Josh is a typical 27-year-old in a career that he enjoys and a successful marriage. Josh begins to exhibit the symptoms of a manic episode. He is soon diagnosed with bipolar disorder. While non-manic, Josh’s preferences are typical. While manic, his preferences change dramatically. He quits his job, cheats on his partner, and squanders his savings. These are behaviors that Josh, when non-manic (euthymic), would never agree to. When Josh returns to a euthymic state, he regrets these decisions. Should those (...) close to Josh have prevented him from making these decisions, or does his competence to decide persist despite his acute mania? In this paper, I examine the connections be-tween bipolar disorder and consent. I defend the view that many (although far from all) individuals with bipolar disorder are competent to consent to a wide variety of things when they are in a manic state. This means that mania should not be presumed to undermine competence in clinical settings. -/- I have several goals in this paper. I want to bring philosophy to bear on the connection between consent and bipolar disorder. Additionally, I intend this paper to contribute to the general debate about the conditions of informed consent. Bipolar disorder presents novel challenges to existing conceptions of competence to consent which require stable core of values for an agent to be competent. For example, Buchanan and Brock endorse such a view. In showing that shifting values do not undermine the competence of a person experiencing acute mania, I show that the aforementioned views of competence are false. Overall, this paper makes substantive contributions to the debate about competence to consent and presents the first sustained philosophical treatment of consent among people with bipolar disorder. (shrink)

The menopause transition is associated with an increased risk of depressed mood. Preliminary evidence suggests that increased sensitivity to psychosocial stress, triggered by exaggerated perimenopausal estradiol fluctuation, may play a role. However, accurately quantifying estradiol fluctuation while minimizing participant burden has posed a methodological challenge in the field. The current pilot project aimed to test the feasibility of capturing perimenopausal estradiol fluctuation via 12 weekly measurements of estrone-3-glucuronide (E1G), a urinary metabolite of estradiol, using participant-collected urine samples in 15 euthymic (...) perimenopausal women ages 45-55 years. Furthermore, it aimed to correlate E1G fluctuation (standard deviation across the 12 E1G measurements) with weekly mood and cardiovascular, salivary cortisol, and subjective emotional responses to the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST) at weeks 4, 8 and 12. Protocol acceptability and adherence was high; furthermore, E1G fluctuation was positively associated with anhedonic depressive symptoms and weekly negative affect. E1G fluctuation was also associated with increased heart rate throughout the TSST as well as higher levels of rejection, anger, and sadness. E1G fluctuation was not significantly associated with TSST blood pressure or cortisol levels. This study suggests a feasible method of assessing estradiol fluctuation in the menopause transition and provides support for the hypothesis that perimenopausal estradiol fluctuation increases sensitivity to psychosocial stress and vulnerability to depressed mood. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Bad, the Ugly, and the Need for a Position by PsychiatryLloyd A. Wells (bio)Keywordsvice, psychiatric education, psychiatry-law interface, medicalizationSadler’s paper is thought provoking and will resonate with many psychiatrists who deal with the interface of vice and psychiatric syndromes. This interface and the dilemmas it poses are perhaps most discussed by residents, who are dealing with the issue for the first time and who often debate what is (...) “psychiatric” about these cases. Many residents have their own informal systems of classifying vice, often with a divide between the criminal population and those perceived as avoiding work and responsibility. These unofficial classifications are usually judgmental and often pejorative, but the residents rarely get much help from faculty in this area. Indeed, many of the faculty have equally judgmental and pejorative views, which are neither systematized nor subject to systematic analysis.By clarifying the importance of the issue of the vice–mental disorder relationship (VMDR) to psychiatry, Sadler may move this topic to one that receives Socratic discourse in our training programs and serious consideration in the training of psychiatrists rather than an idiosyncratic lumping of these patients into the broad category of “patients I don’t like.”Sadler asks for comments in several categories: historical intractability, goals of psychiatry, taxonomy, implications for the criminal justice system, implications for the law, and ethical/political implications.Issues of historical intractability are long standing. In A Tour of the Whole Island of Great Britain, written in the early eighteenth century, Daniel Defoe (1724–1727) describes many asylums, often with the comment, “as it is a madhouse, so is it also a house of correction.” Some of the great public hospitals of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were built at least as much to get antisocial and homeless people off the streets as to provide care for the mentally ill. The moral treatment of France and Great Britain, which added much to the practice of psychiatry, clearly had punitive “treatments” for patients with vice-laden behaviors, and this was very explicit in the American moral model of treatment of the late nineteenth century with its obsessive need to prevent patients from masturbating. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there was great debate about the inclusion of Pritchard’s “moral insanity”—now sanitized into “personality disorders”—into the psychiatric domain, and Kraepelin referred to this group as “enemies of society.”Sadler next asks us to consider the goals of psychiatry in regard to “a proper VMDR.” He wonders [End Page 43] whether a strict medicalization account can be defended. I think it is clear from a large literature and from clinical experience that it cannot be defended —now. But it may become defensible in this century, which will pose enormous challenges to psychiatry, lawmakers, and the courts (vide infra). A strict moralization model is defended by many in society, including some psychiatrists, but has severe limitations and seems illogical. It is hard to make a case (though juries have done so) that, for example, a very delusional young woman with postpartum psychosis who murders her children because of the belief that far worse things than death will happen to them imminently if they live, fits the moralization approach. The Dahmer case is especially instructive. Although there was enormous “vice” (and perhaps “evil”), it is hard to make a case that a sane man would make temples out of the body parts of victims and would attempt to commune with the dead through them.He wonders whether a “mixed” version of medicalization/moralization can be developed and defended. I would argue for both a mixed approach and a “shared” approach. A middle adolescent with bipolar disorder burned his house to the ground. (Fortunately, he and family members were injured but not killed.) He was wildly manic at the time and set the fire because he wanted to prove that he was immortal and totally impervious to flames. He was delusional, extraordinarily impulsive, and completely without judgment, and it would be extraordinarily difficult to exclude the medical frame in any consideration of the vice involved. The vice, indeed, may be more involved in his decision while euthymic to stop taking... (shrink)

The current study verified the association between cognitive process such as attention, executive functioning, and legal capacity in patients with bipolar disorder. The sample consisted of 72 participants, assorted to episodic patients, euthymic patients, and healthy controls. We used the following neuropsychological measures: subtests of the Wechsler Abbreviated Intelligence Scale : vocabulary and matrix reasoning; Continuous Performance Test ; Five Digit Test ; and Rey–Osterrieth Complex Figure. Euthymic patients expressed slower processing speed compared to HC. They tended to make more (...) errors with slightly worse discrimination, suggesting more impulsiveness. On the contrary, episodic patients showed worse discrimination, committed more omissions, were more inconsistent with regard to response speed, showed more difficulties in organizing their actions, and were more rigid. The results suggest that bipolar patients in episode express more cognitive impairments that can compromise the quality of legal capacity. These results highlight the need for more protective support for episodic BD patients regarding legal capacity. (shrink)