The paper begins with a more carefully stated version of ontologically neutral logic, originally introduced in. A non-infinitistic semantics which includes a definition of potential infinite validity follows. It is shown, without appeal to the actual infinite, that this notion provides a necessary and sufficient condition for provability in ON logic.
By supplying propositional calculus with a probability semantics we showed, in our 1996, that finite stochastic problems can be treated by logic-theoretic means equally as well as by the usual set-theoretic ones. In the present paper we continue the investigation to further the use of logical notions in probability theory. It is shown that quantifier logic, when supplied with a probability semantics, is capable of treating stochastic problems involving countably many trials.
In Hailperin 1996 , in addition to its formal development of Probability Logic, there are many sections devoted to historical origins, illustrative examples, and discussion of related work by other authors. Here selected portions of its formal treatment are summarized and then used as a basis for a probability logic treatment of combining evidence.
An elaboration in detail of the contention made in an earlier paper 1 that quantifier logic can be given an adequate formulation in which neither the notion of an individual nor that of a predicate appears. The logic is compatible with either an infinitistic or non-infinitistic completeness theorem.
Exhumation and study of the 1945 paradox of confirmation brings out the defect of its formulation. In the context of quantifier conditional-probability logic it is shown that a repair can be accomplished if the truth-functional conditional used in the statement of the paradox is replaced with a connective that is appropriate to the probabilistic context. Description of the quantifier probability logic involved in the resolution of the paradox is presented in stages. Careful distinction is maintained between a formal logic language (...) and its semantics, as the same language may be outfitted with different semantics. An acquaintance with sections 1? 5 of Hailperin (2006) covering the sentential aspects of probability logic is assumed as background information for quantifier probability logic. (shrink)
The introduction has a brief statement, sufficient for the purpose of this paper, which describes in general terms the notion of probability logic on which the paper is based. Contributions made in the eighteenth century by Leibniz, Jacob Bernoulli and Lambert, and in the nineteenth century by Bolzano, De Morgan, Boole, Peirce and MacColl are critically examined from a contemporary point of view. Historicity is maintained by liberal quotations from the original sources accompanied by interpretive explanation. Concluding the paper is (...) a summary. (shrink)
This paper investigates the ontological presuppositions of quantifier logic. It is seen that the actual infinite, although present in the usual completeness proofs, is not needed for a proper semantic foundation. Additionally, quantifier logic can be given an adequate formulation in which neither the notion of individual nor that of a predicate appears.
This essay describes a variety of contributions which relate to the connection of probability with logic. Some are grand attempts at providing a logical foundation for probability and inductive inference. Others are concerned with probabilistic inference or, more generally, with the transmittance of probability through the structure (logical syntax) of language. In this latter context probability is considered as a semantic notion playing the same role as does truth value in conventional logic. At the conclusion of the essay two fully (...) elaborated semantically based constructions of probability logic are presented. (shrink)
A form of quantification logic referred to by the author in earlier papers as being 'ontologically neutral' still made use of the actual infinite in its semantics. Here it is shown that one can have, if one desires, a formal logic that refers in its semantics only to the potential infinite. Included are two new quantifiers generalizing the sentential connectives, equivalence and non-equivalence. There are thus new avenues opening up for exploration in both quantification logic and semantics of the infinite.
The approach used by Boole in Mathematical analysis of logic to develop propositional logic was based on the idea of ?cases? or ?conjunctures of circumstances?. But this was dropped in Laws of thought in favor of one which Boole considered to be more satisfactory, that of using the notion of ?time for which a proposition is true?. We show that, when suitable clarifications and corrections are made, the earlier approach? which accords with modern logic in eschewing the extraneous notion of (...) time?is indeed a viable one. (shrink)
The paper begins with a more carefully stated version of ontologically neutral (ON) logic, originally introduced in (Hailperin, 1997). A non-infinitistic semantics which includes a definition of potential infinite validity follows. It is shown, without appeal to the actual infinite, that this notion provides a necessary and sufficient condition for provability in ON logic.
Borel's concept of denumerable probability is described by means of three of his illustrative problems and their solution. These problems are then reformulated in contemporary terms and solved from the viewpoint of probability logic. A section compares Kolmogorov set-theoretic probability with probability logic. The concluding section describes a highly adverse criticism of Borel's conception for its not using something like Kolmogorov theory (introduced two decades later) and, in support of Borel, this criticism is countered from the standpoint of quantifier probability (...) logic. (shrink)