David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Analysis 72 (1):57-60 (2012)
The lottery paradox can be solved if epistemic justification is assumed to be a species of permissibility. Given this assumption, the starting point of the paradox can be formulated as the claim that, for each lottery ticket, I am permitted to believe that it will lose. This claim is ambiguous between two readings, depending on the scope of ‘permitted’. On one reading, the claim is false; on another, it is true, but, owing to the general failure of permissibility to agglomerate, does not generate the paradox. The solution generalizes to formulations of the paradox in terms of rational acceptability and doxastic rationality
|Keywords||Lottery paradox Epistemic justification Permissibility Agglomeration Rational belief Rational acceptance Lotteries|
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References found in this work BETA
Mark T. Nelson (2010). We Have No Positive Epistemic Duties. Mind 119 (473):83-102.
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