Article presents the experience of death from the point of view of the second person in the context of the problems that arise from Epicurus’s famous thesis that as long as we exist, death is not present and when it is present, we do not exist. The epistemo-logical problem is the possibility of experiencing death. We cannot resolve this problem from the point of view of the first or third person. In your death, however, the death of a close friend, (...) of a person emotionally connected with me, I can partly experience my own death. We can resolve some of the other problems in a similar manner: the ontological prob-lem, the axiological problem, the moral problem and the eschatological problem. (shrink)

The paper is a discussion of Tomasz Polak’s book System kościelny, czyli przewagi pana K. [The Church System, or the Dominance of Mr. K.]. The author emphasizes the significance of Polak’s book not only for religious studies, given especially his original thesis about Christianity’s atheistic core, but also for other fields within humanities, dealing with the origins, development and fall of non-religious myths, social or national.

The article is a critical commentary on Peter Singer’s thesis that the brain death definition should be replaced by a rule outlining the conditions permitting organ harvesting from patients who are biologically alive but are no longer persons. Largely agreeing with the position, I believe it can be justified not only on the basis of utilitarian arguments, but also those based on Kantian ethics and Christianity. However, due to the lack of reliable methods diagnosing complete and irreversible loss of consciousness, (...) we should refrain from implementing upper brain death into medical practice. Organs also should not be harvested from people in a persistent vegetative state or from anencephalic children, for similar reasons. At the same time, patients who suffered from whole-brain death should not be artificially sustained; in light of current knowledge they can be declared dead and become organ donors. (shrink)

The article aims to answer the question whether philosophy of religion can fulfil its research goals, that is discover the essence of religion, find out if any one of them is true and if faith and religious behavior are rational. In the face of a multitude of religions it is difficult to point to any common elements which makes it harder to discover the essence of religion. Trying to prove the consistency of the concept of God as an object of (...) religion and either His/Her existence or non-existence faces similar problems; this makes it impossible to conclusively decide whether religion is true or not. Therefore, it is also difficult to settle whether religious faith is rational or irrational. However, this failure does not deny the cognitive value of philosophy of religion, which can analyze various religious doctrines as it relates to their consistency, truthfulness, or the rationality of following them. (shrink)

Author: Ziemiński Ireneusz Title: PHILOSOPHY AS MEDITATIO MORTIS (PLATO AND MONTAIGNE) (Filozofia jako meditatio mortis (Platon – Montaigne)) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2006, vol:.6, number: 2006/1, pages: 43-58 Keywords: MEDITATIO MORTIS, DEATH, PLATO, MONTAIGNE Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The idea of philosophy as meditatio mortis is illustrated with the examples of Plato’s and Montaigne’s views. According to Plato, life within body is a kind of evil, and death is the (...) way of release and return to divine life. Philosophy regarded as seeking the truth is at the same time an exercise in dying because it consists in taking off reason from body and senses. Philosophy as meditatio mortis is then preparing to true and eternal life. According to Montaigne, death is the necessary end of human existence, which we should accept without reservation and fear. Philosophy lies in preparing to death as a natural biological event, common to all living creatures. Human dying should be liberated from all ceremonies and cultural rituals because they are the main reasons of our fear and prevent us from accepting death as a natural event. (shrink)

Author: Ziemiński Ireneusz Title: “BECAUSE THOU HAST NOT ASKED FOR THYSELF LONG LIFE...” AN ATTEMPT AT PHILOSOPHICAL INTERPRETATION OF SALOMON’S DREAM („Nie błagałeś dla siebie o długie życie...” – próba filozoficznej interpretacji snu Salomona) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2005, vol:.5, number: 2005/1, pages: 33-43 Keywords: SALOMON, HUMAN CONDITION, GOD FOR LONG LIFE Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The author of the article presents biblical Salomon as a man who does not (...) ask God for long life. Salomon can understand his own human condition as a mortal being. This understanding is the ground of human wisdom. To be a human being is to be a mortal being. (shrink)

The article tries to explain Wittgenstein’s thesis “death is not an event in life.” Death is neither a positive nor a negative fact, but a one-time event. Death is an event, which, not belonging to the world, constitutes the limit of all possible experience, and as such, it is inaccessible to any form of consciousness. While constituting the end of the subject as a prerequisite of the world, death is also the final annihilation of existence as such. The above analysis (...) shows that Wittgenstein is a transcendental idealist. According to him death is not an event in life because: (1) it is the death of the subject, and the transcendental subject does not belong to the world, (2) the transcendental subject is a condition of the world, so the death of the subject is the end of the world. (shrink)

