Traditionally legal theorists, whenever engaged in controversy, have agreed on one point: legal norms are par excellence rules which impose obligations. The author examines this assumption, which from another perspective (that of constitutional law, for instance) appears less obvious. In fact, constitutional rules are commoniy empowering norms, norms which do not create duties but powers. To this objection many theorists would reply that empowering rules are incomplete and that they are to be understood as parts of duty‐creating rules. A different (...) position from this traditional stance is that defended in Kelsen's later writings, according to which the fundamental type of norm is the empowering norm. The author discusses Kelsen's three theories on the “ideal form” or structure of the legal norm, with special attention to the third of these, the empowerment theory. (shrink)

Hans Kelsen's legal philosophy and legal theory is regarded by many in the field as the most influential theory in this century. This volume makes available some of the best work extant on Kelsens' theory, including papers newly translated into English. It covers topics such as competing philosophical positons on the nature of law, legal validity, legal powers, and the unity of municipal and international law, as well as shedding light on Kelsen's intellectual milieu and his intellectual debts.

Following Einstein's prediction of the gravitational bending of light, and in the course of experimental work aimed at its verification, only sporadic and at times misleading references have been made to Johann Georg von Soldner. In a paper published in 1804, Soldner derived the gravitational bending of light on the classical Newtonian basis and calculated its value around the sun with remarkable accuracy. Soldner's paper, inaccessible even in German, is now presented in English translation and put in the perspective of (...) Soldner's life and the science of his day and ours. (shrink)

First, the author examines the traditional doctrine of imputation. A look at the traditional doctrine is useful for establishing a point of departure in comparing Kelsen's doctrines of central and peripheral imputation. Second, the author turns to central imputation. Here Kelsen's doctrine follows the traditional doctrine in attributing liability or responsibility to the subject. Kelsen's legal subject, however, has been depersonalized and thus requires radical qualification. Third, the author takes up peripheral imputation, which is the main focus of the paper. (...) It is argued that with respect to the basic form of the law, exhibited by the linking of legal condition with legal consequence, peripheral imputation counts as an austere doctrine, shorn as it is of all references to legal personality or the legal subject. If Kelsen's reconstructed legal norms are empowerments, then the austere doctrine of peripheral imputation captures the rudiments of their form, exactly what would be expected if peripheral imputation does indeed serve as the category of legal cognition. Finally, the author develops the puzzle surrounding the legal “ought” in this context. Although Kelsen talks at one point as though the legal “ought” were the peculiarly legal category, the author submits that this is not the best reading of Kelsen's texts. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAs the title suggests, I take up three motifs in the article. Legal science, on a narrower reading, examines the law qua object of legal cognition. Substituting legal cognition for traditio...

Hans Kelsen’s purity thesis is the basic methodological principle of the Pure Theory of Law. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that virtually everything that is peculiar to Kelsen’s legal theory stems from the purity thesis. This includes Kelsen’s normativism or non‐naturalism and his polemic against various dualisms in legal science. I set out Kelsen’s position on these issues after looking at the nomenclature of purity in his writings as well as the philosophical and contextual sources of purity as (...) he understands them. (shrink)

"In The Savior of Science Jaki illumines one of the best kept secrets of science history - the role theology has historically played in fruitful scientific development." "The volume begins by portraying a most-neglected yet all-important facet of cultural history - the invariable stillbirths of science in great ancient cultures, including Greece, China, India, and the early Muslim empire. This overview provides the background for the first major thesis of the book: belief in Christ, the only begotten Son of God (...) - a belief absent in all these cultures - secured for science its only viable birth in a period beginning in the High Middle Ages." "In the second part of the book Jaki continues his critique of science history with a number of meticulously argued theses about Christian monotheism. These include the view that Christian monotheism provides intellectual safeguards for the cosmological argument (an argument powerfully supported by modern scientific cosmology), that Christian monotheism vindicates the sense of purpose destroyed by materialist theories of evolution, and that Christian monotheism secures firm ethical guidelines against fearful abuses of scientific know-how."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

In discussing Elster's views on the use of counterfactuals and on the nature of contradictions in society, it is contended that, in general, these will not seem especially controversial to those trained in neoclassical economics. Similarly, there is little disagreement in principle between the views of many 'new economic historians' and Elster on the use of counterfactuals in the study of historical problems. In evaluating Elster's critique of several applications of counterfactuals in the 'new economic history', it is argued that (...) the concentration on broad philosophical questions may obscure the point that much recent controversy is based upon disagreements concerning factual issues and the nature of empirical relationships and magnitudes. (shrink)

This chapter deals with the background and implementation of the registration of slaves on the island of Trinidad after 1813. Registration was introduced by James Stephen in the British Colonial Office as a means of limiting the inflow of slaves in the illegal slave trade. Slave registration was extended to the other British colonies and then extended every three years until the end of slavery in 1834. Other registrations of slaves are noted, including the manifests of the coastal shipping of (...) slaves in the USA after 1808. (shrink)

Exploring the economic, cultural and political role of slavery in different societies, this volume includes selections from historians, economists and contemporaries - from those enslaved as well as from free members of slave owning societies.

