This paper aims to perform a multi-level analysis of the Irish public discourse on Covid-19. Despite widespread agreement that Ireland’s response was rapid and effective, the country’s journey through the pandemic has been no easy ride. In order to contain the virus, the Government’s emergency legislation imposed draconian measures including the detention and isolation of people deemed to be even “a potential source of infection” and a significant extension of An Garda Síochána’s power of arrest. In April 2020, journalists John (...) Waters and Gemma O’Doherty initiated judicial review proceedings before the High Court to challenge such legislation, which they defined as unconstitutional, “disproportionate” and based on “fraudulent science”. The proceedings attracted widespread media coverage in what soon became a debate on the legitimacy of emergency legislation and the notion of ‘fake news’ itself. After a brief survey of the legislative background to Ireland’s Covid response, the argumentative strategy is analysed through which the High Court eventually dismissed Mr Waters and Ms O’Doherty’s challenge. Focusing on the process of justification of the judicial decision, the paper provides a descriptive account of the argument structure of the Court’s decision. This sheds light on the pattern of multiple argumentation through which the Court interpreted relevant norms in the Constitution and at once re-established the primacy of “facts” informing political decision-making at a time of national emergency. (shrink)

The centrality of argumentation in the judicial process is an age-old acquisition of research on legal discourse. Notwithstanding the deep insights provided by legal theoretical and philosophical works, only recently has judicial argumentation been tackled in its linguistic dimension. This paper aims to contribute to the development of linguistic studies of judicial argumentation, by shedding light on evaluation as a prominent aspect in the construction of the judge’s argumentative position. Evaluation as a deep structure (...) of judicial argumentation is studied from a discursive point of view entailing the analysis of a sample of authentic judicial language. Evaluative lexis is investigated within a single genre of judicial discourse, i.e. judgments, instantiated by a corpus of US Supreme Court judgments. Findings show that judges use diversified strategies to take stance as they organise their argumentative discourse: from easily recognisable verbal and adjectival tools to more finely-grained discourse elements such as the encapsulating pattern ‘this/these/that/those + labelling noun’. (shrink)

Arguments from fairness as described in Aristotle’s _Rhetoric_ are usually taken to aim at mitigating the strictness of the law or, in terms of procedure, to favour the defendant. This paper considers a more inclusive interpretation, that is, that arguments from fairness can work both ways. In the example given in the _Rhetoric,_ arguments from fairness are directed at a restrictive interpretation of the text. That may not be necessary however. Likewise, fairness may speak for the claimant. Two examples may (...) support this conclusion: a judicial speech by Hyperides, and the doctrine of issues appearing in Hellenistic school rhetoric. (shrink)

In this contribution the prototypical argumentative patterns are discussed in which pragmatic argumentation is used in the context of legal justification in hard cases. First, the function and implementation of pragmatic argumentation in prototypical argumentative patterns in legal justification are addressed. The dialectical function of the different parts of the complex argumentation are explained by characterizing them as argumentative moves that are put forward in reaction to certain forms of critique. Then, on the basis of an exemplary (...) case, the famous Holy Trinity case, the way in which the U.S. Supreme Court uses pragmatic argumentation in this case is discussed by showing how the court instantiates general prototypical argumentative patterns in light of the institutional preconditions of the justification in the context of the specific case. (shrink)

This article focuses on strategic manoeuvring that takes place in Dutch administrative judi- cial decisions. These decisions may be seen as a distinct argumentative activity type. Starting from the char- acteristics that traditionally are per- tinent to this activity type, I will explore how implications of current discussions on the changing task of the administrative judge may be- come manifest in the judge’s strate- gic manoeuvring by means of the presentation of argumentation and the introduction of additional stand- points. (...) The case study of Dutch administrative law serves to demon- strate what consequences changing institutional demands may have for the starting points of the analysis of argumentation in judicial decisions. (shrink)