Tematem artykułu jest symbolika krzyża i miecza, wyznaczająca dzieje chrześcijaństwa. Jan Dobraczyński w powieściowej biografii apostoła Pawła wskazuje, że pierwotnym symbolem żydowskiego mesjasza miał być miecz, który wyzwoli naród wybrany spod władzy cesarstwa rzymskiego. Jezus tę ideę zmienił w ideę pokoju i miłości, której zwieńczeniem była jego zbawcza śmierć za grzeszników; w ten sposób miecz został zastąpiony krzyżem. Z tego powodu chrześcijaństwo można uznać za religię krzyża,a nie miecza, w której dobrowolna ofiara zastępuje przemoc; odkąd jednak stało się ono oficjalną (...) religią cesarstwa, było wykorzystywane jako ideowe usprawiedliwienie prześladowania wyznawców kultów pogańskich. W ten sposób nie tylko wróciło do miecza, lecz wprost zastąpiło krzyż mieczem, a nawet uświęciło krzyż jako miecz. Symbolicznym potwierdzeniem takiej interpretacji dziejów chrześcijaństwa jest końcowa scena powieści Dobraczyńskiego Święty miecz, w której apostoł – chrzcząc rzymskiego żołnierza – zamiast krzyża daje mu do pocałowania miecz. (shrink)

The subject of the article is the moral and religious ambiguity of St. Paul’s conversion; rabbi Saul of Tarsus, who had previously been a persecutor of Christians, encountered a resurrected Jesus and proceeded to accept Him as the Messiah, becoming a zealous apostle. On one hand, the moral meaning of his conversion is a positive one, as it shows that even the worst villain can receive God’s forgiveness if they understand their mistake and change their behavior. On the other, however, (...) Paul’s case suggests that God’s mercy is an injustice—it shows that ceasing to do evil and accepting the true faith is enough to avoid punishment for previous evil deeds. The religious meaning of conversion is similarly ambiguous; on one hand God is merciful because He forgave a person who persecuted His followers because he understood his mistake, converted, and accepted the true faith. However, there is an injustice here; converted sinners and Christ’s persecutors may receive salvation given that they are baptized and join the Church, meanwhile people who are moral but do not believe in God and were not baptized cannot be saved despite never having committed any atrocity. (shrink)

Czy Bóg jest dobry? Na marginesie książki Dariusza Łukasiewicza Opatrzność Boża, wolność, przypadek Podstawowym problemem książki Dariusza Łukasiewicza jest kwestia natury Boga, przede wszystkim pytanie, czy jest On bytem doskonale dobrym. Jeśli jest doskonale dobry, to powinien zawsze uczynić to, co w danych warunkach najlepsze lub – jeśli nie ma możliwości czynienia dobra – z dwu lub więcej alternatyw wybierze tę, która jest najmniej zła. W argumentacji rozwijanej w artykule staram się pokazać, że dobroci Boga nie da się wykazać ani (...) a priori, ani a posteriori. Argumenty a priori są niewystarczające, ponieważ z takich ontologicznych cech Boga, jak prostota, konieczność czy nieskończoność dobroć moralna nie wynika. Podobnie moralna dobroć nie wynika z wszechmocy ani wszechwiedzy. Raczej przeciwnie, wszechmoc oraz wszechwiedza mogą być przeszkodą w dobroci moralnej; skoro bowiem Bóg wie wszystko, co jest logicznie możliwe wiedzieć, a także może uczynić wszystko, co jest logicznie możliwe uczynić, to powinien nie tylko zło znać, lecz także móc je czynić. Argumenty a posteriori są niewystarczające z powodu ogromu zła obecnego w świecie; przykładem jest naturalne i nieuchronne zło obecne w przyrodzie, wynikające stąd, że jedne gatunki są pokarmem dla innych. Jeśli zatem Bóg rzeczywiście stworzył świat, to nie był wrażliwy na cierpienie istot, które powołał do istnienia, zwłaszcza, że w zamieszkiwanym przez nas świecie istnieje wiele zła. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes’ standpoint concerning the right for death seems to be coherent as well as justifiable. On one hand he points at the fear of death as the main source of law, but on the other hand he formulates minimum basic rules which safeguard man’s life. Though nobody is obliged to rescue someone else at the cost of their own life, but at the same time nobody has a right to kill anyone. Also nowadays the same rule can be found (...) in many legal systems: even if people are obliged to help others, they are not compelled to undertake heroic deeds or risk their lives. Thus Hobbes’ position can be given the name of ethical individualism, or even egoism in which no form of instrumentalism of human life is allowed. The value of any individual is absolute, which excludes the possibility to sacrifice their life for the sake of others. Hobbes does not share assumptions of utilitarianism and his solution might seem utopian from the perspective of the strategy of social actions, but from the perspective of values and rights of an individual it seems justifiable. (shrink)

