The article aims to provide the main conceptual coordinates in order to fully understand the state of the art of the most recent research in the field of neurobiology of interpersonal experience. The main purpose of this work is to analyze, at an anthropological, phenomenological and epistemological level, how the fundamental characteristics of the recognition of otherness and intercorporeity among human beings contribute to changing the image of nature in the light of a possible new relationship between living bodies, neurophysiological (...) systems and empathy. From this point of view, the hypothesis to investigate is that neurophenomenology, understood as a new evolutionary, multidimensional and autopoietic approach, is capable of probing the preconditions of the possible delineation of a phenomenology of intersubjectivity shaped by the neuroscientific turning point, represented by the discovery of mirror neurons. At this level, the neuroscientific data are interpreted according to a specific interdisciplinary perspective, thus trying to offer a possible unitary and integrated theoretical framework. (shrink)

Le contrôle de constitutionnalité, dont la magistrature parlementaire de l’Ancien Régime revendiquait le plein droit, n’était pas fondé uniquement sur les lois fondamentales du royaume, mais sur l’ensemble des principes (« les maximes ») tirés de la « Tradition ». Cette dernière était composée en premier lieu par le droit divin et le droit naturel, c’est-à-dire par des systèmes juridiques qui nécessitaient, tous les deux, une interprétation juridictionnelle ‘sapientiale’. Cette activité interprétative était ‘révélatrice’ d’un corpus de valeurs métaphysiques à laquelle (...) seule la Scientia Juris des magistrats pouvait puiser. Mais dans la sphère de la Tradition juridique rentraient aussi le « dépôt légal », c’est-à-dire l’ensemble de toutes les lois, même des lois ainsi dites « ordinaires », c’est-à-dire celles qui avaient été produites par la simple manifestation de volonté souveraine d’un roi prédécesseur « car tel avait été son plaisir » (moderne formulation du brocarde de droit romain : « quidquid principi placuit legis habet vigorem »). Ainsi la juridiction parlementaire donnait lieu à un jugement de constitutionnalité qui était normalement exercé de manière très flexible par le corps de la magistrature, dépendant des circonstances et des intérêts politiques momentanés des situations juridiques qu’elle voulait protéger. La hiérarchie des normes était ainsi un formidable instrument de protection de cet ordre juridique dont les legum doctores se sentaient les tuteurs. Elle était, donc, directement liée au gouvernement politique des juges. (shrink)

Riassunto: Il presente contributo esamina il concetto di esperienza cosciente da una prospettiva epistemologica evoluzionista, ispirata ad un approccio naturalistico non riduzionista. Il lavoro si inserisce nel quadro concettuale delle ricerche nel campo della filosofia della mente, avanzando delle ipotesi circa i possibili processi che hanno determinato la comparsa e lo sviluppo nella nostra biosfera di una mente specificatamente umana sia dal punto di vista filogenetico che da quello ontogenetico. In quest’ottica, vengono rivisitati in chiave epigenetica alcuni tratti salienti della (...) teoria della coscienza di Edelman alla luce delle più recenti ricerche sulla misurazione dell’esperienza cosciente, condotte da Tononi e da altri studiosi nell’ambito della Integrated Information Theory. In un quadro siffatto, l’articolo analizza alcune criticità dell’approccio algoritmico della IIT, evidenziando la necessità di individuare nuove misure della complessità per quanto riguarda lo studio dei processi semantici di trasmissione dell’informazione biologica. Parole chiave: Coscienza; Evoluzione naturale; Neuroplasticità; Informazione intenzionale; Seconda natura Reflections on conscious experience. The perspectives of the integrated information theory: This paper examines the concept of conscious experience from an evolutionary epistemological perspective, inspired by a non-reductionist naturalistic approach. Situated in the conceptual framework of philosophy of mind, it considers what processes could have led to the appearance and development of a specifically human mind in our biosphere, both from a phylogenetic and an ontogenetic point of view. Salient features of Edelman’s theory of consciousness are revisited from an epigenetic perspective, in light of some of the most recent measurements of conscious experience proposed by Tononi and other scholars in the field of Integrated Information Theory. The paper analyzes some criticalities in the algorithmic approach of the IIT, highlighting the need to identify new measures of complexity for the study of semantic processes of transmission of biological information. Keywords: Consciousness; Natural Evolution; Neuroplasticity; Intentional Information; Second Nature. (shrink)

