There are experts in arithmetic, music, tennis, and fencing. But are there experts in morality? It is not surprising that there should be people like moral philosophers who are experts in moral theory, just as there are experts in tennis or music theory. But the question concerns whether there are analogues in morality of the expert tennis player or violinist. The unsophisticated answer might be that confessors, counselors, and perhaps even psychiatrists seem to qualify as moral experts in the relevant (...) sense. In turn, most conscientious confessors, counselors, and psychiatrists would deny that they themselves are experts in morality, even though they might claim expertise in divinity, marital advising, or treating emotional disorders. There are, moreover, persuasive philosophical arguments against the possibility of anyone’s being a moral expert, of which certain venerable reasonings of Socrates, Kant, and Ryle may be taken as representative. By examining several venerable arguments against the possibility of moral experts, we will, however, discover much to be said for the unsophisticated answer to the question. (shrink)

In this paper, a game-theoretical semantics is developed for the so-called alpha part of Charles S. Peirce's System of Existential Graphs of 1896. This alpha part is that portion of Peirce's graphs that corresponds to propositional logic. The paper both expounds a game-theoretical semantics for the graphs that seems close to Peirce's own intentions and proves for the alpha part of the graphs that this semantics is adequate.

Lines of identity in Peirce's existential graphs are logically complex structures that comprise both identity and existential quantification. Yet geometrically they are simple: linear continua that cannot have “furcations” or cross “cuts.” By contrast Peirce's “ligatures” are geometrically complex: they can both have furcations and cross cuts. Logically they involve not only identity and existential quantification but also negation. Moreover, Peirce makes clear that ligatures are composed of lines of identity by virtue of the fact that such lines can be (...) “connected” with one another and can “abut upon” one another at a cut. This paper shows in logical detail how ligatures are composed and how they relate to identity, existential quantification, and negation. In so doing, it makes use of Peirce's non-standard account of the linear continuum, according to which, when a linear continuum is separated into two parts, the parts are symmetric rather than asymmetric, and the one point at which separation occurs actually becomes two points, each of which is a Doppelgänger of the other. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Strands of System: The Philosophy of Charles PeirceRobert W. BurchStrands of System: The Philosophy of Charles Peirce, by Douglas R. Anderson; xiv & 204pp. West Layfayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1995, $24.95 cloth, $13.95 paper.The Purdue University Press Series in the History of Philosophy was created to “present well-edited basic texts to be used in courses and seminars and for teachers looking for a succinct exposition of the (...) results of recent research.” Anderson’s contribution to this series matches the aim of the series to near perfection.Strands of System is a general introduction to both the life and the work of the American scientist-mathematician-philosopher Charles S. Peirce. Many, though by no means all, of the main themes of Peirce’s philosophy are touched. Anderson’s exposition is succinct and—usually—at a basic, introductory level; virtually no specialist knowledge of Peirce’s thinking is required to follow it. References to recent research on Peirce are ample and up-to-date. Anderson’s account falls well within the mainstream of current understanding of Peirce, and accordingly it should occasion no distasteful surprises for the teacher who desires a solid introductory survey.Besides a preface and appendices, the book contains four chapters. The first is a biographical sketch; the second is an overview of certain themes in Peirce’s philosophy; the third is the full text of and a commentary upon the rather early essay “The Fixation of Belief”; and the fourth chapter is the full text of and a commentary upon the rather late essay “A Neglected Argument for the Existence of God.”Chapter Two, entitled “Strands of System,” is perhaps the heart of Anderson’s [End Page 384] exposition of what he regards as Peirce’s somewhat-less-than-monolithic philosophical system—a system in which, as Anderson sees it, a host of diverse themes start and stop, twist and turn, and cross and recross each other like the different strands making up a rope. A wide variety of Peircean topics are briefly discussed: the classification of the sciences, mathematics, philosophy, phenomenology, normative sciences, aesthetics, ethics, logic, and metaphysics. Most of the major concepts of Peircean thought are taken up: synechism, tychism, the categories of firstness and secondness and thirdness, the theory of signs, and some features of the notion of semeiosis.Despite its apparent thoroughness, Anderson’s book mostly lacks a presentation of the technical-scientific-mathematical-logical side of Peirce’s thought. In ignoring this side of Peirce’s intellectual endeavor, however, Anderson is not very different from most other contemporary discussants of Peirce; and the omission is perhaps justified in an introductory survey. All in all, Anderson’s volume should make an excellent, if somewhat partial, introduction to the thought of Peirce, an introduction that I can highly recommend for use in a first course or seminar in the thought of this extremely important American thinker.Robert W. BurchTexas A&M UniversityCopyright © 1995 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A chronological edition, volume 4, 1879?1884. Editor [in Chiefl, Christian J. W. Kloesel. Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989. lxx + 698 pp. $57.50.

