We introduce a family of proportional surplus division values for TU-games. Each value first assigns to each player a compromise between her stand-alone worth and the average stand-alone worths over all players, and then allocates the remaining worth among the players in proportion to their stand-alone worths. This family contains the proportional division value and the new egalitarian proportional surplus division value as two special cases. We provide characterizations for this family of values, as well as for each single value (...) in this family. (shrink)

A situation, in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this article we discuss a class of equal surplus sharing solutions consisting of all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value and the equal division solution. We provide several characterizations of this class of solutions on variable and fixed (...) player set. Specifications of several properties characterize specific solutions in this class. (shrink)

A situation, in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this article we discuss a class of equal surplus sharing solutions consisting of all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value and the equal division solution. We provide several characterizations of this class of solutions on variable and fixed (...) player set. Specifications of several properties characterize specific solutions in this class. (shrink)

In sub-Sect. 3.3, the terms “one-person” and “-person” were incorrectly updated by mistake during the correction stage in the online published article.

In cooperative game theory with transferable utilities, there are two well-established ways of redistributing Shapley value payoffs: using egalitarian Shapley values, and using consensus values. We present parallel characterizations of these classes of solutions. Together with the axioms that characterize the original Shapley value, those that specify the redistribution methods characterize the two classes of values. For the class of egalitarian Shapley values, we focus on redistributions in one-person unanimity games from two perspectives: allowing the worth of coalitions to vary, (...) while keeping the player set fixed; and allowing the player set to change, while keeping the worth of coalitions fixed. This class of values is characterized by efficiency, the balanced contributions property for equal contributors, weak covariance, a proportionately decreasing redistribution in one-person unanimity games, desirability, and null players in unanimity games. For the class of consensus values, we concentrate on redistributions in \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$$$\end{document}-person unanimity games from the same two perspectives. This class of values is characterized by efficiency, the balanced contributions property for equal contributors to social surplus, complement weak covariance, a proportionately decreasing redistribution in \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$$$\end{document}-person unanimity games, desirability, and null players in unanimity games. (shrink)

A solution for cooperative games with transferable utility, or simply TU-games, assigns a payoff vector to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss two classes of equal surplus sharing solutions. The first class consists of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the center-of-gravity of the imputation-set value. The second class is the dual class consisting of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the egalitarian non-separable contribution value. We provide characterizations of the two classes of (...) solutions using either population solidarity or a reduced game consistency in addition to other standard properties. (shrink)

Mast cells are a unique class of blood cell. Unlike most blood cells, undifferentiated precursors of mast cells migrate in the bloodstream, invade tissues, proliferate there and then differentiate. Even after differentiation, some mast cells may proliferate extensively. Differentiation of mast cells is regulated by both diffusible growth factors and direct contact with fibroblasts.

This paper reports on an analysis of the work of Leni Riefenstahl, and German expressionism, through the use of trans-disciplinary semantic associative search in specialized databased dictionaries1. Within this database space (Kitagawa and Kiyokim 1993), the quantitative data of objects as representation can be visualized by number. While the method of image analysis is qualitative, it is based on a quantitative analysis of visual representation. Through this analysis, Riefenstahl's film Olympia Fest der Vlker is compared with the Nazi ideology of (...) the body image. The film is often categorized as romantic; however, this paper proposes a new interpretation based on theories of Jonathan Crary, and Martin Jay, which are combined using the mechanism of connotation in searching database systems. We proposs that, in the context of Visual Culture Studies, the use of digital technologies may provide new possibilities for research in the humanities. (shrink)

The philosophy of the town people in Edo period.

Merleau-Ponty and Buddhism explores a new mode of philosophizing through a comparative study of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology and philosophies of major Buddhist thinkers including Nagarjuna, Chinul, Dogen, Shinran, and Nishida Kitaro. The book offers an intercultural philosophy in which opposites intermingle in a chiasmic relationship, and which brings new understanding regarding the self and the self's relation with others in a globalized and multicultural world.

In cooperative Cournot oligopoly games, it is known that the β-core is equal to the α-core, and both are non-empty if every individual profit function is continuous and concave (Zhao, Games Econ Behav 27:153–168, 1999b). Following Chander and Tulkens (Int J Game Theory 26:379–401, 1997), we assume that firms react to a deviating coalition by choosing individual best reply strategies. We deal with the problem of the non-emptiness of the induced core, the γ-core, by two different approaches. The first establishes (...) that the associated Cournot oligopoly Transferable Utility (TU)-games are balanced if the inverse demand function is differentiable and every individual profit function is continuous and concave on the set of strategy profiles, which is a step forward beyond Zhao’s core existence result for this class of games. The second approach, restricted to the class of Cournot oligopoly TU-games with linear cost functions, provides a single-valued allocation rule in the γ-core called Nash Pro rata (NP)-value. This result generalizes Funaki and Yamato’s (Int J Game Theory 28:157–171, 1999) core existence result from no capacity constraint to asymmetric capacity constraints. Moreover, we provide an axiomatic characterization of this solution by means of four properties: efficiency, null firm, monotonicity, and non-cooperative fairness. (shrink)