In this work, we shall study structural abduction and how ways of searching for solutions to the corresponding abductive problems could be modeled. Specifically, we shall define modal semantic tableaux for normal modal systems and study its applications to structural abduction. This method even makes structural abduction clearer and, as it shall be seen, when a radical change of logic is epistemologically required, the corresponding tableau will have pertinent information to suggest it.

We present a framework for understanding abduction within modal logic and Kripke semantics; worlds of a Kripke frame will represent possible theories, and a change in theory will be understood as a passage from one world to an adjacent possible world. Further, these steps may agree with the accessibility relation or may ‘backtrack’, accordingly as new information refutes or reinforces our present theory. Our formalism can be used to model not only abduction, but also to talk about the inner structure (...) of theories as well as relations between them, allowing us to interpret many ideas from philosophy of science within the well-understood framework of modal logic. (shrink)

Hegel. La Odisea del Espíritu reúne la totalidad de las conferencias pronunciadas en el congreso homónimo que, coordinado por Félix Duque, se celebró en el Círculo de Bellas Artes y la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid entre el 28 de mayo y el 1 de junio de 2007 con motivo del segundo centenario de la publicación de "La Fenomenología del Espíritu". El congreso reunió a los mayores especialistas en la obra del pensador alemán y el resultado es una aportación de (...) primer orden a los estudios hegelianos, un libro de referencia imprescindible para quien quiera adentrarse en el magma de ideas y sugerencias de su libro capital. Incluye ensayos de Félix Duque, Volker Rühle, Walter Jaeschke, Jorge Pérez de Tudela, José María Ripalda, Eduardo Álvarez, Dietrich Von Engelhardt, Antonio Gómez Ramos, Klaus Vieweg, Ángel Gabilondo, Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, Paolo D'Angelo, Christoph Jamme, Vincenzo Vitiello y Klaus Düsing. Como el lector, hoy, podrá apreciar, los ensayos están hogaño ordenados como antaño se sucedieron las sesiones del Congreso, es decir: cada articulista interpreta y escribe para su coleto y el de sus lectores un capítulo o tema de la obra. Y así se va siguiendo con regular obediencia la sobresaltada vía de las experiencias de la conciencia, o sea: tal como la obra fue concebida entre -Hegel dixit- dolores del parto de un mundo nuevo que, de no haberse malogrado tan pronto, habría hecho de aquélla, efectivamente, palabra de ayer. Del "Preámbulo" de Félix Duque. (shrink)

Versiones revisadas de las conferencias pronunciadas en el congreso "Pensamiento, arte, poesía.

Las acciones que articulan simbióticamente élites empresariales y políticas, mafias, grupos militares legales e ilegales, se posibilitan bajo la búsqueda de dos fines: uno, reordenar el territorio de manera violenta hiper-acumulando tierras, con el fin de salvaguardar sus intereses económicos e inversiones; dos, hiper-acumular poder político con el fin de sostener sus privilegios, usando dicho poder para la reconfiguración del diseño institucional y la planeación de los territorios imponiendo sus condiciones. Este fenómeno que marca la historia de Colombia es lo (...) que ampliamente podríamos comprender como Criminalidad Corporativa Instaurada. Es el caso y modelo impuesto en el Urabá el cual se fue extendiendo al resto del país. (shrink)

En este ensayo sucinto y cargado de significado se reflexiona sobre un Mundo, no disuelto en el nihilismo cáncer de Occidente sino dispensador de espacios y tiempos a través del hombre. El Mundo como Vacío, donde se construyen precarios lugares habitables, ajustando tradiciones a necesidades, e integrando procesos inventivos en un esquema global de asignación de puestos.

ABSTRACT This study analyses the impact of Oswald Spengler’s work in Spain during the interwar period. It proceeds with three steps as follows: The first part investigates the reception of Spengler’s historic morphology of cultures in the so-called circle of the Revista de Occidente. The second part delves into the early echo of Spengler’s work among the Spanish left up to the Second Spanish Republic. The third part focuses on the impact of Spengler’s historic morphology among conservative traditionalists and members (...) of the radical right prior to the Spanish Civil War. This analysis point towards broad, transideological debate on Spengler in Spain that the Spanish right then usurped and radicalised during the 1930s. (shrink)

Este artículo pretende mostrar que el discurso de la justicia global, tal y como se ha presentado en la tradición de la teoría política liberal, se encuentra poco capacitado para ofrecer respuestas satisfactorias frente al problema de la desigualdad global. Esta tesis se sustenta en la sujeción de dicha tradición al marco socioeconómico capitalista como un presupuesto y en su optimismo frente al discurso de los derechos, que limita, más que fortalece, sus posibilidades de proporcionar soluciones estructurales. Para desarrollar este (...) trabajo se ha hecho uso del análisis de contenido de carácter cualitativo de textos; al ser una investigación de carácter teórico, se da prioridad a las fuentes documentales. (shrink)

We introduce frame-equivalence games tailored for reasoning about the size, modal depth, number of occurrences of symbols and number of different propositional variables of modal formulae defining a given frame property. Using these games, we prove lower bounds on the above measures for a number of well-known modal axioms; what is more, for some of the axioms, we show that they are optimal among the formulae defining the respective class of frames.

