The author explores whether Catholic hospitals should be required by law to perform augmentation mammaplasty on male-to-female transsexuals. The case involves a male-to-female transsexual who presented at a Catholic hospital for breast augmentation surgery. The hospital refused and was sued on the basis of aviolation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. The hospital formulated a policy on how to deal with such cases in the future. It determined that the same standards thatapply to any woman be applied here, since the (...) mammaplasty was not part of the actual transgender surgery. The author argues that augmentation mammaplastyis part of the transgendering process and illicit for a Catholic hospital to perform. Legislation protecting Catholic hospitals from having to perform abortions shouldbe expanded to include transsexual reassignment surgery in all of its stages. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 9.3 (Autumn 2009): 453–458. (shrink)

The question of whether it is permissible to deactivate a pacemaker at the end of life has been addressed in medical journals but rarely in ethics journals. The ethics of pacemaker deactivation is especially challenging because of the disparate ways the devices are viewed by both medical professionals and patients. Some consider pacemakers replacement therapy, and some consider them substitutive therapy. If they are the former, then deactivation would not be permitted, since a replacement device is considered a part of (...) the body, akin to a new heart. Some ask whether pacemakers are natural or artificial; if pacemakers are artificial, deactivation would be permissible. Another factor is whether a patient is pacemaker dependent. Some medical experts decide the issue of deactivation on the basis of patient autonomy. Others weigh in on whether pacemakers are ordinary or extraordinary means of care. This paper examines each proposal and concludes tentatively that pacemaker deactivation is not permissible at the end of life. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 15.1 : 39–51. (shrink)

Body identity integrity disorder is experienced by a small percentage of the population, whose idea of how they should look does not match their actual physical form. The most common manifestation of BIID is the desire to have a specific limb amputated. In a small number of cases, the desire is not for the removal of a limb, but to be blind or paralyzed. There has been a lot of discussion regarding the possible physiological, neurological, or psychological etiologies of BIID. (...) This paper examines the ethical implications of the different approaches to help those with BIID. These approaches and the dilemma that doctors face in cases of BIID are the subject of the final section, which offers some tentative ethical conclusions regarding this disturbing disorder. (shrink)

The purpose of the Instruction Dignitas personae, issued by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, is not only to reaffirm the validity of the teaching laid out in Donum vitae (1987), with regard to both the principles on which it is based and the moral evaluations which it expresses, but to add needed clarification on reproductive technologies in the light of more recent developments. In addition to the reproductive technologies discussed in Dignitas personae, namely, homologous and heterologous artificial (...) insemination, in vitro fertilization, and intracytoplasmic sperm injection, the author also discusses other reproductive technologies, not covered by the Instruction, such as gamete intrafallopian transfer, zygote intrafallopian transfer, tubal embryo transfer, and pronuclear-stage embryo transfer. After analyzing each of these the author offers a general ethical evaluation. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10.1 (Spring 2010): 51–59. (shrink)

El artículo trata del papel hermenéutico de Hch 9,4 en las enarrationes agustinianas, señalando que, por el lugar y función de esta obra, ese texto bíblico es una herramienta hermenéutica útil para entender toda la exposición agustiniana de los salmos.

This is a response to criticism by Rev. Martin Rhonheimer of a critique by Rev. Benedict Guevin of Rhonheimer’s book Vital Conflicts. Rhonheimer insists that Guevin both misunderstood and misrepresented his action theory. Rhonheimer claims that his understanding of “direct” versus “indirect” killing, as well his use of “intention” finds its warrant in the writings of Popes John Paul II and Pius XII. Having examined Rhonheimer’s magisterial sources in detail, Guevin concludes that Rhonheimer’s claim that the object of the moral (...) act is found essentially in the “intention,” that is, in what one intends to do by what one is doing, is baseless. Such a claim is idiosyncratic. The writings of John Paul II and Pius XII are clearly at odds with both Rhonheimer’s analysis and his conclusions. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.4 (Winter 2011): 679–688. (shrink)

In his book Vital Conflicts in Medical Ethics: A Virtue Approach to Craniotomy and Tubal Pregnancies, Martin Rhonheimer offers a virtue approach to vital conflicts in medical ethics. These vital conflicts are those medical situations involving pregnancy in which, if nothing is done, both the mother and her child will die. When analyzed by means of his understanding of the virtue of justice, Rhonheimer concludes that the so-called direct killing of children in the womb or in the fallopian tube is (...) permissible since the child’s death is neither a means to saving the mother’s life nor an end sought for itself and is, therefore, not unjust. Because such a death is not unjust, it is also not a moral evil since only an unjust death can be called a moral evil. The author offers a critique of both his understanding of justice and what constitutes the “object” of the moral act. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10.3 : 471–480. (shrink)