Krytyka tez zwartych w mojej książce Religia jako idolatria, przedstawiona w polemikach autorstwa Błażeja Gębury i Marcina Iwanickiego, jest zasadniczo nietrafna. Głównym powodem jest to, że Autorzy zarzutów nie przedstawili żadnego historycznego przykładu zjawiska religijnego niebędącego idolatrią. Odwołując się jedynie do przykładów logicznie możliwych, nie podali warunków, jakie musiałyby zostać spełnione, aby ów akt mógł zostać urzeczywistniony; tymczasem podstawowym z nich jest zmiana ontycznego i epistemicznego statusu człowieka jako istoty zdolnej bezpośrednio obcować z Bogiem. Również podane przez Polemistów bardziej szczegółowe (...) argumenty nie obalają tezy o nieuchronnej idolatryczności religii. Jeśli bowiem Bóg przyjmuje wszystkie akty czci, składane Mu w dziejach, to należy Go oskarżyć o łamanie elementarnych zasad moralnych, trudno bowiem zaakceptować krwawe ofiary składane Mu z ludzi i zwierząt. Z kolei „religia zero” jest niemożliwa do spełnienia; z jednej strony okazuje się fenomenem całkowicie prywatnym, z drugiej — oznacza poznanie Boga na sposób ludzki. Podobnie nieświadomy akt czci jest doznaniem estetycznym, a nie religijnym; teistyczna interpretacja tego aktu nosi znamiona przemocy symbolicznej, a także redukuje doświadczenia religijne do poczucia piękna. Nie ma też wątpliwości, że postulowany przez Polemistów dystans ontyczny jako konieczny warunek religii nieidolatrycznej w rzeczywistości ją uniemożliwia, ponieważ nawet Bóg nie jest w stanie objawić się nam takim, jaki jest, lecz musi się dostosować do naszych ograniczeń poznawczych; może się zatem objawić jedynie jako nie-Bóg. Z tego powodu każdy akt religijny jest nieuchronnie idolatryczny; nie oznacza to jednak nadużycia słowa „idolatria” do zjawisk religijnych, lecz właściwy opis ich natury. Mimo to nie należy całkowicie eliminować religii z życia społecznego; dopóki bowiem ludzie religijni nikogo nie krzywdzą i nie próbują narzucać swoich idoli innym osobom, mają prawo bez przeszkód w nie wierzyć, a nawet je czcić. (shrink)

The reviewed collection, The Emotional Power of Music, presents the multi-dimensional picture of music as an important element of human life. The multi-disciplinary character of the book is visible not only in showing the variety of areas of research studying the emotional aspects of music but also the variety of theories, which attempt to explain the links between music and emotions. It should also be mentioned, that—because of limited technical jargon and adding artists’ comments—the book is not only addressed to (...) people professionally interested in the links between music and emotions, but to a broader audience. Therefore, the editors’ hope that it will be useful to both experts and people searching for an instructive introduction to the discussed issues is justified. (shrink)

The reviewed collection, The Emotional Power of Music, presents the multi-dimensional picture of music as an important element of human life. The multi-disciplinary character of the book is visible not only in showing the variety of areas of research studying the emotional aspects of music but also the variety of theories, which attempt to explain the links between music and emotions. It should also be mentioned, that—because of limited technical jargon and adding artists’ comments—the book is not only addressed to (...) people professionally interested in the links between music and emotions, but to a broader audience. Therefore, the editors’ hope that it will be useful to both experts and people searching for an instructive introduction to the discussed issues is justified. (shrink)

The article reviews the book Śmierć, nieśmiertelność, sens życia. Egzystencjalny wymiar filozofii Ludwiga Wittgensteina [Death, Immortality, the Meaning of Life: The Existential Dimension of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophy], by Ireneusz Ziemiński.

The article reviews the book Śmierć, nieśmiertelność, sens życia. Egzystencjalny wymiar filozofii Ludwiga Wittgensteina [Death, Immortality, the Meaning of Life: The Existential Dimension of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophy], by Ireneusz Ziemiński.