This second volume arising from the Frontiers in American Philosophy Conference held at Texas A&M University is "festive, celebrating the diversity of thought and influences in American philosophy," say its editors. In these thirty-six essays, there is no attempt to define an American ethos; in fact, the editors conclude that, even pragmatism, identified by Tocqueville as America's defining attribute, should not be described as a national philosophy. It is, as Gerard Deledalle notes in his essay, "the new universal philosophy, because (...) it is the philosophy of experience and democracy that is any nation's `manifest destiny.'" These articles, by thoughtful scholars from North America and several European nations, look forward through the developments presently shaping philosophical inquiry in the United States and backward to the origins and plurality of the American intellectual heritage. Not a parochial or narrow perspective, the focus on American philosophy sharpens the dialogue that clarifies and explicates American thought in the context of a world community. (shrink)

To push the edges of the known, to look at the accepted in novel ways, is indeed to stand at the frontiers of a field. In Frontiers in American Philosophy thirty-five contemporary scholars explore classical American thought in bold new ways. An extraordinary range of issues and thinkers is represented in these pages--from such core themes as metaphysics and social philosophy, which receive primary attention, to some consideration of American philosophers' technical accomplishments in mathematical logic and philosophical analysis. The authors (...) also offer new perspectives on the work of the leading American philosophers, including George Herbert Mead, William James, John Dewey, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Emma Goldman. Not surprisingly perhaps, a great deal of the discussion revolves, either directly or indirectly, around that great axis of intellectual issues commonly known as the "realism/idealism" controversy. It seems fitting that so much attention is devoted to the possibility of some sort of middle position between "external realism" and its antipode in some form of relativistic subjectivism. For, in the last analysis, such a middle position is for the American philosophers the core meaning of "pragmatism.”. (shrink)

