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Profile: Michael Wilby (Anglia Ruskin University)
  1. Michael Wilby (2012). Embodying the False-Belief Tasks. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):519-540.
    Embodied approaches to mindreading have tended to define themselves in contrast to cognitive approaches to social mindreading. One side effect of this has been a lack of engagement with key areas in the study of social cognition—in particular the topic of how we gain an understanding of the referential nature of others’ thoughts, and how that understanding develops from infancy. I argue that embodied accounts of mindreading are well equipped to enter into this debate, by making use of the notion (...)
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  2. Michael Wilby (2012). Subject, Mode and Content in We-Intentions. Phenomenology and Mind.
  3. Michael Wilby (2010). The Simplicity of Mutual Knowledge. Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):83-100.
    Mutual perceptual knowledge is a prevalent feature of our everyday lives, yet appears to be exceptionally difficult to characterise in an acceptable way. This paper argues for a renewed understanding of Stephen Schiffer’s iterative approach to mutual knowledge, according to which mutual knowledge requires an infinite number of overlapping, embedded mental states. It is argued that the charge of ‘psychological implausibility’ that normally accompanies discussion of this approach can be offset by identifying mutual knowledge, not with the infinite iterations themselves, (...)
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