Dans un article récent publié sous le titre « The Sanctuary of Despoina at Lykosoura: A Megalopolitan Creation? », Alaya Palamidis remet en question les affirmations de Pausanias sur l’ancienneté de Lykosoura et de ses cultes ; elle fait l’hypothèse que le panthéon de Lykosoura est une création de Mégalopolis synécisée à partir d’emprunts à d’autres cultes de la région. Il a paru utile de revenir sur le sujet pour en revoir certains aspects (statut de Lykosoura au moment (...) du synécisme et absence de Despoina dans les sources écrites avant l’époque hellénistique), et pour cerner le caractère problématique de l’hypothèse qui sous-tend l’article, ce que suggérait déjà le point d’interrogation à la fin de la proposition affirmative du titre. (shrink)

De nombreuses sources antiques indiquent que l’épiclèse d’Apollon Smintheus, divinité honorée en Troade, provient du terme dialectal σμίνθος, qui désigne la souris. Des auteurs anciens ajoutent que des souris considérées comme sacrées sont élevées dans le sanctuaire. Or une nouvelle analyse de ces sources suggère qu’elles ne sont pas antérieures à l’époque hellénistique. Dans cet article sera proposée l’hypothèse d’une réinvention du culte du dieu à la suite de la découverte de l’étymologie supposée de l’épiclèse à cette époque. Dans un (...) second temps seront analysés les mythes permettant d’expliquer l’association d’Apollon et des souris. Il sera suggéré que le premier mythe a été créé par l’auteur d’une œuvre dédiée à l’histoire de la Troade et que son évolution reflète les préoccupations du sanctuaire et des deux cités auxquelles appartient successivement le lieu de culte. Enfin, une nouvelle interprétation de l’épiclèse du dieu sera proposée. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Buddhist Unconscious: The Ālaya-vijñāna in the Context of Indian Buddhist ThoughtMark SideritsThe Buddhist Unconscious: The Ālaya-vijñāna in the Context of Indian Buddhist Thought. By William S. Waldron. New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. Pp. xvi + 269. $90.00.The Buddhist Unconscious: The Ālaya-vijñāna in the Context of Indian Buddhist Thought by William S. Waldron is an examination of the origins of the Yogācāra concept of ālaya-vijñāna, or "storehouse-consciousness." Where orthodox (...) Buddhist psychology speaks of six types of consciousness (one for each external sense modality, plus one for "inner sense" or manas), the Yogācāra school of Mahāyāna Buddhism posits an additional kind of consciousness to serve as the substratum of the seeds thought to be engendered by karma. This is sometimes seen as tantamount to admitting a self, a criticism the author seeks to rebut. His chief concern, however, is to show how this posit grew out of a set of problems inherited from pre-Yogācāra Abhidharma. He discusses the conception of consciousness that is to be found in early Buddhist sources, describes how orthodox Abhidharma sought to deal with a variety of mental continuities, and then traces the development of the notion of ālaya-vijñāna through the early Yogācāra texts Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, Yogācārabhūmi and Mahāyānasaṃgraha.The story that the author tells is basically this. Early Buddhism explains suffering as derived from false belief in an enduring subject, the "I," where there is really just a multiplicity of ephemeral psychophysical factors in causal succession. Actions based [End Page 358] on this false belief lead to a further strengthening of those factors that perpetuate the belief, resulting in the round of rebirth. Abhidharma set about trying to catalog these factors and their multifarious causal connections. But it encountered a seemingly insuperable difficulty in trying to account for a variety of psychological continuities in terms of a model that