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  1. John A. Barker (1974). Paradox Without Knowledge. Synthese 28 (2):261 - 270.
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  2. Denis Bonnay & Mikaël Cozic, Which Logic for the Radical Anti-Realist ?
    Since the ground-breaking contributions of M. Dummett (Dummett 1978), it is widely recognized that anti-realist principles have a critical impact on the choice of logic. Dummett argued that classical logic does not satisfy the requirements of such principles but that intuitionistic logic does. Some philosophers have adopted a more radical stance and argued for a more important departure from classical logic on the basis of similar intuitions. In particular, J. Dubucs and M. Marion (?) and (Dubucs 2002) have recently argued (...)
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  3. John Brunero (2005). Instrumental Rationality and Carroll's Tortoise. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (5):557 - 569.
    Some philosophers have tried to establish a connection between the normativity of instrumental rationality and the paradox presented by Lewis Carroll in his 1895 paper “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles.” I here examine and argue against accounts of this connection presented by Peter Railton and James Dreier before presenting my own account and discussing its implications for instrumentalism (the view that all there is to practical rationality is instrumental rationality). In my view, the potential for a Carroll-style regress just (...)
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  4. Tyler Burge (1984). Epistemic Paradox. Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):5-29.
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  5. Tyler Burge (1978). Buridan and Epistemic Paradox. Philosophical Studies 34 (1):21 - 35.
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  6. Massimiliano Carrara & Davide Fassio, Reductionism and Perfectibility of Science.
    Nicholas Rescher, in The Limits of Science (1984), argued that: «perfected science is a mirage; complete knowledge a chimera» . He reached the above conclusion from a logical argument known as Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability. The argument, starting from the assumption that every truth is knowable, proves that every truth is also actually known and, given that some true propositions are not actually known, it concludes, by modus tollens, that there are unknowable truths. Prima facie, this argument seems to seriously (...)
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  7. Fred Chernoff (1980). Goldman on Epistemic Conjunction. Analysis 40 (1):45 - 47.
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  8. Leo K. C. Cheung (2013). On Two Versions of 'the Surprise Examination Paradox'. Philosophia 41 (1):159-170.
    In this paper, I consider a popular version of the clever student’s reasoning in the surprise examination case, and demonstrate that a valid argument can be constructed. The valid argument is a reductio ad absurdum with the proposition that the student knows on the morning of the first day that the teacher’s announcement is fulfilled as its reductio. But it would not give rise to any paradox. In the process, I criticize Saul Kripke’s solution and Timothy Williamson’s attack on a (...)
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  9. David Christensen (2004). Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief. Oxford University Press.
    What role, if any, does formal logic play in characterizing epistemically rational belief? Traditionally, belief is seen in a binary way - either one believes a proposition, or one doesn't. Given this picture, it is attractive to impose certain deductive constraints on rational belief: that one's beliefs be logically consistent, and that one believe the logical consequences of one's beliefs. A less popular picture sees belief as a graded phenomenon.
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  10. Mark Colyvan (2006). Naturalism and the Paradox of Revisability. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):1–11.
    This paper examines the paradox of revisability. This paradox was proposed by Jerrold Katz as a problem for Quinean naturalised epistemology. Katz employs diagonalisation to demonstrate what he takes to be an inconsistency in the constitutive principles of Quine's epistemology. Specifically, the problem seems to rest with the principle of universal revisability which states that no statement is immune to revision. In this paper it is argued that although there is something odd about employing universal revisability to revise itself, there (...)
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  11. Earl Conee (1994). Against an Epistemic Dilemma. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4):475 – 481.
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  12. Roy T. Cook (2014). Should Anti-Realists Be Anti-Realists About Anti-Realism? Erkenntnis 79 (2):233-258.
    On the Dummettian understanding, anti-realism regarding a particular discourse amounts to (or at the very least, involves) a refusal to accept the determinacy of the subject matter of that discourse and a corresponding refusal to assert at least some instances of excluded middle (which can be understood as expressing this determinacy of subject matter). In short: one is an anti-realist about a discourse if and only if one accepts intuitionistic logic as correct for that discourse. On careful examination, the strongest (...)
