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Profile: Jeanette Kennett (Macquarie University)
  1. Jeanette Kennett, Addiction, Choice, and Disease : How Voluntary is Voluntary Action in Addiction?
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  2. Jeanette Kennett (2013). Pleasure and Addiction. Frontiers in Psychiatry 4.
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  3. Jeanette Kennett & Doug McConnell (2013). Explaining Addiction: How Far Does the Reward Account of Motivation Take Us? Inquiry 56 (5):470 - 489.
    ABSTRACT Choice theorists such as George Ainslie and Gene Heyman argue that the drug-seeking behaviour of addicts is best understood in the same terms that explain everyday choices. Everyday choices, they claim, aim to maximise the reward from available incentives. Continuing drug-use is, therefore, what addicts most want given the incentives they are aware of but they will change their behaviour if and when better incentives become available. This model might explain many typical cases of addiction, but there are hard (...)
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  4. Jeanette Kennett (2012). Living With One's Choices Moral Reasoning In Vitro and In Vivo. In Robyn Langdon & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning. Psychology Press. 257.
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  5. Steve Matthews & Jeanette Kennett (2012). Truth, Lies, and the Narrative Self. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (4):301-316.
    Social persons routinely tell themselves and others richly elaborated autobiographical stories filled with details about deeds, plans, roles, motivations, values, and character. Saul, let us imagine, is someone who once sailed the world as a young adventurer, going from port to port and living a gypsy existence. In telling his new acquaintance, Jess, of his former exotic life, he shines a light on his present character and this may guide to some extent their interaction here and now. Perhaps Jess also (...)
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  6. John Bigelow, Raymond D. Bradley, Andrew Brennan, Tony Coady, Peter Forrest, James Franklin, Karen Green, Russell Grigg, Matthew Sharpe, Jeanette Kennett, Neil Levy, Catriona Mackenzie, Gary Malinas, Chris Mortensen, Robert Nola, Paul Patton, Charles R. Pidgen, Val Plumwood, Graham Priest, Greg Restall, Jack Reynolds, Paul Thom & Michelle Boulous Walker (2011). The Antipodean Philosopher: Public Lectures on Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Lexington Books.
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  7. Jeanette Kennett (2011). Imagining Reasons. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):181-192.
    In this article, I explore the implications of Karsten Stueber's account of imaginative resistance, particularly as it relates to the phenomenon of moral dumbfounding described by Jonathan Haidt and colleagues. I suggest that Stueber's account allows us to redescribe the phenomenon as a failure of the folk psychological project of interpretation and so to challenge Haidt's metaethical conclusions. I close by considering some implications for moral deliberation and judgment in those, such as autistic people, whose interpretive capacities are impaired.
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  8. Jeanette Kennett (2011). Science and Normative Authority. Philosophical Explorations 14 (3):229-235.
    Philosophical Explorations, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 229-235, September 2011.
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  9. Jessica Wolfendale & Jeanette Kennett (eds.) (2011). Fashion – Philosophy for Everyone: Thinking with Style. Blackwell.
    This book explores the diverse and sometimes contradictory aspects of fashion in a series of lively, entertaining thoughtful essays from prominent philosophers and writers. Topics include: What is fashion?
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  10. Philip Gerrans & Jeanette Kennett (2010). Neurosentimentalism and Moral Agency. Mind 119 (475):585-614.
    Metaethics has recently been confronted by evidence from cognitive neuroscience that tacit emotional processes play an essential causal role in moral judgement. Most neuroscientists, and some metaethicists, take this evidence to vindicate a version of metaethical sentimentalism. In this paper we argue that the ‘dual process’ model of cognition that frames the discussion within and without philosophy does not do justice to an important constraint on any theory of deliberation and judgement. Namely, decision-making is the exercise of a capacity for (...)
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  11. Jeanette Kennett (2010). Reasons, Emotion, and Moral Judgment in the Psychopath. In Luca Malatesti & John McMillan (eds.), Responsibility and Psychopathy: Interfacing Law, Psychiatry and Philosophy. Oup Oxford.
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  12. Jeanette Kennett & Cordelia Fine (2009). Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):77–96.
    The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814–834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Haidt’s research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons. We argue that there can be no ‘real’ moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of moral judgments. However, we suggest that the empirical literature (...)
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  13. Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews (2009). Mental Timetravel, Agency and Responsibility. In Matthew Broome Lisa Bortolotti (ed.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives.
    We have argued elsewhere (2002) that moral responsibility over time depends in part upon the having of psychological connections which facilitate forms of self-control. In this paper we explore the importance of mental time travel – our ordinary ability to mentally travel to temporal locations outside the present, involving both memory of our personal past and the ability to imagine ourselves in the future – to our agential capacities for planning and control. We suggest that in many individuals with dissociative (...)
     
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  14. Jeanette Kennett (2008). True and Proper Selves: Velleman on Love. Ethics 118 (2):213-227.
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  15. Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews (2008). Normative Agency. In Catriona MacKenzie Kim Atkins (ed.), Practical Identity and Narrative Agency. Routledge.
  16. Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews (2008). What's the Buzz? Undercover Marketing and the Corruption of Friendship. Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (1):2–18.
    Undercover marketing targets potential customers by concealing the commercial nature of an apparently social transaction. In a typical case an individual approaches a marketing target apparently to provide some information or advice about a product in a way that makes it seem like they are a fellow consumer. In another kind of case, a friend displays a product to you, and encourages its purchase, but fails to disclose their association with the marketing firm. We focus on this second type of (...)
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  17. J. David Velleman, Jeanette Kennett, Andrew Altman, Christopher Heath Wellman, Mitchell N. Berman & Ben Bradley (2008). 10. Ajume H. Wingo, Veil Politics in Liberal Democratic States Ajume H. Wingo, Veil Politics in Liberal Democratic States (Pp. 367-371). [REVIEW] Ethics 118 (2).
