David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):35-53 (2009)
Many philosophers claim that intuitions are evidential. Yet it is hard to see how introspecting one's mental states could provide evidence for such synthetic truths as those concerning, for example, the abstract and the counterfactual. Such considerations have sometimes been taken to lead to mentalism---the view that philosophy must concern itself only with matters of concept application or other mind-dependent topics suited to a contemplative approach---but this provides us with a poor account of what it is that philosophers take themselves to be doing, for many of them are concerned with the extra-mental facts about the universe. Evidentialism therefore gestates a disaster for philosophy, for it ultimately demands an epistemology for the investigation into such matter as the abstract and the modal that simply will not be forthcoming. We make a different suggestion: That intuitions are inclinations to believe. Hence, according to us, a philosophical argument does well, as a socio-rhetorical matter of fact, when it is founded on premises philosophers are generally inclined to believe, whether or not those inclinations to believe connect appropriately to the extra-mental facts. Accordingly, the role of intuitions (inclinations to believe) in philosophical methodology is non-evidential, and the question of how they could be used as evidence falls away.
|Keywords||intuition evidence a priori inclinations dispositions methodology dispositional mentalism|
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Citations of this work BETA
Jennifer Nado (2016). The Intuition Deniers. Philosophical Studies 173 (3):781-800.
Bernard Molyneux (2014). New Arguments That Philosophers Don't Treat Intuitions as Evidence. Metaphilosophy 45 (3):441-461.
Annelies Monseré (2015). The Role of Intuitions in the Philosophy of Art. Inquiry 58 (7-8):806-827.
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