This paper treats a classical topic of scientific epistemology from a new point of view. It considers biology to be a science intermediate between physics and sociology, and the transition from physics to biology as proceeding upwards. As a consequence, any type of reductionism will be avoided. The foundation of sociology can now be viewed as an extension of physics and biology. Indeed social reality is built by means of constitutive rules that create those social facts that have been denominated (...) ‘institutional'. Having argued for the connection among values and norms and actions, the problem is that of justifying this connection. Can values and norms be reasons that explain action? Can reasons be understood as causes? In this paper the thesis is advocated that reasons are not sufficient for causally explaining actions. Taking up the classical analysis of ‘practical inference', I want to point out that, if from the reasons for action logically followed the action itself, the reasons would be sufficient causes of the action: indeed, this would eliminate free will. For this reason, we must examine the problem of free will. My conclusion is in favor of the position of B. Libet, who has demonstrated free will experimentally, and therefore the nondeterministic nature of the practical-inferential model. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the problem of time in the thought of Bergson, showing how the evolution of the concept of duration is conducive to new developments in the philosophy of intuition. Duration, which in the Essay connotes the experience of a non-measurable lived experience, while in Matter and Memory it assumes rhythms of different intensities to justify the relationship between perception and memory, as well as in Creative Evolution is judged as the fabric of reality itself, in Duration and Simultaneity (...) it is posited not only as a criterion to discern what is real and what is artificial, but also to justify the measurement of reality, that is to say, to restore the point of contact between time as duration and space, that seemed previously compromised by the loss of ontological consistency of extension as the dimension of the body. In this paper, then, Bergson, also by virtue of a controversial, detailed comparison with the theory of relativity, finally arrives to support the hypothesis of a single temporal dimension, curved and dynamic, where space comes to be outlined as the abstract tangent of time. It is at this level, then, that it becomes possible to examine the emergence of the concepts within the meanders of intuition as concepts imbued with meaning: here is the primary source of that continuous “added” element of new nuclei of creativity that characterizes the very logic of Bergsonian living where what, as ideal relationship, is time, as a real relationship, becomes life, i.e., the continuous opening of a register in which time is inscribed, becoming incarnate thus in the very nature of every organism. (shrink)

Communicating an unfavourable prognosis while maintaining patient hope represents a critical challenge for healthcare professionals. Duty requires respect for the right to patient autonomy while at the same time not doing harm by causing hopelessness and demoralisation. In some cases, the need for therapeutic privilege is discussed. The primary objectives of this study were to explore HPs’ perceptions of hope in the prognosis communication and investigate how they interpret and operationalise key ethical principles. Sixteen qualitative semistructured interviews with HPs from (...) different positions and experience, including doctors and nurses in four different departments, were conducted in the Ticino Cantonal Hospital, Switzerland. The interviews were recorded, transcribed verbatim and analysed using thematic analysis. HPs defined prognosis and patient hope as interdependent concepts related to future perspectives for subjective quality of life. Two main factors allow HPs to maximise the benefits and minimise the harm of their communication: respecting the patient’s timing and sharing the patient’s wishes. Time is required to reframe needs and expectations. Furthermore, communication needs to be shared by HPs, patients and their relatives to build common awareness and promote a person-centred approach to prognosis. In this process, interprofessional collaboration is key: doctors and nurses are complementary and can together guarantee that patients and relatives receive information in the most appropriate form when they need it. Organisational aspects and the HPs’ emotional difficulties, particularly in coping with their own despair, are barriers to effective communication that need further investigation. (shrink)

In human groups performing oscillatory tasks, it has been observed that the frequency of participants' oscillations reduces when compared to that acquired in solo. This experimental observation is not captured by the standard Kuramoto oscillators, often employed to model human synchronization. In this work, we aim at capturing this observed phenomenon by proposing three alternative modifications of the standard Kuramoto model that are based on three different biologically-relevant hypotheses underlying group synchronization. The three models are tuned, validated and compared against (...) experiments on a group synchronization task, which is a multi-agent extension of the so-called mirror game. (shrink)

