David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press 17-38 (2003)
We ordinarily suppose that there is a difference between having and failing to exercise a rational capacity on the one hand, and lacking a rational capacity altogether on the other. This is crucial for our allocations of responsibility. Someone who has but fails to exercise a capacity is responsible for their failure to exercise their capacity, whereas someone who lacks a capacity altogether is not. However, as Gary Watson pointed out in his seminal essay ’Skepticism about Weakness of Will’, the idea of an unexercised capacity is much more difficult to make sense of than it initially appears. The aim of ’Rational Capacities’ is to provide the needed explication of this idea.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Alfred R. Mele (2008). Manipulation, Compatibilism, and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):263-286.
Neil Levy & Michael McKenna (2009). Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.
Neil Levy (2011). Resisting 'Weakness of the Will'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):134 - 155.
Toby Handfield (2008). Unfinkable Dispositions. Synthese 160 (2):297 - 308.
Derek Baker (2014). The Abductive Case for Humeanism Over Quasi-Perceptual Theories of Desire. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (2):1-29.
Similar books and articles
Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.) (2003). Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Clarendon Press.
Robert Audi (1990). Weakness of Will and Rational Action. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (3):270 – 281.
Ferenc Huoranszki (2011). Weakness and Compulsion: The Essential Difference. Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):81-97.
Michael Smith (2004). Ethics and the a Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
Edmund Henden (2012). Addictive Actions. Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):362-382.
Kevin Zaragoza (2006). What Happens When Someone Acts Compulsively? Philosophical Studies 131 (2):251 - 268.
Michael Smith (2003). Rational Capacities. In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Varities of Practical Irrationality. Oxford University Press 17-38.
Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield (2010). Rational Capacities, Resolve, and Weakness of Will. Mind 119 (476):907 - 932.
Jeanette Kennett (2001). Agency and Responsibility: A Common-Sense Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press.
Gary Watson (1977). Skepticism About Weakness of Will. Philosophical Review 86 (3):316-339.
Added to index2009-06-25
Total downloads236 ( #12,314 of 1,939,032 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #62,354 of 1,939,032 )
How can I increase my downloads?