Research on legal discourse has developed according to a variety of perspectives. As for descriptive accounts, two approaches are noteworthy. Firstly, Anglophone scholars have dealt with legal language from a genre-based viewpoint. Secondly, French studies have focused on argumentation in judicial texts, by considering the forms of reasoning involved in it and, albeit more rarely, its linguistic constituents. This paper aims at reinforcing the linguistic component of the analysis of legal discourse, by carrying out a corpus-based genre analysis (...) on a sample of 40 judgments. First of all, the results of the investigation of the genre structure of judgments will be presented. The comparative approach adopted will show that the differences between European and English/Irish judgments mainly concern the generic move Arguing the case. Secondly, analysis will concentrate in more detail on one of the most frequent tools used in the discursive construction of argumentation within the aforementioned move, i.e. the widely spread reporting verb HOLD. A study of its concordances suggests that it is used in all types of judgments as a meta-argumentative operator signalling either an authoritative stance taken by the Court or an equally authoritative reported argumentation of another judge or court. (shrink)

Robert Alexy has argued that the democratic objection to judicial review of legislation can be successfully addressed by assuming that judges exercise a special form of argumentative representation. In this article we argue that Alexy does not explain (as he should) under what circumstances judicial review tends to produce better decisions than parliamentary procedure, nor does he explain how judicial review can have a greater intrinsic value than parliamentary procedure. Subsequently, we argue that the intrinsic value of (...) argumentative representation depends on the promotion of citizen deliberation, whereas its instrumental value depends on judges being committed to the rights of discrete and insular minorities in the face of hostile majorities. (shrink)

Empirical research in the field of legal interpretation shows that, in many cases, analogy argumentation is complex rather than simple. Traditional analytical approaches to analogy argumentation do not explore that complexity. In most cases analogy argumentation is reconstructed as a simple form of argumentation that consists of two premises and a conclusion. This article focuses on the question of how to analyze and evaluate complex analogy argumentation. It is shown how the pragma-dialectical approach provides clues (...) for analyzing complex analogy argumentation and how the criteria for evaluating analogy argumentation can be used to reconstruct these types of complex analogy argumentation in Dutch case law. The critical questions in the argumentation scheme do not only serve as a tool for analyzing arguments justifying analogy argumentation, but are also helpful in analyzing arguments against a specific analogy argumentation. (shrink)

Aulis Aarnio addresses the question of how legal interpretations should be justified. Aarnio considers a justification to be rational only if the justification process has been conducted in a rational way, and if the final result of this process is acceptable to the legal community. According to Aarnio, a theory concerning the justification of legal interpretations should contain a procedural component specifying the conditions of rationality for legal discussions, and a substantial component specifying the material conditions of acceptability for the (...) final result. The procedural component of Aarnio’s theory formulates rules for the rationality of legal discussions. The substantial component specifies when the result of a legal interpretation can be called acceptable. Aarnio considers such a result acceptable if it is acceptable to a particular legal community in which there is consensus with respect to certain norms and values. (shrink)

Although the genetic argument is a widely used interpretative argument, what it amounts to does not seem to be altogether clear. Basic forms of the genetic argument that are distinguished are often too rough to provide an adequate basis for the evaluation of an interpretative decision. In this article I attempt to provide a more detailed analysis of the genetic argument by making use of pragma-dialectical insights. The analysis clarifies the character and the structure of different forms of the genetic (...) argument and thus the elements that are relevant for the evaluation of the argument.*. (shrink)

There have been few studies of the Law Lords, and no study of them by a political scientist for more than ten years. This book concentrates on the arguments the Law Lords use in justifying their decisions, and is concerned as much with the legal methodology as with the substance of their decisions. Very close attention is paid to the different approaches and styles of judicial argument, but the book is not restricted to this traditional analytic approach. One chapter (...) applies the statistical techniques Americans call 'jurimetrics' and have successfully used on the US Supreme Court. The main theme is that the Law Lords enjoy and fully utilise far more discretion in their judgements than is normally admitted, and that much depends on exactly which judges happen to hear a case. the second part of the book shows the impact this extreme discretion has had in shaping both public law and areas of civil law. (shrink)

