Friedrich Schleiermacher war eine zentrale Figur des geistigen Lebens in Berlin im ersten Drittel des 19. Jahrhunderts und ein wichtiger Protagonist im preußischen Reformprozess. Der Band widmet sich insbesondere dem zweiten Jahrzehnt zu Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts. Er untersucht Schleiermachers Denken und Wirken in den entscheidenden Jahren während und nach den Befreiungskriegen und konturiert seine Position während des Umbruchs von der Reform zur Restauration in einzelnen Schlaglichtern. Die interdisziplinären Beiträge geben eine historische Analyse des politischen Kontextes, beleuchten das Berliner Stadtleben (...) sowie Schleiermachers berufliche und private Netzwerke, die sich nicht zuletzt aus den an der Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften historisch-kritisch edierten Korrespondenz und Tageskalender F. Schleiermachers erschließen. Vor dem Hintergrund dieser gesellschaftspolitischen Matrix wird deutlich, wie eng Schleiermachers wissenschaftliche Werke und die Genese seiner wissenschaftlichen Systematik mit seinem konkreten Handeln als Wissenschafts- und Kirchenpolitiker, als Gemeindeleiter und Prediger, aber auch als Freund, Kollege und Familienmensch verzahnt ist. (shrink)

(2005). Freedom in Responsibility: On the Relevance of “Sin” As a Hermeneutic Guiding Principle in Bioethical Decision Making. Christian Bioethics: Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 147-165.

Current analytical philosophies of romantic love tend to identify the essence of such love with one specific element, such as concern for the beloved person, valuing the beloved person or the union between the lovers. This paper will deal with different forms of the union theory of love which takes love to be the physical, psychic or ontological union of two persons. Prima facie, this theory might appear to be implausible because it has several contra-intuitive implications, and yet, I submit, (...) it is more coherent and attractive than it seems to be. I shall distinguish three specific models and thereby offer a differentiated account of the union theory which has not previously been provided in the literature. I will claim that two of these models should be rejected. I shall then defend the third model against certain possible objections ; but nevertheless, I shall conclude by showing how this model, too, faces further significant objections which ultimately expose the limits of the union theory of love. In conclusion, I will sketch the outlines of a non-reductive cluster theory of love. (shrink)

This paper deals primarily with theDoctrine of Method(DM) of Kant’sDoctrine of Virtue. First, I present an overview of theDM(1.1) and an explanation of how it is possible to teach virtue (1.2). Second, I address the following issues: Why is aDMnecessary at all (2.1)? How does theDMrelate to what Kant calls casuistry (2.2)? I will argue that wide duties have two essential characteristics: They command the right kind of moral motivation in terms of a moral maxim, and they allow for latitude. (...) The fact that wide duties command the right kind of motivation leads to theDM; the latitude of wide duties, however, leads to casuistry. To unfold this interpretation, it must also be shown that both imperfect and perfect duties are wide duties. (shrink)

The debate between moral realism and antirealism plays an important role in contemporary metaethics as well as in the interpretation of Kant’s moral philosophy. This volume aims to clarify whether, and in what sense, Kant is a moral realist, an antirealist, or something in-between. Based on an explication of the key metaethical terms, internationally recognized Kant scholars discuss the question of how Kant’s moral philosophy should be understood in this regard. All camps in the metaethical field have their inhabitants: Some (...) contributors read Kant’s philosophy in terms of a more or less robust moral realism, objectivism, or idealism, and some of them take it to be a version of constructivism, constitutionism, or brute antirealism. In any case, all authors introduce and defend their terminology in a clear manner and argue thoughtfully and refreshingly for their positions. With contributions of Stefano Bacin, Jochen Bojanowski, Christoph Horn, Patrick Kain, Lara Ostaric, Fred Rauscher, Oliver Sensen, Elke Schmidt, Dieter Schönecker, and Melissa Zinkin. (shrink)

