In the last decade there arose a debate between William P. Alston and Nicholas Wolterstorff on the subject of Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine of analogia—that is, the position that perfection terms, when properly predicated of God and of creatures, are distinct, yet related in meaning. Whereas Alston interprets Aquinas to hold this well-known position before criticizing it, Wolterstorff argues that Aquinas actually did not hold the position as it is usually presented. In this paper, I show why Alston’s “orthodox” interpretation is (...) more faithful to the letter of Aquinas’s text than is Wolterstorff’s “heterodoxy” and attempt to defuse Alston’s criticisms. (shrink)

This paper is a response to an article in Philosophia Christi by W. Paul Franks and Richard B. Davis entitled “Against a Postmodern Epistemology.” In this article, the authors offer a critique of James K. A. Smith. I respond to three of their particular criticisms in the following manner: by explaining the motivations behind rejecting a modern “correspondence theory of truth”; revealing what I take to be an invalid inference on the topic of scripture and interpretation; and offering an alternative (...) account of the “universality” of the gospel. (shrink)

In this article, I defend a version of ontological pluralism, specifically with an eye toward laying metaphysical groundwork for an account of divine naming inspired by Avicenna. I try to show (1) that Avicenna’s pluralism is well-motivated as a metaphysical thesis and (2) that it offers substantive philosophical support for a correlatively pluralist approach to divine naming. My argument proceeds by identifying two influential objections to ontological pluralism, and then offering replies to these objections with the help of Avicenna. The (...) first objection pertains to pluralism as a position in general metaphysics, whereas the second pertains to pluralism as a position in theological epistemology or divine naming. To the extent that these replies are successful, I argue that Avicennian pluralism is compelling on both counts as a philosophical position. (shrink)

Abstract:Epistemic paternalism occurs when evidence is withheld or shaped in particular ways in order to help an agent arrive at the truth, but this is done without their consent (and sometimes without their knowledge). While general defenses of epistemic paternalism are garnering more attention in the recent literature, little has been said regarding the practice in religious contexts. We explore a defense of epistemic paternalism in religious settings inspired by the work of the medieval Islamic philosopher Averroes. According to Averroes, (...) epistemic paternalism is permissible in cases where it would help a layperson arrive at religious knowledge via imagination because they are incapable of arriving at it by demonstration. We conclude by explaining how the distinction between imagination and demonstration can be used to justify epistemic paternalism in contemporary settings. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that there are resources in the work of Thomas Aquinas that amount to a unique approach to what David P. Schweikard and Hans Bernhard Schmid’s call the “Central Problem” facing theorists of collective intentionality and action. That is to say, Aquinas can be said to affirm both (1) the “Individual Ownership Claim” and (2) the “Irreducibility Claim,” coherently and compellingly. Regarding the Individual Ownership Claim, I argue that Aquinas’s concept of “general virtue” (virtus generalis) buttresses (...) an account of the way in which individuals act collectively qua individuals, i.e., without invoking hive minds or other scientifically problematic phenomena. Further, with respect to the Irreducibility Claim (2), I argue that Aquinas’s concept of “common good” (bonum commune) offers an account of the way in which some powers and acts of social groups are importantly irreducible to those of their members. Considered together, I argue that these two positions in Aquinas are correlative, and therefore amount to a coherent account of collective action and group agency, respectively. (shrink)

At least since Martin Heidegger’s influential reading of Thomas Aquinas’s account of truth as a precursor to modern philosophy’s unfortunate “forgetfulness of being,” it has been popular to classify the Angelic Doctor as one of the fore­runners of the modern “correspondence theory” of truth. In what follows, I attempt to answer the question of whether or not this is a correct assessment. I want to suggest that Aquinas’s account of truth has superficial concord but deep conflict with modern correspondence theories. (...) The argument proceeds in two major segments: First, I attempt to establish a working definition of correspondence theory by tracing its development in the work of John Locke, John Stuart Mill and Bertrand Russell. Next, in light of these fundamental features of correspondence theory, I sketch out the way in which Aquinas’s own account is in superficial concord but deep conflict with it. (shrink)

Existential gratitude-gratitude for one's very existence or life as a whole-is pervasive across the most influential human, cultural and religious traditions. Weaving together analytic and continental, as well as non-western and historical philosophical perspectives, this volume explores the nexus of gratitude, existence and God as an inter-subjective phenomenon for the first time. A team of leading scholars introduce existential gratitude as a perennially and characteristically human phenomenon, central to the distinctive life of our species. Attention is given to the conditions (...) under which existence itself might be construed as having a gift-like or otherwise gratitude-inducing character. Drawing on a diversity of perspectives, chapters mark out new territory in philosophical inquiry, addressing whether and in what sense we ought to be grateful for our very existence. By analysing gratitude, this collection makes a novel contribution to the discourse on moral emotions, phenomenology, anti-natalism and theology. (shrink)

I argue that the many disparate meanings of truth in John’s Gospel ought to be con­sidered “prolegomena” for any Christian truth theory. That is to say, insofar as any theory of truth in Christian philosophy fails to accommodate the multifaceted character of truth evidenced in John, it fails as a theory. After demonstrating some of the most important meanings of truth in John, I argue that the “correspondence” theory advocated by many contemporary Christian analytic philosophers is a reductionism when considered (...) in light of these prolegomena. Finally, I defend a more adequate alternative from Anselm’s De Veritate. (shrink)

In this study, I consider the viability of what is perhaps one of the more “obscure” transcendentals in Aquinas’s work—that is, the concept of multitudo transcendens. This strange notion is mentioned explicitly (as a member of the transcendentia, that is) on four occasions in Aquinas’s oeuvre. Despite its apparent difficulties, i.e., the clear difficulties associated with claiming that ens is really convertible with both unum and multitudo, I suggest that Aquinas’s affirmation of multitudo as a transcendental is a conceptually coherent (...) way of providing a compelling answer to a perennial problem in both ancient and modern philosophy: namely, the logical and metaphysical problem of doing justice to the seemingly equiprimordial notions of “the one” and “the many”—as harmonious perfections rather than competitive notions. (shrink)

The burgeoning analytic literature on “social ontology”—that is, the properly ontological status of “social” phenomena, such asinstitutions, firms and nation-states—has yielded some promising avenues of research for economists interested in the economic agency of groups as opposed to individual persons. Following M. D. Ryall, in this paper I offer a preliminary sketch of an ontology of social entities inspired by the work of Bernard Lonergan and the Aristotelian metaphysical tradition.