Judicial Deliberations compares how and why the European Court of Justice, the French Cour de cassation and the US Supreme Court offer different approaches for generating judicial accountability and control, judicial debate and deliberation, and ultimately judicial legitimacy. Examining the judicial argumentation of the United States Supreme Court and of the French Cour de cassation, the book first reorders the traditional comparative understanding of the difference between French civil law and American common law (...) class='Hi'>judicial decision-making. It then uses this analysis to offer the first detailed comparative examination of the interpretive practice of the European Court of Justice. Lasser demonstrates that the French judicial system rests on a particularly unified institutional and ideological framework founded on explicitly republican notions of meritocracy and managerial expertise. Law-making per se may be limited to the legislature; but significant judicial normative administration is entrusted to State selected, trained, and sanctioned elites who are policed internally through hierarchical institutional structures. The American judicial system, by contrast, deploys a more participatory and democratic approach that reflects a more populist vision. Shunning the unifying, controlling, and hierarchical French structures, the American judicial system instead generates its legitimacy primarily by argumentative means. American judges engage in extensive debates that subject them to public scrutiny and control. The ECJ hovers delicately between the institutional/argumentative and republican/democratic extremes. On the one hand, the ECJ reproduces the hierarchical French discursive structure on which it was originally patterned. On the other, it transposes this structure into a transnational context of fractured political and legal assumptions. This drives the ECJ towards generating legitimacy by adopting a somewhat more transparent argumentative approach. (shrink)

This paper examines Jeremy Waldron’s ‘core case’ against judicial review. Waldron’s arguments, it shows, exaggerate the importance of voting to our judgements about the legitimacy and democratic credentials of a society and its government. Moreover, Waldron is insufficiently sensitive to the ways that judicial review can provide a legitimate avenue of political activity for those seeking to rectify historic injustice. While judicial review is not necessary for democratic government, the paper concludes that Waldron is wrong to believe (...) that it is a threat to democracy. (shrink)

A variety of theoretical positions are emerging to explain the judicial process from such perspectives as hermeneutics, semiotics, critical theory and argumentation/rhetoric. They ask such questions as these: What is the source of judicial authority? How do judges arrive at their decisions? By what logic are decisions to be tested? In this essay I argue that a focus on decisions and their justifications alone masks the broader process in which judges, along with all the other relevant groups, (...) engage in a continuing and evolving dialogue to structure their normative universe through the complementary processes of dialectic and rhetoric. Contemporary concepts of argumentation can serve to analyze this process critically. (shrink)

Jeremy Waldron is well known for his disdain of U.S. jurisprudential doc- trine that allows courts to invalidate democratically enacted legislation on the ground it violates certain fundamental constitutional (and quasi-moral) rights. He believes that where disagreement on the relevant substantive is- sues is widespread among citizens and officials alike, it is illegitimate for judges to impose their views on the majority by invalidating a piece of enacted law. Even if we assume, plausibly enough, there are objective moral constraints on (...) what restrictions on behavior may be enacted into law, judges have no privileged access to the objective truth and must, like everyone else, rely on their own subjective intuitions and views. Given that judges are hence no more likely than citizens or legislators to reach the correct decision about what morality requires, these disagreements should be democratically resolved. As he puts it, if disagreement about rights is to be sorted out by counting heads, it should be the heads of citizens who have ultimate sovereignty in a democracy, rather than those of unelected judges, that ought to count.In this essay, I consider Wilfrid Waluchow’s response to Waldron’s argument in his outstanding new book, A Common Law Theory of Judicial Re- view, in which he attempts to provide the practice of judicial review with something akin to the foundation that justifies allowing judges authority over the development of the common law. I will begin with a short explication of Waldron’s argument and then consider Waluchow’s objections to Waldron, as well as Waluchow’s living-tree conception of a common-law constitution with content that evolves through a common law approach to reasoning in constitutional disputes.Resumen:A Jeremy Waldron se le conoce por el desprecio que ha manifestado con relación a la doctrina constitucional estadounidense que permite a los tribunales invalidar legislación que ha sido promulgada de manera democrática, dado que según Waldron lo anterior constituye una violación a ciertos derechos constitucionales (y cuasi-morales). Él piensa que si existe un desacuerdo importante entre los ciudadanos y oficiales del derecho en relación con cierto tema sustantivo, es ilegítimo que los jueces impongan sus puntos de vista sobre los de la mayoría de la población al invalidar una ley promulgada. Incluso si suponemos, de manera lo suficientemente plausible, que existen limitantes morales objetivas sobre las restricciones que el derecho puede contemplar en relación con el comportamiento de los ciudadanos, los jueces no gozan de un privilegio especial con el que puedan acceder a estas verdades objetivas y deben, como todos los demás, basarse en sus propios puntos de vista e intuiciones subjetivas. Entonces, dado que los jueces al igual que los ciudadanos y legisladores no pueden llegar a mejores y correctas decisiones en relación con lo que exige la moralidad, estos desacuerdos se deben decidir de manera democrática. Como sostiene Waldron, si los desacuerdos sobre los derechos se deben decidir con un recuento de manos, deben ser las manos de los ciudadanos, los cuales tienen la soberanía última en una democracia, no así los jueces que no son electos.En este artículo, el autor analiza la respuesta de Wilfrid Waluchow a los argumentos de Waldron, los cuales se encuentran plasmados en el nuevo e interesante libro: A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review, donde Waluchow intenta justificar la práctica del judicial review a través de algo parecido a la justificación que otorga a los jueces autoridad para desarrollar el common law. El autor inicia con una breve explicación del argumento de Waldron y continúa con las objeciones de Waluchow a Waldron, entre las cuales destaca la concepción de Waluchow de la Constitución como árbol viviente. (shrink)

