A partir del concepto de hospitalidad propuesto por el filósofo francés Jacques Derrida, este ensayo pretende definir los rasgos más significativos de La cresta de Ilión (Tusquets, 2002), de la escritora mexicana Cristina Rivera Garza; novela recientemente reeditada (Random House, 2018) y que resulta pieza fundamental de su narrativa, ya que desde allí se irradiarán muchos asuntos singulares para sus obras posteriores. Si en Nadie me verá llorar (1999), primera novela de Rivera Garza, buena parte de las acciones acontecían (...) en un recinto «hospitalario», La cresta de Ilión parece presentar cierta continuidad, al menos en lo que se refiere a los espacios de desenvolvimiento de la trama y a los personajes masculinos abrumados, pero el efecto performativo sobre la prosa misma de Rivera Garza se verá completamente transformado. Por lo tanto, en diálogo y en polémica con esa crítica literaria anterior que ha trabajado este libro, se estudiará de qué manera un espacio literario recibe, de forma problemática, trazas de otros discursos, pensando este procedimiento de un modo alternativo al «intertexto», concepto que ya parece insuficiente para determinar el articulado de novelas como ésta. (shrink)

En la Antigüedad, ante los logros y hechos extraordinarios de una persona, especialmente si en la época no podían tener más explicación que la intervención sobrenatural, la comunidad encontraba una rápida vía aclaratoria en la atribución a una influencia demoníaca, a una traición a Dios cuyo responsable se afanaba en ocultar: a la persona de éxito se le relacionaba con el diablo a través de un pacto formal, de una hipoteca sobre la salvación de su alma que rubricaba como parte (...) interesada a cambio de un inmenso poder. Por su parte, y como parte contratante, Lucifer obraba de buena fe y de acuerdo a la relación contractual, a cambio de que la persona le cediera su alma, le confería un poder sobrenatural. (shrink)

Las teorías posmodernas no son tan originales como sus seguidores lo presumen. El escepticismo clásico de la era helenística constituye el más interesante precursor del posmodernismo a causa de su inexorable relativismo y, paradójicamente, por su propensión al oportunismo ideológico y el conservatismo político. Los antiguos escépticos y los posmodernos contemporáneos han solido ser gentes desilusionadas con las doctrinas revolucionarias y los sistemas filosóficos de supuesta validez universal. De allí han evolucionado una muy razonable tendencia antidogmática y algunas técnicas para (...) desintegrar las bien urdidas construcciones teoréticas, pero también han procedido a partir de un principio dogmático: si todo conocimiento, percepciones y proposiciones son relativas e inciertas, esta misma sentencia es por lo tanto incierta, y abre la posibilidad de un conocimiento relativamente cierto. En la esfera política, el principio de ?todo vale? se vuelve un lema conservador: si todas las opciones son tan buenas o tan malas como cualquier otra, uno tiene a regirse por el orden existente como el mal menor. (shrink)

Los materiales producidos por entidades ligadas a la salud de las infancias como la OMS, UNICEF o la OPS tienden a enumerar argumentos en contra de las tecnologías, desde los que se desalienta el “uso”, la “exposición” o el “consumo” de pantallas por parte de niñas y niños. Los diseños curriculares para la educación inicial, al contrario, se refieren a las tecnologías como parte de los saberes a enseñar, como oportunidades para la innovación, potenciales recursos para la enseñanza o incluso (...) como rasgos de las llamadas nuevas infancias. En este artículo procuraremos analizar los escenarios de encuentro entre infancias y tecnologías que surgen de ambas fuentes, sobre la hipótesis de que consideran escenarios muy diferentes: no hablan de las mismas tecnologías ni de las mismas infancias. La producción se inscribe en un estudio en curso de la Universidad Pedagógica Nacional, titulado “Infancias, tecnologías digitales y escuela: un análisis desde la educación infantil”. (shrink)

O objetivo deste texto é analisar os argumentos de Jean-François Lyotard a respeito do filosofar enquanto transformação na obra intitulada Por que filosofar? Lyotard publicou esse livro em 1989, constituído por quatro conferências proferidas em 1964 intituladas i. Por que desejar?, ii. Filosofia e Origem; iii. Sobre a palavra filosófica e iv. Sobre filosofia e ação, durante a fase em que foi marxista crítico nos anos 60 e 70. Em 1986 Lyotard afirma que foi atacado injustamente por ter mudado sua (...) posição política a partir da publicação de 1971, a qual marca a ruptura em sua obra, intitulada Discurso, Figura, onde analisa o que é a figura e o que é o figural/figurativo. (shrink)