From three simple Peircean semeiotic principles, the general formula is derived for the number of definable sign-types from the number of semeiotic trichotomies to be used in defining the sign-types. If k is the number of such trichotomies, then [ ]/2 is the number of sign-types definable by appealing to them. The significance of the derivation lies in its setting constraints on particular detailed theories of sign-types.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Strands of System: The Philosophy of Charles PeirceRobert W. BurchStrands of System: The Philosophy of Charles Peirce, by Douglas R. Anderson; xiv & 204pp. West Layfayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1995, $24.95 cloth, $13.95 paper.The Purdue University Press Series in the History of Philosophy was created to “present well-edited basic texts to be used in courses and seminars and for teachers looking for a succinct exposition of the (...) results of recent research.” Anderson’s contribution to this series matches the aim of the series to near perfection.Strands of System is a general introduction to both the life and the work of the American scientist-mathematician-philosopher Charles S. Peirce. Many, though by no means all, of the main themes of Peirce’s philosophy are touched. Anderson’s exposition is succinct and—usually—at a basic, introductory level; virtually no specialist knowledge of Peirce’s thinking is required to follow it. References to recent research on Peirce are ample and up-to-date. Anderson’s account falls well within the mainstream of current understanding of Peirce, and accordingly it should occasion no distasteful surprises for the teacher who desires a solid introductory survey.Besides a preface and appendices, the book contains four chapters. The first is a biographical sketch; the second is an overview of certain themes in Peirce’s philosophy; the third is the full text of and a commentary upon the rather early essay “The Fixation of Belief”; and the fourth chapter is the full text of and a commentary upon the rather late essay “A Neglected Argument for the Existence of God.”Chapter Two, entitled “Strands of System,” is perhaps the heart of Anderson’s [End Page 384] exposition of what he regards as Peirce’s somewhat-less-than-monolithic philosophical system—a system in which, as Anderson sees it, a host of diverse themes start and stop, twist and turn, and cross and recross each other like the different strands making up a rope. A wide variety of Peircean topics are briefly discussed: the classification of the sciences, mathematics, philosophy, phenomenology, normative sciences, aesthetics, ethics, logic, and metaphysics. Most of the major concepts of Peircean thought are taken up: synechism, tychism, the categories of firstness and secondness and thirdness, the theory of signs, and some features of the notion of semeiosis.Despite its apparent thoroughness, Anderson’s book mostly lacks a presentation of the technical-scientific-mathematical-logical side of Peirce’s thought. In ignoring this side of Peirce’s intellectual endeavor, however, Anderson is not very different from most other contemporary discussants of Peirce; and the omission is perhaps justified in an introductory survey. All in all, Anderson’s volume should make an excellent, if somewhat partial, introduction to the thought of Peirce, an introduction that I can highly recommend for use in a first course or seminar in the thought of this extremely important American thinker.Robert W. BurchTexas A&M UniversityCopyright © 1995 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Signs of Logic: Peircean Themes on the Philosophy of Language, Games, and CommunicationRobert W. BurchAhti-Veikko Pietarinen Signs of Logic: Peircean Themes on the Philosophy of Language, Games, and Communication Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2006. xiv + 496 pp.This compendious volume of fourteen of Pietarinen's essays on Peirce, plus a three-page set of "Final Words" relating to the work of Robert Aumann, is a "must-have" for both the (...) Peirce scholar and any other philosopher who wishes to relate Peirce's thinking on language and logic to other major thinkers and logical themes of the twentieth century (and beyond). The essays extend or complement discussions of Peirce's logic and philosophy of language that have come to be expected from the "Finnish school" of philosophers, which includes Hintikka and Hilpinen, as well as Pietarinen.Nine of the essays (Chapters 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, and 14), comprising about two-thirds of the entire book, are revised and expanded versions of essays that Pietarinen has previously published. The remaining one-third (approximately) of the book is brand new. Chapters 1 and 2 serve as general introductions to the book's major interests. Chapter 6 is on evidence for constructivism in Peirce, as well as several other topics. Chapter 9 compares Peirce's ideas with Wilfred Hodges's "dialogue foundations" and contains a small philosophical dialogue, which has Peirce, Wittgenstein, and Hodges as its characters. Chapter 11 concerns evolutionary semantics and language [End Page 577] games. And the cursory Chapter 15 of "Final Words" predicts that the game-theoretical approach to semantics and Peirce scholarship has an exploding future, like an erupting volcano.From the foregoing one can gather, correctly, that each essay in the book is separately conceived and that the book is not a single continuous line of argumentative development of one or even of a few themes. Still, the essays are similar to one another in two ways, which ways are closely related to each other. First, they all concern the Peircean doctrine that semeiotic and semeiosis constitute the heartland of logic, and that this heartland is vastly richer than the sort of pure mathematical calculi that might mistakenly be taken for logic itself (and were in fact so taken for much of the twentieth century). Second, they all deal with the Peircean insistence that semeiosis is inherently a form of Praxis in which interchanges occur between or among various "agents" or "actors," one of which might be nature itself; so that at the very least logic is dialogic, and so that more generally one may justifiably speak of semeiosis as involving something like a "game." These lines of exploration will surprise no seasoned Peirce scholar, but the special genius of the Finnish "school" of Peirce interpretation from Hintikka forward is to have spotlighted in dramatic fashion the game-theoretical nature of many elements in Peirce's semeiotic.In these essays Pietarinen amply exhibits two attainments of mind that are indispensable for the serious Peirce scholar. One is the object of what we might call "The Eisele Imperative" after the vehement urgings of Carolyn Eisele: this is the possession of some significant degree of sophistication in mathematics. Pietarinen's mathematical skills are plainly sufficient for his discussions of logic and game theory. For example, his Chapter 5 is an excellent technical discussion of Peirce's existential graphs, and his Chapter 7 is an admirable technical discussion of certain aspects of game theory and generalized quantifiers. Another crucial skill needed by the serious Peirce scholar is the object of what we might call "The Pietarinen Corrective" after the practices exemplified in these essays: this is the possession of extremely broad knowledge of recent and contemporary philosophy, especially philosophy of language, logic, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of science.Indeed, the breadth of Pietarinen's acquaintance with twentieth century logic and philosophy of language, both "analytic" and "continental," is breathtaking. This allows him scope for comparisons of Peirce's views with an extraordinarily wide, and not always easily anticipated, range of philosophers and philosophic traditions. Pietarinen's range of reference is so extensive that it would be pointless to attempt to discuss in... (shrink)

