In this article I address the issue of the ontological conditions of possibility for a naturalistic notion of emergence, trying to determine its fundamental differences from the atomist, vitalist, preformationist and potentialist alternatives. I will argue that a naturalistic notion of ontological emergence can only succeed if we explicitly refuse the atomistic fundamental ontological postulate that asserts that every entity is endowed with a set of absolutely intrinsic properties, being qualitatively immutable through its extrinsic relations. Furthermore, it will be shown (...) that, ironically enough, this metaphysical assumption is implicitly shared by all the above mentioned alternatives to Emergentism. The current article concludes that the notion of organization by itself is not enough, and that ontological emergence can only be justified by assuming a relational ontological perspective that, in opposition both to atomism and holism, defends that the existence-conditions, the identity and the causal behavior of any emergent systemic property can only be conceived, and explained, as constructed by and through specific networks of qualitatively transformative relational processes that occur between the system’s components and between the system and its environment. Additionally, I try to explain how one can make sense of the idea that an emergent phenomenon is both dependent on, and autonomous from, its emergence base. (shrink)

Downward causation exercised by emergent properties of wholes upon their lower-level constituents’ properties has been accused of conceptual and metaphysical incoherence. Only upward causation is usually peacefully accepted. The aim of this paper is to criticize and refuse the traditional hierarchical-vertical way of conceiving both types of causation, although preserving their deepest ontological significance, as well as the widespread acceptance of the traditional atomistic-combinatorial view of the entities and the relations that constitute the so-called ‘emergence base’. Assuming those two perspectives (...) with no reserves, we are condemned to confine our debate to the question of whether reified wholes can have the power to downwardly change or influence their lower-level parts, a question which seems profoundly misleading to me. I therefore propose an alternative relational ontological view, assuming a straightforward horizontal and intra-level way of representing those putative cases of cross-level causation. I finally confront two recent replies to Kim’s well-known objections to DC—Craver and Bechtel and Kistler :595–609, 2009)—, emphasizing their global positive approaches, as well as the reasons why their accounts still seem insufficient to me. I conclude arguing that both Kim’s principle of the causal closure of the physical domain and its allegation of an overdetermination in cases of DC can be surpassed by the new relational ontological perspective presented here. (shrink)

One of the foundational problems of biochemistry concerns the conceptualisation of the relationship between the composition, structure and function of macromolecules like proteins. Part of the recent philosophical literature displays a reductionist bias, that is, the endorsement of a form of microstructuralism mirroring an out-dated biochemical conceptualisation. We shall argue that such microstructuralist approaches are ultimately committed to a potentialist form of micro-predeterminism whereby the macrostructure and function of proteins is accounted for solely in terms of the intrinsic properties and (...) potentialities of the components of the primary structure as if they were self-contained or essentially immutable entities. We shall instead suggest that a conceptualisation of the relationship between proteins’ composition, structure and function consistent with contemporary biochemical practice should account also for the causal role of the cellular, organismal and environmental relations in protein development. The analysis of the folding process we propose suggests that microstructure-laden reductionist approaches are ontologically indefensible. Rather than a potentialist form of micro-predeterminism, our analysis ultimately supports a relational-construction-based view of protein development and potentialities formation, which requires an indispensable analysis of the dynamical interplay between the micro-level of the parts and the macro-level of the relational structures of their systems. (shrink)

This paper proposes an integrated-structure notion of interlevel emergence, from a dynamic relational ontological perspective. First, I will argue that only the individualist essentialism of atomistic metaphysics can block the possibility of interlevel emergence. Then I will show that we can make sense of emergence by recognizing the formation of structures of transformative and interdependent causal relations in the generation and development of a particular class of mereological complexes called integrated systems. Finally, I shall argue that even though the emergent (...) structural attributes of such systems are not micro-determined nor micro-reducible, they can still be accounted for by an interlevel integrative neo-mechanistic form of explanation. (shrink)

Some relevant distinctions between the notions of complexity, non-linearity, self-organization and emergence are addressed.

While ontic structural realism (OSR) has been a central topic in contemporary philosophy of science, the relation between OSR and the concept of emergence has received little attention. We will argue that OSR is fully compatible with emergentism. The denial of ontological emergence requires additional assumptions that, strictly speaking, go beyond OSR. We call these _physicalist closure assumptions._ We will explain these assumptions and show that they are independent of the central commitments of OSR and inconsistent with its core goals. (...) Recognizing the compatibility of OSR and ontological emergence may contribute to the solution of ontological puzzles in physics while offering new ways to achieve the goals that advocates of OSR set for their view. (shrink)

The present selection of papers constitutes the second special issue dedicated to the “Lisbon International Conference: Philosophy of Science in the 21st Century—Challenges and Tasks”, which took place in 2013 in Lisbon’s renowned Center for Philosophy of Science of Lisbon University between December 4th and 6th.