lacks mental continuants. The Yogācāra posit of ālaya-vijñāna solves this difficulty by supplying a mental continuum that is not (ordinarily) accessible to introspection.Yogācāra is best known, of course, for its denial of external objects (cittamātra), but that claim is largely ignored here. Instead the author focuses on continuities with earlier Abhidharma thought concerning the nature of the mental continuum. Waldron is no doubt correct to see the Yogācāra enterprise as itself a (Mahāyāna) form of Abhidharma. But while the concept of ālaya-vijñāna might perhaps be seen as growing out of Abhidharma controversies concerning how best to explain continuities in mental dispositions and karma, it at least facilitates an account of sensory experience that renders the external object superfluous and thus paves the way for subjective idealism. For ālaya-vijñāna becomes the receptacle for the seeds deposited by prior action the ripening of which results in sensory cognitions. Since the author claims (p. xiii) to be writing for a nonspecialist audience, it might have been useful to make this point at the outset rather than near the end of the study (p. 161 ). There is also some tension between Waldron's reading of the concept's origins and that of Schmithausen, and more might have been said on that score.Waldron seems to take a sympathetic stance toward the defense of ālaya-vijñāna that he discerns in the texts. This is only to be expected given that the best hermeneutical strategy should involve substantial doses of interpretive charity. Still, greater critical distance might have led to a more useful discussion of the topic. For instance, a more probing investigation of the claim that only ālaya-vijñāna can explain karmic and mental-dispositional continuities might have yielded a deeper understanding of the overall view. The problem faced by Abhidharma theories is clear. One phenomenon that any theory of persons must accommodate is the intermittent recurrence of similar behaviors all of which seem traceable to an event at some remove in the past: having learned in my early childhood that fire is hot, from time to time I intentionally avoid... (shrink)

On journalistic ethics of mass media in Sri Lanka and the role of Śrī Laṅkā Puvatpat Maṇḍalaya.

불교 유식학은 현상세계가 아뢰야식의 자증분의 심식전변 결과에 불과하다고 설명한다. 선험적 현상학은 현상세계가 선험적 주관성의 지향적 구성의 결과에 불과하다고 설명한다. 이렇게 현상세계를 가능하게 해주는 궁극적 근거인 마음의 구조와 작용원리를 탐구한다는 점에서 불교 유식학과 선험적 현상학은 의식철학적인 공통성을 지닌다. 따라서 현상학은 불교 유식학의 아뢰야식의 4분설을 서양철학적으로 해석할 수 있는 훌륭한 도구가 될 수 있다. 아뢰야식의 4분설은 아뢰야식이 인식주체로서의 기능적 측면에서 4부분으로 분석된다는 이론이다. 그 4가지의 인식 기능적 측면은 상분, 견분, 자증분, 증자증분이다. 현상학의 자연적 태도에 의거하면, 아뢰야식의 상분은 경험적 대상에 해당된다. 그리고 아뢰야식의 (...) 견분은 경험적 대상의식과 더불어 경험적 자기의식에 해당된다. 왜냐하면 경험적 자기의식은 경험적 대상의식이 경험적 대상의식 자기 자신을 경험적 대상으로 삼아서 인식하는 일종의 경험적 대상의식이기 때문이다. 현상학의 선험적 태도에 의거하면, 아뢰야식의 자증분은 선험적 자기의식인 선험적 주관성에 해당되는데, 특히 이것은 선험적 자기의식 중에서도 전반성적인 선험적 자기의식에 해당된다. 왜냐하면 전반성적인 선험적 자기의식은 대상의식의 대상정립을 가능하게 해줌으로써 대상으로서의 현상세계를 가능하게 해주는 궁극적 근거이기 때문이고, 선험적 자기의식의 필증적 명증성을 지니는 선험적 자기지각인 반성적인 선험적 자기의식을 가능하게 해주는 궁극적 근거이기 때문이다. 그리고 아뢰야식의 증자증분은 선험적 자기의식 중에서도 반성적인 선험적 자기의식에 해당된다. (shrink)

Bunhwang Wonhyo (芬皇 元曉, 617-686) was a philosopher in the Korean Shilla Dynasty. He was a successor to the Buddha's wise thought and merciful life on the basis of One Mind (一心) - Reconcilement (和會) -Interfusion(無碍). His One Mind philosophy opened a new way for researching the human abyss and worldessence. The breadth of his enlightenment also enabled many people to live in the vast sea of Buddha dharma, as his manner of thinking and living opened up completely new, unique, (...) and encompassing vistas well beyond the conventional limits of his age, people, religion and philosophy. Wohyo's One Mind philosophy was based on the One Mind-Two Approaches (一心二門) formulation described in Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith. He