In this revised and updated edition of a classic text, one of America's leading constitutional theorists presents a brief but well-balanced history of judicial review and summarizes the arguments both for and against judicial activism within the context of American democracy. Christopher Wolfe demonstrates how modern courts have used their power to create new "rights" with fateful political consequences and he challenges popular opinions held by many contemporary legal scholars. This is important reading for anyone interested in the (...) role of the judiciary within American politics. Praise for the first edition of Judicial Activism: "This is a splendid contribution to the literature, integrating for the first time between two covers an extensive debate, honestly and dispassionately presented, on the role of courts in American policy. —Stanley C. Brubaker, Colgate University. (shrink)

"The main argument of this paper is that there are reasons for judges not only to evaluate the substantive merit of legislation, but to advert to the fact that the place of elected legislatures in our scheme of government gives legislation a standing, an entitlement to consideration, that may go beyond judicial estimates of its intrinsic merit." [Is this just a statement of procedural legitimacy?] "To answer the question [of who assigns rights], courts must take a view as to (...) the proper role of courts vis-a-vis legislatures; they must take a view about the allocation of power in our legal/political system. In drawing this line, courts can take one of two approaches. First, they can make decisions solely on the basis of considerations internal to the relevant clauses of the Constitution, perhaps by giving them a moral reading. Second, they can include in their thinking institutional considerations regarding the role of popular decision-making bodies in our governmental structure." Claims that Dworkin advocates the first [which is false], and that we should accept the second, which is advocated by advocates of judicial restraint. It is appropriate for a judge to give weight to the fact that a decision was reached by a legislature. "Specifically, I think it appropriate that courts presume the constitutionality of such laws, understanding that their own role demands that they overturn them if they are not merely different from what the judges might have decided on their own, but are beyond acceptability." Reasons for the presumption of constitutionality: value of compromise, allocation of power ), appropriateness of humility, integrity and community. (shrink)

This study examines discursive representations of judicial power in Russian print media. The data are drawn from governmental and oppositional newspapers and cover a six-month period during 2013. Using an approach that is informed by Critical Discourse Analysis and a pragma-dialectical perspective on argumentation, the authors distinguish strategies and specific linguistic means as well as argumentation fallacies that journalists employ in the articles to construct the representation which is consistent with a newspaper’s ideology.

This essay defends judicial review on procedural grounds by showing that it is an integral part of American democracy. Critics who object to judicial review using counter-majoritarian and epistemic arguments raise important concerns that should shape our understanding of the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, critics often fail to account for the formal and informal mechanisms that overcome these difficulties. Critics also fail to show that other branches of government could use the power of Constitutional interpretation more responsibly. By defending (...) judicial review in the American context, this essay demonstrates that judicial review is not inherently undemocratic. (shrink)

This paper is the result of my participation in a discussion event of Problema. Anuario de filosofía y teoría del derecho entitled “The Construction of Precedent in Civil Law: Debates, Concepts and Challenges”. Several colleagues with a vast knowledge on the subject of judicial precedent participated in this seminar, which also delved into the widely debated aspects of judicial precedent focused on the case of Chile. The entire discussion aimed at proposing solutions, as well as shedding some light (...) on some of its important aspects.Starting from such transcendental concepts as, rationality and argumentative use, it is possible to find certain problems arising from the improper use of the above concepts, which in turn leads us to stare decisis, a term that if used incorrectly may result in an act against the internal independence of judges. (shrink)