Whereas fundamental norms in the juridico‐philosophical tradition serve to impose constraints, Kelsen's fundamental norm—or basic norm —purports to establish the normativist character of the law. But how is the basic norm itself established? Kelsen himself rules out the appeals that are familiar from the tradition—the appeal to fact, and to morality. What remains is a Kantian argument. I introduce and briefly evaluate the Kantian and neo‐Kantian positions, as applied to Kelsen's theory. The distinction between the two positions, I argue, is (...) reflected in an ambiguity in the use of the term “regressive.”. (shrink)

This new collection of writings from America's foremost authority on the relationship between science and religion, Templeton Prize-winner Stanley L. Jaki, is an incisive overview of the intersection of science with the most fundamental areas of human culture.

In his introductory section, Christian Dahlman points to various “absurdities” or “self-contradictions” generated by the basic norm. I adduce arguments showing that these “absurdities” or “self-contradictions” do not arise - not, at any rate, from Dahlman’s premises. In his central section, Dahlman sets out three purported problems and claims to resolve them by appeal to one or another of the “three basic norms” that he adumbrates. None of these problems is resolved by Dahlman. Specifically, I adduce arguments showing that the (...) first problem is a straw man of Dahlman’s own making, his resolution of the second problem turns on his confusion of the fictitious basic norm in Kelsen’s post-1960 period with the basic norm of ostensibly normative import in Kelsen’s classical or neo-Kantian phase, and, finally, Dahlman’s resolution of the third problem turns on his confusion of Kelsen’s basic norm with H.L.A. Hart’s rule of recognition. I close with remarks on Kelsen’s own conception of the juridico-theoretical problems he faced. (shrink)

In his introductory section, Christian Dahlman points to various “absurdities” or “self-contradictions” generated by the basic norm. I adduce arguments showing that these “absurdities” or “self-contradictions” do not arise - not, at any rate, from Dahlman’s premises. In his central section, Dahlman sets out three purported problems and claims to resolve them by appeal to one or another of the “three basic norms” that he adumbrates. None of these problems is resolved by Dahlman. Specifically, I adduce arguments showing that the (...) first problem is a straw man of Dahlman’s own making, his resolution of the second problem turns on his confusion of the fictitious basic norm in Kelsen’s post-1960 period with the basic norm of ostensibly normative import in Kelsen’s classical or neo-Kantian phase, and, finally, Dahlman’s resolution of the third problem turns on his confusion of Kelsen’s basic norm with H.L.A. Hart’s rule of recognition. I close with remarks on Kelsen’s own conception of the juridico-theoretical problems he faced. (shrink)

The separability thesis claims that the concept of law can be explicated independently of morality, the normativity thesis, that it can be explicated independently of fact. Continental normativism, prominent above all in the work of Hans Kelsen, may be characterized in terms of the coupling of these theses. Like Kelsen, H. L. A. Hart is a proponent of the separability thesis. And–a leitmotiv–both theorists reject reductive legal positivism. They do not, however, reject it for the same reasons. Kelsen's reason, in (...) a word, is the normativity thesis. Hart, however, grounds his theory in social fact. In place of the reductive thesis of the legal positivist tradition, and in sharp contrast to Kelsen's normativity thesis, Hart defends a non‐reductive version of what the author terms the facticity thesis. (shrink)

Despite far‐reaching historical and political differences, and despite legal systems that reflect altogether different traditions, the United States and Austria manifest striking similarities where some aspects of their respective development of constitutional review are concerned. For example, on the constitutional review of federalist issues (competing claims of federal and state law), the review power was there from the beginning in both countries. And both countries developed a power of constitutional review reaching to the enactments of the federal legislature. In a (...) brief sketch of aspects of the early development of constitutional review in both countries, the author looks, in particular, to the kinds of arguments made on behalf of constitutional review in the American and Austrian legal systems. (shrink)

Book reviewed:Adolf Julius Merkl, Gesammelte Schriften.