Polyamorie ist romantische Liebe, die sich auf mindestens zwei Personen bezieht oder beziehen kann. Eine solche Definition klingt leichter als sie es tatsächlich ist. Um eine genaue und adäquate Analyse von Polyamorie zu leisten, muss, erstens, geklärt werden, was Liebe – die hier allein als romantische Liebe thematisiert wird – überhaupt ist. Sie ist, so soll gezeigt werden, ein spezifisches dispositionales Emotionsmuster, das eine besonders starke Form der subjektiven Bedeutsamkeit konstituiert. Auf dem Hintergrund dieses Verständnisses von romantischer Liebe im Allgemeinen (...) soll dann, zweitens, gezeigt werden, dass polyamore Liebe keine andere Form der Liebe ist als monoamore Liebe, sondern sich als romantische Liebe allein durch die divergierende Anzahl der Personen, die Gegenstand der Liebe sind, von monoamorer Liebe unterscheidet; besonderer Auszeichnungen wie verantwortlich oder konsensuell, wie sie in der Literatur geläufig sind, bedarf eine so verstandene polyamore Liebe, um sie hinreichend zu definieren, also nicht. Beachtet man aber, dass es eine Sache ist, polyamore Liebe, verstanden als emotionales Phänomen, zu definieren, und eine durchaus ganz andere Sache, polyamore Beziehungen zu definieren, bleibt Raum für die Frage, wann genau eine Beziehungskonstellation eigentlich polyamor ist, oder wann eine polyamore Person einfach nur mehrere Personen liebt, ohne dass die entstehende Beziehungskonstellation als solche aber polyamor wäre. Schließlich soll, drittens, das Verhältnis von Polyamorie und Sexualität beleuchtet werden. Auch wenn Sexualität für gewöhnlich als eines der hervorstechenden Elemente der romantischen Liebe verstanden wird, gehört sie gar nicht notwendig zu ihr – und jedenfalls hätte die Behauptung, dass eine notwendige Beziehung zwischen Polyamorie und gelebter Sexualität besteht, begrifflich-normative Konsequenzen, die man wohl gar nicht haben will. Es wird gezeigt, warum es keine notwendige Beziehung zwischen Liebe und Sexualität gibt – weder zwischen monoamorer noch zwischen polyamorer Liebe und Sexualität. Auch asexuelle polyamore (romantische) Liebe ist somit möglich. (shrink)

Gesellschaftliche Veränderungen in grossem Massstab, von der Pluralisierung der Gesellschaft, der Digitalisierung, die als Vierte Kulturtechnik bezeichnet wird, bis hin zur Widerfahrnis von Kontingenzen wie Armut und Flüchtlingsströmen oder Umweltkatastrophen, stellen die Verantwortungsfähigkeit des Menschen vor neue Herausforderungen. Es wird dabei deutlich: Humanität und Vernunft, Würde und Freiheit verdanken ihren Gehalt und ihre Gestalt einem die Vernunft selbst übersteigenden Transzendenten, in dem die Vernunft je und je ihres eigenen Grundes ansichtig werden kann. Dass dieses Verhältnis zwischen Vernunft und ihrem transzendenten (...) Grund alle Wissens- und Lebensbereiche durchdringt, zeigen die interdisziplinären Beiträge dieses Bandes, die Fragen der Weltentstehung und Anthropologie, der Logik und Mystik, des Glaubens und des Gottesbildes, des Sinns und der Religion, der Gottesdienstpraxis und der Architektur behandeln. (shrink)

O presente texto aborda o conceito de cultura como sendo toda a produção artística e científica, além dos costumes e crenças conservadas, de uma geração para outra. Traz como elemento fundamental da evolução humana a constituição da linguagem como forma de comunicação, discutindo as manifestações das tecnologias da inteligência como artefatos que servem de elementos constitutivos de nosso desenvolvimento. Revela que a cultura digital instaurada em nossos dias só pode ser concebida a partir de uma construção histórica que tem os (...) seus primeiros indícios na comunicação de nossos ancestrais e que avança até a criação dos mais avançados computadores. Partindo dessa perspectiva, defendemos, neste artigo, a utilização de ambientes virtuais como influenciadores do desejo de aprender e como alternativas para a exclusão digital, que ainda é uma realidade em muitas escolas brasileiras. Apresenta como exemplo o AVArte, um ambiente virtual de Arte/Educação Ambiental que se constitui como um material didáticoque favorece processos de apropriação e inclusão digital, cujo objetivo é, além de promover o contato com as ferramentas tecnológicas, proporcionar o acesso a informações sobre a cultura e o meio ambiente com vistas à construção de valores e atitudes que desenvolvam o sentido de pertencimentoem direção à sustentabilidade socioambiental. (shrink)

Este texto originou-se de uma dissertação de mestrado emEducação Ambiental, cujo objetivo é compreender como reconhecidos educadores ambientais, que atuam em Programas de Pós-graduação em Educação, no Brasil, conceituam sustentabilidade. Foram feitas entrevistassemiestruturadas com estudiosos participantes do Grupo de Trabalho em Educação Ambiental da Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Educação. A escolha dos colaboradores da pesquisa recaiu sobre tais atores por estes estarem vinculados a Programas de Pós-Graduação em Educação e desenvolverem pesquisas na área da Educação Ambiental. Para (...) o exame dos dados, foi utilizada a Análise Textual Discursiva desenvolvida por Moraes e Galiazzi. Para estabelecer o diálogo com os dados empíricos, autores como Loureiro, Leff, Tristão e Carvalho foram consultados e referenciados. A análise dos dados obtidos por meio das entrevistas evidencia que os pesquisadores abordam sustentabilidade comoum tema transversal e polissêmico. Discute-se também a construção de sociedades sustentáveis baseadas em relações socioeconômicas, que não sejam embasadas no capitalismo. As transformações não devem partir de um desenvolvimento arbitrário, mas a partir de inovações alusivas às questõessocioambientais, com vistas a sociedades verdadeiramente sustentáveis. (shrink)

