Leibniz: Political Philosophy

Der Band beleuchtet Leibniz' Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie im Kontext seiner Metaphysik, Logik, Erkenntnistheorie und Moralphilosophie. Auch die Rezeption seiner Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie wird in den Beiträgen reflektiert. Gerade im Hinblick auf die aktuelle Diskussion um die politische Gestaltung Europas und die kosmopolitische Gestaltung der Globalisierung verdient seine Philosophie Aufmerksamkeit - nicht zuletzt auch auf Grund interner Spannungen, die das politische Selbstverständnis Europas bis heute kennzeichnen.

This volume presents introductory chapters from internationally-renowned experts on eleven of Leibniz's key philosophical writings. Offering accessible accounts of the ideas and arguments of his work, along with information on their composition and context, this book is an invaluable companion to the study of Leibniz.

This paper focuses on Leibniz’s engagement with Thomas Hobbes’s political anthropology in the Mainz-period writings, and demonstrates that Leibniz tried to construct an alternative to the English philosopher by conceiving of a physically- and ontologically-grounded psychology of actions. I provide textual evidence of this attempt, and account for Leibniz’s rejection of Hobbes’s political theory and anthropological assumptions. In doing so, I refer to diverse aspects of Leibniz’s work, thereby highlighting his aspiration to congruity and consistency between different areas of investigation. (...) Furthermore, Leibniz’s political writings and letters will reveal another—sometimes neglected—aspect of the issue: his concern to defend and legitimize the existence of pluralist and collective constitutional political systems like the Holy Roman Empire by providing the theoretical ground of their ability to last. (shrink)

Leibniz puts forward an intriguing argument against the moral permissibility of chattel slavery in a text from 1703. This argument has three independent layers or sub-arguments. The first is that slavery violates natural rights. The second is that moral laws such as the principles of equity and piety oppose slavery, or at least severely limit the permissible actions toward slaves. The third and final layer is that slavery can at most be justified if the slave is permanently incapable of conducting (...) herself well. Yet, it is very doubtful that any actual human beings satisfy that description. This paper analyzes and evaluates Leibniz’s argument, which scholars have so far largely neglected. Even though some elements of the argument are not original to Leibniz, it is of considerable importance for the scholarship of early modern philosophy: it sheds light on Leibniz’s views not only on the moral status of slavery itself, but also on moral rights and obligations more generally. (shrink)

In this paper, I focus on the fiction of the retroaction of the condition in contracts, a very old tool of law which may be traced back to Roman antiquity. In the first part, I introduce the notion of a contract with a suspensive condition, i.e. a contract whose efficacy is subordinated to a future uncertain event. As will be addressed in the second part, this kind of contracts is often linked to the fiction of the retroaction of the condition (...) (e.g. the French Code Civile 1179 and the Italian Codice Civile 1360): When the condition of the contract is fulfilled we should do as if the condition was fulfilled at the very time of the stipulation of the contract. In the third part, I turn to an attempt by the young Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz to rationalize this fiction: Although – as every fiction – false, the retroaction of the condition allows us to reach true conclusions with respect to a deterministic metaphysics. Eventually, after having raised some objections to the Leibnizian account, I develop an alternative rationalization of the fiction: The fiction does indeed lead us to true conclusions because the same conclusions may be reached by relying on an equity-principle or, alternatively, on a merely possible yet expedient law. (shrink)

At the end of 1671 and start of 1672, while in the service of the Archbishop and Elector of Mainz, Leibniz composed his Egypt Plan, which sought to persuade Louis XIV to invade Egypt. Scholars have generally supposed that Leibniz’s rationale for devising the plan was to divert Louis from his intended war with Holland. Little attention has been paid to the religious benefits that Leibniz identified in the plan, and those who do acknowledge them are often quick to downplay (...) them. This tendency to downplay or even dismiss the religious benefits Leibniz claimed of the Egypt Plan is undermotivated and stems from a very superficial reading of the documents that together comprise it. In this paper I argue that we should take seriously Leibniz’s claim that a French invasion of Egypt would bring religious benefits, and that he saw them as important and intrinsically desirable inasmuch as he came to believe that the execution of the plan would lead to the flowering of co-operation and brotherhood among Christians in a show of inter-denominational koinonia, that is, fellowship with other Christians in the participation of shared goals. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with Leibniz’s Egypt Plan, written in 1671 and 1672, when Leibniz was in the service of the Elector of Mainz. One of the aims of this paper is to offer a more balanced and plausible reading of the religious benefits of war that Leibniz outlines in his Egypt plan.