Henry Sheffer’s 1908 Harvard Ph.D. thesis contains an interesting appendix on a central feature of the logical work of his thesis advisor, Josiah Royce. This is the claim in Royce’s 1905 article “The Relations of the Principles of Logic to the Foundations of Geometry” that an unsymmetric ordering relation can be defined on the single symmetric O-relation for which he gives postulates in that paper. Sheffer criticizes Royce’s specific definition from the point of view of the evolving twentieth century conception (...) of axiomatic method and also shows more generally that an unsymmetric1 order relation cannot be defined in the system of the 1905 paper based on the O-relation. In this article I wish to consider the nature.. (shrink)

I adapt Robert Sinnerbrink's notion of cinematic poesis by arguing that Terrence Malick's The Thin Red Line constitutes an example of ecological cinematic poesis: a style of filmmaking that works in concert with the limits and potentialities of the filmmaking as a medium. This cinematic bearing emerges in a new way following Malick's return to Hollywood, where a combination of factors spur the emergence of a radical Emersonian practice of cinematic receptivity. I draw on oral histories, and the film (...) itself, to demonstrate how Malick's creative process consistently tends towards an ethos of poverty. To further pattern and illuminate the ecological stakes of this Emersonian stance, I draw on the complementary framework of second-order systems theory, and in particular, on Niklas Luhmann's concept of simultaneity. In so doing, I outline the layered nature of Malick's cinematic praxis – a doubled Emersonian receptivity which not only invites defamiliarizing depictions of warfare and the nonhuman, but also welcomes, and toys with, the otherness haunting technical images and human cognition. As such, The Thin Red Line, and its immediate counterparts, perform the ecological work of reframing the conditions of wonder, asking us to marvel not at what we have seen, but what we haven’t. (shrink)

Robert Batterman examines a form of scientific reasoning called asymptotic reasoning, arguing that it has important consequences for our understanding of the scientific process as a whole. He maintains that asymptotic reasoning is essential for explaining what physicists call universal behavior. With clarity and rigor, he simplifies complex questions about universal behavior, demonstrating a profound understanding of the underlying structures that ground them. This book introduces a valuable new method that is certain to fill explanatory gaps across disciplines.