This article will contrast two portrayals of Protagoras: one in the "Theaetetus," where Socrates discusses Protagorean theory and even comes to his defense by imitating the deceased sophist; and another in the "Protagoras," where Socrates recounts his encounter with the sophist. I suggest that Plato wants listeners and readers of the dialogues to hear the dissonance between the two portraits and to wonder why Socrates so distorts Protagoras in the "Theaetetus." Protagoras in the "Protagoras" behaves and speaks in ways that (...) are incompatible with the Protagorean position presented in the "Theaetetus.". (shrink)

b>—Several paradigms (e.g. change blindness, inattentional blindness, transsaccadic integra- tion) indicate that observers are often very poor at reporting changes to their visual environment. Such evidence has been used to suggest that the spatio-temporal coherence needed to represent change can only occur in the presence of focused attention. However, those studies almost always rely on explicit reports. It remains a possibility that the visual system can implicitly detect change, but that in the absence of focused attention, the change does not (...) reach awareness and consequently is not reported. To test this possibility, we used a simple change detection paradigm coupled with a speeded orien- tation discrimination task. Even when observers reported being unaware of a change in an item’s orientation, its nal orientation effectively biased their response in the orientation discrimination task. Both in aware and unaware trials, errors were most frequent when the changed item and the probe had incongruent orientations. These results demonstrate that the _nature _of the change can be represented in the absence of awareness. (shrink)

In this paper, drawing on evidence internal to the Platonic dialogues (supplemented with some ancient testimonia), I answer the question, “How did Plato teach in the Academy?” My reconstruction of Plato’s pedagogy in the Academy is that there was a single person who read the dialogue aloud like a rhapsode (this is in contrast to the dramatic theatrical hypothesis, in which several speakers function as actors in the performance of a dialogue). After the rhapsodic reading, students were allowed to ask (...) that portions of the text to be re-read, to ask a question about the text, and were encouraged to enter into a broader conversation about the topic and themes brought out by the text. This later pedagogical method of interrogating and investigating a dialogue is of more importance than the mere reading of a dialogue. I contend that Plato’s experiences teaching were woven into some of the dialogues, and that Plato’s pedagogy reflects some of the ways that he taught in the Academy. I propose that excellent points made by students may have been written into revised forms of the dialogue. And not only good points, but also mistakes in reasoning may have been added into the dialogues. I suggest that the way certain dialogues are organized with “guest lecturers” and “tag-team” philosophical debates reflect Plato’s pedagogy in the Academy. Plato’s broadmindedness, his openness to various and opposing viewpoints, is also evident from both outside and inside of the dialogue. Lastly, drawing on the idea of Socratic mimēsis, I give a plausible curriculum for how Plato may have used the dialogues to teach them: he had his students “play” with them. Plato may have asked his students to enter into the roles of the characters in the dialogues to better understand them and the type of person they represent. Plato may have also asked students to take over from the position of the character in the dialogue and to suggest a better, truer account of things than what the characters said or did. (shrink)

La denominada 'estrategia del explanandum dual' ha sido utilizada en el pasado para enfrentar problemas de distinta clase, entre los que se cuentan el debate 'explicación vs. comprensión' y el problema de cómo las razones pueden explicar la conducta. Esta estrategia puede ser descripta someramente como un intento de resolver la rivalidad explicativa entre dos explicaciones por medio de la división del explanandum. En este artículo se analiza el uso que Ausonio Marras ha hecho de ella. Este autor ha sostenido (...) que su utilización permite enfrentar el problema de la ineficacia causal de las propiedades mentales, problema que ha representado una seria amenaza en las últimas dos décadas para el programa del materialismo no reduccionista. Se intentará mostrar que la estrategia sugerida no puede ser exitosa frente a este problema a menos que pueda proveerse de una explicación exitosa de cómo las propiedades mentales pueden mantener su eficacia causal completa, y que la respuesta que se ofrece no satisface esta exigencia. The dual explanandum strategy' has been used in the past to contend some quite different problems, including the 'explanation vs. understanding' debate and the problem of how reasons can explain behavior. This strategy can be roughly described as an intent to solve the explanatory rivalry between two explanations by means of the division of the explanandum. In this paper I want to analyze the use of this strategy by Ausonio Marras, who has claimed that it allows us to face the problem of causal inefficacy of mental properties. This problem has arisen in the last two decades in the context of non reductive materialism and has become a serious menace to this program. I try to show that this strategy can not work out this problem unless it can be provided with a successful account of the way that mental properties can keep their complete causal efficacy, and the answer he offers does not satisfy this demand. (shrink)