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  13. Adam M. Croom (2010). Wittgenstein, Kripke, and the Rule Following Paradox. Dialogue 52 (3):103-109.
    In ?201 of Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein puts forward his famous ?rule-following paradox.? The paradox is how can one follow in accord with a rule ? the applications of which are potentially infinite ? when the instances from which one learns the rule and the instances in which one displays that one has learned the rule are only finite? How can one be certain of rule-following at all? In Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke concedes the skeptical position (...)
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  14. C. D. (1978). Paradoxes of Knowledge. Review of Metaphysics 32 (2):375-376.
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  15. A. A. Derksen (1978). The Alleged Lottery Paradox Resolved. American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1):67 - 74.
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  16. Keith DeRose, I. The Problem.
    In some lottery situations, the probability that your ticket's a loser can get very close to 1. Suppose, for instance, that yours is one of 20 million tickets, only one of which is a winner. Still, it seems that (1) You don't know yours is a loser and (2) You're in no position to flat-out assert that your ticket is a loser. "It's probably a loser," "It's all but certain that it's a loser," or even, "It's quite certain that it's (...)
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  17. By Igor Douven (2008). The Lottery Paradox and Our Epistemic Goal. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):204–225.
    Many have the intuition that the right response to the Lottery Paradox is to deny that one can justifiably believe of even a single lottery ticket that it will lose. The paper shows that from any theory of justification that solves the paradox in accordance with this intuition, a theory not of that kind can be derived that also solves the paradox but is more conducive to our epistemic goal than the former. It is argued that currently there is no (...)
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  18. Igor Douven (2007). A Pragmatic Dissolution of Harman's Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):326–345.
    There is widespread agreement that we cannot know of a lottery ticket we own that it is a loser prior to the drawing of the lottery. At the same time we appear to have knowledge of events that will occur only if our ticket is a loser. Supposing any plausible closure principle for knowledge, the foregoing seems to yield a paradox. Appealing to some broadly Gricean insights, the present paper argues that this paradox is apparent only.
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  19. Igor Douven (2003). Nelkin on the Lottery Paradox. Philosophical Review 112 (3):395-404.
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  20. Igor Douven (2003). The Preface Paradox Revisited. Erkenntnis 59 (3):389 - 420.
    The Preface Paradox has led many philosophers to believe that, if it isassumed that high probability is necessary for rational acceptability, the principleaccording to which rational acceptability is closed under conjunction (CP)must be abandoned. In this paper we argue that the paradox is far less damaging to CP than is generally believed. We describe how, given certain plausibleassumptions, in a large class of cases in which CP seems to lead tocontradiction, it does not do so after all. A restricted version (...)
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  21. Dorothy Edgington (2010). Possible Knowledge of Unknown Truth. Synthese 173 (1):41 - 52.
    Fitch’s argument purports to show that for any unknown truth, p , there is an unknowable truth, namely, that p is true and unknown; for a contradiction follows from the assumption that it is possible to know that p is true and unknown. In earlier work I argued that there is a sense in which it is possible to know that p is true and unknown, from a counterfactual perspective; that is, there can be possible, non-actual knowledge, of the actual (...)
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  22. Jim Edwards (1997). Is Tennant Selling Truth Short? Analysis 57 (2):152–158.
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  23. Simon J. Evnine (2001). Learning From One's Mistakes: Epistemic Modesty and the Nature of Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2):157–177.
    I argue that it is not ideally rational to believe that some of one's current beliefs are false, despite the impressive inductive evidence concerning others and our former selves. One's own current beliefs represent a commitment which would be undermined by taking some of them to be false. The nature of this commitment is examined in the light of Nagel's distinction between subjective and objective points of view. Finally, I suggest how we might acknowledge our fallibility consistently with this special (...)
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  24. Simon J. Evnine (1999). Believing Conjunctions. Synthese 118 (2):201-227.
