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In this article, I consider the notion of facework in the context of unfinished turns in French conversation. Unfinished turns in French conversation normally occur in the environment of talk that can be characterized as delicate or problematic. They provide a mechanism for dealing with such talk in a way that both manages misalignment and divergence between the participants and minimizes possible threats to the participants' face. They provide a subtle avoidance or minimization mechanism in that they enable the participants (...) to hint at what remains unarticulated, whilst registering enough of the type of actions that they seek to accomplish. I conclude that, although unfinished turns can be seen as one way in which participants engage in facework, their analysis suggests that only an interactional-sequential account reveals the work that they accomplish, and insists upon a conceptualization of face/facework as interactional. (shrink)

Hence arose the demand to which this book is a. response. 1 I shall, therefore, endeavor to do as I have been asked, and preserve in the written word the ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume 29, Number 1, April 2003, pp. 125-141 Dr. George Cheyne, Chevalier Ramsay, and Hume's Letter to a Physician JOHN P. WRIGHT The publication of a new intellectual biography of George Cheyne1 provides a "propitious" occasion for "a thoroughly skeptical review"2 of the question which has long exercised Hume scholars, whether Cheyne was the intended recipient of David Hume's fascinating pie-Treatise Letter to a Physician,3 the (...) letter which describes his own hypochondriacal physical and mental symptoms and gives an account of his early philosophical development.4 Hume's nineteenth-century biographer, John Hill Burton, argued that Hume was probably writing to Cheyne,5 while Ernest Mossner claimed to definitively refute that hypothesis in an article entitled "Hume's Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot," published in 1944.6 Anita Guerrini's intellectual biography does not discuss Cheyne as a possible recipient of Hume's letter, but she does present a well-rounded picture of this interesting eighteenth-century physician from which we can judge his appropriateness as its addressee. In the following discussion I will make use of the biographical material found in this new biography of Cheyne, as well as other sources, to show that Mossner's arguments are less than definitive, and that it would be wrong to dismiss the possibility that the letter was sent to George Cheyne.7 This is a possibility that, for reasons that I will make clear, makes good biographical and philosophical sense. At the same time, it is important to keep a proper suspense of judgment as Burton did, for the evidence that the letter was either intended for or actually sent to Cheyne is not definitive. John P. Wright is Professor of Philosophy, Central Michigan University, Mt. Pleasant, MI 48859, USA. e-mail: [email protected] 126 John P. Wright Burton, who first published the autobiographical letter of the 22-yearold Hume in 1846, narrowed down the possible addressees of Hume's letter to either Cheyne or John Arbuthnot. He also pointed out that it is possible that the letter was never sent, and that the ten and a half page manuscript is only a neatly written draft, rather than a fair copy of an actual letter. Nevertheless, Burton thought he could identify the unnamed addressee on the basis of the internal evidence of the manuscript and the records of Scottish physicians practicing in England at the time. In the letter, Hume refers to the intended recipient as his "Countryman, a Scotchman [,]... a skilful Physician, a man of Letters, of Wit, of Good Sense, & of great Humanity."8 Further he writes that he is consulting him because he is a person "of great Learning beyond [his]... own Profession" who is acquainted with the "Motions of the Mind" he has described in his letter, and that "Fame pointed [him]... out as the properest person to resolve my Doubts..." about the cure of his disorder.9 Burton tells us that "the first name that suggested itself... was Arbuthnot, whose fine genius was just then flickering in the socket."10 (John Arbuthnot had been ill for some time, and died a year later.) But he then added that "a more full consideration showed to my satisfaction that it must have been destined for Dr. George Cheyne." His main reason for settling on Cheyne was that Cheyne's immensely popular The English Malady (1733) had recently been published, and that "there is a certain unison of tone between Hume's letter and this book." Burton quotes a portion of Cheyne's own long autobiographical account of his own disease in The English Malady. Cheyne's autobiography begins with the claim that "I passed my Youth in close study, and almost constant Application to the abstracted Sciences, (wherein my chief pleasure consisted) and consequently in great Temperance and a Sedentary Life"; it is followed by the reflection that any overindulgence in food or drink led to physical and psychological problems.11 He goes on to describe these in great detail for 39 pages, along with a history of his life. Burton also quotes a section of the book in which Cheyne describes how a studious and sedentary life causes the symptoms... (shrink)

