle connaît deux orientations. L’une conduit à une vision industrielle, orientée vers la recherche de cibles susceptibles d’intervention technique. L’autre vise la critique des choix politiques et sociaux en matière de santé publique. L’article porte sur cette croisée des chemins dans la manière d’appréhender les rapports entre santé et environnement. (shrink)

La conception américaine de la convergence technologique, promue par le programme NBIC, est orientée vers la recherche d’une intégration de tous les domaines du réel dans la représentation unitaire d’un monde constitué de systèmes hiérarchiques complexes et couplés entre eux. Il s’agit par conséquent d’une vision totalisante, témoignant d’un idéal de contrôle et de maîtrise que rien ne paraît devoir limiter. Les Grecs avaient un...

La conception américaine de la convergence technologique, promue par le programme NBIC (Nano-Bio-Info-Cogno), est orientée vers la recherche d’une intégration de tous les domaines du réel (la nature, la vie, l’esprit, la société) dans la représentation unitaire d’un monde constitué de systèmes hiérarchiques complexes et couplés entre eux. Il s’agit par conséquent d’une vision totalisante, témoignant d’un idéal de contrôle et de maîtrise que rien ne paraît devoir limiter. Les Grecs avaient un...

Simondon situou o conjunto de seus trabalhos sob o signo de uma confrontação entre a filosofia e as ciências humanas. Partindo da constatação de que as ciências humanas de sua época são insuficientemente unificadas e que elas perdem a realidade do homem concreto e completo, ele quer propor uma filosofia da individuação humana que possa renovar os saberes sobre o homem. Esta filosofia da individuação se apresenta como um esforço para casar estreitamente duas dimensões da realidade humana que são habitualmente (...) tratadas separadamente: as formas de organização social de um lado, os modos de confrontação à matéria do outro. Em suma, o social e o técnico. Na capacidade de pensar conjuntamente estas duas dimensões, do social e do técnico, lança-se, segundo Simondon, a possibilidade de propor um novo humanismo à altura dos desafios contemporâneos. (shrink)

La pensée technique peut-elle être l’occasion d’un renouveau de la réflexion transcendantale, ou bien est-elle vouée à demeurer tributaire du « préjugé anthropologique » dont Foucault a repéré la mise en place au XIXe siècle avec la formation des sciences humaines, et qui a eu pour conséquence précisément la dissolution du transcendantal dans l’empirique? Cet article opte résolument pour la première solution, et examine les approches qui vont dans ce sens en refusant de penser les techniques à partir de la (...) finitude anthropologique. (shrink)

For the last twenty years, the philosophy of technology has firmly taken an “empirical turn” and has been strongly pervaded with Science and Technology Studies (STS) lessons, focusing on the social consistency of technical beings. In this context, Simondon’s approach to technology may appear a bit dated. A major issue of On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects (MEOT) is indeed to theorize technology beyond any reference to social commitments: Simondon distinguishes “pure technicity,” amenable to rational analysis, from “psychosocial (...) overdeterminations” that contaminate technical objects with exogenous concerns. Thus, Simondon may prove behind the times when he claims to analyze technology as a non-social realm. This article intends to demonstrate that Simondon can nevertheless fruitfully feed current debates related to technological developments. More precisely, the difference between several concepts of technological objects in MEOT proves to be of major interest for clarifying current issues related, in particular, to ethics. (shrink)

For the last twenty years, the philosophy of technology has firmly taken an “empirical turn” and has been strongly pervaded with Science and Technology Studies lessons, focusing on the social consistency of technical beings. In this context, Simondon’s approach to technology may appear a bit dated. A major issue of On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects is indeed to theorize technology beyond any reference to social commitments: Simondon distinguishes “pure technicity,” amenable to rational analysis, from “psychosocial overdeterminations” that (...) contaminate technical objects with exogenous concerns. Thus, Simondon may prove behind the times when he claims to analyze technology as a non-social realm. This article intends to demonstrate that Simondon can nevertheless fruitfully feed current debates related to technological developments. More precisely, the difference between several concepts of technological objects in MEOT proves to be of major interest for clarifying current issues related, in particular, to ethics. (shrink)

Scientists and engineers who extensively use the term “nanomachine” are not always aware of the philosophical implications of this term. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the concept of nanomachine through a distinction between three major paradigms of machine. After a brief presentation of two well-known paradigms - Cartesian mechanistic machines and Von Neumann’s complex and uncontrolled machines – we will argue that Drexler’s model was mainly Cartesian. But what about the model of his critics? We propose a (...) third model - Gilbert Simondon’s notion of concrete machines – which seems more appropriate to understand nanomachines than the notion of “soft machines”. Finally we review a few strategies currently used to design nanomachines, in an effort to determine which paradigm they belong to. (shrink)