COVID-19 has resulted in extraordinary disruptions to the higher education landscape. Here, we provide a brief report on 295 students’ academic perceptions and emotional well-being in late May 2020. Students reported the high levels of uncertainty regarding their academic futures as well as significant levels of stress and difficulty coping with COVID-19 disruptions. These outcomes were related to the higher levels of neuroticism and an external locus of control. Female students reported worse emotional well-being compared to males, and the students (...) of color reported the significantly higher levels of stress and uncertainty regarding their academic futures compared to White students. These results suggest that some students may be at particular risk for academic stress and poor emotional well-being due to the pandemic and highlight the urgent need for intervention and prevention strategies. (shrink)

In the "Republic," Plato has Socrates attack poetry’s use of mimēsis, often translated as ‘imitation’ or ‘representation.’ Various scholars (e.g. Blondell 2002; Frank 2018; Halliwell 2009; K. Morgan 2004) have noticed the tension between Socrates’ theory critical of mimēsis and Plato’s literary practice of speaking through various characters in his dialogues. However, none of these scholars have addressed that it is not only Plato the writer who uses mimēsis but also his own character, Socrates. At crucial moments in several dialogues, (...) Socrates takes on a role and speaks as someone else. I call these moments “Socratic mimēsis.” While previous commentators have noticed some of these moments, they have either overstated their rarity or they have not studied them collectively. My dissertation is the first in-depth investigation of this phenomenon in the dialogues. Socrates’ dramatic imitation of others is way of teaching in a voice separate from his own, and it is also a way for Plato to speak to, and to educate, different kinds of audiences. Although “Socratic mimēsis” occurs throughout the Platonic corpus, I focus on three passages from three different dialogues, which are paradigm instances: [1] in the "Crito" Socrates plays the part of ‘the Laws’ (50a-54c); [2] in the "Theaetetus" he acts the part of ‘Protagoras’ (166a-168c); and [3] in the "Menexenus" he recites a funeral speech learned from ‘Aspasia’ (236d-249c). Instead of one-sidedly reading the dialogues as either only literary works of art or as only a series of philosophical arguments, this study gleans philosophic insights from the literary and dramatic details of the dialogues. In chapter one I argue that in the "Crito" Socrates tries to convince Crito of a universal and absolute ethics based on never committing injustice, but Crito is not able to understand. In order to make Crito more just—but not yet at the level of Socratic ethics—Socrates creates ‘the Laws’ to persuade Crito to expand his personal notion of justice. Socrates instills a political obedience in place of Crito’s existing lawlessness as a second-best recourse. Plato expects the astute listener or reader to see the contrast between Socrates’ earlier ethical principles, said in his own voice, with what he says in the voice of ‘the Laws.’ In chapter two I argue that in the part of the "Theaetetus" where Socrates defends Protagoras (often called ‘the Defense’), Socrates, by imitating ‘Protagoras,’ is actually criticizing Protagorean relativism. The Protagorean theory cannot account for mimēsis and Socrates’ mimetic act performatively contradicts the identity of appearance and reality, which the theory presupposes. Finally, in chapter three I argue that in the Menexenus the funeral oration that Socrates recounts for Menexenus that he heard from ‘Aspasia’ is actually a disguised criticism of political rhetoric and of Athenian imperialism. Although the speech is never interrogated within the dialogue, Plato provokes the listener or reader outside the dialogue to question its message and to see how it conflicts with many of Socrates’ positions in other dialogues. Beyond reconsidering the long-standing and persistent view that Plato was against poetry and mimetic performance, I re-examine the role that performance and role-playing can have in philosophy and pedagogy more generally. Actors, by taking on other personas, and audience members, in observing actors and their actions, are both involved in acts of imagination that can expand their horizon of thinking and feeling. (shrink)

Evidence from many different paradigms (e.g. change blindness, inattentional blindness, transsaccadic integration) indicate that observers are often very poor at reporting changes to their visual environment. Such evidence has been used to suggest that the spatio-temporal coherence needed to represent change can only occur in the presence of focused attention. In four experiments we use modified change blindness tasks to demonstrate (a) that sensitivity to change does occur in the absence of awareness, and (b) this sensitivity does not rely on (...) the redeploy- ment of attention. We discuss these results in relation to theories of scene percep- tion, and propose a reinterpretatio n of the role of attention in representing change. (shrink)