Mitchel Lasser's Judicial Deliberations compares the argumentative practices of the French Cour de cassation, the US Supreme Court, and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and examines how they achieve judicial legitimacy. In this review I firstly question the models of judicial legitimacy presented by Lasser. I believe that the French ‘institutional’ model relies far more on the interplay between the Cour de cassation and the legislature than on the system of selection of those who take part (...) in the judicial discourse or on their conception of law which would deny judicial decision a place among the sources of law. I also have doubts about the lack of institutional means of judicial control and the emphasis on ‘argumentative transparency’, which lies at the core of Lasser's presentation of the US system. Finally the ECJ, somewhat included rather as an afterthought in the book's central analysis, in my opinion faces rather different problems from those identified in the book. Secondly, I discuss a deeper problem of Judicial Deliberations: its lack of conceptual clarity and the rather scant evidence it provides for some of its bold claims. In conclusion I make the case for a ‘comparative jurisprudence’ approach, suggested some time ago by William Ewald, which in my view Judicial Deliberations follows only in name. (shrink)

Does the effective protection of constitutional rights require a system of robust judicial review? This differs from the question of whether judicial review is democratically legitimate, although the two are often merged. The dominant liberal constitutional discourse concerning the requirement of judicial review has arguably suffered from a degree of insensitivity to the actual effects of specific judicial review systems. In contrast to a fact‐insensitive approach, I suggest that the ‘matrix’ of rights‐protection in any specific system (...) of judicial constitutional review must incorporate two types of calculation. The first must compare incidences of the invalidation of ‘wrong’ statutes (on the ‘gains’ side) with invalidations of ‘right’ statutes and cases of upholding ‘wrong’ statutes (on the ‘losses’ side). The second looks at the gains and losses resulting from the very existence of the system of judicial review (rather than the specific cases that have been upheld or invalidated). It thus recognizes the deep disagreement between individuals about their preferred interpretations of constitutional rights. Under some conditions, the results of this matrix may be modified by arguments about an overlap in preferred articulations of constitutional rights, prudence, and the deliberative nature of the courts that exercise constitutional review, and the paper concludes with a discussion of how this can occur. We do not have to have a court that will strike down laws—a court with the power of judicial review—to have a vibrant language of fundamental rights available to us. (shrink)

Ch. 1 defines activism as involving four judicial practices: refusing to take an attitude of deference for legislative or executive power or judgment; relaxing requirements for justiciability; breaking precedent; and loosely or controversially construing constitutions, statutes or precedents. I defend each element, through , in later chapters. I defend primarily in Ch. 2A-B, primarily in Ch. 2C, primarily in Ch. 3 and in Chs. 2 and 4. Ch. 1 concludes that - seem to have knowing change of the law (...) in common. Ch. 1 considers and rejects different definitions of activism. My definition explains what I call The Crossover Thesis, which says that two types of activism, and , are quite distinct, and what I call The Political Neutrality Thesis, which says activism and passivism are politically neutral in that neither is necessarily conservative or liberal, and neither is necessarily politically superior to the other. ;Ch. 2 defends activism against objections based on democracy by reconciling activism with democracy somewhat and by supporting some activism based on the Constitution's supreme legal authority. I give what I call The Ashwander Defense and the Carolene Defense of activism, which are named after famous judicial opinions I use to defend activism. ;Ch. 3 argues against stare decisis, which requires following precedent. The passivists' version of stare decisis is inadequately supported by arguments that stare decisis increases: the fairness of treating like cases alike; the predictability of the law; thereby the efficiency of judges in making decisions. ;Ch. 4 argues that courts should use due process more to support activism which clarifies the law. I show how much activism is justified by the vagueness doctrine, which constitutionally requires law's meaning to be reasonably accessible to ordinary people. ;Ch. 5 summarizes earlier chapters and shows how my defense of activism is restrained. (shrink)

In January 2004 Baroness Brenda Hale became the first woman to sit on the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords. Five years on, she has brought to her judicial role a lightness of touch that belies her increasingly significant impact on the court’s jurisprudence. Early forecasts that she would be “just a bit different” from her male companions have proved prophetic. However such assessments have stemmed primarily from a focus on her decision-making on a case-by-case basis. But what (...) of her jurisprudence as a whole? This paper considers arguments for a more sustained and coherent methodological approach to analyses of Baroness Hale’s (and other judges’) jurisprudence as a framework through which to better understand and explore the potential of judicial difference and to better inform current debates about increasing judicial diversity in England and Wales. (shrink)

Courts do many good things. Judges carefully consider individual claims and arguments,1 and contrast them against the law in light of evidence. Their decisions are argued for, are public, and can be contested in form and content in different hierarchical stages. Additionally, and among other things, these practices are said to contribute to the will-formation of the public sphere and improve the quality of the legislative process.2.

