David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Clayton Littlejohn John Turri (ed.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion (forthcoming)
Cases of reasonable, mistaken belief figure prominently in discussions of the knowledge norm of assertion and practical reason as putative counterexamples to these norms. These cases are supposed to show that the knowledge norm is too demanding and that some weaker norm (e.g., a justification or reasonable belief norm) ought to put in its place. These cases don't show what they're intended to. When you assert something false or treat some falsehood as if it's a reason for action, you might deserve an excuse. You often don't deserve even that.
|Keywords||Justification Excuse Epistemic Norms Knowledge First Knowledge and Practical Reason|
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Citations of this work BETA
Sanford C. Goldberg (forthcoming). Should Have Known. Synthese:1-32.
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