L'esperienza del leggerescrivere ci ha guidati oltre i confini della nostra corporeitÀ in una esplorazione che ha riguardato noi stessi e il mondo. Terminato questo esercizio, la pratica dell'ipertestuale ci introduce a un modo di pensare narrativo, sensoriale e ambientale che attraversa le diverse Muse e le unisce nell'idioma col quale ci stiamo confrontando. Dopo il pensiero vettoriale che accumula lettere nelle parole e parole nelle pagine incatenandole in nessi causali, dubiteremo che una ragione abbia mai guidato i nostri passi (...) nei sentieri sempre interrotti del mondo e che una coscienza sia stata la vigile sentinella delle nostre intenzioni? (shrink)

Let M be an o-minimal expansion of an ordered field. Let φ be a formula in the language of ordered domains. In this note we establish some topological properties which are transferred from $\varphi^M$ to $\varphi^R$ and vice versa. Then, we apply these transfer results to give a new proof of a result of M. Edmundo-based on the work of A. Strzebonski-showing the existence of torsion points in any definably compact group defined in an o-minimal expansion of an ordered field.

The present article conceptualizes morally controversial innovations as a category of innovations that raise ethical issues due to their potentially undesirable long-term consequences on society or the natural environment. Then, it analyzes the case of biofuel crops by applying an extended version of the theory of planned behavior, which includes moral norm and ethical self-identity. The obtained results show that attitude and subjective norms are positively related to farmers' intention to grow biofuel crops. Yet the intention of those farmers with (...) a higher ethical self-identity is also influenced by perceived behavioral control and moral norm. In particular, moral norm negatively affects their intention to grow biofuel crops, thus restraining the adoption of this innovation. Implications for theory, as well as for policymakers interested in promoting the diffusion of morally controversial innovations, are discussed. (shrink)

Il saggio prende in esame due punti della teorizzazione di Harry Frankfurt in merito alla moral agency. Il primo è la corretta concettualizzazione del momento della ‘decisione’ all’interno del­­la ca­tena deliberativa. Vengono esaminati tre passaggi critici: a) la base normativa a cui la decisione ri­spon­de; b) la teoria della ‘unificazione della persona’ attraverso la decisione e c) la distinzione fra ‘scelta’ e ‘decisione’. Il secondo punto è l’ambiguità in­sita nel concetto di ‘doveri d’amore’ pro­posto da Frankfurt. A questo pro­posito vengono (...) esaminate: a) la di­stin­zione fra amore ‘attivo’ e ‘passivo’ e b) la mancata tematizzazione della ‘legittimità del­l’a­more’, ovvero del rap­porto fra l’a­more in quanto relazione sociale e i quadri interpretativi del­la cul­tura entro cui si sviluppa.In this paper two aspects of Harry Frankfurt’s theory of moral agency will be examined. First, his conceptualization of the moment of ‘decision’ wi­thin the deliberative chain will be addressed. Three critical junctures will be dis­cussed: a) the normative basis of the actor’s ‘decision’; b) Frankfurt’s view of the ‘unification’ of the person via decision and c) his distinction of ‘choice’ and ‘decision’. The second point addressed is the ambiguity in­herent in Frankfurt’s notion of ‘duties of love’. With regard to this notion, the following points will be discussed: a) the distinction between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ love and b) Frankfurt’s neglect of the dimension of the ‘le­gi­timacy of love’, i.e. of the nexus of love qua social relation and the inter­pre­tive cadres of the culture within which it unfolds. (shrink)

The author proposes a key of interpretation of the post — modern age not as a mere cultural attitude but as an effective philosophical horizon of our time. Two considerations are needed in order to define it: the proclaimed impossibility of a one-way description of reality, and the conviction of the existence of a plurality of conceptual schemes which can not be absolutely reduced one to the other. Therefore postmodernism severely limits the possibility of analysing notions such as liberty, justice (...) and good, which are laden with universalism. After indicating the different possible solutions, the author presents his personal thesis of reflective authenticity: from the kantian notion of reflective judgement, the author traces in authenticity the quality of "being measure for one-selves" or self-congruence typical of arts’ masterpieces. By disengaging this notion from its original aesthetic ambit it is possible, in Ferrara’s opinion, to refer to a pluralistic or exemplar universalism, applicable to ethics as to law, to the political judgement as to the theoretical one, completely different from that generic universalism which is on the contrary based on trans-contextual principles, typical of the modern age. (shrink)

[The judgment view of higher lawmaking; ].