was not restricted by the commonly accepted view of Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith, wherein One Mind is understood in light of dualistic opposition of the Combined Consciousness of True and False (眞妄和合識)1). On the contrary, he applied a different view of One Mind to Combined Consciousness, unlike the Ālaya-vijñāna view of the Consciousness-Only school that tried to understand One Mind as True Consciousness of Great Perfect Mirror Wisdom (大圓鏡智). Therefore, his understanding of One Mind is very dynamic and elastic. The dynamics and elasticity are also caused by the dualistic structure of Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith (大乘起信論), that divides One Mind into two characteristics such as white-clean and dirty-contaminated. Wonhyo, who investigated deeply into the suffering mind in order todetermine whether to classify the unenlightened person and Buddha as two or whether to unify them, also made One Mind open to the Ninth Consciousness (九識) without restricting the range of it to Eight Consciousnesses (八識). This ground of understanding is due to Wonhyo's dynamics and Miraculous Understanding. Wonhyo connects One Mind to Tathāgata-garbha (如來藏), while saying that 'it is called Tathāgata-garbha because the body of One Mind is defined as Original Enlightenment (本覺) and it causes phenomenon depending on ignorance.' In order to explain this, he 'coins' the expression of Miraculous Understanding and provides expands the existing understanding of One Mind by adding the meaning of Miraculous Understanding to the understanding of One Mind. And heexplains Miraculous Understanding on the basis of the property of Nirmāṇa-kāya that does not adopt inanimate objectivity, which shows that Wonhyo's One Mind exposes the changeable meaning of an absolute aspect and the unchangeable meaning of a phenomenal aspect at the same time. Wonhyo quoted the concept of Miraculous Understanding in order to explain changeability of an absolute aspect rather than its unchangeability, and unchangeability of a phenomenal aspect rather than its changeability. And finally, Wonhyo's Miraculous Understanding of One Mind shows that the real nature of Original Enlightenment is miraculous by itself. And the meaning of Miraculous Understanding belongs in the Ninth Consciousness, Amala-vijñāna, rather than being restricted to the eighth consciousness, Ālaya-vijñāna. In this way, Wonhyo harmonizes the Eight Consciousnesses theory of Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith and the Nine Consciousnesses theory of Vājrasamādhi–Sūtra (金剛三昧經論) through dynamics and Miraculous Understanding of One Mind. As a result, Wonhyo enlarged the extension of One Mind understanding by granting the meaning of dynamics and Miraculous Understanding to One Mind, which challenged the existing interpretation of his time. (shrink)

Bunhwang Wonhyo was a philosopher in the Korean Shilla Dynasty. He was a successor to the Buddha's wise thought and merciful life on the basis of One Mind - Reconcilement -Interfusion. His One Mind philosophy opened a new way for researching the human abyss and worldessence. The breadth of his enlightenment also enabled many people to live in the vast sea of Buddha dharma, as his manner of thinking and living opened up completely new, unique, and encompassing vistas well beyond (...) the conventional limits of his age, people, religion and philosophy. Wohyo's One Mind philosophy was based on the One Mind-Two Approaches formulation described in Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith. He was not restricted by the commonly accepted view of Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith, wherein One Mind is understood in light of dualistic opposition of the Combined Consciousness of True and