In recent years, the pages of our journal have carried a number of discussion articles dealing primarily with one question: the essence of the concept of "ethical category" and the concrete place that each ethical category should occupy in the socio-cultural complex denoted by the terms: morality, morals, ethics. The need for discussion of such questions in our scholarly literature on ethics has long been present. The immediate impetus for opening the discussion was publication of L. M. Arkhangel'skii's interesting and (...) significant monograph, The Categories of Marxist-Leninist Ethics [Kategorii marksistsko-leninskoi etiki], and his article "The Essence of Ethical Categories" [Sushchnost' eticheskikh kategorii], in Filosofskie nauki, 1961, No. 3. These writings indisputably represent a step forward in the study of a number of specific ethical categories. However, both in Arkhangel'skii's definition of the concept of "ethical category" and in his interpretation of that definition, there are, in the opinion of a number of participants in the discussion, spots that are weak both in terms of science and of logic. Arkhangel'skii understands ethical categories as "the principal key concepts of ehtical theory, reflecting the fundamental characteristics of morality in general , constituting social reflection of objectively operative concrete historical criteria of moral evaluation , as well as of requirements presented with respect to moral obligations , moral responsibility , dignity , and moral satisfaction , the content of which is determined by the principles of a given morality". (shrink)

The problem of the beautiful and of esthetic perception is one of the most complex problems in the area of esthetic analysis. Its solution became possible only on the basis of a Marxist-Leninist esthetics, as a consequence of comprehensive knowledge concerning the laws of social development and of human thought.

The history of Marxist ethical thought, particularly in the USSR, is not only the history of research into ethical problems, but of the dissemination of ethical knowledge among the masses. Moreover, as a rule, these two currents of scientific-ideological activity developed in constant interaction with each other, so that delimitation and study of each of them separately are not always possible. Marxist-Leninist ethics, like Marxism as a whole, has never been a sphere of "pure knowledge," but was always an implement (...) of the revolutionary practice of the proletariat, resolving problems propounded by that practice, and in intimate association with it. (shrink)

Ch. 1. Filosofskoe osmyslenie kulʹtury -- ch. 2. Problemy mnozhestvennosti kulʹtur.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the International Conference on Spatial Information Theory, COSIT 2005, held in Elliottville, NY, USA in September 2005. The 30 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 82 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on vagueness, uncertainty, and gradation; paths and routes; ontologies and semantics; ontologies and spatial relations; spatial reasoning: cognitive maps and spatial reasoning; time, change, and dynamics; landmarks and navigation; geographic information, and spatial behaviour.

This paper describes the topological aspect of a logic-based, artificial intelligence approach to formalising the qualitative description of spatial properties and relations, and reasoning about those properties and relations. This approach, known as RCC theory, has been under development for several years at the University of Leeds. The main rationale for this project is that qualitative descriptions of spatial properties and relationships, and qualitative spatial reasoning, are of fundamental importance in human thinking about the world: even where quantitative spatial data (...) are most important, they must be attached to the components of a perceived spatial structure if we are to make use of them. RCC theory covers other qualitative aspects of spatial description and reasoning, but the topological properties and relations of spatially extended entities are fundamental to our work. The topological formalisms used by mathematicians are, in general, not well suited to the task of formalising the kinds of ‘common-sense’ or ‘everyday’ qualitative spatial description and reasoning which are our primary interest. Nevertheless, we must come to grips with the concepts of topology as practised by mathematicians if we are not to risk constantly ‘reinventing wheels’. (shrink)

Question and quotation marks tend to proliferate in articles which ask whether Homer can provide any historical information about early Greek society. In this article ‘Homeric’ society will refer to the society which is portrayed in the Iliad and the Odyssey. ‘The World of Odysseus’ will refer to the recension of ‘Homeric’ society which appears in M. I. Finley's book of that name. Finley claims that ‘The World of Odysseus’ is a faithful account of ‘Homeric’ society and that the latter (...) is a literary portrait of a real society that existed in Greece some time during the dark ages. As a result of Finley's influential book, ‘The World of Odysseus’, or something very like it, has found its way into most of the history books generally available in the classroom. In this article I wish to reconsider ‘Homeric’ society and to question the propriety of identifying it with either ‘The World of Odysseus’ or any real society. (shrink)

At the beginning of the fifth century there was a change in the style of clothing worn by Athenian men.1 When Thucydides speaks of it,2 he first describes how the Greeks of ancient times used to carry weapons in everyday life, just as the barbarians of his own day still did. The Athenians were the first to lay weapons aside and to take up a relaxed and more luxurious way of life.

It was with this bitter intervention from Thrasymachus, occurring halfway through the first of its ten Books, that that work begins to come urgently alive. For the remainder of Book I the Socrates of the Dialogue asks questions and raises objections, while Thrasymachus keeps urging that in fact the just become through their very justice the victims of exploitation–the suckers!

Bateson's belated acceptance of the chromosome theory came in two main stages, and was permanent, although he retained to the end reservations about some implications and extensions of the theory. Coleman's attempt to explain Bateson's resistance in terms of his conservative mode of thought is critically examined, and rejected: the attributes Coleman assigns to Bateson are all either inappropriate, or irrelevant to chromosome theory, or both. Instead, the diverse factors which contributed to Bateson's resistance are enumerated and discussed. These include (...) deficiencies in the evidence then available to support the theory; embryological difficulties; Bateson's aversion to microscopy combined with the lack of a close colleague skilled in cytology; his iconoclastic temperament, and the fact that he found T. H. Morgan, the leader of the Drosophila school, an uncongenial personality. Taken together, these factors suffice to account for his resistance. Bateson's position is contrasted with that of the other most eminent opponent, W. Johannsen, whose organismic outlook was the main obstacle to acceptance. (shrink)

At their extremes, the modernization of ancient mathematical texts (absolute presentism) leaves nothing of the source and the refusal to modernize (absolute antiquarism) changes nothing. The extremes exist only as tendencies. This paper attempts to justify the admissibility of broad modernization of mathematical sources (presentism) in the context of a socio-cultural (non-fundamentalist) philosophy of mathematics.

Suffering patients (when able), grieving families and compassionate physicians have always sought the least detrimental alternative while deciding care in the face of tragedy. Modern medical technology has brought great benefits to patients but has blurred traditional concepts of life and death and created new dilemmas for practising doctors. While this technology has given doctors great control over living and dying, their dominance in critical decision making is being challenged. More and more their decisions are liable to public and legal (...) scrutiny, intense publicity by the news media and exploitation by lobbyists with opposing aims. Increasing pressure of this kind may deflect the physician form his primary responsibility to patients and their families. For infants with gross malformations or a distressing terminal illness we believe that the parents and their doctors must be allowed primary decisional power even if the chosen course of action involves the death of the infant. Choices for death should be permitted but only after suitable family and professional consultation. Some general guidelines are suggested. As these situations are so varied and so complex, much latitude in decision-making should be expected and tolerated. (shrink)