Gegenstand der Erörterung ist die Offenlegung des faktischen und potentiellen Ethikbezugs von Technik. Grundlegend für jede Ethik ist ein je bestimmtes Verständnis des Menschen und seiner Wirklichkeit. Diese prinzipielle Positionalität ist gegenüber diskurs- und verfahrensethischen Ansätzen ebenso festzuhalten wie gegenüber utilitaristischen Nivellierungen grundlagentheoretischer Fragen. Die vorliegende Untersuchung aus evangelischer Perspektive zeigt anhand der Analyse zweier technikphilosophischer Konzeptionen der Gegenwart (G. Ropohl, W. Ch. Zimmerli) die Relevanz von Technikethik nicht nur für Techniker, sondern bezüglich menschlichen Handelns im allgemeinen.

ABSTRACTThe ability to evaluate scientific claims and evidence is an important aspect of scientific literacy and requires various epistemic competences. Readers spontaneously validate presented information against their knowledge and beliefs but differ in their ability to strategically evaluate the soundness of informal arguments. The present research investigated how students of psychology, compared to scientists working in psychology, evaluate informal arguments. Using a think-aloud procedure, we identified the specific strategies students and scientists apply when judging the plausibility of arguments and classifying (...) common argumentation fallacies. Results indicate that students, compared to scientists, have difficulties forming these judgements and base them on intuition and opinion rather than the internal consistency of arguments. Our findings are discussed using the mental model theory framework. Although introductory students validate scientific information against their knowledge and beliefs, the.. (shrink)

Este livro apresenta-se como o resultado da contribuição de professores e pesquisadores de diversos campos da filosofia e de diferentes universidades brasileiras durante a ocasião do I Encontro "Vozes femininas na Filosofia", ocorrido em junho de 2017, na UFRGS, em Porto Alegre, RS. Nossa motivação parte da constatação que a área de filosofia nas universidades brasileiras sofre uma evidente crise de representatividade: tanto nos cursos de graduação como nos programas de pós-graduação em filosofia, nos quais menos de 30% são mulheres, (...) entre docentes e discentes. Procura-se, por meio dos textos organizados neste volume, entender a produção e a contribuição de filósofas cujas presenças se mostram diminuídas – senão totalmente esquecidas – na história de filosofia e na atualidade. (shrink)

This edited collection brings together thirteen inaugural lectures given at the 'old' philosophical faculty of the University of Vienna. It presents the voices of important representatives of humanities, cultural and natural sciences through programmatic texts from the mid-19th century to the mid-20th century. Some published for the first time, the lectures have been annotated by renowned scholars in terms of disciplinary, scientific and academic history as well as socio-political context. Hence, this volume contributes substantially to the so far under-researched history (...) of the inaugural lecture as a university ritual, academic practice and text-genre. With inaugural lectures by Alexander Conze, Erich Schmidt, Ernst Mach, Elise Richter, Ludwig Boltzmann, Moritz Schlick, Erwin Schrödinger and others. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt and the Meaning of Politics. Edited by Craig Calhoun and John McGowan, viii + 362 pp. $54.95 cloth $21.95 paper. Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss: German Emigrés and American Political Thought after World War II. Edited by Peter Graf Kielmansegg, Horst Mewes, and Elisabeth Glaser‐Schmidt, x + 208 pp. $49.95/£35.00 cloth, $16.95 paper. Hannah Arendt: Twenty Years Later. Edited by Larry May and Jerome Kohn, viii + 384 pp. $40.00 cloth, $17.50 paper.

A full account of purposive action must appeal not only to propositional attitude states like beliefs, desires, and intentions, but also to motor representations, i.e., non-propositional states that are thought to represent, among other things, action outcomes as well as detailed kinematic features of bodily movements. This raises the puzzle of how it is that these two distinct types of state successfully coordinate. We examine this so-called “Interface Problem”. First, we clarify and expand on the nature and role of motor (...) representations in explaining intentional action. Next, we characterize the respective functions of intentions and motor representations, the differences in representational format and content that these imply, and the interface challenge these differences in turn raise. We then evaluate Butterfill and Sinigaglia’s recent answer to this interface challenge, according to which intentions refer to action outcomes by way of demonstrative deference to motor representations. We present some worries for this proposal, arguing that, among other things, it implicitly presupposes a solution to the problem, and so cannot help to resolve it. Finally, we suggest that we may make some progress on this puzzle by positing a “content-preserving causal process” taking place between intentions and motor representations, and we offer a proposal for how this might work. (shrink)

