Explanatory epiphenomenalism

Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):437-451 (2005)
Abstract
I propose a new form of epiphenomenalism, 'explanatory epiphenomenalism', the view that the identification of A's mental properties does not provide a causal explanation of A's behaviour. I arrive at this view by showing that although anomalous monism does not entail type epiphenomenalism (despite what many of Davidson's critics have suggested), it does (when coupled with some additional claims) lead to the conclusion that the identification of A's reasons does not causally explain A's behaviour. I then formalize this view and show that it is an attractive position, because it captures the insights of existing forms of epiphenomenalism without their onerous metaphysical commitments
Keywords Causality  Epiphenomenalism  Explanation  Metaphysics  Mind  Campbell, Keith
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References found in this work BETA
Neil Campbell (1997). The Standard Objection to Anomalous Monism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (3):373-82.
Neil Campbell (2001). What Was Huxley's Epiphenomenalism? Biology and Philosophy 16 (3):357-375.
David J. Chalmers (1995). Explaining Consciousness: The'Hard Problem'. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-219.

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