G. W. Leibniz is usually not regarded as a political philosopher. However, despite this prevailing opinion, Leibniz’ impact on political theory is valuable. The paper discusses Leibniz in the context of the history of the concepts of “sovereignty” and “federation”, and demonstrates that Leibniz presents an original interpretation of these concepts. Even though Leibniz’ attention to the problem of sovereignty is conditioned by the practical interests of his patron, the Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg, and Leibniz’ own intentions to participate in international (...) negotiations, Leibniz’ theoretical solution is no less original. Leibniz, in his attempt to defend the independence of imperial princes, creates an alternative to Jean Bodin’s theory of absolute sovereignty, and argues that sovereignty is compatible with divisibility. In demonstrating the possible coexistence of several centers of power, Leibniz makes the notion of sovereignty relative, which, however, does not force him into rejecting the notion entirely. The article discusses the historical context framing the appearance of the Leibniz’ doctrine, the reasons why Leibniz is critical of Bodin’s theory, and the innovations introduced by his approach. Based on Leibniz’ texts Codex Juris Gentium and Caesarinus Fürstenerius, the paper analyzes the development of his theory, and shows how power is divided between the Emperor and the princes. The paper raises the questions of how Leibniz’ interests are similar to those of contemporary political theorists in trying to reevaluate the notion of sovereignty, of which model of federation Leibniz prefers, and of how his political ideas are connected with his metaphysical system. (shrink)

This chapter argues that Spinoza's political philosophy played an important role in the fact that the mature Leibniz was a strict anti-Spinozist. Leibniz's reading of Spinoza's political texts developed from an initial mixed reaction of both interest and scandal towards a curious exclusion of the Spinozist possibility. Indeed, there is not a single text by the mature Leibniz addressing Spinoza's political philosophy. In order to overcome this textual problem, and establish the parameters for a confrontation between the two philosophers on (...) the issue of political philosophy, the chapter considers how Leibniz and Spinoza respectively approached Hobbes' theory of natural right and contract theory. This interpretive triangulation allows determining with some plausibility what stance Leibniz took with regard to Spinoza's political philosophy in spite of the fact that he never actually stated it explicitly. (shrink)

Leibniz’ 1669-1671 manuscript “Elements of Natural Right” – first published in the 21st century – provides keen insights into problems of political philosophy and marks the outset of Leibniz’ engagement with the Hobbesian indivisible sovereignty idea. While concurring with the Sage of Malmesbury that any state worthy of the name is a security system, Leibniz – via reversal of Hobbes’ contention security produces happiness – throws open a series of questions related to “retrotraction” and the state legitimacy problematic. Citizens’ cognitive (...) capacity to link current state crisis manifestations to past ones - to “retrotract” - is seen as determining whether dissolution of the state is immanent, and the functioning of such capacity is described as intimately linked to self-perceived happiness of individuals. The plurality of happiness possibilities in various polities in turn is conceptualized by Leibniz as proof of degrees of state quality and sovereignty, degrees of sovereignty constituting Hobbes’ bête noire. (shrink)

Leibniz’s role en current political and social thought is complex. On the one hand, he represents the last great synthesis built on the idea of the World as a creation of God and man as his cooperator in history. However his notion of contingency can help to explain some of the problems facing social sciences today in so far as he understandsthis concept not only from an ontological but also from an epistemological point of view. To this one should add (...) that criticisms of classical and modern philosophy such as those of Isaiah Berlin and Hannah Arendt leave intact the need of reason to organise society and we can see in Leibniz use of reason a forerunner of public choice postions. In sum, his vision of reason is very much alive though in new contexts. (shrink)

This essay deals with Leibniz's concept of international law. It will be argued that while, on the one hand, there is a difference between Leibniz's position and that of Thomas Hobbes, on the other hand, the Leibnizian approach to the problem has also to be distinguished from Kant's later reflection on international law. This essay explores to what extent Leibniz' thought on international law is based on his concept of natural law. Moreover, it will be shown that the metaphor of (...) "balance", which is central to the understanding of the political structure of the German empire, and of the idea of Europe as a "unity in the multiplicity", is of decisive importance for interpreting Leibniz's position on the problem of international law. (shrink)

