Graduate studies at Western
Noûs 34 (2):203-236 (2000)
|Abstract||(1) Harry believes that Twain is a writer. (2) Harry believes that Clemens is a writer. I say that this is Russellianism's most notorious consequence because it is so often used to argue against the view: many philosophers think that it is obvious that (1) and (2) can differ in truth value, and so they conclude that Russellianism is false. Let's call this the Substitution Objection to Russellianism.|
|Keywords||Belief Generalization Language Psychology Russell|
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