The main argument of this paper is that there are reasons for judges not only to evaluate the substantive merit of legislation, but to advert to the fact that the place of elected legislatures in our scheme of government gives legislation a standing, an entitlement to consideration, that may go beyond judicial estimates of its intrinsic merit.

The general assumption that underlines Richard Posner’s argument in his book Not a Suicide Pact is that decisions concerning rights and security in the context of modern terrorism should be made by balancing competing interests. This assumption is obviously correct if one refers to the most rudimentary sense of balancing, namely, the idea that normative decisions should be made in light of the importance of the relevant values and considerations. However, Posner advocates a more specific conception of balancing, both substantively (...) and institutionally. Substantiality, he argues for balancing based on a consequential moral theory that rejects the ideas of deontological rights and particularly absolute or very weighty deontological rights. More specifically, it seems that Posner assumes a utilitarian theory that also rejects intrinsic concern for distributive justice. Institutionally, Posner argues that this method of reasoning should be adopted by judges when interpreting the constitution. These substantive and institutional background assumptions are of course controversial, but I do not dispute them in this Article. My critique concerns Posner’s conclusions based on these assumptions. Posner’s main claim is that given the magnitude of the danger of modern terrorism, even a small probability that an act of terror may occur justifies extreme anti-terror measures. While the general idea that even a slight risk of very serious harm justifies significant cost is plausible, I doubt Posner’s assumptions regarding the cost of various means of preventing these dangers, his claim that judicial review in this context should be very limited, and his suggestion of an absolute formal prohibition that is not strictly enforced in the context of measures such as interrogational torture. (shrink)

Many theories of liberal public reason exclude claims derived from religion on grounds that religious beliefs are not publicly ‘accessible’, because they are not amenable to meaningful evaluation by outsiders to the faith. Some authors, though, have argued that at least some religious beliefs are, in fact, publicly accessible. This paper examines the consequences of these arguments by exploring the accessibility requirement in relation to U.S. judicial precedent concerning religious accommodation. I first show that precedent accords de facto with (...) the accessibility requirement by precluding judicial evaluation of the content of religious beliefs. I then show that this norm is independent of the status of religious claims vis-à-vis accessibility: even granting the accessibility of religious beliefs, other important political ends weigh against judicial evaluation of the content of those beliefs. I then generalize this conclusion to the broader enterprise of public reason, suggesting the general inadequacy of the accessibility requirement. (shrink)

While defeasibility in legal reasoning has been the subject of recent scholarship, it has yet to be studied in the context of judicial opinion. Yet, being subject to appeal, judicial decisions can default for a variety of reasons. Prakken (2001) argued that the defeasibility affecting reasoning involved in adversarial legal argumentation is best analysed as procedural rather than logical. In this paper we argue that the defeasibility of ratio decendi is similarly best explained and modeled in a (...) procedural and dialectical framework. We propose that appeals are best understood as meta-dialogues about the reasoned dialogue occurring in the initial trial. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to clarify the dispute over judicial discretion by distinguishing the different senses in which claims about judicial discretion can be understood and by examining the arguments for these various interpretations. Three different levels of dispute need to be recognized. The first concerns whether judges actually do exercise discretion, the second involves whether judges are entitled to exercise discretion, and the third is about the proper institutional role of judges. In this context, (...) the views of Dworkin, Raz, Perry, Greenawalt, and Sartorius are examined. Finally, it is suggested that a resolution of the judicial discretion controversy requires a satisfactory theory of the justification of judicial decisions. (shrink)

Landmark Supreme Court rulings determine American law by adjudicating among competing reasonable interpretations of basic political rights. Jeremy Waldron argues that this practice is democratically illegitimate because what determines the content of basic rights is a bare majority vote of an unelected, democratically unaccountable, elitist body of nine judges. I argue that Waldron's democratic critique of judicial review has implications for real-world reform, but not the implications he thinks it has. He argues that systems of legislative supremacy over the (...) judiciary are democratically preferable to the American one. I provide reasons why his argument is unsound and explain that, properly construed, Waldron's premises support implementing a system where ordinary citizens chosen by lottery participate in a deliberative mini-public to vote on which reasonable interpretation of a basic political right will become the law of the land. (shrink)