Recent developments in the neuroscience offer an increasing amount of “brain-based” explanations of decision-making in ethics . Are those explanations more basic than the psychological, “social” or philosophical ones? In my paper I address this question analyzing the meaning of “because” in sentences like “when someone is willing to act on a moral belief, it is because the emotional part of his or her brain has become active when considering the moral question at hand” . My answer is a pluralistic (...) one. I reject brain-fundamentalism and I argue that neuroscientific developments support a moderate form of naturalism, according to which empirical results may indirectly influence moral reflection, but offer no direct evidence to radical reductive naturalism. (shrink)

Popper’s theory of World 3 is often regarded as incongruent with his defense of methodological individualism. This article criticizes this widespread view. Methodological individualism is said to be at odds with three crucial assumptions of the theory of World 3: the impossibility of reducing World 3 to subjective mental states because it exists objectively, the view that the mental functions cannot be explained by assuming that individuals are isolated atoms, and the idea that World 3 has causal power and influences (...) both individual minds and actions. This article demonstrates that the inconsistency thesis stems from a confusion between methodological individualism as understood by Popper and reductionism. The reasons for this confusion are analyzed and clarified. It is argued that two variants of methodological individualism can be distinguished, and that unlike psychologistic individualism, Popper’s nonatomistic individualism is fully consistent with his theory of World 3. (shrink)

Objective Apeiron was founded in 1966 and has developed into one of the oldest and most distinguished journals dedicated to the study of ancient philosophy, ancient science, and, in particular, of problems that concern both fields. Apeiron is committed to publishing high-quality research papers in these areas of ancient Greco-Roman intellectual history; it also welcomes submission of articles dealing with the reception of ancient philosophical and scientific ideas in the later western tradition. The journal appears quarterly. Articles are peer-reviewed on (...) a double-blind basis. Topics ancient philosophy ancient science reception of ancient philosophical and scientific ideas in the later western tradition Article formats Original Articles. (shrink)

The Timaeus is the dialogue that was for many centuries the most influential of Plato’s works. Among its readers we find Descartes, Boyle, Kepler and Heisenberg. In the first division of Timaeus Plato deals with the theory of celestial motion, in the second he presents us with the first mathematical theory of the structure of matter. Here, in a gigantic step forward with respect to the preceding Democritean atomistic theory with its unalterable micro-entities, he introduces the intertransformability of elementary corpuscles (...) and with that the first “chemical” reactions in history. Plato’s geometrical interpretation of Empedocles’ elements and his geometrical atomism is described at the molecular, atomic and sub-atomic level. The “chemical” reactions reported in Timaeus are written in the enlightening chemical symbolism, analogies with modern chemistry are noticed throughout. (shrink)

In this book we offer a theory of the self, whose core ideas are that the self is a process of self-representing, and this process aims mainly at defending the self-conscious subject against the threat of its metaphysical inconsistence. In other words, the self is essentially a repertoire of psychological manoeuvres whose outcome is a self-representation aimed at coping with the fundamental fragility of the human subject. Our picture of the self differs from both the idealist and the eliminative approaches (...) widely represented in contemporary discussion. Against the idealist approach, we deny that the self is something primitive and logically prior. Rather, we take it to be the result of a process of construction that starts with subpersonal unconscious processes. On the other hand, we also reject the anti-realistic, eliminative argument that, from the non-primary, derivative nature of the self, infers its status as an illusory by-product of real neurobiological events, devoid of any explanatory role. (shrink)

Introduzione Il modello della mente estesa (mme) afferma che esistono processi cognitivi distribuiti nell’ambiente e veicolati da strumenti esterni di elaborazione dell’informazione. In questo scritto metto in rilievo una serie di difficoltà che affliggono mme in relazione alla nozione di soggetto degli stati mentali — ovvero alla questione di chi sia il titolare degli stati e dei processi cognitivi che si estenderebbero nell’ambiente. La tesi che viene sostenuta è che, sebbene sia possibile...