     
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  18. Philip Gerrans & Jeanette Kennett (2006). Introduction. Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):3 – 12.
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  19. Jeanette Kennett (2006). Do Psychopaths Really Threaten Moral Rationalism? Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):69 – 82.
    It is often claimed that the existence of psychopaths undermines moral rationalism. I examine a recent empirically based argument for this claim and conclude that rationalist accounts of moral judgement and moral reasoning are perfectly compatible with the evidence cited.
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  20. Dean Cocking & Jeanette Kennett (2003). Friendship and Role Morality. In Kim Chong Chong, Sor-Hoon Tan & C. L. Ten (eds.), The Moral Circle and the Self: Chinese and Western Approaches. Open Court.
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  21. Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews (2003). Delusion, Dissociation and Identity. Philosophical Explorations 6 (1):31-49.
    The condition known as Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) or Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) is metaphysically strange. Can there really be several distinct persons operating in a single body? Our view is that DID sufferers are single persons with a severe mental disorder. In this paper we compare the phenomenology of dissociation between personality states in DID with certain delusional disorders. We argue both that the burden of proof must lie with those who defend the metaphysically extravagant Multiple Persons view and (...)
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  22. Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews (2003). The Unity and Disunity of Agency. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (4):308-312.
    Effective agency, according to contemporary Kantians, requires a unity of purpose both at a time, in order that we may eliminate conflict among our motives, and over time, because many of the things we do form part of longer-term projects and make sense only in the light of these projects and life plans. Call this the unity of agency thesis. This thesis can be regarded as a normative constraint on accounts of personal identity and indeed on accounts of what it (...)
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  23. Jeanette Kennett (2002). Autism, Empathy and Moral Agency. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):340-357.
    Psychopaths have long been of interest to moral philosophers, since a careful examination of their peculiar deficiencies may reveal what features are normally critical to the development of moral agency. What underlies the psychopath's amoralism? A common and plausible answer to this question is that the psychopath lacks empathy. Lack of empathy is also claimed to be a critical impairment in autism, yet it is not at all clear that autistic individuals share the psychopath's amoralism. How is empathy characterized in (...)
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  24. Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews (2002). Identity, Control and Responsibility: The Case of Dissociative Identity Disorder. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):509-526.
    Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) (formerly known as Multiple Personality Disorder) is a condition in which a person appears to possess more than one personality, and sometimes very many. Some recent criminal cases involving defendants with DID have resulted in "not guilty" verdicts, though the defense is not always successful in this regard. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Stephen Behnke have argued that we should excuse DID sufferers from responsibility, only if at the time of the act the person was insane (typically delusional); (...)
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  25. Jeanette Kennett (2001). Agency and Responsibility: A Common-Sense Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press.
    Taking the problem of weakness of will as her starting point, Jeanette Kennett builds an admirably comprehensive and integrated account of moral agency which gives a central place to the capacity for self-control. Her account of the exercise and limits of self-control vindicates the common-sense distinction between weakness of will and compulsion and so underwrites our ordinary allocations of moral responsibility.
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  26. Dean Cocking & Jeanette Kennett (2000). Friendship and Moral Danger. Journal of Philosophy 97 (5):278-296.
    We focus here on some familiar kinds of cases of conflict between friendship and morality, and, on the basis of our account of the nature of friendship, argue for the following two claims: first, that in some cases where we are led morally astray by virtue of a relationship that makes its own demands on us, the relationship in question is properly called a friendship; second, that relationships of this kind are valuable in their own right.
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  27. Dean Cocking & Jeanette Kennett (1998). Friendship and the Self. Ethics 108 (3):502-527.
    We argue that companion friendship is not importantly marked by self-disclosure as understood in either of these two ways. One's close friends need not be markedly similar to oneself, as is claimed by the mirror account, nor is the role of private information in establishing and maintaining intimacy important in the way claimed by the secrets view. Our claim will be that the mirror and secrets views not only fail to identify features that are in part constitutive of close or (...)
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  28. Jeanette Kennett, Review: Wallace R Jay, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. [REVIEW]
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  29. Jeanette Kennett & Michael Smith (1997). Synchronic Self-Control is Always Non-Actional. Analysis 57 (2):123–131.
  30. Jeanette Kennett & Michael Smith (1996). Frog and Toad Lose Control. Analysis 56 (2):63–73.
    It seems to be a truism that whenever we do something - and so, given the omnipresence of trying (Hornsby 1980), whenever we try to do something - we want to do that thing more than we want to do anything else we can do (Davidson 1970). However, according to Frog, when we have will power we are able to try not to do something that we ‘really want to do’. In context the idea is clearly meant to be that (...)
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  31. Jeanette Kennett & Michael Smith (1996). Philosophy and Commonsense: The Case of Weakness of Will. In Michaelis Michael & John O.’Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind. Kluwer. 141-157.
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  32. Jeanette Kennett & Michael Smith (1994). Philosophy and Commonsense: The Case of Weakness of Will. In John O'Leary-Hawthorne & Michaelis Michael (eds.), Philosophy in Mind. Kluwer. 141--157.
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  33. Jeanette Kennett (1993). Mixed Motives. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (3):256 – 269.
    My aim in this paper is, by process of elimination, to elucidate and defend an account of how ordinary people act on their values. I will be making both a descriptive claim about our psychology and a further claim about its effectiveness and rational status. I want to suggest that the way in which most of us in fact put our values into practice is, over time, preferable to the ways which initially seem required or at least desirable.
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  34. Jeanette Kennett (1991). Decision Theory and Weakness of Will. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):113-130.
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