This article discusses minimal model explanations, which we argue are distinct from various causal, mechanical, difference-making, and so on, strategies prominent in the philosophical literature. We contend that what accounts for the explanatory power of these models is not that they have certain features in common with real systems. Rather, the models are explanatory because of a story about why a class of systems will all display the same large-scale behavior because the details that distinguish them are irrelevant. This story (...) explains patterns across extremely diverse systems and shows how minimal models can be used to understand real systems. (shrink)

This paper concerns what Jerry Fodor calls a 'metaphysical mystery': How can there by macroregularities that are realized by wildly heterogeneous lower level mechanisms? But the answer to this question is not as mysterious as many, including Jaegwon Kim, Ned Block, and Jerry Fodor might think. The multiple realizability of the properties of the special sciences such as psychology is best understood as a kind of universality, where 'universality' is used in the technical sense one finds in the physics literature. (...) It is argued that the same explanatory strategy used by physicists to provide understanding of universal behavior in physics can be used to explain how special science properties can be heterogeneously multiply realized. (shrink)

This paper aims to draw attention to an explanatory problem posed by the existence of multiply realized or universal behavior exhibited by certain physical systems. The problem is to explain how it is possible that systems radically distinct at lower-scales can nevertheless exhibit identical or nearly identical behavior at upper-scales. Theoretically this is reflected by the fact that continuum theories such as fluid mechanics are spectacularly successful at predicting, describing, and explaining fluid behaviors despite the fact that they do not (...) recognize the discrete nature of fluids. A standard attempt to reduce one theory to another, is shown to fail to answer the appropriate question about autonomy. (shrink)

This paper looks at emergence in physical theories and argues that an appropriate way to understand socalled “emergent protectorates” is via the explanatory apparatus of the renormalization group. It is argued that mathematical singularities play a crucial role in our understanding of at least some well-defined emergent features of the world.

Autonomy -- Hydrodynamics -- Brownian motion -- From Brownian motion to bending beams -- An engineering approach -- The right variables and natural kinds.

In its broadest sense, "universality" is a technical term for something quite ordinary. It refers to the existence of patterns of behavior by physical systems that recur and repeat despite the fact that in some sense the situations in which these patterns recur and repeat are different. Rainbows, for example, always exhibit the same pattern of spacings and intensities of their bows despite the fact that the rain showers are different on each occasion. They are different because the shapes of (...) the drops, and their sizes can vary quite widely due to differences in temperature, wind direction, etc. There are different questions one might ask about such patterns. For instance, one might ask why the particular rainbow... (shrink)

This paper examines a fundamental problem in applied mathematics. How can one model the behavior of materials that display radically different, dominant behaviors at different length scales. Although we have good models for material behaviors at small and large scales, it is often hard to relate these scale-based models to one another. Macroscale models represent the integrated effects of very subtle factors that are practically invisible at the smallest, atomic, scales. For this reason it has been notoriously difficult to model (...) realistic materials with a simple bottom-up-from-the-atoms strategy. The widespread failure of that strategy forced physicists interested in overall macro-behavior of materials toward completely top-down modeling strategies familiar from traditional continuum mechanics. The problem of the ``tyranny of scales'' asks whether we can exploit our rather rich knowledge of intermediate micro- scale behaviors in a manner that would allow us to bridge between these two dominant methodologies. Macroscopic scale behaviors often fall into large common classes of behaviors such as the class of isotropic elastic solids, characterized by two phenomenological parameters---so-called elastic coefficients. Can we employ knowledge of lower scale behaviors to understand this universality---to determine the coefficients and to group the systems into classes exhibiting similar behavior? (shrink)

This paper examines contemporary attempts to explicate the explanatory role of mathematics in the physical sciences. Most such approaches involve developing so-called mapping accounts of the relationships between the physical world and mathematical structures. The paper argues that the use of idealizations in physical theorizing poses serious difficulties for such mapping accounts. A new approach to the applicability of mathematics is proposed.

This paper examines the role of mathematical idealization in describing and explaining various features of the world. It examines two cases: first, briefly, the modeling of shock formation using the idealization of the continuum. Second, and in more detail, the breaking of droplets from the points of view of both analytic fluid mechanics and molecular dynamical simulations at the nano-level. It argues that the continuum idealizations are explanatorily ineliminable and that a full understanding of certain physical phenomena cannot be obtained (...) through completely detailed, non-idealized representations. (shrink)