In scholarship on the history of philosophy, it is widely assumed that Charles Fourier was a utopian socialist who could not have exerted a significant influence on the development of Karl Marx's thought. Indeed, both Marx and Engels seem to have advanced this view. In contrast, I argue that in 1844 when Marx was developing his anthropology and social critique, he relied upon Fourier's thought to supply a key assumption. After establishing this connection, I explain why Marx's tacit reliance on (...) Fourier creates a problematic undercurrent in his thought. (shrink)

The aim of the present study is (1) to show, on the basis of a number of unpublished documents, how Heinrich Scholz supported his Warsaw colleague Jan ?ukasiewicz, the Polish logician, during World War II, and (2) to discuss the efforts he made in order to enable Jan ?ukasiewicz and his wife Regina to move from Warsaw to Münster under life-threatening circumstances. In the first section, we explain how Scholz provided financial help to ?ukasiewicz, and we also adduce evidence of (...) the risks incurred by German scholars who offered assistance to their Polish colleagues. In the second section, we discuss the dramatic circumstances surrounding the ?ukasiewiczes' move to Münster in the summer of 1944. (shrink)

The 2013 Rostock Symposium on Systems Biology and Bioinformatics in Aging Research was again dedicated to dissecting the aging process using in silico means. A particular focus was on ontologies, as these are a key technology to systematically integrate heterogeneous information about the aging process. Related topics were databases and data integration. Other talks tackled modeling issues and applications, the latter including talks focussed on marker development and cellular stress as well as on diseases, in particular on diseases of kidney (...) and skin. (shrink)

Die Frage, ob ein Grundeinkommen für jede Bürgerin und jeden Bürger eine gerechte Institution ist, wird unter Philosophen seit gut 20 Jahren verstärkt diskutiert. Zur Begründung der Institution des Grundeinkommens wird von vielen Denkern eine Überlegung geltend gemacht, die von links-libertären Philosophen entwickelt wurde. Sie beruht auf der Annahme, dass von Natur aus gegebene Dinge und Ressourcen ursprünglich das gemeinsame Eigentum aller Menschen sind und dass private Aneigner derartiger Dinge und Ressourcen deshalb aus Gerechtigkeitsgründen gegenüber den anderen Menschen zur Zahlung (...) einer Entschädigung verpflichtet sind, deren Höhe dem ökonomischen Wert der von ihnen angeeigneten Güter entspricht. In der vorliegenden Untersuchung wird gezeigt, dass diese Begründung des Grundeinkommens auch dann nicht überzeugen kann, wenn man die eigentumstheoretischen Grundannahmen des Links-Libertarismus akzeptiert. Hierfür sind werttheoretische Defizite verantwortlich, die es fraglich erscheinen lassen, ob sich die Größe des ökonomischen Werts der von Natur aus gegebenen Dinge und Ressourcen im Rahmen der links-libertären Philosophie überhaupt überzeugend bestimmen lässt. For a good twenty years now, philosophers have been increasingly discussing whether or not a basic income for every citizen is a just institution. Some of these thinkers ground the institution of basic income on a notion that was developed by left-libertarian philosophers. This notion is based on the claims that things and resources that are naturally given are originally the common possession of all of mankind and that, out of reasons of justice, whoever privately appropriates such things or resources is therefore liable to paying compensation of an amount corresponding to the economic value of the appropriated items. The aim of the present study is to show that even if one accepts the basic assumptions made by left-libertarians about property rights, the above justification of basic income does not hold. This is due to deficits in the theory of value, which render it questionable whether the magnitude of the economic worth of things and resources given in nature can ever be convincingly determined within the framework of left-libertarianism. (shrink)

The way in which we produce and consume energy has profound implications for our societies. How we configure our energy systems determines not only our chances of successfully dealing with climate change but also, how benefits and burdens of these systems are distributed. In this paper, we set out to map the literature on conflicts related to the energy system in Sweden using a framework of energy justice. The purpose of this exercise is twofold: first, to identify and understand energy (...) conflicts in Sweden through the research that is published; and second, to identify gaps in the literature on energy justice in Sweden. This systematic review builds upon 40 scholarly articles focusing on energy conflicts in Sweden. All articles were written in the time period from January 2010 to January 2021. All articles were published in English in peer-reviewed scientific journals. The papers were analysed using a framework for energy justice that focused on the elements of distributional and procedural justice and recognition justice. The findings of the review suggest that there has been little explicit focus on energy justice in the literature on Sweden's energy system. Issues of distributional justice are most raised and procedural and recognition justice are often conflated in research. While conflicts over hydropower and nuclear have dominated in the past, wind energy in Sami territory is most problematised in the reviewed literature. The understanding of justice in the Swedish energy system is currently missing two elements: a rigorous handling of ecologically unequal exchange and restorative justice. (shrink)

Für die zeitgenössische Philosophie ist das Vererben ein Vermögenstransfer, der unter Gesichtspunkten sozialer Gerechtigkeit zu behandeln ist. Diese Untersuchungsperspektive ist angesichts der massiven Verteilungseffekte, die das Vererben zeitigt, ohne Frage sehr wichtig. Allerdings lässt sie einen Punkt unberücksichtigt: Das testamentarische Vererben kann wichtige Beiträge dazu leisten, dass wir Verstorbene, denen wir zu Lebzeiten nahestanden, in Erinnerung behalten und wertschätzen. Hierbei ist der monetäre Wert der vererbten Güter nicht entscheidend. Wie ich in meinem Aufsatz darlege, lässt sich mit diesem Befund erklären, (...) warum die (von einer wachsenden Zahl von Gerechtigkeitstheoretikerinnen und -theoretikern geforderte) Abschaffung des Rechts zu vererben nicht nur von Vorteil sein würde, sondern auch mit ethischen Kosten verbunden wäre. Ein adäquater philosophischer Diskurs hätte diesen Befund (mit dem sich neoliberale oder rechtslibertaristische erbrechtliche Positionen nicht rechtfertigen lassen) angemessen zu berücksichtigen. (shrink)