Las ideas filosóficas del ámbito de la actividad física suelen estar sustentadas en concepciones que trascienden la propia disciplina de estudio aludida, de modo que es importante estudiarlas en profundidad. Este ensayo tiene por objetivo comprender la interpretación de los términos movimiento humano y motricidad humana desde la mirada de tres corrientes filosóficas que han sido utilizadas por referentes de la actividad física, el deporte y la Educación Física. La primera corriente filosófica analizada es la de corte idealista, que entiende (...) el movimiento humano como un acto esencialmente mecánico y biológico. La segunda perspectiva filosófica es la materialista, que entiende el movimiento humano como una manifestación de la motricidad, la cual sería inmanente a la esencia del ser humano. Es decir, estaría dotada de intencionalidad. La tercera corriente sería una mirada ecléctica de las dos anteriores, asemejando el concepto de movimiento humano con el de las contemporáneas interpretaciones de motricidad. En otras palabras, el movimiento humano sería parte de la potencia y el acto. Se concluye que, según diferentes perspectivas filosóficas, es posible utilizar el concepto de movimiento y/o motricidad para trascender la mirada idealista o moderna del movimiento humano. (shrink)

In this paper we deal with the logical description of complexity classes arising in the real number model of computation introduced by Blum, Shub, and Smale [4]. We adapt the approach of descriptive complexity theory for this model developped in [14] and extend it to capture some further complexity classes over the reals by logical means. Among the latter we find NC R , PAR R , EXP R and some others more.

Este artículo examina la relación entre el deporte y la filosofía, buscando comprender el concepto del "Homo deportivus". El autor explora cómo el deporte puede ser considerado desde una perspectiva filosófica, analizando temas como la emancipación, la educación liberadora y el dualismo cuerpo y alma. También se aborda el legado espiritual de los deportistas y la conexión entre la filosofía política y el deporte. El estudio destaca la importancia de incluir perspectivas filosóficas en el ámbito deportivo y promueve un enfoque (...) inclusivo y abierto tanto en la filosofía como en el deporte. (shrink)

This article investigates the relationship between emotional sharing and the extended mind thesis. We argue that shared emotions are socially extended emotions that involve a specific type of constitutive integration between the participating individuals’ emotional experiences. We start by distinguishing two claims, the Environmentally Extended Emotion Thesis and the Socially Extended Emotion Thesis. We then critically discuss some recent influential proposals about the nature of shared emotions. Finally, in Sect. 3, we motivate two conditions that an account of shared emotions (...) ought to accommodate: Reciprocal Other-awareness and Integration. Consideration of and discussion of relational accounts of joint attention lead us to the proposal that a construal of socially extended emotions in terms of a constitutive integration of the participating individuals’ experiences is more promising than proposals that simply appeal to various forms of social situatedness, embeddedness, or scaffolding. (shrink)

During the first half of the twentieth century, many philosophers of memory opposed the postulation of memory traces based on the claim that a satisfactory account of remembering need not include references to causal processes involved in recollection. However, in 1966, an influential paper by Martin and Deutscher showed that causal claims are indeed necessary for a proper account of remembering. This, however, did not settle the issue, as in 1977 Malcolm argued that even if one were to buy Martin (...) and Deutscher’s argument for causal claims, we still don’t need to postulate the existence of memory traces. This paper reconstructs the dialectic between realists and anti-realists about memory traces, suggesting that ultimately realists’ arguments amount to inferences to the best explanation. I then argue that Malcolm’s anti-realist strategy consists in the suggestion that causal explanations that do not invoke memory traces are at least as good as those that do. But then, Malcolm, I argue that there are a large number of memory phenomena for which explanations that do not postulate the existence of memory traces are definitively worse than explanations that do postulate them. Next, I offer a causal model based on an interventionist framework to illustrate when memory traces can help to explain memory phenomena and proceed to substantiate the model with details coming from extant findings in the neuroscience of memory. (shrink)

The experimental interventions that provide evidence of causal relations are notably similar to those that provide evidence of constitutive relevance relations. In the first two sections, I show that this similarity creates a tension: there is an inconsistent triad between Woodward’s popular interventionist theory of causation, Craver’s mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms, and a variety of arguments for the incoherence of inter-level causation. I argue for an interpretation of the views in which the tension is merely apparent. (...) I propose to explain inter-level relations without inter-level causation by appealing to the notion of fat-handed interventions, and an argument against inter-level causation which dissolves the problem. (shrink)