Qu'est-ce que la connaissance? Que pouvons-nous connaître? Et comment connaissons-nous? Ces questions philosophiques classiques relèvent de l'épistémologie, qui excède largement l'histoire philosophique des sciences à laquelle elle se trouve trop souvent réduite. Attentif aux enseignements des sciences de la cognition comme aux exigences normatives de la connaissance, le présent volume introduit aux questions les plus débattues de l'épistémologie contemporaine de façon nouvelle et accessible. Ses chapitres ont été rédigés par une nouvelle génération de philosophes francophones dont les recherches s'inscrivent résolument (...) dans les débats internationaux les plus vifs. Que connaissons-nous grâce à nos sens? Quelle confiance accorder à la perception? A la mémoire? Au témoignage? Raisonner nous permet-il d'élargir le domaine de nos connaissances? Est-il possible d'étendre nos capacités cognitives? L'art et les émotions sont-ils des outils de connaissance à part entière? La connaissance de soi est-elle d'un genre particulier? Que pourrions-nous savoir de Dieu? Qu'est-il possible de connaître a priori? A quelles conditions nos jugements sont-ils justifiés? Y a-t-il des normes de la croyance et de l'enquête? Telles sont les questions épistémologiques fondamentales auxquelles ce livre est consacré. (shrink)

Les textes réunis dans ce volume traitent de questions particulièrement discutées de l’épistémologie contemporaine, entendue comme élucidation philosophique de la nature de la connaissance, de sa valeur et de ses modalités, ainsi que de la justification et des modalités de la croyance. Une clarification des notions de raison et de justification permet notamment d’affronter de manière renouvelée les défis du scepticisme. L’épistémologie y est ainsi présentée dans toute son extension, de l’analyse du concept de connaissance aux conditions sociales de la (...) mise en œuvre et du progrès de la connaissance, en passant par l’examen de sa signification en esthétique, métaphysique et anthropologie, comme de ses rapports avec l’action et la communication. (shrink)

v. 1. Half brain fables and figs in paradise -- v. 2. The corpus and the cortex -- v. 3. Scorpions and the anatomy of time.

Dans cet article l’auteur a souhaité étudier le travail de subjectivation des liens familiaux chez un auteur de violence sexuelle dans le cadre du dispositif pénal qu’est l’injonction de soins. À partir d’une recherche clinique menée sur un mode longitudinal, il propose de montrer comment le génogramme (en test, re-test) peut être un révélateur de la mise en œuvre du processus de subjectivation. Ce procédé permet de relever deux différences notables entre les deux génogrammes : dans le passage d’une place (...) fantasmatique dans les liens (celle d’un « enfant ») à celle d’une position instituée concomitante avec une affiliation intersubjective ; la présence ou l’absence de nom sur les icônes parentales. Des différences favorisées, selon nous, par le dispositif d’injonction de soins. (shrink)

Dans cet article l’auteur a souhaité étudier le travail de subjectivation des liens familiaux chez un auteur de violence sexuelle dans le cadre du dispositif pénal qu’est l’injonction de soins. À partir d’une recherche clinique menée sur un mode longitudinal, il propose de montrer comment le génogramme (en test, re-test) peut être un révélateur de la mise en œuvre du processus de subjectivation. Ce procédé permet de relever deux différences notables entre les deux génogrammes : dans le passage d’une place (...) fantasmatique dans les liens (celle d’un « enfant ») à celle d’une position instituée concomitante avec une affiliation intersubjective ; la présence ou l’absence de nom sur les icônes parentales. Des différences favorisées, selon nous, par le dispositif d’injonction de soins. (shrink)

Le philosophe américain Charles S. Peirce ne trouva, malgré ses efforts, guère d’interlocuteurs en France. On le considéra comme un mathématicien et logicien, un physicien et un psychologue fiable, mais son œuvre philosophique fut systématiquement distordue au gré des controverses franco-françaises. Nous mettons l’accent sur les lectures d’André Lalande et de Louis Couturat qui contribuèrent néanmoins à faire reconnaître en France l’originalité du père du pragmaticisme.Despite his efforts, the American philosopher Charles S. Peirce found hardly any interlocutors in France. He (...) was considered mostly as a mathematician and logician, a physicist and a reliable psychologist, but his philosophical work was systematically distorted in consequence of “Franco-French” disputes. We emphasize here the readings of André Lalande and Louis Couturat who made significant contributions towards the recognition in France of the originality of the founding father of Pragmaticism. (shrink)