"In this paper I shall attempt to sketch a defense of the plain man's view that the job of the judge, qua judge is to apply the law." What seems to have lead to the other view is the pervasive role of policy and principle in the justification of judicial decisions. This is no argument, however, for the existence of discretion: "For while it must be admitted that judges are entitled to appeal to certain general policies and principles, this (...) by no means implies that they are entitled to exercise discretionary judgment in the formulation of such standards." With Dworkin, distinguishes weak and strong discretion: the former means merely final or controversial; the latter implying that judges are at some point free to reach decisions not controlled by authoritative standards. Agrees with Dworkin that non-rule standards are part of law. "Both Dworkin and I are in agreement that law is a system of entitlements, although, as we shall see, we differ as to what is their basis." "At any rate, we share the view that a litigant before a court of law is not in the position of one begging a favor from a potential benefactor, but rather in that of one demanding a particular decision as a matter of right, as something to which the law entitles him. Such a demand has two aspects: a claim that a right exists which the law recognizes; a claim that this right takes precedence over any competing legal rights or obligations involved. Let us refer to these two sorts of claims respectively as ones involving decisions as to recognition, and weight.:" Argues that we cannot distinguish between legal moral principles and non-legal moral principles without a rule of recognition. The same is true for the problem of establishing weight between various principles - here we have to consider how well a principle coheres with the institutional practice of a legal system. "[I]t is the distinctive feature of the institutionalized role of the judiciary, in contrast to the legislative, that it may not directly base decisions on substantive considerations of the value of competing social policies." "The theoretical possibility of the law being indeterminate with regard to what it requires...does not imply any correspondign indeterminacy with regard to what is required of the judge.". (shrink)

An analysis of a broad sample of Dutch judicial and semi-judicial decisions shows similar structures as the ones Bhatia and Mazzi found before. The question is posed what explains this seemingly unchangeable judicial format. From a perspective of argumentative and communicative efficacy and comprehensibility, the format is certainly not the optimal choice. The explanation is that the format is a sign of an ideology. The format suggests an objectivity of the decision taken. This is actually a myth. (...) This makes a decision to change the format an ideological one. (shrink)

An analysis of a broad sample of Dutch judicial and semi-judicial decisions shows similar structures as the ones Bhatia and Mazzi found before. The question is posed what explains this seemingly unchangeable judicial format. From a perspective of argumentative and communicative efficacy and comprehensibility, the format is certainly not the optimal choice. The explanation is that the format is a sign of an ideology. The format suggests an objectivity of the decision taken. This is actually a myth. (...) This makes a decision to change the format an ideological one. (shrink)

This brief essay responds to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bucklew v. Precythe. It contends that the argument relied upon by the Court in that decision, as well as in Glossip v. Gross, is either trivial or demonstrably invalid. Hence, this essay provides a nonmoral reason to oppose the Court’s recent capital punishment decisions. The Court’s position that petitioners seeking to challenge a method of execution must identify a readily available and feasible alternative execution protocol is untenable, and must (...) be revisited. (shrink)

This paper develops a virtue-account of legal reasoning which significantly differs from standard, principle-based, theories. A virtue approach to legal reasoning highlights the relevance of the particulars to sound legal decision-making, brings to light the perceptual and affective dimensions of legal judgment, and vindicates the relevance of description and specification to good legal reasoning. After examining the central features of the theory, the paper proposes a taxonomy of the main character traits that legal decision-makers need to possess to successfully engage (...) in legal reasoning. The paper concludes by discussing an array of strategies in legal education, institutional design, and legal culture that can be put in place to work virtue in legal decision-making. (shrink)

This paper investigates the role of (DIS)RESPECT a value premise in two landmark civil rights cases given by the United States Supreme Court. It adopts a corpus-assisted approach whereby a keyword analysis and the analysis of key semantic domains are used to identify potential values relied upon by judges in their justifications. The two categories of NO RESPECT and RESPECTED have been selected and examined as one domain of (DIS)RESPECT. (DIS)RESPECT turns out to be the only value marked by strong (...) evaluative polarity and it is found in the majority, as well as in dissenting opinions. The analysis shows how the notion of (DIS)RESPECT has been integrated into the arguments of judges and it highlights the central importance of values and the related evaluative language for legal argumentation. (shrink)