The article reviews the book Śmierć, nieśmiertelność, sens życia. Egzystencjalny wymiar filozofii Ludwiga Wittgensteina [Death, Immortality, the Meaning of Life: The Existential Dimension of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophy], by Ireneusz Ziemiński.

The article reviews the book Śmierć, nieśmiertelność, sens życia. Egzystencjalny wymiar filozofii Ludwiga Wittgensteina [Death, Immortality, the Meaning of Life: The Existential Dimension of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophy], by Ireneusz Ziemiński.

The article reviews the book Śmierć, nieśmiertelność, sens życia. Egzystencjalny wymiar filozofii Ludwiga Wittgensteina [Death, Immortality, the Meaning of Life: The Existential Dimension of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophy], by Ireneusz Ziemiński.

In a recent article, Ireneusz Zieminski argues that the main goals of philosophy of religion are to define religion; assess the truth value of religion and; assess the rationality of a religious way of life. Zieminski shows that each of these goals are difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Hence, philosophy of religion leads to scepticism. He concludes that the conceptual tools philosophers of religion employ are best suited to study specific religious traditions, rather than religion more broadly construed. (...) But it’s unclear whether the goals Zieminski attributes to philosophy of religion are accurate or even necessary for successful inquiry. I argue that an essentialist definition of religion isn’t necessary for philosophy of religion and that philosophers of religion already use the conceptual analysis in the way Zieminski suggests that they should. Finally, the epistemic standard Zieminski has in view is often obscure. And when it is clear, it is unrealistically high. Contemporary philosophers of religion rarely, if ever, claim to be offering certainty, or even evidence as strong as that found in the empirical sciences. (shrink)

The article reviews the book Byt i sens. Księga Pamiątkowa VII Polskiego Zjazdu Filozoficznego w Szczecinie, 14–18 września 2004 roku, edited by Renata Ziemińska and Ireneusz Ziemiński.

The article reviews the book Byt i sens. Księga Pamiątkowa VII Polskiego Zjazdu Filozoficznego w Szczecinie, 14–18 września 2004 roku, edited by Renata Ziemińska and Ireneusz Ziemiński.

Author: Koepke Ireneusz Title: ANDRZEJ WALICKI AND “WARSAW SCHOOL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS” (Andrzej Walicki i „warszawska szkoła historyków (historii) idei”) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2005, vol:.5, number: 2005/1, pages: 259-276 Keywords: ANDRZEJ WALICKI, WARSAW SCHOOL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:This article is an attempt of presenting Andrzej Walicki connections with the so called Warsaw School of the History of Ideas and his research (...) on basic methodological issues created by this “school”, which are linked with the history of ideas and the history of philosophy. The most important are research rules which has been used by A. Walicki, and their consequences on his intellectual work as well as some critical remarks. (shrink)

Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz: about cognition -- Roman Ingarden: about the existence of the world -- Józef Maria Bocheński: on communism -- Rev. Józef Tischner: about the ethics of solidarity -- Kazimierz Twardowski: about happiness.

RubisCO is Earth's main enzyme responsible for CO2 fixation via carboxylation of ribulose-1,5-bisphosphate into organic matter. Besides the carboxylation reaction, RubisCO also catalyzes the oxygenation of RuBP by O2, which is probably as old as its carboxylation properties. Based on molecular phylogeny, the occurrence of the reactive oxygen species -removing system and kinetic properties of different RubisCO forms, we postulated that RubisCO oxygenase activity appeared in local microoxic areas, yet before the appearance of oxygenic photosynthesis. Here, in reviewing the literature, (...) we present a novel hypothesis: the RubisCO early oxygenase activity hypothesis. This hypothesis may be compared with the exaptation hypothesis, according to which latent RubisCO oxygenase properties emerged later during the oxygenation of the Earth's atmosphere. The reconstruction of ancestral RubisCO forms using ancestral sequence reconstruction techniques, as a promising way for testing of RubisCO early oxygenase activity hypothesis, is presented. RubisCO catalyzes carboxylation and oxygenation of ribulose-1,5-bisphosphate. Carboxylating properties of RubisCO are an ancient way for CO2 fixation into organic matter. However, an evolutionary importance of oxygenase activity of RubisCO remains enigmatic. Here, we formulated RubisCO early oxygenase activity hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, RubisCO oxygenase activity appeared yet before the appearance of oxygenic photosynthesis. (shrink)