    I argue that it is rational for a person to believe the conjunction of her beliefs. This involves responding to the Lottery and Preface Paradoxes. In addition, I suggest that in normal circumstances, what it is to believe a conjunction just is to believe its conjuncts.
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  25. Henry J. Folse (1978). Quantum Theory and Atomism: A Possible Ontological Resolution of the Quantum Paradox. Southern Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):629-640.
  26. Patrick Greenough (2011). Truthmaker Gaps and the No-No Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):547 - 563.
    Consider the following sentences: The neighbouring sentence is not true. The neighbouring sentence is not true. Call these the no-no sentences. Symmetry considerations dictate that the no-no sentences must both possess the same truth-value. Suppose they are both true. Given Tarski’s truth-schema—if a sentence S says that p then S is true iff p—and given what they say, they are both not true. Contradiction! Conclude: they are not both true. Suppose they are both false. Given Tarski’s falsity-schema—if a sentence S (...)
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  27. Patrick Grim (1993). Operators in the Paradox of the Knower. Synthese 94 (3):409 - 428.
    Predicates are term-to-sentence devices, and operators are sentence-to-sentence devices. What Kaplan and Montague's Paradox of the Knower demonstrates is that necessity and other modalities cannot be treated as predicates, consistent with arithmetic; they must be treated as operators instead. Such is the current wisdom.A number of previous pieces have challenged such a view by showing that a predicative treatment of modalities neednot raise the Paradox of the Knower. This paper attempts to challenge the current wisdom in another way as well: (...)
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  28. Theodore Guleserian (2007). Gregory W. Fitch, 1948-2007. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 81 (2):172 -.
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  29. Leon Horsten (2009). An Argument Concerning the Unknowable. Analysis 69 (2):240-242.
    Williamson has forcefully argued that Fitch's argument shows that the domain of the unknowable is non-empty. And he exhorts us to make more inroads into the land of the unknowable. Concluding his discussion of Fitch's argument, he writes: " Once we acknowledge that [the domain of the unknowable] is non-empty, we can explore more effectively its extent. … We are only beginning to understand the deeper limits of our knowledge. " I shall formulate and evaluate a new argument concerning the (...)
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  30. Dale Jacquette (2008). Logic of the Preface Paradox. Principia 12 (2):203-216.
    http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2008v12n2p203 The preface paradox is the apparent pragmatic inconsistency that occurs when the author of a book declares in its preface that despite believing that it is highly probable that everything the book maintains is true it is also highly probable that the book contains at least some errors. The preface paradox has often been presented as an example of a logically inconsistent belief that it is nevertheless rational to accept, supporting the suggestion that rationality has nothing immediately to do (...)
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  31. Neil Kennedy (2014). Defending the Possibility of Knowledge. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):579-601.
    In this paper, I propose a solution to Fitch’s paradox that draws on ideas from Edgington (Mind 94:557–568, 1985), Rabinowicz and Segerberg (1994) and Kvanvig (Noûs 29:481–500, 1995). After examining the solution strategies of these authors, I will defend the view, initially proposed by Kvanvig, according to which the derivation of the paradox violates a crucial constraint on quantifier instantiation. The constraint states that non-rigid expressions cannot be substituted into modal positions. We will introduce a slightly modified syntax and semantics (...)
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  32. Thomas Kroedel (2013). The Permissibility Solution to the Lottery Paradox – Reply to Littlejohn. Logos and Episteme 4 (1):103-111.
    According to the permissibility solution to the lottery paradox, the paradox can be solved if we conceive of epistemic justification as a species of permissibility. Clayton Littlejohn has objected that the permissibility solution draws on a sufficient condition for permissible belief that has implausible consequences and that the solution conflicts with our lack of knowledge that a given lottery ticket will lose. The paper defends the permissibility solution against Littlejohn's objections.
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  33. Thomas Kroedel (2012). The Lottery Paradox, Epistemic Justification and Permissibility. Analysis 72 (1):57-60.
