Russellianism and psychological generalizations

Noûs 34 (2):203-236 (2000)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

(1) Harry believes that Twain is a writer. (2) Harry believes that Clemens is a writer. I say that this is Russellianism's most notorious consequence because it is so often used to argue against the view: many philosophers think that it is obvious that (1) and (2) can differ in truth value, and so they conclude that Russellianism is false. Let's call this the Substitution Objection to Russellianism.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Parts of Propositions.Cody Gilmore - 2014 - In Shieva Kleinschmidt (ed.), Mereology and Location. Oxford University Press. pp. 156-208.
Russellianism and Explanation.David Braun - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s15):253-289.
Understanding belief reports.David Braun - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595.
Pure Russellianism.Sean Crawford - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (2):171-202.
Color constancy and Russellian representationalism.Brad Thompson - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):75-94.
Russellian Propositions and Properties.Jan Almäng - 2012 - Metaphysica 13 (1):7-25.
On the testability of psychological generalizations (psychological testability).David K. Henderson - 1991 - Philosophy of Science (December) 586 (December):586-606.
A problem for Russellian theories of belief.Gary Ostertag - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 146 (2):249 - 267.
Russellianism and prediction.David Braun - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (1):59 - 105.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
151 (#115,044)

6 months
9 (#144,029)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David Braun
University at Buffalo

Citations of this work

Perspectivism.Jeremy Goodman & Harvey Lederman - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):623-648.
Minimal Fregeanism.Aidan Gray - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):429-458.
Propositional attitude reports.Thomas McKay - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 21 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Frege’s Puzzle (2nd edition).Nathan U. Salmon - 1986 - Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company.
Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.

View all 48 references / Add more references