The paper presents a new logic for reasoning about the formation of beliefs through perception or through inference in non-omniscient resource-bounded agents. The logic distinguishes the concept of explicit belief from the concept of background knowledge. This distinction is reflected in its formal semantics and axiomatics: we use a non-standard semantics putting together a neighborhood semantics for explicit beliefs and relational semantics for background knowledge, and we have specific axioms in the logic highlighting the relationship between the two concepts. Mental (...) operations of perceptive type and inferential type, having effects on epistemic states of agents, are primitives in the object language of the logic. At the semantic level, they are modelled as special kinds of model-update operations, in the style of dynamic epistemic logic. Results about axiomatization, decidability and complexity for the logic are given in the paper. (shrink)

Metacognition refers to any knowledge or cognitive process that monitors or controls cognition. We highlight similarities between metacognitive and executive control functions, and ask how these processes might be implemented in the human brain. A review of brain imaging studies reveals a circuitry of attentional networks involved in these control processes, with its source located in midfrontal areas. These areas are active during conflict resolution, error correction, and emotional regulation. A developmental approach to the organization of the anatomy involved in (...) executive control provides an added perspective on how these mechanisms are influenced by maturation and learning, and how they relate to metacognitive activity. (shrink)

We introduce the logics GLP Λ, a generalization of Japaridze’s polymodal provability logic GLP ω where Λ is any linearly ordered set representing a hierarchy of provability operators of increasing strength. We shall provide a reduction of these logics to GLP ω yielding among other things a finitary proof of the normal form theorem for the variable-free fragment of GLP Λ and the decidability of GLP Λ for recursive orderings Λ. Further, we give a restricted axiomatization of the variable-free fragment (...) of GLP Λ. (shrink)

This is a short entry on "Metatheatre" in Section 4, "Concepts, Themes and Topics Treated in the Dialogues," in The Bloomsbury Handbook of Plato, edited by Gerald Press and Mateo Duque.

Durkheim's underdeveloped notion of fatalism is the keystone for a bridge between two conceptual categories central to Marxian and Durkheimian theory: alienation and anomie. Durkheim does not necessarily disagree with Marx that excessive regulation can be socially damaging but chooses to highlight the effects of under- regulation. A Durkheimian critique of overregulation becomes possible if we turn away from anomie and toward Durkheim's idea of fatalism-a concept that I will argue here is unexpectedly consistent with Marx's notion of alienation. We (...) can infer that Durkheim presents us with a notion of an "optimal" human condition that exists between anomie and fatalism. The structure of modern societies, it will be argued, is characterized not just by excessive control leading to alienation or by a lack of integrative restraint leading to anomie but also by active efforts to optimally regulate social life. (shrink)

This is a short entry on "Comedy" in Section 3, "Important Features of the Dialogues," in The Bloomsbury Handbook of Plato, edited by Gerald Press and Mateo Duque.

At the end of the first hypothesis, Parmenides gets Aristotle to agree that being [οὐσίας] must be in time; that is, that being must partake in at least one of the temporal modes: either to have been in the past, to be in the present, or it will be in the future (140e-142a). If this is true, then “the one does not partake in being” (141e7-8), meaning temporal being—to which Aristotle agrees, saying “Apparently not” (141e9). Parmenides then gets Aristotle to (...) agree that “Therefore, ‘the one’ in no way is” (141e9-10). This, however, contradicts the very first premise that begins Parmenides’ entire gymnastic exercise, “if one is” (137c4). The problem with the previous conclusion—that to be is to be in time—is that in professing his assent to it, Aristotle, in fact, gainsays it. He performatively contradicts the very thing he wants to assert. Aristotle answers Parmenides question, “Therefore could something partake of being in any way other than in one of those ways?” (141e7-8) with a two-word answer in Greek: “οὐκ ἔστιν [It’s not possible].” We can, therefore, ask of the very claim Aristotle is making—that it is impossible for something to be and not be in time—when in time does it hold true? At what time is it “not possible [οὐκ ἔστιν]” for something to not partake of temporal being? Is it not possible only in the present moment, in the past, or in the future? If Aristotle’s assertion is to have any force it must hold always. It has the same tenselessness as mathematical propositions, like ‘1+1=2.’ Forms, like mathematical entities, must necessarily have atemporal existence. Accordingly, in atemporally maintaining that anything that is must be in time, Aristotle undermines his own assertion. He performatively contradicts the very thing that he wants to affirm. (shrink)