    The lottery paradox can be solved if epistemic justification is assumed to be a species of permissibility. Given this assumption, the starting point of the paradox can be formulated as the claim that, for each lottery ticket, I am permitted to believe that it will lose. This claim is ambiguous between two readings, depending on the scope of ‘permitted’. On one reading, the claim is false; on another, it is true, but, owing to the general failure of permissibility to agglomerate, (...)
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  34. Frederick Kroon (1993). Rationality and Epistemic Paradox. Synthese 94 (3):377 - 408.
    This paper provides a new solution to the epistemic paradox of belief-instability, a problem of rational choice which has recently received considerable attention (versions of the problem have been discussed by — among others — Tyler Burge, Earl Conee, and Roy Sorensen). The problem involves an ideally rational agent who has good reason to believe the truth of something of the form:[Ap] p if and only if it is not the case that I accept or believe p.
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  35. Jonathan Kvanvig, The Epistemic Paradoxes.
    The four primary epistemic paradoxes are the lottery, preface, knowability, and surprise examination paradoxes. The lottery paradox begins by imagining a fair lottery with a thousand tickets in it. Each ticket is so unlikely to win that we are justified in believing that it will lose.
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  36. Jonathan Kvanvig (1999). Tennant on Knowability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):422-428.
    The knowability paradox threatens metaphysical or semantical antirealism, the view that truth is epistemic, by revealing an awful consequence of the claim [i] that all truths are knowable. Various attempts have been made to find a way out of the paradox.
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  37. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2006). ``Epistemic Closure Principles&Quot. Philosophy Compass 1:256-267.
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  38. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2006). The Knowability Paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This book thus provides a thorough investigation of the literature on the paradox, and also proposes a solution to the deeper of the two problems raised by ...
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  39. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1998). Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Boston: Routledge.
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  40. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1998). ``The Epistemic Paradoxes&Quot. In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Boston: Routledge
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  41. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1996). ``The Knowability Paradox and the Prospects for Anti-Realism&Quot. Noûs 29:481-500.
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  42. Eong D. Lee (1998). Kroon on Rationality and Epistemic Paradox. Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (2):169-174.
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  43. Bernard Linsky (1994). G. W. Fitch's Paleontology. Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):189 - 193.
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  44. R. Lunnon (1994). Review: R. Hinnion, L'Anti-Fondation En Logique Et En Theorie des Ensembles; , A Propos de l'Anti-Fondation. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 59 (3):1107-1108.
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  45. Paolo Maffezioli, Alberto Naibo & Sara Negri (2013). The Church–Fitch Knowability Paradox in the Light of Structural Proof Theory. Synthese 190 (14):2677-2716.
    Anti-realist epistemic conceptions of truth imply what is called the knowability principle: All truths are possibly known. The principle can be formalized in a bimodal propositional logic, with an alethic modality ${\diamondsuit}$ and an epistemic modality ${\mathcal{K}}$ , by the axiom scheme ${A \supset \diamondsuit \mathcal{K} A}$ (KP). The use of classical logic and minimal assumptions about the two modalities lead to the paradoxical conclusion that all truths are known, ${A \supset \mathcal{K} A}$ (OP). A Gentzen-style reconstruction of the Church–Fitch (...)
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  46. Stephen Maitzen (1998). The Knower Paradox and Epistemic Closure. Synthese 114 (2):337-354.
    The Knower Paradox has had a brief but eventful history, and principles of epistemic closure (which say that a subject automatically knows any proposition she knows to be materially implied, or logically entailed, by a proposition she already knows) have been the subject of tremendous debate in epistemic logic and epistemology more generally, especially because the fate of standard arguments for and against skepticism seems to turn on the fate of closure. As far as I can tell, however, no one (...)
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  47. Ruth Barcan Marcus (1988). F.B. Fitch 1908-1987. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 61 (3):551 - 553.
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  48. Colin McGinn (1981). Reply to Tennant. Analysis 41 (3):120 - 122.
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  49. John R. Myhill (1949). Note on an Idea of Fitch. Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (3):175-176.
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  50. Doris Olin (1987). On an Epistemic Paradox. Analysis 47 (4):216 - 217.
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