Four questions dominate normative contemporary constitutional theory: What is the purpose of a constitution? What makes a constitution legitimate? What kinds of arguments are legitimate within the process of constitutional interpretation? What can make judicial review of legislation legitimate in principle? The main purpose of this text is to provide one general answer to the last question. The secondary purpose is to show how this answer may bear upon our understanding of the fundamental basis of constitutional law. These two (...) purposes should suggest particular answers to the first three questions. (shrink)

The use of foreign law by national courts when deciding cases that concern fundamental rights has provoked a debate on the legitimacy of the judiciary to resort to this practice. Indeed, many arguments have been made by legal scholars to support the proposition that judges should not take account of unincorporated international human rights instruments or the decisions of foreign courts when they decide cases that concern fundamental rights. This article puts these arguments to scrutiny, and discusses whether this (...) class='Hi'>judicial practice should be resorted to. (shrink)

This article engages legal positivism conceived of as a political project rather than as a descriptive account of law. Jeremy Waldron’s ‘democratic jurisprudence’ represents such a politicized legal positivism—a normative argument for legal positivism rather than a non-normative claim that legal positivism is true. Unsurprisingly, the essential institutional elements of this democratic jurisprudence turn out to be the familiar features of classical legal positivism, and the case Waldron makes against judicial review grows out of his overarching political position. But, (...) consequently, if there are reasons to doubt the strength of Waldron’s case against judicial review, there are surely reasons to doubt the normative bases of his case for positivism, and in turn, descriptive or conceptual positivism more generally. This article investigates this claim, noting that Waldron’s political case for positivism is based on Kantian notions about moral autonomy given circumstances of moral disagreement, but that Waldron’s conclusions about the role of judges undermine both these Kantian foundations and the aims of democratic jurisprudence. While Waldron’s arguments revive a tradition of political positivism that goes back to Bentham, engagement with those arguments suggests that legal positivism ultimately must embrace a radical democratic form of anti-constitutionalism. (shrink)

Referring to foreign legal systems for the sake of producing a convincing judicial argument has been a custom in judicial decision-making for more than a century. However, a generally accepted theoretical framework for this kind of reasoning is yet to be established. The article suggests that such a framework must answer at least the following three fundamental questions: first, what is the normative relationship, as a matter of principle, between domestic and foreign law?; second, what is the primary (...) motive and functioning of comparative legal reasoning?; and third, what methodological approach enables such reasoning to work in practice? Drawing in particular on linguistic philosophy, as well as recent work on the theory of argumentation, the article outlines a theoretical framework that addresses these questions in order to understand, evaluate and rationalise the use of comparative arguments in legal practice. (shrink)

The legal system – from the jury room to the deliberations of the Supreme Court – offers an abundance of rich resources for the study and teaching of critical thinking.The courts have (often for centuries) struggled with many of the issues central to critical thinking. The courts not only provide fascinating examples and exercises for students to examine, but in many areas – the appropriate use of ad hominem arguments, the distinction between argument and testimony, the proper placing of the (...) burden of proof, the distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions, the legitimate (and fallacious) use of appeals to authority, the nature of arguments by analogy – jurists and legal scholars have analyzed these issues carefully, and their insights are of great value to anyone concerned with rigorous critical thinking. Study of those legal resources has also had an impact on my views concerning the moral responsibility system. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to ofter a general view of the development of the issue about judicial reasoning and argumentation in Europe. I start with a mention to the methodological problem in law, and after that I expose the main models about the so called “legal argumentation theories”. Thirdly, I bring out some general thesis about judicial reasoning, and finally I propose some critical reflections about those theories.

Posner's “pragmatic” defense of broad judicial deference to legislative power still reflects the shortcomings noted in my review of his Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy. His pragmatism still fails to provide meaningful criteria for decision making that do not collapse into an indeterminate relativism; and his argument that strict constraints on judicial power are required by respect for democracy underestimates the importance of two serious interconnected weaknesses of the modern state: widespread voter ignorance, and interest‐group exploitation of that ignorance.

Justifying judicial review as a democratic institution is a core concern of Cristina Lafont’s splendid new book. Even though her interpretation is appealing, this also poses some problems. This is due to the non-thematization of ideology that results from Lafont’s ideal-theoretical and argument-privileging approach. I will first address this ideology-problem and then reflect on the implications that this has for the question of what is considered legitimate political action.