The idea of a ‘true’ account of pluralism is ultimately contradictory. Liberal political philosophers often fell prey to a special version of this fallacy by presupposing that there might be only one correct argument for justifying the acceptance of pluralism as the core of a liberal democratic polity. Avoiding this trap, Rawls’s ‘political liberalism’ has offered a more sophisticated view of reasonable pluralism as linked with the ‘burdens of judgement’. His philosophical agenda, however, left some questions underexplored: What is the (...) relation of pluralism to relativism? How can a conception of pluralism avoid being either one view among others with no special claim to truth, or a foundationalist claim? If pluralism is a fact, in what sense can it bind us? These questions – crucial for grasping the distinctiveness of ‘political’ liberalism – are addressed by revisiting Plato’s simile of the cave, in order to make it accommodate the groundbreaking Rawlsian notion of the ‘r... (shrink)

This article discusses Jürgen Habermas’s latest book Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie from the specific angle of what the section on Rawls indicates about the overall philosophical project pursued by Habermas. This tiny element within the imposing architecture reveals a structural problem that affects Habermas’s program for a detranscendentalization of reason. After a general premise, Habermas’s appraisal of Rawls’s work is reconstructed and critically examined. Then, in the guise of a Rawlsian rejoinder, a problematic understanding of pluralism is shown to (...) undergird Habermas’s overlooking of the ground-breaking potential of the normativity of ‘the reasonable’ and ‘the most reasonable’. Finally, this neglect is argued to be indicative of a deeper lacuna: namely, a missing confrontation with Wittgenstein’s rival path to a postmetaphysical, intersubjective, detranscentendalized reason. That lacuna, finally, invites a closer scrutiny of the overall genealogical picture and its central opposition between two pathways to the postmetaphysicization of reason. (shrink)

This article discusses Jürgen Habermas’s latest book Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie from the specific angle of what the section on Rawls indicates about the overall philosophical project pursued by Habermas. This tiny element within the imposing architecture reveals a structural problem that affects Habermas’s program for a detranscendentalization of reason. After a general premise, Habermas’s appraisal of Rawls’s work is reconstructed and critically examined. Then, in the guise of a Rawlsian rejoinder, a problematic understanding of pluralism is shown to (...) undergird Habermas’s overlooking of the ground-breaking potential of the normativity of ‘the reasonable’ and ‘the most reasonable’. Finally, this neglect is argued to be indicative of a deeper lacuna: namely, a missing confrontation with Wittgenstein’s rival path to a postmetaphysical, intersubjective, detranscentendalized reason. That lacuna, finally, invites a closer scrutiny of the overall genealogical picture and its central opposition between two pathways to the postmetaphysicization of reason. (shrink)

This article discusses Jürgen Habermas’s latest book Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie from the specific angle of what the section on Rawls indicates about the overall philosophical project pursued by Habermas. This tiny element within the imposing architecture reveals a structural problem that affects Habermas’s program for a detranscendentalization of reason. After a general premise, Habermas’s appraisal of Rawls’s work is reconstructed and critically examined. Then, in the guise of a Rawlsian rejoinder, a problematic understanding of pluralism is shown to (...) undergird Habermas’s overlooking of the ground-breaking potential of the normativity of ‘the reasonable’ and ‘the most reasonable’. Finally, this neglect is argued to be indicative of a deeper lacuna: namely, a missing confrontation with Wittgenstein’s rival path to a postmetaphysical, intersubjective, detranscentendalized reason. That lacuna, finally, invites a closer scrutiny of the overall genealogical picture and its central opposition between two pathways to the postmetaphysicization of reason. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyse the concepts used by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in their elaboration of the notions of plane of immanence and processes of subjectification, which are connected through a complex interrelationship. More specifically, the essay proposes to cross the concept of ‘diagram’, which Deleuze inherited from the thought of Michel Foucault, with the concept of a life, singular and impersonal. To this end, an argument is made for a concept that can be called (...) the virtual body, where this is understood as something other than a biological or social body, even if this difference remains inscribed within them. Since by virtual body what is intended is not something that someone is – which means it isn’t a essence – but something that someone ‘owns’, it can also be used to think the subject outside the limits of ontology. (shrink)

Die erste, noch unveröffentlichte, Vorlesung über die Transzendentale Logik wurde von Fichte in Berlin während des SS 1812 gelesen.

