La solution des antinomies s’accomplit en 3 étapes. 1° La théorie des types de Russell avec l’axiome de réductibilité. 2° Ramsey divise les antinomies en deux groupes. Le premier groupe reçoit sa solution de la simple théorie des types ; seul, le groupe élargi exige l’axiome de réductibilité. 3° Hilbert fonde la théorie métamathématique de la preuve, que les logiciens polonais élargissent en une métalogique. Gödel découvre l’arithmétisation et il prouve l’existence de propositions insolubles. Tarski montre que le concept de (...) vérité ne peut être défini sans contradiction que dans un métalangage. Carnap généralise ce résultat, ce qui fait que les antinomies syntactiques sont sans dommage pour la science. (shrink)

1. t. Wirklichkeit und logik.--2. t. Die grundbegriffe der wissenschaft.

Was charakterisiert den Geist im Gegensatz zur Materie? Wodurch unterscheidet sich die Psychologie von der Physik? Der Stoff, aus dem die Welt unserer Erfahrung besteht, ist nach Russell weder Geist noch Materie, sondern etwas Ursprünglicheres. In den Vorlesungen über Die Analyse des Geistes versucht er so genau wie möglich zu beschreiben, was in Wirklichkeit stattfindet, wenn wir z.B. etwas glauben oder begehren. Die Einfachheit und zugleich Präzision der Russellschen Beschreibungen machen die Lektüre zu einem außerordentlichen Genuß.

The received view has it that Hans Reichenbach and his friends of the Berlin Group worked close together with the more prominent Vienna Circle. In the wake of this view, Reichenbach was often treated as a logical positivist – despite the fact that he decisively opposed it. In this chapter we follow another thread. We shall show the “third man”– besides Reichenbach and Walter Dubislav – of the Berlin Group, Kurt Grelling, as a man who could grasp the (...) academic trends of the time faster than anybody else, who was better informed about logic and philosophy of nature than his two prominent colleagues and thus, could better delineate, although tentatively, central threads of research of the Berlin Group. Grelling did this on several occasions, but most ostensibly in the last years of his life when he was focused on problems of formal ontology. On the basis of this analysis, we shall see that in the early 1920s, Reichenbach too was led by a project in ontology of science that he elaborated together with the psychologist Kurt Lewin. Moreover, Reichenbach’s later philosophy of nature was also shaped by this project. We present this direction of philosophy of science as a “road less travelled” which, however, if revived, can point to a new direction that will more closely connect philosophy and science. (shrink)

In his ontological works Kurt Grelling tries to give a rigorous analysis of the foundations of the so-called Gestalt-psychology. Gestalten are peculiar emergent qualities, ontologically dependent on their foundations, but nonetheless non reducible to them. Grelling shows that this concept, as used in psychology and ontology, is often ambiguous. He distinguishes two important meanings in which the word “Gestalt” is used: Gestalten as structural aspects available to transposition and Gestalten as causally self-regulating wholes. Gestalten in the first (...) meaning are, according to Grelling, “equivalence classes of correspondences”, while Gestalten as self-regulating wholes have more to do with relations of ontological dependence. Grelling’s clarification of the concept of Gestalt is doubtless an excellent piece of philosophical analysis, but at the end of the day it turns out that his analysis captures at best only a part of intuitions traditionally connected with the notion of Gestalt. (shrink)

The Berlin Group for scientific philosophy was active between 1928 and 1933 and was closely related to the Vienna Circle. In 1930, the leaders of the two Groups, Hans Reichenbach and Rudolf Carnap, launched the journal Erkenntnis. However, between the Berlin Group and the Vienna Circle, there was not only close relatedness but also significant difference. Above all, while the Berlin Group explored philosophical problems of the actual practice of science, the Vienna Circle, closely following Wittgenstein, was more interested in (...) problems of the language of science. The book includes first discussion ever (in three chapters) on Walter Dubislav’s logic and philosophy. Two chapters are devoted to another author scarcely explored in English, Kurt Grelling, and another one to Paul Oppenheim who became an important figure in the philosophy of science in the USA in the 1940s–1960s. Finally, the book discusses the precursor of the Nord-German tradition of scientific philosophy, Jacob Friedrich Fries. Mehr anzeigen Weniger anzeigen . (shrink)