Die Entwicklungsgeschichte des Lebens in all ihrer Lückenhaftigkeit läßt doch schon ersehen, wie sich der Intellekt kraft ununterbrochenen Fortschritts in aufsteigender Linie, über die Reihe der Wirbeltiere hin bis zum Menschen, herausgebildet hat. Sie zeigt uns in der Fähigkeit des Verstehens einen Ausläufer der Fähigkeit des Handelns, eine immer schärfere, immer mehrgliedrigere, immer geschmeidigere Anpassung des Lebewesens an die gegebenen Existenzbedingungen. Woraus zu folgern wäre, daß unser Intellekt im engeren Sinn des Worts dazu bestimmt sei, die vollkommene Verwebung unseres Körpers (...) in seine Umgebung zu sichern, die Beziehungen der äußeren Dinge aufeinander vorzustellen, kurz: dazu, die Materie zu denken. Und tatsächlich wird dies einer der Schlüsse unserer Arbeit sein. (shrink)

This translation makes available to the Anglophone world, for the first time, what is possibly Max Stirner’s final reply to his critics, entitled ‘Die Philosophischen Reactionäre’ (1847). The article was signed ‘G. Edward’, and its authorship has been disputed ever since John Henry Mackay ‘cautiously’ attributed it to Stirner and included it in his collection of Stirner’s lesser writings. If it is indeed Stirner’s final reply, then some of the main traits of Der Einzige und sein Eigentum are restated and (...) posited against those whom Stirner scornfully refers to as ‘the philosophers’. Since it was written almost three years after his magnum opus, it would offer a unique insight into Stirner’s own appraisal of the book in the wake of the ultimate demise of Young Hegelianism. Other than its obvious historical-philosophical significance, the text bears witness to Stirner’s own ‘spectrality’. The controversy over Stirner’s authorship is related to the inherently idiosyncratic nature of his thought. Stirner defies – and indeed mocks – all philosophical and theoretical conventions or categorizations. Yet, perhaps the controversy over Stirner’s authorship of ‘Die Philosophischen Reactionäre’ need not be settled after all: the mystery surrounding it only affirms the spectrality of the thinker who, in the words of ‘Edward’, one can ‘go crackers’ on. (shrink)

The Making of Modern Law: Foreign, Comparative and International Law, 1600-1926, brings together foreign, comparative, and international titles in a single resource. Its International Law component features works of some of the great legal theorists, including Gentili, Grotius, Selden, Zouche, Pufendorf, Bijnkershoek, Wolff, Vattel, Martens, Mackintosh, Wheaton, among others. The materials in this archive are drawn from three world-class American law libraries: the Yale Law Library, the George Washington University Law Library, and the Columbia Law Library.Now for the first time, (...) these high-quality digital scans of original works are available via print-on-demand, making them readily accessible to libraries, students, independent scholars, and readers of all ages.+++++++++++++++The below data was compiled from various identification fields in the bibliographic record of this title. This data is provided as an additional tool in helping to insure edition identification: +++++++++++++++Columbia University Law LibraryLP3C001240019060101The Making of Modern Law: Foreign, Comparative, and International Law, 1600-1926Heidelberg: Carl Winter's, 190649, [1] p. 23 cmGermany. (shrink)

Humanism and Realism, the Egoist way. A classic essay from Stirner.

Über Schulgesetze -- Christentum und Antichristentum -- Gegenwort -- Über B. Bauers "Posaune des jüngsten Gerichts" -- Das unwahre Prinzip unserer Erziehung -- Kunst und Religion -- Über die Verpflichtung der Staatsbürger zu irgendeinem Religionsbekenntnis -- Einiges Vorläufige vom Liebesstaat -- Über "Die Mysterien von Paris" (Eugène Sue) -- Rezensenten Stirners -- Die philosophischen Reaktionäre.

Now, as soon as man suspects that he has another side of himself Jenseits] within himself, and that he is not enough in his mere natural state, then he is driven on to divide himself into that which he actually is, and that which he should become. Just as the youth is the future of the boy, and the mature man the future of the innocent child, so that othersider Jenseitiger] is the future man who must be expected on the (...) other side of this present reality. Upon the awakening of that suspicion, man strives after and longs for the second other man of the future, and will not rest until he sees himself before the shape of this man from the other side. This shape fluctuates back and forth within him for a long time; he only feels it as a light in the innermost darkness of himself that would elevate itself, but as yet has no certain contour or fixed form. For a long time, along with other groping and dumb others in that darkness, the artistic genius seeks to express this presentiment. What no other succeeds in doing, he does, he presents the longing, the sought after form, and in finding its shape so creates the - Ideal. For what is then the perfect man, man's proper character, from which all that is seen is but mere appearance if it be not the Ideal Man, the Human Ideal? The artist alone has finally discovered the right word, the right picture, the right expression of that being which all seek. He presents that presentiment - it is the Ideal. 'Yes! that is it! that is the perfect shape, the appearance that we have longed for, the Good News - the Gospel. The one we sent forth so long ago with the question whose answer would satisfy the thirst of our spirit has returned!' So hail the people that creation of genius, and then fall down - in adoration. (shrink)