Four years after completing his Ph.D. on “The Psychology of Kant,” one of Peirce’s most famous students, John Dewey, published a compendium of Leibniz’s main theses, his 1888 Leibniz’s New Essays.1 Such a move from critical to pre-critical rationalism seems to echo Peirce’s judgment that to fully understand Kant, a thorough familiarity with Leibniz’s philosophy is an indispensable preliminary (N 2:186, 1899); for Kant himself “was reposing in a firm belief in the metaphysics of Leibnitz as theologized by Wolff when (...) he first read the book of Hume.” (W 1:104, 1863) Peirce himself started his reflection with the study of Kant’s thought. The purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate that his actual implicit.. (shrink)

Deux grandes manières de faire de l’épistémologie sociale se sont développées depuis une trentaine d’années. L’une relève de la philosophie analytique, l’autre hérite de la sociologie des sciences. Tandis que le relativisme menace celle-ci, la première souffre d’un parti pris fondamentalement individualiste. Ces limites ont servi de base à une critique réciproque qui a viré à la concurrence, voire à l’hostilité. Le présent article suggère qu’en appliquant leurs propres méthodes d’analyse à l’opposition même des épistémologies sociales, leurs représentants auraient dû (...) privilégier à la compétition la visée d’un accord de la communauté des chercheurs. (shrink)

A reference that is as discreet as it is obstinate runs through the pragmaticist inquiry into the meaning of meaning: when he intends to clarify what meaning is, Peirce very often appeals to a quote by John of Salisbury, a rather obscure author of the 12th century. What is the point of mentioning that names “name singulars but signify universals”? My paper intends to show that, in twisting the original purport of the sentence, Peirce uses it for his semiotic, pragmatist (...) and realist theory of signification. (shrink)

Le titre pourrait rebuter. Il présuppose que l’esprit serait saturé. De quoi? Probablement d’attributs superflus tels que des capacités mentales, des représentations, des pouvoirs causaux, une essence, qui tous auraient en commun de renvoyer à une intériorité. En ce sens, on pourrait voir dans Désaturer l’esprit un pamphlet contre le désormais célèbre “mythe de l’intériorité.” Ce n’est toutefois pas seulement, ou pas essentiellement, son mérite. Comme l’écrit Pierre Steiner à propos de Wittge...

Résumé L’art américain des années 1960 et 1970 témoigne de mutations singulières à la fois en termes de pratiques et de lieux qui les accueillent. Le processus – processus de création, processus d’altération des matériaux, de développement de l’image filmé, de déploiement des gestes dansés ou d’une musique sérielle – œuvre comme une expérience primant sur l’objet et ouvrant vers la conjonction de temporalités distinctes, celle de l’atelier et celle de l’espace d’exposition. Le glissement esthétique de l’œuvre vers le processus, (...) accompagné d’un glissement sémantique de l’œuvre vers le « travail », participe alors d’un contexte plus vaste, dépassant le domaine artistique, comme un symptôme de mutations politiques, sociales et institutionnelles. (shrink)

Les contributions de Mill à la logique ont exercé une influence décisive sur la deuxième moitié du XIX e siècle. La discussion de sa théorie de l’induction a servi de repoussoir à la constitution de la pensée de nombreux philosophes et logiciens, de William Whewell à Charles Peirce. Au nom d’une conception de la loi comme habitude, ce dernier rejette le principe d’uniformité du cours de la nature, se distinguant fermement du nominalisme millien. Le présent article entend montrer que paradoxalement, (...) via une discussion de la sémiotique épicurienne, Peirce se trouve en définitive reconduit à une conception fondée sur les classes naturelles qui n’est guère éloignée de la solution de Mill lui-même. (shrink)

ABSTRACT : Alfred Fouillee's doctrine of ideas-forces approximates historically and intellectually William James’s theory of will. But Fouillee's criticism of pragmatism also has connections with Pierce's emphasis on the real and the analysis of concepts, and shows an influence of tychism approaching mysticism. -/- .

L’article examine les raisons philosophiques, plutôt que mathématiques ou logiques, pour lesquelles MacColl a pu vouloir développer une logique propositionnelle. Nous trouvons des éléments de réponse dans le refus discret d’endosser une logique des choses, dans l’anti-psychologisme nuancé de MacColl, et dans une subtile épistémologie de la certitude liée à un usage méthodique de la grammaire.