Dieser Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit der Frage nach der Relevanz von Leibniz’ Denken vor dem gegenwärtigen politischen und sozialen Hintergrund, ohne internationale Fragen mit einzubeziehen. Der Abstand, der uns vom frühen 18. Jahrhundert trennt, ist dabei von großer Bedeutung. Der Beitrag versucht, Leibniz als einen Vorläufer von ‘Big Government’ und staatlichen Interventionismus zu präsentieren, aber dieses immer innerhalb eines moralischen Rahmens auf der Grundlage seiner Interpretation des Naturrechts. Jedoch erscheint es so, dass sein wichtigster begrifflicher Beitrag dabei in der Kontingenz (...) von Bedeutungen liegt, welche die Ratlosigkeit angesichts politischer Denkrichtungen erklärt, was u. a. in den Werken von Isaiah Berlin und Hannah Arendt reflektiert wird. Schließlich werden Leibniz’ zwar marginale, aber dafür interessante Beiträge zu Versuchen angeführt, ein rationales Entscheidungsverfahren in den Sozialwissenschaften zu etablieren. In diesem Zusammenhang wird von uns auf Arbeiten von Habermas und Robert Putnam hingewiesen. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: En excluant le monopole juridictionnel de la souveraineté afin de préserver une autorité supérieure aux souverains, Leibniz réduit celle-ci au seul monopole de la coercition. Cependant, cette redéfinition de la souveraineté place la guerre au cœur des relations internationales. Elle est, en tant que faculté, la condition de participation pour les souverains au «droit des gens», droit qui lui-même doit éviter de tellesguerres. La paix n’est donc pour Leibniz qu’au prix de l’établissement d’un équilibre entre forces contraires qui, en (...) s’opposant et si elles sont de même intensité, annulent réciproquement leurs effets. C’est cette conception dynamique de l’ordre politique que cet article se propose de traiter.ABSTRACT: This article deals with Leibniz’s dynamic conception of political order. Leibniz reduces the sovereignty of States to the monopoly of coercion by setting apart jurisdictional monopoly and sovereignty. With this new definition of sovereignty however, war becomes the core of international relations. The sovereigns’ ability to make war is the condition to take part in law of nations, whose precise aim is to prevent wars. Peace can only exist if there is a balance between opposite forces of similar magnitude that cancel each other. (shrink)

Beyond geometry : Leibniz and the science of law -- The force of law : will -- Leibniz's systema iuris -- From the gesetzbuch to the landrecht : the ALR and the triumph of legality -- The rule of law : the Crown Prince lectures and the grounding of legality in order and security -- From reason to history : Savigny's system and the rise of social legal science -- The Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) of 1900 : positive legal science and (...) the end of justice. (shrink)

This study tells the story of legal codification as it emerged in the jurisprudence of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz through to its culmination in the first modern code, the Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht of 1794. Codification, or the laying down of the entirety of law in a scientific and systematic code of laws, conforms to the demand of natural science that everything that exists have a reason why it is rather than that it is not. Since law too, as an object of (...) science, must have reasons and grounds for its existence, scientific legal codes allow for the derivation of a systematic body of laws from out of simple principles of justice. The scientific approach to law offers a potential gift: a complete and certain code of law. ;The gift of science, however, had an unexpected consequence. In making law subject to its grounds and reasons, the scientific approach reflects and furthers a transformation of law itself from something natural and reasonable into something that is willful and posited, from an authoritative saying into a command in need of scientific justification. In telling the story of the European debates over legal codification, this study reveals how law, as right , gives way to law as positive law ; as positive law is always in need of scientific justification by human reason, law becomes a means to certain and human ends. In asking after the essence of legal codifications and the birth of positive law, the dissertation raises the question not only of the being of law in modern times, but of the being of man as well. (shrink)