False 1). On the contrary, he applied a different view of One Mind to Combined Consciousness, unlike the Ālaya-vijñāna view of the Consciousness-Only school that tried to understand One Mind as True Consciousness of Great Perfect Mirror Wisdom. Therefore, his understanding of One Mind is very dynamic and elastic. The dynamics and elasticity are also caused by the dualistic structure of Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith, that divides One Mind into two characteristics such as white-clean and dirty-contaminated. Wonhyo, who investigated deeply into the suffering mind in order todetermine whether to classify the unenlightened person and Buddha as two or whether to unify them, also made One Mind open to the Ninth Consciousness without restricting the range of it to Eight Consciousnesses. This ground of understanding is due to Wonhyo's dynamics and Miraculous Understanding. Wonhyo connects One Mind to Tathāgata-garbha, while saying that 'it is called Tathāgata-garbha because the body of One Mind is defined as Original Enlightenment and it causes phenomenon depending on ignorance.' In order to explain this, he 'coins' the expression of Miraculous Understanding and provides expands the existing understanding of One Mind by adding the meaning of Miraculous Understanding to the understanding of One Mind. And heexplains Miraculous Understanding on the basis of the property of Nirmāṇa-kāya that does not adopt inanimate objectivity, which shows that Wonhyo's One Mind exposes the changeable meaning of an absolute aspect and the unchangeable meaning of a phenomenal aspect at the same time. Wonhyo quoted the concept of Miraculous Understanding in order to explain changeability of an absolute aspect rather than its unchangeability, and unchangeability of a phenomenal aspect rather than its changeability. And finally, Wonhyo's Miraculous Understanding of One Mind shows that the real nature of Original Enlightenment is miraculous by itself. And the meaning of Miraculous Understanding belongs in the Ninth Consciousness, Amala-vijñāna, rather than being restricted to the eighth consciousness, Ālaya-vijñāna. In this way, Wonhyo harmonizes the Eight Consciousnesses theory of Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith and the Nine Consciousnesses theory of Vājrasamādhi–Sūtra through dynamics and Miraculous Understanding of One Mind. As a result, Wonhyo enlarged the extension of One Mind understanding by granting the meaning of dynamics and Miraculous Understanding to One Mind, which challenged the existing interpretation of his time. (shrink)

The paper aims at bringing out a valid comparison between the notion of intentionality portrayed in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and that of Vijňānavāda in general. One of the crucial objectives of the Husserlian phenomenology is to understand the nature of consciousness. To Husserl, Consciousness is always intentional, that is, intended or directed towards something. It constitutes the world in the sense of bestowing meaning and being to the world. The object intended by consciousness may or may not be (...) there, but it certainly has a sense. Husserl makes a distinction between empirical and transcendental consciousness. To him, the empirical ego is momentary whilst the transcendental ego survives all reduction and presides over all epistemic acts. To explore whether the Vijňānavadins propose a similar notion of Consciousness and its intentionality would be the primary objective of the paper. On the other hand, to Vijňānavāda, the apparent external world is projected by the Absolute Consciousness, the Ālaya, not by the individual consciousness or Vijňāna. Vijňānavāda distinguishes between individual consciousness (pravritti Vijňāna) and absolute consciousness (Ālaya Vijňāna). All intentional acts are performed by the individual consciousness having the Ālaya Vijňāna as its background. The Ālaya manifests itself as subject and object as well as seven pravritti Vijňānas. They are intended and constituted by the Ālaya. It, therefore, follows that Ālaya is always intentionally correlated with the pravritti Vijňānas. Vijňānavāda appears to be a kind of constitutive phenomenology rather than idealism. (shrink)