This two-volume work examines far-reaching debates on the concept of courage from Greek antiquity to the Christian and mediaeval periods, as well as the modern era. Volume 1 explains how competing accounts of epistêmê, rational wisdom, and truth dominated classical antiquity. Early Christian and mediaeval thinkers, in contrast, favoured fortitude founded on faith and fear of God over philosophical reasoning left to its own devices. Volume 2 turns to theories of courage from the early modern period to the present. It (...) shows how the twin laws of polis and physis are at the heart of post-medieval thought. Courage is found at the crossroads of love and dread, freedom and fate, happiness and suffering, as well as power and submission to the ruling order. The later influence of evolutionism, existentialism, and the social and natural sciences on moral philosophy is also addressed at some length. The protection of people's best interests, the passions and powers of the human will, and the rule of active energy in all aspects of life supplant courage formerly viewed through the lens of reason or faith, or a combination of the two. These new ideas, paradoxically, herald the end of the ethics of courage. They also undermine the courage of ethical thinking. Courage is no longer an end in itself, nor is it a means to happiness "at the end." Regardless of what Gandhi, Tillich, and Foucault have to say about the topic, late modernity and the global age witness a marked loss of interest in courage as an idea worthy of conceptual investigation. Debates about the moral implications of courage give way to the value-free science of resilience, which studies how people can recover from past trauma and find wellness, primarily in the realm of physis. (shrink)

This two-volume work examines far-reaching debates on the concept of courage from Greek antiquity to the Christian and mediaeval periods, as well as the modern era. Volume 1 begins with Homeric poetry and the politics of fearless demi-gods thriving on war. The tales of lion-hearted Heracles, Achilles, and Ulysses, and their tragic fall at the hands of fate, eventually give way to classical views of courage based on competing theories of rational wisdom and truth. Fears of the enemy and anxieties (...) about suffering and death are addressed through the lenses and teachings of medicine, geography, military history, moral philosophy, and metaphysics. For early Christian thinkers, the ethics of fear, fate, and fealty to the Almighty supplant the voice of reason and the wisdom of virtue. Much of Christian doctrine's history is a long journey towards bridging the gap between Greek philosophy and devotion to God and spirits in heaven. Some Church Fathers attempt to dispel the fear of suffering through a joyful craving for martyrdom and the eternal blessings that follow. Others show openness to one or more of the following principles: the abstractions of moral philosophy, the metaphysics of Gnostic enlightenment, the gift of free will and intentionality, the growth of church authority and hegemony, and the intrinsic worth of life on Earth. Augustine, Ambrose, Cassian, and Chrysostom play a central role in revisiting the foundations of Christian fortitude along some or all of these lines. They lay the groundwork for the scholastic adaptations of faith-based rationalism proposed by Peter Lombard, Philip the Chancellor, Albert the Great, and Thomas of Aquinas. The mediaeval period ends with church dissidents and Protestant Reform leaders condemning Rome’s corruption and calling for a return to early Christian faith and the courage of godly fear, submission, suffering, and fate. (shrink)

It is well known that, in France, this important movement, which originated in Port-Royal, did not remain exactly on the same basis during its development. In this paper we attempt to show how a new concept was proposed by Du Marsais, Beauzée and, finally, Letellier.

We consider weighted o-minimal hybrid systems, which extend classical o-minimal hybrid systems with cost functions. These cost functions are “observer variables” which increase while the system evolves but do not constrain the behaviour of the system. In this paper, we prove two main results: optimal o-minimal hybrid games are decidable; the model-checking of WCTL, an extension of CTL which can constrain the cost variables, is decidable over that model. This has to be compared with the same problems in the framework (...) of timed automata where both problems are undecidable in general, while they are decidable for the restricted class of one-clock timed automata. (shrink)

We study the idea of implantation of Piron's and Bell's geometrical lemmas for proving some results concerning measures on finite as well as infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces, including also measures with infinite values. In addition, we present parabola based proofs of weak Piron's geometrical and Bell's lemmas. These approaches will not used directly Gleason's theorem, which is a highly non-trivial result.

We extend some of the classical connections between automata and logic due to Büchi [5] and McNaughton and Papert [12] to languages of finitely varying functions or “signals”. In particular, we introduce a natural class of automata for generating finitely varying functions called ’s, and show that it coincides in terms of language definability with a natural monadic second-order logic interpreted over finitely varying functions Rabinovich [15]. We also identify a “counter-free” subclass of ’s which characterise the first-order definable languages (...) of finitely varying functions. Our proofs mainly factor through the classical results for word languages. These results have applications in automata characterisations for continuously interpreted real-time logics like Metric Temporal Logic Chevalier et al. [6] and [7]. (shrink)