At the beginning of 2020, COVID-19 became a global problem. Despite all the efforts to emphasize the relevance of preventive measures, not everyone adhered to them. Thus, learning more about the characteristics determining attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic is crucial to improving future interventions. In this study, we applied machine learning on the multi-national data collected by the International Collaboration on the Social and Moral Psychology of COVID-19 (N = 51,404) to test the predictive efficacy of constructs from (...) social, moral, cognitive, and personality psychology, as well as socio-demographic factors, in the attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic. The results point to several valuable insights. Internalized moral identity provided the most consistent predictive contribution—individuals perceiving moral traits as central to their self-concept reported higher adherence to preventive measures. Similar was found for morality as cooperation, symbolized moral identity, self-control, open-mindedness, collective narcissism, while the inverse relationship was evident for the endorsement of conspiracy theories. However, we also found a non-negligible variability in the explained variance and predictive contributions with respect to macro-level factors such as the pandemic stage or cultural region. Overall, the results underscore the importance of morality-related and contextual factors in understanding adherence to public health recommendations during the pandemic. (shrink)

Max Stirner is generally considered a nihilist, anarchist, precursor to Nietzsche, existentialism and even post-structuralism. Few are the scholars who try to analyse his stands from within its Young Hegelian context without, however, taking all his references to Hegel and the Young Hegelians as expressions of his own alleged Hegelianism. This article argues in favour of a radically different reading of Stirner considering his magnum opus “Der Einzige und sein Eigentum” as in part a carefully constructed parody of Hegelianism deliberately (...) exposing its outwornness as a system of thought. Stirner's alleged Hegelianism becomes intelligible when we consider it as a formal element in his criticism of Bauer's philosophy of self-consciousness. From within this framework it becomes quite clear what Stirner meant with such notions as “ownness” and “egoism”. They were part of his radical criticism of the implicit teleology of Hegelian dialectics as it found according to him its highmark in Bauer. In short, this article puts the literature on Stirner into question and tries for the first time in 30 years to dismantle Stirner's entire undertaking in “Der Einzige und sein Eigentum” by considering it first and foremost a radical criticism of Hegelianism and eventually the whole of philosophy while fully engaged in the debates of his time. ☆ The author would like to thank Douglas Moggach for corresponding with me on the idea of the comic and for not sparing me his “critical criticism” in general. I'm also indebted to William Desmond and Lawrence Stepelevich for their comments on earlier drafts of this text. (shrink)

This book interprets Max Stirner's The Ego and Its Own as a critique of modernity and traces the basic elements of his dialectical egoism through the writings of Benjamin Tucker, James L. Walker, and Dora Marsden. Stirner's concept of 'ownness' is the basis of his critique of the dispossession and homogenization of individuals in modernity and is an important contribution to the research literature on libertarianism, dialectics, and post-modernism.

Even before Nietzsche, Stirner opened a crak inside the metaphysical western tradition, that always considered life as something that must be judged, understood and evaluated, and that used knowledge as the instrument to go deep in the truth of being. In The Ego and His Own we attend the attempt to reverse this tradition: thinking does not have the function to conceive and found what is «real», but it does make tough and assure the loss of concerns. The unbelief and (...) the loss of concerns are the elements of Stirner’s spectrology that, instead of imposing the laws of real life, it begins to fight «new battles» against the huge and horrible shadow of God. One of these battles, the one Stirner hard devote himself to, is the «Man’s death». Normal 0 14 false false false IT X-NONE X-NONE /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabella normale"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin-top:0cm; mso-para-margin-right:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:10.0pt; mso-para-margin-left:0cm; line-height:115%; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi; mso-fareast-language:EN-US;}. (shrink)

En este artículo se quiere trazar una teoría política de la insurrección en el pensamiento de Max Stirner, en tanto alternativa ética y política a la revolución. Se mostrará cómo, según el pensador alemán, la revolución es en última instancia una estrategia fallida de emancipación en tanto en cuanto no libera al individuo de las formas de subjetividad que lo mantienen dependiente del poder. Más en general, se enseñará como el orden liberal post-revolucionario, detrás del lenguaje secular de los derechos, (...) las libertades y la igualdad, engendra técnicas más sutiles de gobernabilidad del individuo. La insurrección, en cambio, puede ser vista como un rechazo de las identidades y de los roles que disciplinan al individuo. Al respecto, se prestará una atención especial al concepto stirneriano de Eigenheit, como estrategia ética de auto-determinación y liberación de las formas rígidas de la subjetividad. En última instancia, se querrá mostrar cómo todo el proyecto político de la insurrección stirneriana se basa en un anarquismo ontológico que rechaza la lógica teleocrática del racionalismo moderno y pone en entredicho la misma noción de realización. The aim of this article to outline a political theory of insurrection in Max Stirner’s thought as an ethical and political alternative to revolution. I will show that revolution is ultimately a failed strategy of emancipation as it does not free the individual from the forms of subjectivity that keep her dependent on power. Insurrection, on the other hand, can be seen as a rejection of the identities and roles that discipline the individual. In this regard, special attention will be paid to the Stirnerian concept of Eigenheit as an ethical strategy of self-determination and liberation from rigid forms of subjectivity. Ultimately, I will show how the whole political project of the Stirnerian insurrection is based on an ontological anarchism that rejects the teleocratic logic of modern rationalism and calls into question the very notion of realization. (shrink)

RESUMENEl presente artículo trata de mostrar la evolución de una concepción del poder concreta que lleva de Hegel a Stirner a través del papel desempeñado por el individuo. De esta forma, el individualismo aparece entre dos líneas enfrentadas de la metafísica y la teoría de la acción.PALABRAS CLAVEHEGEL, STIRNER, ACCIÓN, POLÍTICAABSTRACTThis article tries to show the evolution of one specific conception of power that leads from Hegel to Stirner through the role played by the individual. Thus, individualism appears between two (...) conflicting lines of metaphysics and action theory.KEYWORDSHEGEL, STIRNER, ACTION, POLITICS. (shrink)