Feminist philosophers have discussed the prospects for assessing values empirically, particularly given the ongoing threat of sexism and other oppressive values influencing science and society. Some advocates of such tests now champion a “values as evidence” approach, and they criticize Helen Longino’s contextual empiricism for not holding values to the same level of empirical scrutiny as other claims. In this paper, we defend contextual empiricism by arguing that many of these criticisms are based on mischaracterizations of Longino’s position, overstatements of (...) certain claims, and false dichotomies. Her contextual empiricism not only allows for the empirical support and disconfirmation of values, but Longino explicitly discusses when values can be empirically adjudicated and emphasizes the crucial role of the community for standards of evidence. We support contextual empiricism and elaborate a less direct account of “values as heuristics” by reviewing Longino’s theory of evidence and then using a case study from Elisabeth Lloyd on the biology of female orgasm, demonstrating the disconfirmation of androcentric values in evolutionary science. Within Longino’s and Lloyd’s contextual empiricism, values do not get treated as empirical evidence to be directly assessed by individuals, but rather values are heuristic tools to build models whose use can be validated or invalidated by communities based on their empirical fruitfulness in the logic and pragmatics of research questions in specific historical and cultural contexts. (shrink)

Most of us create and use a panoply of non-sentential representations throughout our ordinary lives: we regularly use maps to navigate, charts to keep track of complex patterns of data, and diagrams to visualize logical and causal relations among states of affairs. But philosophers typically pay little attention to such representations, focusing almost exclusively on language instead. In particular, when theorizing about the mind, many philosophers assume that there is a very tight mapping between language and thought. Some analyze utterances (...) as the outer vocalizations of inner thoughts (e.g. Grice 1957, Devitt 2005), while others treat thought as a form of inner speech (e.g. Sellars 1956/1997, Carruthers 2002). But even philosophers who take no stand on the relative priority of language and thought still tend to individuate mental states in terms of the sentences we use to ascribe them. Indeed, Dummett (1993) claims that it is constitutive of analytic philosophy that it approaches the mind by way of language. In many ways, this linguistic model is salutary. Our thoughts are often intimately intertwined with their linguistic expression, and public language does provide a comparatively tractable proxy for, and a window into, the messier realm of thought. However, an exclusive focus on thought as it is expressed in language threatens to leave other sorts of thought unexplained, or even to blind us to their possibility. In particular, many cognitive ethologists and psychologists find it useful to talk about humans, chimpanzees, birds, rats, and even bees as employing cognitive maps. We need to make sense of this way of talking about minds as well as more familiar sentential descriptions. In what follows, I investigate the theoretical and practical possibility of non-sentential thought. Ultimately, I am most interested in the contours of distinctively human thought: what forms does human thought take, and how do those different forms interact? How does human thought compare with that of other animals? In this essay, however, I focus on a narrower and more basic theoretical question: could thought occur in maps? Many philosophers are convinced that in some important sense, thought per se must be language-like.. (shrink)

I take up three puzzles about our emotional and evaluative responses to fiction. First, how can we even have emotional responses to characters and events that we know not to exist, if emotions are as intimately connected to belief and action as they seem to be? One solution to this puzzle claims that we merely imagine having such emotional responses. But this raises the puzzle of why we would ever refuse to follow an author’s instructions to imagine such responses, since (...) we happily imagine many other implausible things. A natural response to this second puzzle is that our responses to fiction are real, and so can’t just be conjured up in response to an author’s demands. However, this simple response is inadequate, because we often respond differently to people and events in fiction than we would if we encountered them in real life. Solving these three puzzles in a consistent way requires the notion of a “perspective” on a fictional world. I sketch an account of this intuitive but frustratingly amorphous notion: perspectives are tools for organizing our thinking, which can in turn alter our emotional and evaluative responses. Cultivating a perspective can be illuminating, entertaining, or corrupting — or all three at once. (shrink)

In Francesco Berto’s words, the term “Serious Actualism” is used for the position “that any object must exist in every circumstance in which it has any property – the thesis that predication, or the having of properties as such, entails existence.” (“Modal Meinongianism and Fiction: The Best of Three Worlds”, Philosophical Studies 152, 2011, 324f.) Berto agrees with Nathan Salmon that Serious Actualism is “a confused and misguided prejudice” (Salmon, “Nonexistence”, Noûs 32, 1998, 290). The aim of this paper is (...) to defend the doctrine of Serious Actualism against this verdict. (shrink)

On a familiar and prima facie plausible view of metaphor, speakers who speak metaphorically say one thing in order to mean another. A variety of theorists have recently challenged this view; they offer criteria for distinguishing what is said from what is merely meant, and argue that these support classifying metaphor within 'what is said'. I consider four such criteria, and argue that when properly understood, they support the traditional classification instead. I conclude by sketching how we might extract a (...) workable notion of 'what is said' from ordinary intuitions about saying. (shrink)