This collection highlights the new trend away from rationalism and toward empiricism in the epistemology of modality. Accordingly, the book represents a wide range of positions on the empirical sources of modal knowledge. Readers will find an introduction that surveys the field and provides a brief overview of the work, which progresses from empirically-sensitive rationalist accounts to fully empiricist accounts of modal knowledge. Early chapters focus on challenges to rationalist theories, essence-based approaches to modal knowledge, and the prospects for naturalizing (...) modal epistemology. The middle chapters present positive accounts that reject rationalism, but which stop short of advocating exclusive appeal to empirical sources of modal knowledge. The final chapters mark a transition toward exclusive reliance on empirical sources of modal knowledge. They explore ways of making similarity-based, analogical, inductive, and abductive arguments for modal claims based on empirical information. Modal epistemology is coming into its own as a field, and this book has the potential to anchor a new research agenda. (shrink)

Replicability is widely taken to ground the epistemic authority of science. However, in recent years, important published findings in the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences have failed to replicate, suggesting that these fields are facing a “replicability crisis.” For philosophers, the crisis should not be taken as bad news but as an opportunity to do work on several fronts, including conceptual analysis, history and philosophy of science, research ethics, and social epistemology. This article introduces philosophers to these discussions. First, I (...) discuss precedents and evidence for the crisis. Second, I discuss methodological, statistical, and social-structural factors that have contributed to the crisis. Third, I focus on the philosophical issues raised by the crisis. Finally, I discuss proposed solutions and highlight the gaps that philosophers could focus on. (shrink)

The comments focus on a presumed circular reasoning in the operator hierarchy and the necessity of understanding life’s origin for defining life. Below it is shown that its layered structure prevents the operator hierarchy from circular definitions. It is argued that the origin of life is an insufficient basis for a definition of life that includes multicellular and neural network organisms.

The notion of cognitive system is widely used in explanations in cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Traditional approaches define cognitive systems in an agent-relative way, that is, via top-down functional decomposition that assumes a cognitive agent as starting point. The extended cognition movement challenged that approach by questioning the primacy of the notion of cognitive agent. In response, [Adams, F., and K. Aizawa. 2001. The Bounds of Cognition. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.] suggested that to have a clear understanding of what a cognitive (...) system is we may need to solve “the demarcation challenge”: the problem of identifying a reliable way to determine which mechanisms that are causally responsible for the production of a certain cognitive process constitute a cognitive system responsible for such process and which ones do not. Recently, [Rupert, R. 2009. Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.] offered a solution based on the idea that the mechanisms that constitute a cognitive system are integrated in a particular sense. In this paper I critically review Rupert’s solution and argue against it. Additionally, I argue that a successful account of cognitive system must accommodate the fact that the neural mechanisms causally responsible for the production of a cognitive process are diachronically dynamic and yet functionally stable. At the end, I offer a suggestion as to how to accommodate this diachronic dynamicity without losing functional stability. I conclude by drawing some implications for the discussion on cognitive ontologies. (shrink)

This book provides an up to date, high-level exchange on God in a uniquely productive style. Readers witness a contemporary version of a classic debate, as two professional philosophers seek to learn from each other while making their cases for their distinct positions. In their dialogue, Joshua Rasmussen and Felipe Leon examine classical and cutting-edge arguments for and against a theistic explanation of general features of reality. The book also provides original lines of thought based on the authors’ own (...) contributions to the field, and offers a productive and innovative inquiry into on one of the biggest questions people ask: what is the ultimate explanation of things? (shrink)

The reward system of science is the priority rule. The first scientist making a new discovery is rewarded with prestige, while second runners get little or nothing. Michael Strevens, following Philip Kitcher, defends this reward system, arguing that it incentivizes an efficient division of cognitive labor. I argue that this assessment depends on strong implicit assumptions about the replicability of findings. I question these assumptions on the basis of metascientific evidence and argue that the priority rule systematically discourages replication. My (...) analysis leads us to qualify Kitcher and Strevens’s contention that a priority-based reward system is normatively desirable for science. (shrink)

. Scientists, for the most part, want to get it right. However, the social structures that govern their work undermine that aim, and this leads to nonreplicable findings in many fields. Because the social structure of science is a decentralized system, it is difficult to intervene. In this article, I discuss how we might do so, focusing on self-corrective-labor schemes. First, I argue that we need to implement a scheme that makes replication work outcome independent, systematic, and sustainable. Second, I (...) use these three criteria to evaluate extant proposals, which place the responsibility for replication on original researchers, consumers of their research, students, or many labs. Third, on the basis of a philosophical analysis of the reward system of science and the benefits of the division of cognitive labor, I propose a scheme that satisfies the criteria better: the professional scheme. This scheme has two main components. First, the scientific community is organized into two groups: discovery researchers, who produce new findings, and confirmation researchers, whose primary function is to do confirmation work. Second, a distinct reward system is established for confirmation researchers so that their career advancement is separated from whether they obtain positive experimental results. (shrink)

Advocates of the self-corrective thesis argue that scientific method will refute false theories and find closer approximations to the truth in the long run. I discuss a contemporary interpretation of this thesis in terms of frequentist statistics in the context of the behavioral sciences. First, I identify experimental replications and systematic aggregation of evidence (meta-analysis) as the self-corrective mechanism. Then, I present a computer simulation study of scientific communities that implement this mechanism to argue that frequentist statistics may converge upon (...) a correct estimate or not depending on the social structure of the community that uses it. Based on this study, I argue that methodological explanations of the “replicability crisis” in psychology are limited and propose an alternative explanation in terms of biases. Finally, I conclude suggesting that scientific self-correction should be understood as an interaction effect between inference methods and social structures. (shrink)

On a widely held characterization, triadic joint attention is the capacity to perceptually attend to an object or event together with another subject. In the last four decades, research in developmental psychology has provided increasing evidence of the crucial role that this capacity plays in socio-cognitive development, early language acquisition, and the development of perspective-taking. Yet, there is a striking discrepancy between the general agreement that joint attention is critical in various domains, and the lack of theoretical consensus on how (...) to account for it. This paper pursues three interrelated aims: (i) it examines the contrast between reductive and non-reductive views of (triadic) joint attention, by bringing into focus the notion of recursive mindreading; (ii) it assembles, advances, and discusses a number of arguments against reductive views; (iii) finally, in dialogue with some prominent non-reductive views, it outlines the case for a non-reductive view that gives pride of place to the idea that co-attenders relate to one another as a ‘you’. (shrink)

. Este artículo se propone discutir las dificultades que pertenecen al ejercicio de pensarnos en cuanto corporales. Guía de estas reflexiones son los índices heideggerianos sobre la corporalidad humana realizados en Zollikoner Seminare. Dichos seminarios advierten que la actual experiencia de nuestro cuerpo, pese a poder ser estimada como inmediata, se halla mediada por nuestros propios supuestos epocales y se enraiza ya en el pensar ontológico de Occidente. Así, este artículo intentará examinar las aporías filosóficas de tal mediación histórico-epocal, exponiendo (...) la reflexión heideggeriana del cuerpo desde el claro del ser como una respuesta a la idea tradicional de subjetividad fundada en la noción de “mera presencia”. (shrink)

On the assumption that romantic partners tend to act from a first-person plural perspective, how should the love that binds them be understood? This paper approaches this question by focusing on romantic practical integration, understood as the tendency of romantic partners to integrate their practical perspectives in such a way that allows them to have ‘reasons-for-us’: reasons for action that apply to them as a group, in a collective and non-distributive sense (Westlund Citation2009). After dispelling some reservations about the connection (...) between romantic love and the first-person plural perspective, I argue that the resources offered by one leading account of love, due to Bennett Helm, fall short of accounting for romantic practical integration. Building on Stephen Darwall’s account of romantic love as a ‘second-personal attitude of the heart’, I develop an alternative proposal. The proposed view foregrounds the relational and non-deontic normative character of romantic love, by conceptualizing it as an addressing attitude that intrinsically seeks – but doesn’t demand – reciprocation. On this view, the attitude of romantic love co-involves the addressee of the attitude as a (potential or actual) member of a narratively unified interpersonal community, in light of which putative reasons-for-us may be taken on board or rejected. (shrink)

In this article I explore the relationship between the self and the experience of shame. Drawing mainly on contributions fromthe classical phenomenological tradition, I seek to make sense of the idea that the self of shame is a globally involved self, leaving aside any mysterious connotations that the latter notion might involve. To this end, I suggest a distinction between a property- based and a structure-based account of the self of shame. According to the latter, the self of shame is (...) typically experienced as globally involved to the extent that it reaches an acute sense of its own individuation as an irreducible self vis-_-vis others, that is, as a self whose particular situation in the world is not ascribable to another self. (shrink)

This paper critically examines the notion of the other as it emerges in ethics and in the so called politics of difference. The author confronts this notion with social-ontological and dialogistic thematizations of otherness. On that basis a radical revision of what ‚difference‘ means is claimed to be neccessary in ethical and political respect.