"Philosophie et non-philosophie du poétique" indique une double attitude de la philosophie française contemporaine : pour maîtriser la pensée, elle revient sur soi, mais elle peut aussi ne pas participer à ce mouvement. Le "poétique", objet de l'attitude, implique alors le "poétique" et le "non-poétique", deux usages des expériences fondamentales du langage. La première expérience est la surdétermination du langage qui se rapporte à la pensée de la maîtrise. La deuxième est l'expérience de l'immanence du langage à soi sans retour (...) possible de la pensée. En passant par le poétique, la première attitude vise à la maîtrise de l'immanence. En passant par le non-poétique, la deuxième attitude remet en discussion la maîtrise de l'immanence par la notion d'une naïveté radicale et par la théorie du poétique. Nous parvenons ainsi à la distinction entre la pensée qui met l'immanence en discussion – la philosophie – et la pensée qui part de l'impossibilité de cette mise en discussion – la non-philosophie. (shrink)

The present paper proposes to establish the data that can be drawn securely from a controversial testimonium on an oration of Cato contained in a late antique panegyric.13.3), and to illustrate some of its textual and exegetical problems. Further, in the light of a hitherto overlooked comparison with a gloss of Festus, proposals are made: for a new constitutio and interpretation of the text of the panegyric; and for the identification of a textual citation from the orations of Cato the (...) Censor, and the identification with Cato of the anonymous antiqui to whom Festus attributes the use of the rare substantive oliueta in feminine singular with the sense of ‘gathering of olives’. Finally some considerations are offered on the possible sources used by Festus and by the panegyrist. (shrink)

Im Aufsatz wird auf die Rolle der drei pseudo-ulpianischen Regeln eingegangen, die in der Rechtslehre bei der „Allgemeinen Einteilung der Rechtspflichten“ auftauchen und verschiedene Probleme aufwerfen. Bisher wurden wenige Versuche einer genauen Definition und einer Beantwortung dieser Probleme unternommen. Dabei stellen diese Regeln einen wichtigen Schlüssel zum besseren Verständnis der ganzen Rechtslehre dar. Ihr systematischer Stellenwert bildet das Hauptthema dieser Abhandlung.

Este artigo pretende fazer algumas considerações preliminares e programáticas sobre a questão da cooperação entre filosofia política e ciências sociais empíricas; oferecer uma estratégia para chegar a uma definição de pobreza que independa de dados quantitativos específicos, embora aponte para a importância deles ; apontar para a necessidade de ouvir a voz dos pobres; mostrar as razões da exclusão política dos pobres. Obviamente não se pretende discutir tudo isso de forma exaustiva, mas somente indicar possíveis caminhos a serem explorados.The present (...) paper aims at presenting some preliminary and programmatic considerations on the question of the cooperation between political philosophy and empirical social sciences; offering a strategy to reach a definition of poverty that does not depend on specific quantitative data, while it recognizes their importance ; pointing at the necessity to hear the voice of the poor; showing the reasons for the political exclusion of the poor. Of course all this shall not be discussed in an exhaustive form, but only with the intention of indicating possible paths to be explored. (shrink)

The paper starts from an expression used by Kant in the Doctrine of Right: Beati possidentes. It then discusses Kant’s arguments for justifying the possession of land by individuals and by political community. Its main hypothesis is the following: If we consider unacceptable the application of the Beati possidentes principle on a global level, then we have a good reason to reject it also on the domestic level. It reaches this conclusion not by pointing out the undesirable consequences of the (...) principle, for this would be an empirical argument resulting from a consequentialist approach. Rather, it chooses a procedimental approach, showing that the way in which land was initially distributed was neither rightful on the domestic nor on the global level. (shrink)