Building on the literature on hybrid organizations, this manuscript explores the relationship between the organizational activity of social enterprises backed by venture philanthropy investors and income inequality. Using Ashoka’s portfolio of Indian social enterprises as empirical context of Western venture philanthropy investing activity, our results suggest that Indian municipalities with social enterprises that have received venture philanthropy investments experience a decrease in income inequality level and when these social enterprises are dominated by a collectivistic organizational identity orientation the effect is (...) stronger. Our findings have implications for the research on hybrid organizations, financing of social entrepreneurship and grand ethical challenges. (shrink)

Some philosophers and cognitive scientists think that a naturalised philosophy of the (self-) conscious mind should lead us to reject the very existence of the self. The paper focuses on two case-studies which are representative of this kind of attitude. In particular we examine, and criticise, Thomas Metzinger's 'no-self alternative' and Daniel Dennett's narrative elimination of the self. Our aim is not to prove that any elimination of the self from the inventory of the world based on the empirical study (...) of the mind is doomed to failure. Instead, we would like to introduce a note of caution: it is far from clear that cognitive science and naturalistic philosophies of mind force upon us, or even suggest, a picture of the world without persons and selves. (shrink)

Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Volume 52, Issue 4, Page 207-234, July 2022. According to Searle’s theory of collective intentionality, the fundamental structure of any society can be accounted for in terms of cooperative mechanisms that create deontic relations. This paper criticizes Searle’s standpoint on the ground that, while his social ontology can make sense of simple systems of interaction like symphony orchestras and football teams, the whole coordinative structure of the modern market society cannot be explained solely in terms (...) of we-intentional collaboration and deontic relations. As clarified by Hayek, because of its complexity, this society is a self-organizing system. It results not only from micro-level agreed constraints, but also from an unintended cybernetic mechanism that affects and shapes both its micro and macro dynamics via a circular causality. Searle ignores the coordination problem posed by complexity and provides strawman arguments against the theory of action underpinning the invisible hand explanation of social phenomena. (shrink)

L’architettura fin dalle origini è stata un’arte ancipite tra utile e bello. Nel corso del tempo tale declinazione si è variamente alternata, approdando da un lato alle derivazioni funzionaliste, propugnate in varia misura dai teorici del Movimento Moderno, dall’altro, in casi estremi, a quelle forme di architettura/scultura in cui la destinazione d’uso si annulla nell’esperienza estetica. Questo numero della “Rivista di estetica” vuole fare il punto sullo stato attuale del dibattito, mettend...

This commentary focuses on three aspects of Sandro Nannini’s paper Time and Consciusness in Cognitive Naturalism: the parallel between Einstein’s theory of relativity and the new science of the mind/brain; the Cartesian characterization of non-reductionist positions in the philosophy of mind; the alleged illusory status of consciousness, free will and the Self. We suggest, first, that Nannini overstates the success of cognitive neuroscience; second, that non-reductionism is not necessarily a Cartesian position; and third, that the neurocognitive science data do not (...) show or even suggest, that consciousness, free will and the Self are illusory phenomena. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the role and value of thought experiments concerning phenomenal consciousness. It is divided in two parts. The first part surveys the philosophical and scientific context in which many well-known thought experiments concerning the mind and consciousness have their roots. In particular it focuses on the problems left open by scientific theories about consciousness and by many attempts to reduce the mind to the physical world. The second part is a case study: it concentrates on the analysis (...) of the zombie thought experiment aiming to show how a simple and rather naive image, the zombie intuition, has originated stimulating and complex arguments, enriching our philosophical and intellectual landscape. On the whole, the paper highlights the fact that there are properly philosophical questions about the mind, philosophy not being a sort of junior partner in the collective enterprise of cognitive science. (shrink)