Scientists and engineers who extensively use the term “nanomachine” are not always aware of the philosophical implications of this term. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the concept of nanomachine through a distinction between three major paradigms of machine. After a brief presentation of two well-known paradigms - Cartesian mechanistic machines and Von Neumann’s complex and uncontrolled machines – we will argue that Drexler’s model was mainly Cartesian. But what about the model of his critics? We propose a (...) third model - Gilbert Simondon’s notion of concrete machines – which seems more appropriate to understand nanomachines than the notion of “soft machines”. Finally we review a few strategies currently used to design nanomachines, in an effort to determine which paradigm they belong to. (shrink)

En enero de 1974 Zubiri dio un breve curso en la Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones de Madrid sobre el tema Tres dimensiones del ser humano: individual, social e histórica. Meses después publicó la última de esas lecciones bajo el título de La dimensión histórica del ser humano. El presente volumen recoge el texto de las tres conferencias, más la versión escrita de la última de ellas. La tesis que Zubiri desarrolla en estas lecciones es que el ser humano es (...) a la vez y necesariamente individual, social e histórico, y que estas dimensiones vienen exigidas por su propia realidad específica, que es pluralizante, continuante y prospectiva. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage confronte les pensées de Frege à Husserl à propos du psychologisme et pose la question de savoir comment ces deux penseurs ont pu à la fois lutter contre l'influence grandissante de ce courant et parvenir à une telle incompréhension mutuelle. L'auteur cherche à montrer comment la différence de perspective sur les sciences mathématiques les a conduit à s'opposer sur le statut de la logique et de son rapport à la pensée. S'ils s'accordent pour reconnaître que l'arithmétique implique le (...) recours à la pensée, l'un parvient à une logique symbolique, et l'autre à une logique transcendantale, deux perspectives qui supposent des idées très différentes de ce que signifie " penser ". Quels rapports la pensée entretient-elle avec la représentation et avec les symboles? L'esprit qui pense, aussi bien dans les mathématiques que dans la logique, n'est - il qu'un simple " automate " qui développe les conséquences de la vérité ou est-il responsable des lois qu'il découvre? Par-delà l'étude des divergences sur le statut de la logique, de la psychologie et de leur rapport aux mathématiques, il s'agit d'explorer une divergence plus profonde sur le rapport de la pensée à la nécessité et à la liberté. (shrink)

The past decade has seen a burgeoning of scholarly interest in conscientious objection in healthcare. While the literature to date has focused primarily on individual healthcare practitioners who object to participation in morally controversial procedures, in this article we consider a different albeit related issue, namely, whether publicly funded healthcare institutions should be required to provide morally controversial services such as abortions, emergency contraception, voluntary sterilizations, and voluntary euthanasia. Substantive debates about institutional responsibility have remained largely at the level of (...) first-order ethical debate over medical practices which institutions have refused to offer; in this article, we argue that more fundamental questions about the metaphysics of institutions provide a neglected avenue for understanding the basis of institutional conscientious objection. To do so, we articulate a metaphysical model of institutional conscience, and consider three well-known arguments for undermining institutional conscientious objection in light of this model. We show how our metaphysical analysis of institutions creates difficulties for justifying sanctions on institutions that conscientiously object. Thus, we argue, questions about the metaphysics of institutions are deserving of serious attention from both critics and defenders of institutional conscientious objection. (shrink)

As a result of innovations, mainly new products and services, but also processes or new marketing methods, animal populations and species disappear. The massive development of technologies, products and consumer goods, both current and in the past, has a direct impact on the depletion of natural resources. Innovation is a dual‐entry device that can be called world‐innovation, on the one hand, and consequential‐innovation, on the other. In this chapter, the authors propose to review the change from a new perspective, more (...) precisely, with two major dimensions: world‐innovation and consequential innovation, which help us to understand why innovation has become what it is. Faced with the challenges of innovation in all the aspects we have been able to describe, we must now try to find answers and, it seems to us that this can only be done with philosophy. (shrink)

Many if not most sperm donors in the early years of IVF donated under conditions of anonymity. There is, however, a growing awareness of the ethical cost of withholding identifying parental information from donor children. Today, anonymous donation is illegal in many jurisdictions, and some jurisdictions have gone as far as retrospectively invalidating contracts whereby donors were guaranteed anonymity. This article provides a critical evaluation of the ethics and legality of anonymous donation. We defend Australian and British legislation that has (...) outlawed donor anonymity, and we argue for the establishment of a central registry that provides donor children with the ability to easily and reliably access identifying information about their donor parents. (shrink)

It is shown that axiomatic extensions of intuitionistic propositional calculus defining univocally new connectives, including those proposed by Gabbay, are strongly complete with respect to valuations in Heyting algebras with additional operations. In all cases, the double negation of such a connective is equivalent to a formula of intuitionistic calculus. Thus, under the excluded third law it collapses to a classical formula, showing that this condition in Gabbay's definition is redundant. Moreover, such connectives can not be interpreted in all Heyting (...) algebras, unless they are already equivalent to a formula of intuitionistic calculus. These facts relativize to connectives over intermediate logics. In particular, the intermediate logic with values in the chain of length n may be "completed" conservatively by adding a single unary connective, so that the expanded system does not allow further axiomatic extensions by new connectives. (shrink)

**" CHAPTER * HUMAN NATURE In May, at the time when the French Civil Code was being drafted, one of the orators of the Tribunat, in seeking to justify the ...