Given Leibniz’ admiration for Bayle’s Dictionnaire historique et critique, which he called “le plus beau des dictionnaires” in the Nouveaux essais, and given that Bayle’s skeptical worries provided the occasion for the writing of the Theodicée, it is appropriate to consider in the The Leibniz Review the first English-language version of those articles from Bayle’s Dictionnaire which are most important for political and moral philosophy. For it is a superb version, edited by the most knowledgeable Bayle-scholar in the Anglophone world; (...) it will justly shape early-Englightenment studies in coming decades. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Leibniz’s Political and Moral Philosophy in the Novissima Sinica, 1699–1999Patrick RileyThe Preface to Leibniz’s Novissima Sinica 1 contains an important but highly compressed and abbreviated quintessence of his theory of justice or jurisprudence universelle—a version so compressed and abbreviated that one must have a broader and fuller understanding of this universal jurisprudence before one can entirely appreciate what Leibniz has to say about Christian charity, Platonism, and geometry in (...) the Novissima Sinica itself. Above all, one wants to know why Leibniz, in the key paragraph of the Preface to Novissima Sinica, should describe the Chinese emperor as just and charitable and as a (more or less) “Platonic” geometer who is as wise as he is charitable. And why should Leibniz contrast this “wisely charitable” Chinese ruler with the Pontius Pilate who irresponsibly asked, “What is truth?” and then permitted the judicial murder of the very Christ who did most to make charity and justice coextensive by saying, “A new law I give unto you, that ye love one another”? 2 The wise course, therefore, is to throw enough light on Leibnizian universal jurisprudence in general to make his moral-political utterances in Novissima Sinica intelligible in particular.In 1693, four years before the publication of Novissima Sinica, Leibniz revealed the outlines of his jurisprudence universelle in the Codex Iuris Gentium:a good man is one who loves everybody, so far as reason permits. Justice, then, which is the virtue which regulates that affection which [End Page 217] the Greeks call philanthropy, will be most conveniently defined... as the charity of the wise man, that is, charity which follows the dictates of wisdom... Charity is a universal benevolence, and benevolence the habit of loving or of willing the good. Love then signifies rejoicing in the happiness of another..., the happiness of those whose happiness pleases us turns into our own happiness, since things which please us are desired for their own sakes. 3Slightly later, in La véritable piété, Leibniz indicated what this view of justice entails:those who... reduce justice to [mere] rigor, and who fail altogether to understand that one cannot be just without being benevolent... in a word, not only those who look for their profit, pleasure, and glory in the misery of others, but also those who are not at all anxious to procure the common good and to lift out of misery those who are in their care, and generally those who show themselves to be without enlightenment and without charity, boast in vain of piety which they do not know at all, whatever appearance they create. 4The central idea of Leibniz’s “universal jurisprudence,” which aims to find quasi-geometrical, eternal moral verities equally valid for all rational beings, human or divine, is that justice is “the charity of the wise” (caritas sapientis), 5 that it is not mere conformity to sovereign-ordained “positive” law given ex plenitudo potestatis (in the manner of Hobbes); nor is it mere “refraining from harm” or even “rendering what is due” (the neminem laedere and suum cuique tribuere of Roman law). 6 The equal stress on “charity” and on “wisdom” suggests that Leibniz’s practical thought is a kind of fusing of Platonism—in which the wise know the eternal truths such as absolute goodness (Phaedo 75d), which the gods themselves also know and love (Euthyphro 93-10e) and which therefore deserve to rule (Republic 443d-e) 7 —and of Pauline Christianity, whose key moral idea is that charity or love is the first of the virtues (“though I speak [End Page 218] with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal”). 8 Historically, there is nothing remarkable in trying to fuse Platonism and Christianity. Augustine’s thought (particularly the early De Libero Arbitrio) is just such a fusion. 9 But Leibniz was the last of the great Christian Platonists, and left the world just as Hume, Rousseau, and Kant were about to transform and “secularize” it.I. If one decomposes caritas sapientis into its parts, charity and wisdom, the provenance of both elements is clear enough... (shrink)

This erudite book is aimed more directly at specialists in theories of right and law, than at Leibniz scholars. Acknowledging a debt of inspiration to the remarkable historical work of André de Muralt, the author introduces in variable detail the legal philosophy of Suarez, Grotius, Pufendorf, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Kant, with substantial forays into Augustine, Aquinas, Scotus and Ockham. Leibniz fits into this study less as its raison d’être than as a piece in the puzzle, one local system of (...) thought amid the galaxy of the modern school of natural right. (shrink)

This erudite book is aimed more directly at specialists in theories of right and law, than at Leibniz scholars. Acknowledging a debt of inspiration to the remarkable historical work of André de Muralt, the author introduces in variable detail the legal philosophy of Suarez, Grotius, Pufendorf, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Kant, with substantial forays into Augustine, Aquinas, Scotus and Ockham. Leibniz fits into this study less as its raison d’être than as a piece in the puzzle, one local system of (...) thought amid the galaxy of the modern school of natural right. (shrink)

Leibniz’s role en current political and social thought is complex. On the one hand, he represents the last great synthesis built on the idea of the World as a creation of God and man as his cooperator in history. However his notion of contingency can help to explain some of the problems facing social sciences today in so far as he understandsthis concept not only from an ontological but also from an epistemological point of view. To this one should add (...) that criticisms of classical and modern philosophy such as those of Isaiah Berlin and Hannah Arendt leave intact the need of reason to organise society and we can see in Leibniz use of reason a forerunner of public choice postions. In sum, his vision of reason is very much alive though in new contexts. (shrink)