Examples are given of applications by Pauling, Mulliken, Marcus and G.E.Kimball of the three Pythagorian means to formulate the scales of electronegativity of the elements, to the calculations of rate constants of electron transfer cross-reactions, to the calculation of the observed rate constant as function of activation and diffusion rate constants in the case of mixed reaction-diffusion rates and to the calculation of the effective diffusion coefficient in solution of a salt AB as a whole from the diffusion coefficients of (...) the ions in which it dissociates. (shrink)

Professor Rudolph A. Marcus, recipient of the 1992 Nobel Prize in Chemistry, is a distinguished theoretical chemist. Two important theories happen to bear his name: the Rice Ramsperger Kassel Marcus theory of unimolecular reactions and the Marcus theory of electron transfer reactions. When considering Marcus’ work, one finds characteristics of it that bear striking similarity to those that can be found in the work of some famous scientists. Such characteristics appear then as common recurring patterns in the work of theoreticians. (...) Among them we find the following: the creation of new theories, driven by experiments that preceding theories were unable to explain; the use of thought experiments; the generalization and extensions from one realm of science to another; the making of predictions and the finding of new properties from correlations among series of data; the use of variational principles; the providing of different demonstrations of an equation; the introduction of new types of coordinates; the innovative capacity to use, by somehow recreating it under the pressure of the physical problem, a mathematical method previously unknown to the author; and finally, the presentation of formulations of the same theory in different mathematical and physical languages. Before discussing in some detail the above points, a brief description of Marcus’ work is first presented for the convenience of the reader. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to show that Boudon’s explanation of action in terms of “good reasons” can be philosophically enriched by merging his methodological perspective with Mises’ praxeology and Gadamer’s hermeneutics. In order to develop our goal of merging Boudon’s approach with Mises’ and Gadamer’s, we will focus on two points. The first is the identification of the invariable structure of human action. Unlike Boudon, we suggest that the best way to establish this invariable structure, which makes the (...) explanation of action possible, is not to refer to the controversial concept of “human nature,” but rather to use Mises’ praxeological analysis of the invariable logic which all actions have in common. The second point analyzed in this article is the temporal and cultural dimension of the interpretative process which individuals elaborate to develop their reasons. This point, which is related to hermeneutical philosophy and is not investigated in detail by Boudon, is largely discussed by Gadamer. In our opinion, merging Gadamer’s description of the interpretative process – a process that Gadamer calls “hermeneutical circle” – and Boudon’s sociology of “good reasons” is useful because, unlike Boudon, Gadamer clarifies the epistemological nature of the interpretative process as well as the reasons why this process – which is a trial and error process – allows us to understand the actions of people who belong to different cultures. (shrink)

Starting from the discussion on the original set of criteria advanced by Clark and Chalmers (1998) meant to avoid the overextension of the mind, or the so-called “cognitive bloat”, we will sketch our solution to the problem of criteria evaluation, by connecting it to the search for a mark of the mental. Our proposal is to argue for a “weak conscientialist” mark of the mental based on transparent access, which vindicates the role of consciousness in defining what is mental without, (...) however, identifying the mental with the conscious. This renovated link between mind and consciousness, spelled out through the concept of transparency, further develops some of our previous work on the topic (Di Francesco 2007; Di Francesco and Piredda 2012) and is partially inspired by Horgan and Kriegel (2008). (shrink)

In this article we explore the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious as it has taken shape within contemporary cognitive science - meaning by this term the mature cognitive science, which has fully incorporated the results of the neurosciences. In this framework we first compare the neurocognitive unconscious with the Freudian one, emphasizing the similarities and above all the differences between the two constructs. We then turn our attention to the implications of the centrality of unconscious processes in cognitive science (...) for the classical conception of the self. Our analysis will bring to light a bit of claustrophobic dialectic between an eliminative variety of naturalism and an anti-naturalistic form of hermeneutics. Hence we conclude by recommending the pursuit of a mediation between such extreme stances. (shrink)

This chapter takes the form of a discussion between the editors of this volume and Steven Lukes, one the most eminent critics of methodological individualism. The focus is on Lukes’ interpretation of methodological individualism in terms of linguistic exclusivism (i.e., naive reductionism), the multiple-realization problem, Boudon’s and Elster’s micro-foundationalist approach, ontological individualism, and the rationality of human action.