1. History 2. The Rebirth of Emergentism 3. Emergence Theory and the Possible 4. Forms of Predeterminism and Their Alternatives. -/- Keywords: Emergence · Reduction · Explanation · Microdeterminism · Predeterminism · Downward causation · Causal powers · Possibility.

Este artigo visa construir uma relação direta entre Aristóteles e Platão, no que respeita à sua Retórica e à primeira parte do Górgias de Platão. Este Diálogo de Platão forneceu um aspecto fundamental e relevante: a retórica tem uma relação com o que é justo e injusto e pode ser usada com justiça se o orador for justo. Mas no Diálogo, Platão revela pela boca de Sócrates certo ceticismo frente a esta possibilidade da retórica. Mas seria possível ver, que Aristóteles (...) tentou demonstrar em sua Retórica um caminho para a realização desta possibilidade? Este artigo diz sim a esta questão, e procura mostrar que Aristóteles estabeleceu as condições para esta realização. (shrink)

O tradicional problema do conhecimento do singular mantém-se hoje em dia: o impasse assinalado por Aristóteles prevalece na maioria das ciências actuais que lidam precisamente com casos particulares, contingentes, imprevisíveis, que escapam ao enquadramento nos modelos categoriais. Este Colóquio sobre O Estatuto do Singular constituiu um desafio para todos aqueles que em diversas áreas filosóficas e científicas se enfrentam com a necessidade de repensar modelos e estratégias aplicáveis ao caso prático, à decisão, à acção, à inovação, à invenção; noções como (...) o incerto, o provável, o casual, o frequente, o diferente, o imprevisível - exigem um novo modo de pensar e uma revisão das formas típicas da racionalidade. O tópico convocou, além da filosofia, uma ampla gama de domínios: desde as ciências e artes médicas, a biologia, até ao direito e às ciências humanas e sociais, passando também pela literatura e a arte. O que se pretendeu foi apresentar uma sinopse de diferentes olhares e perspectivas sobre um ponto de mira comum: «o estatuto do singular» foi o leit motiv para abrir um horizonte de pensamento e de diálogo profícuo e abrangente. (shrink)

In the present article, I propose to give a positive characterization of ontological emergence from a relational perspective that, in opposition both to atomism and to holism, defends that the existence-conditions, the identity and the behavior or causal role of any emergent entity are to be conceived, and explained, as constructed by diverse systems of qualitatively transformative relations. I argue that from this relational perspective, the notion of emergence can be seen as ontologically and epistemologically coherent and significant. Finally, I (...) try to show in what sense, and to what extent, the Nonlinear Quantum Physics, as developed by Croca and his team, expresses such a relational and emergentist view of physical reality. (shrink)

Este artigo tem por objetivo identificar e discutir alguns encontros e desencontros existentes entre a epistemologia qualitativa, a fenomenologia e a pesquisa-ação, no que diz respeito à natureza, aos objetivos e procedimentos adotados. Nesse sentido, realizamos uma revisão teórica para identificar as características comuns e divergentes entre as categorias de pesquisa investigadas. Para tanto, buscamos as contribuições teóricas de González Rey acerca da teoria da subjetividade e de sua epistemologia qualitativa, de Moreira e seus estudos sobre a fenomenologia e, por (...) fim, de Thiollent, que apresenta as principais características da pesquisa-ação. (shrink)

In this article we analyse the issue of what accounts for developmental potential, i.e., the possible phenotypes a developing organism can manifest during ontogeny. We shall argue in favour of two theses. First, although the developing organism is the unit of development, the complete causal basis for its potential to develop does neither lie entirely in itself as a whole nor in any specific part of itself (such as its genome). Thus, the extra-organismal environment must be counted as one of (...) the three necessary, partial and complementary causal bases for development potential. Secondly, we shall defend a constructivist view of the developmental process. If the genome, the developing organism and the extra-organismal environment are to be counted as proper elements of the causal basis for an organism’s developmental potential, the latter is not a given. Rather, it is the result of an interaction-based construction, a process sometimes generating genuine developmental novelty. We will thus argue for an interactionist multi-causal basis view of developmental potential construction. We contend that our view provides a biologically tenable and metaphysically coherent account of developmental dynamics. (shrink)