We study a class of [0,1][0,1]-valued logics. The main result of the paper is a maximality theorem that characterizes these logics in terms of a model-theoretic property, namely, an extension of the omitting types theorem to uncountable languages.

The radical autonomy of innovation – regardless of who it depends on – must be pursued with no external pressure to make it more suitable for contemporary challenges. The challenge is to look at innovation as a production or vector of phenomena, and therefore no longer be interested in its consequences. Just as non‐standard philosophy can be considered as an invention in philosophy, phenomenology can be perceived as a recommencing of philosophy, a renewal, a rebirth. The authors propose to focus (...) on the method of phenomenology, its detailed constitution both in its theories and in its modalities of implementation, and to compare each aspect systematically, each step of this philosophy, to measure a possible contribution to (re)thinking innovation. Science, psychology and philosophy color Husserl's phenomenology. What will transpire from its introduction is the rigor that emerges, a rigor that translates into a method, tools, almost procedures, for this phenomenology to be established. (shrink)

An extensions by new axioms and rules of an algebraizable logic in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi is not necessarily algebraizable if it involves new connective symbols, or it may be algebraizable in an essentially different way than the original logic. However, extension whose axioms and rules define implicitly the new connectives are algebraizable, via the same equivalence formulas and defining equations of the original logic, by enriched algebras of its equivalente quasivariety semantics. For certain strongly algebraizable logics, all (...) connectives defined implicitly by axiomatic extensions of the logic are explicitly definable. (shrink)

The authors propose that the third philosophical movement is not an ordinary thought for (re)thinking innovation. Originating from the origins of philosophy more than 2,500 years ago, spiritual exercises are much more often called upon to think about lifestyle than the development of new products or services. All ancient philosophy is a spiritual exercise, an expression that refers to any practice intended to transform, in oneself or in others, the way of living, of seeing things. This notion of spiritual exercise (...) was developed in the different schools of antiquity, mainly among the Stoics, but also among the Epicureans and Cynics. Focusing on the innovator is fundamental, and today's cannot be tomorrow's for the many reasons. No one other than the innovator can imagine, build and develop the world of tomorrow. It is therefore essential that the latter adopt a philosophical way of life based on spiritual exercises. (shrink)

This chapter describes non‐standard philosophy, derived from non‐philosophy, and shows how this discipline and its use can be relevant to the discussion of innovation. The challenge of rebuilding innovation involves developing new processes and new ways of thinking. Multiple challenges, but also opportunities, arise when it comes to (re)thinking innovation with a non‐standard innovation attempt. The first concerns thinking innovation, without which the proposal is neither willing nor able to take root. Non‐standard innovation must be a quasi‐scientific discipline. Because it (...) is not a question of drawing up a new thought that is incapable of proving its interest or reduced to a proposal that does not have practical application. Non‐standard innovation cannot be entrusted solely to the field of organization management. It can only be understood as a form of overcoming, a radicalization or an accomplishment of innovation. (shrink)

F.W.J. Schelling (1775-1854), le plus precoce de philosophes puis l'un des plus ages, a pati, de son vivant comme apres sa mort, de la proximite de Fichte et surtout de Hegel qui l'a supplante dans le jugement de la posterite. Mais il est en passe de combler son retard grace en particulier a l'impulsion donnee depuis un demi-siecle aux recherches sur l'idealisme allemand. Le premier volume de cet ouvrage se propose de presenter le devenir de Schelling sous le signe du (...) systeme vivant. La derniere philosophie de Schelling est analysee dans le second tome. Elle est presque tout entiere posthume, a l'exception de la Preface a Cousin (1834) et de quelques autres textes brefs. La dualite philosophique, enseignee a Berlin, est l'ultime avatar de ce qui etait de facon latente une philosophie en deux. L'auteur s'attache ici a expliquer en detail les motifs et les problemes de cette dichotomie tardive, mais fondee. (shrink)

On sait que sur la question des pensées imperceptibles, Nicole, bientôt suivi par le bénédictin François Lamy, heurte l’opinion d’Arnauld. L’opposition d’Arnauld à Nicole touchant la question de la grâce est bien connue. C’est plutôt de l’originalité philosophique de Nicole qu’il s’agira dans ce travail. En tirant Nicole de « l’ombre d’Arnauld et de Pascal » et en lui faisant crédit d’une consistance spéculative propre, on retrouvera la finesse de sa psychologie, mais on découvrira également l’esquisse d’une subtile anthropologie.

Cogito, ergo sum. Ce n’est pas tiré de la plume de Descartes que cet énoncé apparaît pour la première fois dans les œuvres du philosophe. C’est en effet Caterus qui, dans la première série d’Objectiones aux Meditationes l’écrit, telle que la postérité scolaire va le considérer, comme un objet textuel autonome et digne par soi-même d’intérêt. Le fait est anecdotique, mais il est révélateur. D’abord parce que ce n’est pas Descartes qui a constitué...