On Peter Klein's Concept of Arbitrariness

Metaphilosophy 45 (2):192-200 (2014)

Authors
Coos Engelsma
University of Groningen
Abstract
According to Peter Klein, foundationalism fails because it allows a vicious form of arbitrariness. The present article critically discusses his concept of arbitrariness. It argues that the condition Klein takes to be necessary and sufficient for an epistemic item to be arbitrary is neither necessary nor sufficient. It also argues that Klein's concept of arbitrariness is not a concept of something that is obviously vicious. Even if Klein succeeds in establishing that foundationalism allows what he regards as arbitrariness, this does not yet mean that he confronts it with a sound objection.
Keywords arbitrariness  foundationalism  reasons  Peter Klein  justification
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/meta.12075
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Epistemic Justification.William Alston - 1989 - Cornell University Press.
Believing For a Reason.John Turri - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (3):383-397.
Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.Peter D. Klein - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):297-325.
Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning.Peter Klein - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):1 - 17.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Foundationalism and Arbitrariness.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):18–24.
What's NOT Wrong with Foundationalism.Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):161–165.
Is Klein an Infinitist About Doxastic Justification?Michael Bergmann - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):19 - 24.
Finite Reasons Without Foundations.Ted Poston - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (2):182-191.
On the Regress Argument for Infinitism.John Turri - 2009 - Synthese 166 (1):157 - 163.
Why Not Infinitism?Peter D. Klein - 2000 - Epistemology 5:199-208.
Infinitism Redux? A Response to Klein.Carl Gillett - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):709–717.
The Arbitrariness of the Genetic Code.Ulrich E. Stegmann - 2004 - Biology and Philosophy 19 (2):205-222.
Review: Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of Reasons. [REVIEW]Peter Klein - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):919 - 925.
Infinitism in Epistemology.Peter D. Klein & John Turri - 2013 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-04-03

Total views
174 ( #38,034 of 2,326,071 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
19 ( #34,716 of 2,326,071 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature