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Empathy and mirroring : Husserl and Gallese

In Roland Breeur & Ullrich Melle (eds.), Life, Subjectivity, and Art: Essays in honor of Rudolf Bernet. Springer Science+Business Media (2012)

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  1. Intersubjectivity, Mirror Neurons and the Limits of Naturalism.Anthony Longo - 2023 - In Andrej Božič (ed.), Thinking Togetherness: Phenomenology and Sociality. Institute Nova Reijva for the Humanities. pp. 103-116.
    The paper explores the possibilities and limits of naturalizing the experience of intersubjectivity. The existence of mirror neurons illustrates that an experience of intersubjectivity is already present on a more primitive, precognitive, and embodied level. A similar argument had been made in the first half of the twentieth century by phenomenologists, such as Edmund Husserl. This motivated Vittorio Gallese, one of the discoverers of mirror neurons, and other philosophers to connect the functioning of mirror neurons with Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity (...)
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  • The other in perception: a phenomenological account of our experience of other persons.Susan Bredlau - 2018 - Albany: State University of New York Press.
    Demonstrates the unique, pervasive, and overwhelmingly important role of other people within our lived experience. Drawing on the original phenomenological work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Edmund Husserl, Simone de Beauvoir, and John Russon, as well as recent research in child psychology, The Other in Perception argues for perception’s inherently existential significance: we always perceive a world and not just objective facts. The world is the rich domain of our personal and interpersonal lives, and central to this world is the role of (...)
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  • Self and other: from pure ego to co-constituted we.Dan Zahavi - 2015 - Continental Philosophy Review 48 (2):143-160.
    In recent years, the social dimensions of selfhood have been discussed widely. Can you be a self on your own or only together with others? Is selfhood a built-in feature of experience or rather socially constructed? Does a strong emphasis on the first-personal character of consciousness prohibit a satisfactory account of intersubjectivity or is the former rather a necessary requirement for the latter? These questions are explored in the following contribution.
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  • Empathy and Other-Directed Intentionality.Dan Zahavi - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):129-142.
    The article explores and compares the accounts of empathy found in Lipps, Scheler, Stein and Husserl and argues that the three latter phenomenological thinkers offer a model of empathy, which is not only distinctly different from Lipps’, but which also diverge from the currently dominant models.
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  • The phenomenology of empathy: a Steinian emotional account.Fredrik Svenaeus - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):227-245.
    This paper presents a phenomenological account of empathy inspired by the proposal put forward by Edith Stein in her book On the Problem of Empathy, published originally 1917. By way of explicating Stein’s views, the paper aims to present a characterization of empathy that is in some aspects similar to, but yet essentially different from contemporary simulationist theories of empathy. An attempt is made to show that Stein’s proposal articulates the essential ingredients and steps involved in empathy and that her (...)
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  • Timing together, acting together. Phenomenology of intersubjective temporality and social cognition.Marek Pokropski - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):897-909.
    In this article I consider how the problem of social (intersubjective) cognition relates to time-consciousness. In the first part, I briefly introduce Husserl’s account of intersubjective cognition. I discuss the concept of empathy (Einfühlung) and its relation with time-consciousness. I argue that empathy is based on pre-reflective awareness of the other’s harmony of behaviour. In the second part, I distinguish pre-reflective (passive) and reflective (active) empathy and consider recent empirical research in the field of social cognition. I argue that these (...)
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  • Introduction: intersubjectivity and empathy.Rasmus Thybo Jensen & Dermot Moran - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):125-133.
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  • Direct Perception and Simulation: Stein’s Account of Empathy.Monika Dullstein - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):333-350.
    The notion of empathy has been explicated in different ways in the current debate on how to understand others. Whereas defenders of simulation-based approaches claim that empathy involves some kind of isomorphism between the empathizer’s and the target’s mental state, defenders of the phenomenological account vehemently deny this and claim that empathy allows us to directly perceive someone else’s mental states. Although these views are typically presented as being opposed, I argue that at least one version of a simulation-based approach—the (...)
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