While most people believe the best possible life they could lead would be an immortal one, so‐called “immortality curmudgeons” disagree. Following Bernard Williams, they argue that, at best, we have no prudential reason to live an immortal life, and at worst, an immortal life would necessarily be bad for creatures like us. In this article, we examine Bernard Williams' seminal argument against the desirability of immortality and the subsequent literature it spawned. We first reconstruct and motivate Williams' somewhat cryptic argument (...) in three parts. After that, we elucidate and motivate the three best (and most influential) counterarguments to Williams' seminal argument. Finally, we review, and critically examine, two further distinct arguments in favor of the anti‐immortality position. (shrink)

The enduring replication crisis in many scientific disciplines casts doubt on the ability of science to estimate effect sizes accurately, and in a wider sense, to self-correct its findings and to produce reliable knowledge. We investigate the merits of a particular countermeasure—replacing null hypothesis significance testing with Bayesian inference—in the context of the meta-analytic aggregation of effect sizes. In particular, we elaborate on the advantages of this Bayesian reform proposal under conditions of publication bias and other methodological imperfections that are (...) typical of experimental research in the behavioral sciences. Moving to Bayesian statistics would not solve the replication crisis single-handedly. However, the move would eliminate important sources of effect size overestimation for the conditions we study. (shrink)

This essay focuses on the similarities between Nietzsche’s and Carnap’s views on metaphysics, without ignoring their obvious differences. The essay argues that Nietzsche and Carnap endorse but interpret differently an overcoming metametaphysics characterized by the conjunction of the following three claims: an overcoming of metaphysics ought to be performed; this overcoming is to be performed by adopting a method of linguistic analysis that is suspicious of the metaphysical use of language and that interprets such use through a different use of (...) language which aims to avoid metaphysics; and this overcoming contributes to the political task of resisting “diseased” metaphysical practices and promoting “healthy” non-metaphysical practices. (shrink)

Donald Davidson alcanzó celebridad en el mundo filosófico con la publicación en 1963 de su artículo ¿Acciones, razones y causas¿. En él sostuvo la tesis de que la explicación de una acción mediante razones constituye una forma de explicación causal en la que las razones son entendidas como causa efectiva de la acción. Esta tesis cobró máxima relevancia al interior del contexto intelectual en cuyo seno surgió. Al publicarse el artículo en cuestión, en el mundo anglosajón predominaba la idea de (...) que las razones no eran causa de la acción. Esta idea había sido defendida principalmente por filósofos de orientación wittgensteniana. El presente ensayo aborda algunas de las principales pruebas que se aludieron en defensa de la tesis que sostenía el carácter no causal de las razones, poniéndolas en contraste con los argumentos de los que Davidson se sirve para mostrar la posibilidad de que pueda haber implicaciones lógicas entre determinadas descripciones de eventos, sin que esto impida que tales eventos se relacionen como causa y efecto, dando lugar a lo que en su momento fue ¿y sigue siendo- un original planteamiento filosófico. (shrink)

Este artigo tem por objetivo, a partir da leitura do célebre livro de Rudolf Malter – O pensamento único: introdução à filosofia de Arthur Schopenhauer, em especial da seção intitulada Característica conclusiva: Pessimismo – um conceito crítico –, apresentar a hipótese hermenêutica de um dos mais eminentes interpretes da filosofia schopenhaueriana, a qual versa sobre o pessimismo enquanto conceito crítico, e que pode ser entendida como um dos pontos de sustentação para a justificativa de interpretação da filosofia schopenhaueriana a partir (...) de um viés soteriológico. (shrink)

This manuscript intends to show some features of the concept “Historical Time” and its link with an idea of acceleration of History in constitutive terms. The Historical Time is used as concept mainly from the XVIII century and correspond to a way of understanding the contemporary World as a moment in which take place a chronology of Time and, along with it, the appearance of History. Different temporary schemes support this transit; among them, a pass from Synchrony to Diachrony, a (...) change from iteration to the Event, the circularity to the linearity. In it follows we propose to observe some implications and forms of articulation of an Historical Time and Social Acceleration in the sense that both of them are connecting and mutual depending elements. (shrink)