To avoid the one-sidedness and abuse of the rule of xieju 絜矩, Zhang Taiyan 章太炎 redefines zhong-shu 忠恕, the Confucian golden rule, as two separate yet complementary principles, the idea of which is most manifestly drawn from Zhuangzi’s 莊子 “Qiwulun 齊物論”. Zhang’s association of zhong-shu and qiwu 齊物 is based upon his vision of equality premised on recognition of and respect for differences. In Zhang’s reading of the Zhuangzi in light of Yogācāra, the crucial “concept matching” is the explanation of (...) cheng xin 成心 as seeds in the ālaya consciousness. Cheng xin in this sense not only refers to the natural pattern of things and so is the basis for inference and deduction, but also serves as the means to deal with the diversity of opinions. In moral practice, Zhang proposes the liang xing 兩行 approach of his qiwu philosophy: to recognize the equal worth of all beings on one hand, and to take the particular characteristics and desires of individuals into account on the other. Thus, it requires the dual practice of zhong and shu: to acquire firsthand observation through personal experience, and to imagine oneself in the position of the other. (shrink)

이 글의 목적은 바수반두 『유식이십론』 9송에 나타나는 vijñapti의 의미를 드러내는 것이다. 특히 『유식이십론』 9송은 vijñapti의 발생론적 관점을 유식 논서 처음으로 언급한다. vijñapti는 근과 경으로부터 생기는 vijñāna와는 달리 자종자와 현현으로부터 생긴다는 9송이 그것이다. 게다가 『유식이십론』에는 이 세계가 오직 vijñapti라는 것을 증명하기 위하여 대상 부정이라는 방식을 채택하는 가운데 존재하지 않는 대상과 오직 존재하는 vijñapti와의 관계 또한 기술되어 있다. 『유식이십론』에서의 vijñapti의 이러한 용례에 주목하여 vijñapti의 정체를 보다 분명하게 드러내고자 한다. 이에 『유식이십론』 9송을 중심으로 vijñapti와 자종자(svabīja)와의 관계와 더불어 현현(pratibhāsa)과의 관계를 살펴본다. 아뢰야식(ālaya-vijñāna)에 저장된 자종자는 (...) vijñapti 발생의 직접적인 원인이고 자종자가 뭇 인연을 만나 변하여 대상과 유사하게 현현하는 것이 바로 vijñapti라는 것이 드러날 것이다. vijñapti는 자종자를 원인으로 삼아 대상과 유사하게 현현한다는 것이다. 어떤 하나의 대상을 식별한다는 것은 바로 대상과 유사한 형상으로 현현하는 것이다. 식은 종자와 현현을 모두 포섭하고 있다는 특성을 지닌다. 이에 vijñapti는 자종자를 지닌 vijñapti와 현현을 지닌 vijñapti로 존재한다. vijñapti는 대상을 아는 작용이 아니라 대상과 유사하게 나타나는 것이다. 그러므로 우리 주변을 둘러싸고 있는 대상은 물질성으로서가 아니라 내부 종자가 대상으로 ‘현현한 것’(vijñapti)이다. (shrink)

인간은 언어 없이는 사유할 수 없다는 것은 자명한 사실이다. 이를 부인할 수는 없다. 초기유식의 논리에 따르면, 인간의 식과 언어는 동본원적 지위를 갖는 것이다. 이 둘은 서로를 인과로 삼음으로써 비로소 공히 생명력을 얻을 수 있기 때문이다. 이것은 또한 유식무경임에도 불구하고 인간이 자신의 세계를 인식할 수 있는 이유이기도 하다. 그렇다면 우리는 언어가 나의 세계를 구성하는 것이라고 말할 수 있다. 그러나 언어가 그 자체 실체로서 인식대상을 담지하는 것은 아니다. 무로서 식이 존재할 수 있는 것도 언어가 이를 현상하는 집이자 형식이기 때문이라면, 그리고 언어 또한 (...) 이 식을 인과로 삼음으로써 존재할 수 있는 것이라면, 언어가 실체일 수는 없는 것이다. 그렇다면 우리는 언어와 언어에 의해 드러난 세계는 상호 연관성이 없는 객(客)이라고 해야 한다. 인간은 언어로 사유할 수 있지만, 언어에 의한 분별로 현상된 세계는 실체가 아니라는 것이다. 이것을 유식학은 ‘견이 있는 의언분별’이라고 설명한다. 지혜란 깨달음의 다른 말이라고 볼 때, 이러한 언어와 존재자의 관계에 대한 깨달음은 나의 세계를 새롭게 해석할 수 있는 눈이 될 수 있다. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Books ReceivedAquinas on Being. By Anthony Kenny. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002. Pp. x + 212. Price not given.Before and after Avicenna: Proceedings of the First Conference of the Avicenna Study Group. Edited by David C. Reisman, with the assistance of Ahmed H. al Rahim. Leiden: Brill, 2003. Pp. xix + 302. Price not given.Beside Still Waters: Jews, Christians, and the Way of the Buddha. Edited by Harold Kasimow, John (...) P. Keenan, and Linda Klepinger Keenan. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003. Pp. 284. Paper $14.95.The Buddhist Unconscious: The ālaya-vijñāna in the Context of Indian Buddhist Thought. By William S. Waldron. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. Pp. xvi + 269. Price not given.Comparative Political Philosophy: Studies under the Upas Tree. Edited by Anthony J. Parel and Ronald C. Keith. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2003. Pp. xxxviii + 260. Paper $26.95.The Confucian Quest for Order: The Origin and Formation of the Political Thought of Xun Zi. By Masayuki Sato. Leiden: Brill, 2003. Pp. xviii + 500. Price not given.Gathering the Meanings: The Compendium of Categories: The Arthaviniścaya Sūtra and Its Commentary Nibandhana. Translated from the Sanskrit by N. H. Samtani. Berkeley: Dharma Publishing, 2002. Pp. xxxiv + 390. Price not given.I Have Arrived, I Am Home: Celebrating Twenty Years of Plum Village Life. By Thich Nhat Hanh. Berkeley: Parallax Press, 2003. Pp. 253. Paper $25.00.Identity and the Moral Life. By Mrinal Miri. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. xvii + 132. Hardcover Rs 645.00.Indian Philosophers and Postmodern Thinkers: Dialogues on the Margins of Culture. By Carl Olson. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. xv + 331. Hardcover Rs 950.00.Islamic Humanism. By Lenn E. Goodman. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. xiii + 273. Price not given.Letting Go: The Story of Zen Master Tōsui. Translated by Peter Haskel. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001. Pp. xv + 167. Hardcover $45.00. Paper $16.95.A Life Journey to the East: Sinological Studies in Memory of Giuliano Bertuccioli (1923-2001). Edited by Antonino Forte and Federico Masini. Kyoto: Scuola Italiana di Studi sull'Asia Orientale, 2002. Pp. xxxv + 280. Price not given.The Measure of Things: Humanism, Humility and Mystery. By David E. Cooper. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002. Pp. ix + 372. Price not given. [End Page 277]Mencius, Hume and the Foundations of Ethics. By Xiusheng Liu. Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003. Pp. vii + 204. Price not given.Monks and Monarchs, Kinship and Kingship: Tanqian in Sui Buddhism and Politics. By Chen Jinhua. Kyoto: Scuola Italiana di Studi sull'Asia Orientale, 2002. Pp. xiii + 310. Price not given.Music in the Sky: The Life, Art, and Teachings of the 17th Gyalwa Karmapa Ogyen Trinley Dorje. By Michele Martin. Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 2003. Pp. 351. Paper $18.95, U.K. £12.95.New Confucianism: A Critical Examination. Edited by John Makeham. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Pp. 262. Hardcover $55.00.On the Boundaries of Theological Tolerance in Islam: Abū Hāmid Al-Ghāzalī's Faysal al-Tafriqa Bayna al-Islām wa al-Zandaqa. By Sherman A. Jackson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. xiv + 156. Hardcover Rs 295.00.Pandita Ramabai's American Encounter: The Peoples of the United States (1889). By Pandita Ramabai and translated and edited by Meera Kosambi. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003. Pp. xi + 284. Hardcover $59.95. Paper $29.95.Parmenides of Elea: A Verse Translation with Interpretative Essays and Commentary to the Text. By Martin J. Henn. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003. Pp. 147. Hardcover $59.95.Philosophes taoïstes, tome II: Huainan Zi, texte traduit, présenté et annoté sous la direction de Charles le Blanc et de Rémi Mathieu. Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2003. Pp. lxxxiii + 1182. Hardcover €56,90.The Philosophy and Ethics of the Vīraśaiva Community. By Dan A. Chekki. Lewiston, New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2003. Pp. xxv + 287. Hardcover $119.95.Poems of Hanshan. Translated by Peter Hobson with introduction by T. H. Barrett. Walnut Creek, California: AltaMira Press, 2003. Pp. viii + 151. Hardcover $65.00. Paper $19.95.Psychoanalysis and Buddhism: An Unfolding Dialogue. Edited by Jeremy D. Safran. Boston... (shrink)